TB7-22418

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-22418 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (A.K.A. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 9, 2018 Date de la décision Panel G. Erauw Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Ali Yusuf Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "Appellant") is a citizen of Iraq and is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant argues that he was denied a fair hearing because of interpretation issues, the RPD erred in its credibility assessment, and that it erred in its consideration of the documentary evidence. After careful review of the evidence in the record, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) finds that the Appellant was not denied a fair hearing, and he is not credible regarding the central allegations in his claim. Therefore, the Appellant is not a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. [2] For the reasons provided below, the appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that his sister was married to a man named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, who is also the brother of the Appellant's wife. After XXXX cheated on the Appellant's sister, they got a divorce. However, the Appellant alleges that as a result of the divorce, XXXX insisted that the Appellant also divorce his wife for cultural reasons. The Appellant and his wife refused to divorce, and community negotiation did not resolve the conflict. Eventually, XXXX threatened to kill the Appellant if he did not do so. The Appellant claims that XXXX is a member of the Brigade led by XXXX XXXX, who is a XXXX XXXX XXXX Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) member, so when he made a complaint to the police he was told there was little they could do. As a result, the Appellant and his wife moved out of their home and his wife and children went into hiding at a friend's home. Having already possessed a United States of America (U.S.) visa, the Appellant arranged to go to a conference in the U.S. When he arrived in the U.S. he travelled to Canada where he made an inland refugee claim. Further details are provided in his Basis of Claim (BOC) form, and his testimony at the RPD hearing.1 The RPD's Decision [4] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on March 13, 2017. In a written decision issued on May 19, 2017, the RPD rejected the claim. The RPD panel found he had not provided sufficient reliable and credible evidence to establish the basis of his claim on a balance of probabilities. Therefore, the RPD concluded that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground, or that he would not personally be subjected to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or a danger of torture upon return to Iraq. ROLE OF THE RAD [5] For questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law, the RAD applies the standard of correctness in accordance with the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Huruglica.2 In assessing findings involving the credibility of oral testimony, the RAD may apply the modified standard of reasonableness in situations where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage. Unless otherwise stated in the reasons, the RAD uses the correctness standard on all findings and will consider the overall refugee determination on a standard of correctness, even where the RAD has deferred on some or all findings. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED ON APPEAL [6] Evidence from the person who is the subject of the appeal is only admissible on appeal if it meets one of the statutory conditions set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, namely that it arose after, or was not reasonably available, or the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the time the claim was rejected. If one of these conditions is met, the RAD will then consider if the evidence is credible, relevant, and new as endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh.3 [7] It is unclear based on the Appellant's memorandum, or upon review of the appeal record, what documents the Appellant is submitting as new evidence. The Appellant's memorandum only provides submissions on the admissibility of the interpreter's audit and an affidavit from counsel's legal assistant, XXXX XXXX. [8] The affidavit from the legal assistant refers to several additional documents, including news articles, letters from the Appellant's family members, and copies of the Appellant's complaint to the police and the "arrest warrant" from a judge in XXXX. Although the Appellant's memorandum refers to the legal assistant conducting a Google search about cultural practice of "bride exchange", no such evidence is provided in the affidavit to that effect, nor is there any information explaining how and why the documents listed in the legal assistant's affidavit are being submitted to the RAD as new evidence. Oddly, there is no affidavit from the Appellant himself explaining how and why the documents listed in the legal assistant's affidavit are being submitted to the RAD as new evidence. Such information is necessary in order to assess how these documents meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) and Singh. In this respect, I note that it is incumbent upon the Appellant to comply with Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) of the RAD Rules and make full and detailed submissions regarding the means by which any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to him. The Federal Court has held that it is reasonable for the RAD to refuse to admit evidence that does not comply with Rule 3(3)(g)(iii), as it is not able to determine whether the requirements of subsection 110(4) are met without further information regarding dates on which the evidence became available to the Appellant, how it came to his attention, or why it was not available until after the rejection of his claim.4 The Appellant is required to give submissions about how each document mentioned in the affidavit of XXXX XXXX5 meets the requirements of 110(4). Affidavit of XXXX XXXX and its Listed Documents [9] With the exception of the audit by the interpreter, I find that the documents listed in the affidavit of XXXX XXXX are inadmissible as new evidence, as I have no information about how they meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) and Singh. I also note that three of the documents already exist in the RPD record, including the Appellant's police complaint submitted to the judge in XXXX, the acknowledgement of the Appellant's complaint by the judge, and the alleged arrest warrant. These are not "new" since they are already in the RPD record. [10] Furthermore, considering the RPD specifically asked for the Appellant to corroborate his claim with objective evidence about the cultural practices surrounding divorce referenced in his BOC, he has not established that he could not have provided the documents about "bride exchange" at the time the RPD rejected his claim. Although one of the articles post-dates the RPD's decision, I do not have the article in the original Kurdish about "bride exchange", only a translated version. Moreover, I note that nowhere in his BOC or testimony does the Appellant refer to his situation as one of the cultural practice of "bride exchange". He does not explain why he is now casting his allegations in this manner on appeal. Rather it appears that he is simply trying to bolster his appeal by providing such evidence at this time. In regards to the document from his family that post-dates the RPD's decision, the date on the document is not what is important, but the content and whether it could have been provided at the time of the RPD rejecting his claim. The Appellant's failure to explain how these letters meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) means he has not established that this information could not have been provided at the time of rejection. For the above reasons, I find that the Appellant has not established that the documents listed in the affidavit of XXXX XXXX, other than the interpreter's audit, meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and Singh. Therefore, they are inadmissible as new evidence. The Interpreter's Audit [11] The Appellant submits that the audit of the interpretation was not reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection because he could not have foreseen the difficulties he would face at the hearing and that the extent of the problem did not become clear until after he received the RPD's decision and was able to review it with the transcript. The audit was necessarily created after the hearing to address the adequacy of the interpretation provided. He submits that the audit shows that the procedural filing of the police complaint and obtaining court documents was unclear and inadequate, which played a substantial role in the RPD finding him not credible. [12] Although the Appellant must raise issues with the interpretation at the earliest opportunities, it is acknowledged on the record, and in the RPD's reasons, that there was some confusion about some of the words used by the interpreter when the RPD questioned the Appellant about his police report and the judge's order. As such, I find the criteria under subsection 110(4) is satisfied. With respect to the Singh criteria, I note that the audit is relevant with respect to credibility findings made by the RPD, the audit is credible for the purposes of admissibility as the audit was conducted by a Board certified interpreter, and the report is "new" insofar as no similar evidence appears in the record. Therefore, I find that the interpreter's audit is admissible as new evidence. Request for an Oral Hearing [13] The RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.6 [14] The Appellant makes no submissions on why the RAD should hold an oral hearing in this case. That said, I find that holding an oral hearing in this appeal is not warranted based on this new evidence. I am able to assess the interpreter's audit in conjunction with the transcript and other evidence in the record to see if he was denied adequate interpretation. Holding a hearing and questioning the Appellant would provide no assistance in this regard. Therefore, the audit does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and, if accepted, would not justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. As a result, the RAD decides not to hold a hearing in this case. ISSUES IN APPEAL [15] The Appellant argues the following issues in his appeal, which I have rephrased for ease of reference: a. The Appellant was denied procedural fairness due to inadequate interpretation at his hearing;7 b. The RPD erred in its assessment of the objective documentary evidence relevant to his allegations;8 c. The RPD was trivial and microscopic in its credibility assessment.9 ANALYSIS The RAD finds the interpretation at the RPD was adequate The Appellant's Argument [16] The Appellant submits that the interpreter was not sufficiently continuous, contemporaneous, precise, nor competent, which resulted in a violation of the Appellant's right to procedural fairness and natural justice. He argues that the audit shows that there were significant interpretation issues throughout the hearing, which caused confusion. In particular, the Appellant notes the issues while discussing his testimony about the police complaint. [17] He states that the errors are not trivial, but taint the RPD's findings on key points. Specifically, he refers to his attempts to explain to the RPD that the stamp on the police complaint was not store bought, stating "after the police office finished writing my complaint, he told me to go out and put a stamp on it". He submits that the interpreter translated his words as "when he wrote the complaint, when he wrote, he give, me, I bought the stamp." [18] The Appellant also argues that the RPD's findings at paragraph 27-30 about the reliability of his documents takes on added significance. As he indicated that he did not understand the questions with regards to the documents, but that the interpreter did not understand the questions about the documents and failed to accurately translate the Appellant's desire to fully address the RPD's questions during the hearing. This led to the RPD making a negative finding of credibility against him. He states that the audit shows that he made attempts to clarify the confusion about the divorce documents by stating "Excuse me, can I clarify something here?" Yet, this was not interpreted at all. This interpretation problem continued throughout the hearing when discussing how he obtained the document, resulting in the RPD's finding in paragraphs 31-33. The sheer number of inaccuracies in the interpretation should be enough to set aside the RPD decision. The RAD's Assessment [19] Section 19 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules provides that a refugee claimant may request the Division to provide an interpreter for a language or dialect specified by the claimant. The right to an interpreter in a proceeding in another language is enshrined in Section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), and this right has been held to be generally applicable to a proceeding before the RPD.10 [20] Interpretation should be continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous. Although the standard of interpretation is high, it need not be so high as to be perfect. If a breach of this standard is shown, it is not necessary to show actual prejudice.11 What is important is whether the Appellant understood the interpretation and was able to adequately express himself through the interpreter.12 To put it another way, persons who do not speak and understand one of the official languages must be able to tell their story, and the interpretation must be of such quality that they are not impeached in their ability to make their case.13 [21] Complaints about the quality of interpretation must be raised at the earliest opportunity;14 failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to object to the interpretation on judicial review,15 and by analogy also on appeal to the RAD. Here, the Appellant does not speak English well, while his counsel before the RPD apparently did not speak Kurdish, and therefore, neither could reasonably be expected to have been aware of the interpretation issues, until subsequent to the rejection of his refugee claim. Therefore, the RAD finds the Appellant has not waived his right to object to the interpretation on appeal. Was the Appellant able to adequately express himself and tell his story to the RPD? [22] In reviewing the Appellant's submissions on the interpretation issue, I note that they are brief and general in nature. The Appellant simply provides two examples of issues with interpretation, then insists that there are many errors in interpretation that tainted his credibility and resulted in negative credibility findings in paragraph 27-33. However, he has not indicated where and how the RPD's specific credibility findings are based on facts that arose due to the interpretation issues. He has also not demonstrated that the errors are not trivial. The Appellant effectively raises an issue and expects the RAD to find evidence to support his argument. The RAD has no obligation to look for such evidence for them,16 since it is the Appellant's obligation to provide full and detailed submissions to show how and where the RPD erred.17 [23] Based on my review of the audit and the transcript about the stamp, it is clear that while there was some poor translation initially, when the interpreter stated "when he wrote the complaint, when he wrote, he give, me, I bought the stamp," it was subsequently clarified. The Appellant testified, and the RPD confirmed that he bought the stamp outside the police station and brought into the police station, and that the police officer told him to put a stamp on it, as it is the law and then he handed it in.18 I do not see how the above quoted misstatement impacted his ability to tell his story. For that matter, I note that where, when and how he bought the stamp does not factor significantly into the RPD's analysis that the document is not reliable because of the many anomalies on the face of the document. I find the interpretation error identified by the Appellant is trivial and did not prevent him from telling his story. [24] In regard to the Appellant's argument that the interpreter never translated "Excuse me, can I clarify something here?", I note that immediately thereafter the Appellant repeated his request to explain and this was not missed or misinterpreted and the Appellant had an opportunity to explain and clarify for the RPD.19 I also note that the Appellant's testimony about how he was able to obtain the documents was not negatively impacted, as this was further clarified later in the hearing upon questioning by counsel without issue. The Appellant testified that he received them from the friend of a friend by email. Even on the rare occasion that the interpreter did not interpret because the Appellant understands some English and responded to the question before the interpreter could interpret.20 In my view, the Appellant was able to explain his documents to the RPD,21 and he has not demonstrated that the errors in the interpretation were not trivial and that he was unable to tell his story to the RPD. [25] Having reviewed the audit and the whole record, nothing significant turns on the issues identified. Those that were identified were clarified during the hearing and without interpretation issue. Therefore, the Appellant's argument that he had inadequate interpretation is rejected. The RAD finds the RPD did not ignore key documentary evidence relevant to the allegations The Appellant's Argument [26] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider the remaining evidence before it that is the most relevant to him regarding honour crimes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This evidence he submits could have refuted the conclusions of the RPD. The Appellant states that the RPD relied on documentary evidence that focussed on females as being the primary target of honour crimes, but ignored evidence that shows men are also victims of honour killings. [27] He also submits that the RPD ignored his testimony about the powerful position of XXXX and the National Documentation Package (NDP) evidence that honour killings are tolerated and protection victims and potential victims are dependent on the position of the aggressor in society. He also argues that the RPD made contradictory statements based on the evidence about males not being subject to honour killings, when evidence from the NDP states that males can be victims of honour crimes, and that honour crimes "occur for a variety of reasons". By failing to consider his testimony and BOC narrative, the RPD focussed on women being the primary targets of honour crimes. Therefore, he submits that the RPD failed to reasonably consider key evidence in determining that the Appellant is not credible. The RAD's Assessment [28] I reject the Appellant's argument and find the RPD did not err. The RPD did not state that only women could be victims of "honour crimes". However, it found that in reviewing the objective documentary evidence before it about the specific examples of honour-based crimes and customs underlying marriage and divorce, as well as considering the circumstances in Iraq in general and the KRI, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there was no independent corroboration for the cultural expectation and issues of "honour" alleged by the Appellant. Furthermore, the RPD specifically requested the Appellant to provide independent evidence of the cultural practices he alleged, but he failed to do so, despite testifying that there were examples on the internet of similarly-situated persons. In my view, given the lack of corroboration from the Appellant it was correct for the RPD to find that the Appellant failed to establish the foundation for his claim and the cultural practices in the KRI. One would expect that if the cultural practice and expectation was as described by him, it would be mentioned in the documentary evidence. [29] While the Appellant points to a passage cited by the RPD to show that men can be victims of honour crimes, in the absence of corroborative evidence regarding the Appellant's allegations, I am not prepared to accept that this general statement establishes his allegations. Having reviewed the documentary evidence where it mentions men can be victims of honour crimes, I do not find this to be persuasive evidence of the risk to the Appellant in his alleged circumstances. There are no examples of such honour-based crimes of the nature described by the Appellant in the objective evidence. Rather, the prevalent objective evidence about women and divorce in KRI demonstrates that a divorce to the Appellant's wife would have the opposite effect, by bringing stigma and shame onto her family as a divorced woman, not restore the family's honour. The Appellant's allegations are illogical based on the documentary evidence before me. [30] I agree that the NDP states that "[t]here might be cases where men are at risk of honour crimes for committing certain acts which have brought shame on their family,"22 but the Appellant has not committed an act that has brought shame on his family. In his circumstances, he alleges that when a man rejects his wife, there is a cultural expectation that the brother-in-law should also reject his wife, when the wife is the sister of the man who initiated the problem. Furthermore, I note that with respect to bringing shame and dishonor, the Appellant has not demonstrated that his community views his alleged situation to be one of restoring honour, as the cleric who attended the mediation with XXXX family believed that the Appellant and his wife did not need to get a divorce. Also, I observe that in regard to the circumstances where men can be a victim of honour-based crimes, this includes gay or effeminate men, and men engaged in illicit sexual relationships.23 These are not profiles that the Appellant shares, and he presents no evidence about males being victims of honour-based crimes of the nature described in his allegations. If the Appellant's allegations are true, one would expect the documentary evidence to mention the risk to him for refusing the cultural expectation to divorce his wife. Given the documentary evidence fails to mention what one would normally expect it to mention, the presumption that a claimant's sworn testimony is true is rebutted.24 [31] In regard to the Appellant's argument that he testified that XXXX is powerful, I find this is not evidence that his allegations are credible about the cultural expectation that he divorce his wife (XXXX sister), which is the core of his claim. On the contrary, I note that other than the Appellant's bald assertion that XXXX is powerful and a member of the XXXX, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to establish on a balance of probabilities that XXXX is such a powerful individual with the connections and capacities alleged. [32] For the above reasons, I find the Appellant has failed to establish the foundation for his claim and that his failure to establish the cultural practices as alleged demonstrates a lack of credibility. The RAD finds the RPD was not trivial and microscopic in its examination of the evidence The Appellant's Argument [33] The Appellant argues that the RPD was microscopic in its examination of the evidence and found trivial inconsistencies. In particular, the RPD was microscopic in regard to his details about his filing of the police report and the events that took place. He also submits that the interpreter failed to adequately translate the questions which led to confusion. The Appellant claims that the RPD focussed on his inability to accurately understand and answer the questions in order to impugn his credibility. [34] In addition the RPD erred by assuming his documents were unreliable without a clear inference as to how it reached that conclusion, as the member assumed that the police complaint and judge's order should require some form of "stamp or printed portion", but it did not have a police complaint form and the judge's order from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to compare it with. The Appellant argues the adverse credibility findings are of a minor or peripheral nature and that he provided plausible explanations for the issues with his documents. The RAD's Assessment [35] I reject the Appellant's argument and find the RPD did not err. First, as indicated above, I find that the Appellant has not established that the interpretation at the RPD affected his ability to tell his story. [36] Second, I have reviewed the Appellant's documentary evidence and agree with the RPD's assessment that his documents are not reliable, based on their appearance and the Appellant's testimony about how he received them. With respect to the police complaint, summary and judicial document, the RPD reasoned based on the objective documentary evidence that it was unlikely that these documents would not be on any official letter head, have ink stamps or printed material. Instead, they are all handwritten on blank pages and follow no standard form. The RPD noted that with respect to other judicial documents referred to in the NDP there is evidence that police and judicial systems use printed forms, or at a minimum have a standard form. The RPD notes the example of a notice to appear in the NDP showing that a logo is on such forms. [37] I do not find the RPD erred in this respect, as the Appellant's own supporting documentation provided from the KRG, such as marriage documents, also use a standard form and letterhead. They also contain identification numbers and reference numbers for proper filing and tracking with the relevant government office, something the Appellant's police and judicial documents do not have. I find that the lack of letterhead, logo, seal, contact information for the offices, undermine the reliability of the documents from the police and judiciary. The documents look like they could have been written by anyone and anywhere. Further adding to the reliability concerns is that the Appellant testified that he received these documents in an email, however, the email provided simply lists attachments and has no discussion about the documents or the original request. There is no way to confirm that the documents attached are from the friend of a friend who works at the XXXX. The Appellant provides no supporting document from the friend to attest to his XXXX in the XXXX and how he obtained them. As such, the provenance of the documents cannot be confirmed. Due to these credibility concerns with the Appellant's police and judicial documents, I give them very little weight to establishing his allegations. [38] Finally, I note that the Appellant does not specifically contest two of the RPD's credibility findings. In particular, he does not take issue with the RPD's finding that he made a significant omission in his BOC with respect to the threats made against him since leaving the KRI, and he does not dispute the RPD's finding regarding his failure to claim in the U.S. Considering the Appellant does not contest these findings, I see no reason to interfere with them. They are correct and based on the evidence in the record. The Appellant testified that he was threatened a few times since his departure from KRI, one of these times was before he completed his BOC, but this is excluded from his BOC. His explanation that he informed his lawyer is also accepted by the RAD, as he signed his BOC stating that it was complete, true and accurate, and he declared that it was fully interpreted to him. He was also represented by experienced counsel and he makes no complaint against his former counsel for omitting the information. I also draw a negative credibility inference with respect to the Appellant's allegations for this BOC omission. [39] In regards to his failure to claim in the U.S., the RPD's finding is correct and based on the evidence. The Appellant's statement that he did not even investigate his options for claiming asylum in the U.S., even though he is an educated person with a university degree and extensive travel history, was not consistent with a person seeking protection from persecution, but of a person exploring general migration options. I agree with the RPD that it makes no sense that the Appellant would base his decision to leave the U.S., where he had a valid visa, and instead travel to Canada where he did not have authorization to enter and make a claim, because someone told him before his fear materialized that he would not be allowed to stay and make a claim in the U.S. His decision to make a claim in Canada, where he did not have authorization to enter before he left Iraq and before he investigated his options, undermines his credibility. [40] Having considered the totality of the record, including the audio recording of the hearing, I find the Appellant is not credible and has not established with sufficient and credible evidence his allegations on a balance of probabilities. The above credibility concerns with the Appellant's allegations are sufficient to dispose of this appeal, so I need not assess the RPD's finding that he was vague and evasive about his police complaint documents and judge's order. Therefore, I find the Appellant is not a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [41] After conducting its own analysis of the entire record, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in its credibility findings or its assessment of the documentary evidence. Nor was the Appellant denied procedural fairness due to interpretation issues. Therefore, the RPD's final determination that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection is correct. As a result, this appeal must be dismissed. DETERMINATION [42] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). (signed) "G. Erauw" G. Erauw October 10, 2018 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Appellant's BOC, at pp. 25-38; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 3 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 4 Ilias v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 661. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 134-135. 6 Section 110(6), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at pp. 297-299, at paras. 51-55. 8 Ibid, at pp. 303-307, at paras. 70-78. 9 Ibid, at pp. 300-303, at paras. 59-69. 10 Mohammadian, Soliman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6500-98), Pelletier, March 10, 2000. Reported: Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 371 (T.D.); (2000), 4 Imm. L.R. (3d) 131 (F.C.T.D.). Reported: Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 4 F.C. 85 (C.A.). [Mohammadian] 11 Sohal, Manwinder Singh v. M.P.S.E.P. (F.C., no. IMM-1078-11), Harrington, October 18, 2011, 2011 FC 1175, para. 18, citing R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 SCR 951. 12 Lawal, Kayode Fasasi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3534-07), de Montigny, July 10, 2008, 2008 FC 861, at para. 26. 13 Dhaliwal, Hardial Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-978-11), de Montigny, September 26, 2011, 2011 FC 1097, at para. 18. 14 Mohammadian, supra, footnote 10, at para. 27. 15 Bal, Tarlok Singh v. M.C.I (F.C., no. IMM-1472-08), de Montigny, October 17, 2008, 2008 FC 1178, at para. 31. 16 Huang v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2460-17), Phelan, December 1, 2017, 2017 FC 1090, at para. 7. 17 Rule 3(3)(g)(i)-(ii), Refugee Appeal Division Rules. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Interpreter's Audit, at pp. 203-206. 19 Ibid, at p. 219. 20 Ibid, at pp. 246, 259-260. 21 Ibid, Interpreter's Audit, at pp. 197-215. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Iraq, 28 February 2017, at item 1.14 at p. 32. 23 Ibid, at item 1.7 at p. 42. See also at p. 158, footnote 912. 24 Adu v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 114 (FCA) at para. 1. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-22418