VB5-01844

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB5-01844 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal (Also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Appeal considered at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit à Date of decision December 2, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) Bashir Khan Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), is a citizen of Honduras. He appeals the June 8, 2015 determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD"). The claim was heard by the RPD on June 8, 2015 with a Notice of Decision being sent to the appellant on June 18, 2015. The RPD found that the appellant is neither a Convention1 refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act" or "IRPA").2 DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that the appellant is not a Convention refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the Act. This appeal is therefore dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The appellant was self-represented before the RPD. The appellant is represented by counsel before the RAD. The Minister has not intervened before the RPD hearing or the RAD. [4] A transcript of the RPD proceedings has not been included in the Appellant's Record.3 [5] The appellant does seek to present "new" evidence4 to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act. BASIS OF CLAIM [6] According to the allegations set out in the appellant's Basis of Claim Form,5 the appellant's brother was threatened by individuals in their hometown of Danli, Honduras. These individuals came to know that the brother was leaving the country and the appellant fears that even though he did not live in Honduras at the time, he will also be threatened by the same individuals. The appellant alleges that the rest of his family is at risk as well. [7] The appellant left Honduras on December 3, 2012. [8] The RPD's Reasons stated that the appellant's claim for refugee protection was rejected based on credibility and the availability of an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA). GROUNDS OF APPEAL [9] The appellant's submissions as to the grounds of this appeal can be summarized as follows.6 * Did the RPD Member fail to consider the two part test in her IFA analysis? CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE [10] Subsection 110(4) of the Act provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [11] The appellant has submitted the following documents as new evidence7 at the time the appeal was perfected pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act: 1. Letter from lawyer: Ruben I. Rodriguez Betancourth dated July 4, 2015. 2. Letter from brother, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated July 4, 2015 3. Letter from Police Officer, Mercy Lili Avila Rodriguez, dated July 4, 2015 4. Letter from brother, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated July 8, 2015 5. Letter from sister, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated July 7, 2015 6. Letter from Director of Cultural Centre July 6, 2015 7. Letter from Melanie Hellyer from Prairie Mountain Health dated July 3, 2015 [12] The appellant submits8 that this new evidence only came to his attention after his RPD hearing. He further states in his affidavit that "after my refugee hearing my family in Honduras decided to let me know about the reality of their situation there, this information they had chosen to keep from me in order to better protect me from anxiety and stress is now affecting me very badly. I am suffering from symptoms of depression. I was very nervous at the refugee hearing as I did not sleep the night before the hearing because I had never been to court before in my life."9 [13] I have reviewed all the family letters, documents 2, 4, and 5. These are letters from the appellant's brothers and sister. I note that all these documents are dated post-RPD hearing and determination date. However, the only explanation provided by the appellant is that his family did not tell him of their situation to avoid causing stress to the appellant. However, I also note that the appellant did state in his BOC and at the RPD hearing that his family is receiving threats. I do not find the appellant has provided a persuasive argument that the RPD member ignored this information. Rather, the RPD member has acknowledged this information in her reasons and at the RPD hearing. I also find that these letters do not provide any new information that was not present before the RPD member. Furthermore, I find that the risk associated to the family is not relevant in the final determination made by the RPD member on Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) and to the arguments made on this issue by the appellant for this RAD appeal. Therefore, I decline to admit documents 2, 4, and 5 as new evidence for this RAD appeal as per subsection 110(4) of IRPA. [14] In reference to document 3, the police report from Honduras, I note that the issue surrounding the July 2014 incident was central to his refugee protection claim. I note that the appellant has not provided any explanation as to why this letter was not submitted to the RPD as corroborative evidence. Clearly this was all relevant to the appellant's refugee claim and was related to events that happened prior to the appellant making a refugee claim in Canada. The appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation for why such evidence was not presented to the RPD member during the hearing of his claim. As such, this evidence does not represent new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the Act. I decline to admit document 3 as new evidence for this RAD appeal. [15] Document 1 is a letter from a lawyer in Honduras who states that protection is not forthcoming for the appellant in Honduras. The lawyer has expressed his opinion as to why he believes the appellant is not safe in Honduras. I do not find this is relevant or new information to the appeal before the RAD as the appeal is dealing with an IFA determination. Furthermore, as stated above, the appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to how this letter constitutes 'new evidence' and why this information was not put before the RPD at the time of his refugee hearing. I decline to admit document 1 as new evidence for this RAD appeal. [16] Documents 6 and 7 pertain to the appellant's emotional well-being. The appellant stresses that he was nervous at the hearing and that he is suffering from depression. However, this was never presented to the RPD member either before, during, or after the hearing. In reviewing the oral hearing transcript, I find the RPD Member was diligent in ensuring that the appellant was aware of all disclosure that was to be looked at during the course of the hearing. The BOC form states that the appellant is responsible for adding all that is relevant to his case at the time the claim is made and up to the hearing date. I note that the appellant completed his own forms and has the ability to speak and listen in English proficiently. At no point in the hearing does it appear that the appellant was not able to understand the proceedings. Furthermore, I note that the RPD Member asked10 the appellant, at the end of her questioning, whether he had anything to say specifically about the issues covered in the RPD hearing. Therefore, I find that this clearly shows that the RPD member was diligent in understanding the appellant was unrepresented and gave him an opportunity to say what he needed to in support of his refugee claim. I find the appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to why this information was not available for the RPD and thus, decline to admit this as 'new evidence' for his RAD appeal as per subsection 110(4) of IRPA. Application for an Oral Hearing [17] The appellant has requested an oral hearing on the basis that the new evidence submitted justified holding such a hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the Act. [18] Subsection 110(3) of the Act requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD Record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the appellant. [19] According to subsection 110(6), the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, that is central to the RPD decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [20] When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new evidence,11 in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, is central to the RPD decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [21] However, none of the documents submitted as 'new evidence' have been accepted for this RAD appeal. Thus, the application for an oral hearing is denied. REMEDY SOUGHT [22] The appellant has requested12 that the RAD, under subsection 111(1)(b) of the Act, set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that the appellant is a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. In the alternative, the appellant has requested13 that the RAD, under subsection 111(1)(c) of the Act, allow the appeal and refer the matter to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted Panel. ROLE OF THE RAD [23] Although the Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [24] RAD, being a new Division, has struggled with the standard of review to be used in RAD appeals based on several Federal Court (the "Court") cases that have differed in their approach of what standard should be used. Initially, RAD followed the Supreme Court of Canada (the "Supreme Court") case Dunsmuir14 as the leading case on standard of review. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court has said that there should be only two standards when reviewing decisions of administrative tribunals: reasonableness and correctness. The standard of correctness applies to questions of law, while the standard of reasonableness applies to questions of fact, and mixed fact and law. [25] In recent months, the Court has issued differing decisions on the role of RAD when conducting an appeal of a RPD determination. These decisions include the Court cases Iyamuremye,15 Eng,16 Alvarez,17 Huruglica,18 Njeukam,19 Yetna,20 Wahgmo,21 and Alyafi22 among others. [26] The Court in Iyamuremye addressed the question of the proper standard of review to be applied by the RAD in reviewing RPD findings and confirmed that the appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and mixed fact and law is reasonableness, and the appropriate standard of review for questions of law is correctness: That said, the Court finds that in assessing the reasonableness of the decision, the RAD should, at the very least, have reviewed the evidence that was presented before the RPD and conducted an independent assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD, on the basis of the facts and the conditions of the country in question, had properly considered the evidence and reasonably justified its conclusion. 23 [27] In Alvarez, Justice Shore said that, "the Court is of the view that the RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts."24 Furthermore, Justice Shore stated that, [w]hen analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error."25 Justice Shore also said in Alvarez that, . . . the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error.26 [28] In Huruglica, Justice Phelan found that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. "It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection."27 Justice Phelan also states that, "that notion may well justify deference to a RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness' credibility is critical or determinative. Where there is no adverse finding of credibility, the policy rationale for deference is not sustainable." 28 [29] Justice Phelan also found that the RAD's role should be to determine whether the RPD decision is wrong rather than look at whether it was a reasonable decision. Justice Phelan emphasized that the RAD's mandate is to conduct a fact based review. The RAD, Justice Phelan said "must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment. . . . Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision." Furthermore: In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error."29 [30] The appellant has not provided any submissions regarding the standard of review to be used for this RAD appeal. [31] The Huruglica decision is the most thorough of all the cases and the first one where the Federal Court has certified a question for the Federal Court of Appeal (the "FCA"). Again, I refer to paragraphs 54 and 55 of Huruglica which read as follows: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.30 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error."31 [32] Following the Huruglica decision, many other Court cases relating to RAD have followed the Huruglica approach in what the role of the RAD should be in assessing an appeal. There is another line of authority that suggests that the standard that RAD should apply is that of "palpable and overriding error."32 In Alyafi,33 Djoussou,34 and Siliya,35 the Court notes that there are two competing approaches in the Court jurisprudence and that the RAD Member is free to decide which approach to follow. [33] In Kanga, the Court held: Furthermore, even where there is divided Federal Court authority on a point of law, I do not agree that the Board is required to explain why it has adopted one view over the other. Presumably, Federal Court jurisprudence speaks for itself and the Board has no obligation to offer any additional interpretation of the legal authorities that it chooses to rely upon in resolving a point of law.36 [34] In this appeal, and taking into consideration the Court decisions regarding the role of the RAD, I will be applying the points set out in Huruglica. In this appeal, I have reviewed all aspects of the RPD's decision and have conducted my own independent assessment of all the evidence to determine whether the appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, while giving a certain deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellant's credibility and any other issues where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. As well, it is clear from the many recent Court cases that have been previously mentioned, all agree that the standard of correctness should be used for any error of law found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [35] Counsel for the appeal has addressed persecution as the basis for the appellant's risk of returning to his home country, Honduras. This claim is not one that falls under section 96 of IRPA where persecution and well-founded fear could be potential issues, and this is clearly addressed at the RPD hearing and in the RPD member's reasons. Furthermore, it is clear from the CD of the oral hearing and the RPD member's decision that the appellant's claim was recognized as a section 97 claim. [36] The RPD member finds:37 I do not find any nexus between the risks that you have identified and your race, your religion, your nationality, political opinion as defined in the refugee Convention. You confirmed in your testimony that the threats that initially targeted your brother, Fredor, also do not stem from any of the Convention grounds and, therefore, I also find that you do not have a nexus to the Convention ground of particular social group of family. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that what you fear is a criminal threat and you have confirmed that today in your testimony. Owing to the fact that what you fear is a criminal threat, this assessment of your risks is eligible only to be conducted with respect to subsection 97(1) of the Act and that section employs a test of balance of probabilities in assessing forward looking and personalized risk to life, risk of torture by or with the consent of the state or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [37] The appellant has not provided any argument that refutes this determination made by the RPD member. Clearly, the issue of persecution was not put before the RPD Member and thus I will not pursue this issue for this RAD appeal. The appellant is required to advance errors made by the RPD Member in his memorandum and not introduce new issues that were not addressed at the RPD hearing. Taking into account the results of the RPD hearing and the appellant's lack of explanation on how his claim falls under the grounds of persecution as per s. 96 of IRPA, I will be focusing on my analysis by examining the RPD Member's reasons on IFA as it relates to section 97 of IRPA. [38] I will assess this appeal by analyzing the RPD Member's reasoning on whether she applied the proper test as it relates to IFA. The RPD Member did inform the appellant at the beginning of the RPD hearing that IFA is an issue in his refugee protection hearing.38 [39] The key concepts concerning IFA come from two cases: Rasaratnam39 and Thirunavukkarasu.40 The Panel must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that (1) there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted or, on the balance of probabilities, subjected to a risk to life or to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture in the IFA41 and, (2) that conditions in that part of the country are such that it would be reasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there.42 [40] The FCA has stated that one must first determine whether an IFA exists and then determine whether the IFA is a realistic, achievable option, given the particular circumstances of the individual.43 In Rasaratnam,44 the FCA held that, with respect to the burden of proof, once the issue was raised, the onus is on the claimant to show that he or she does not have an IFA. Furthermore, both prongs must be satisfied for a finding that the appellant has an IFA. [41] I have reviewed the evidence in its entirety, including listening to the compact disc recording of the RPD oral hearing.45 I find the main issue is whether the men feared by the appellant have the motivation and connections to find the appellant in the proposed IFA locations. [42] The appellant submits46 "in light of the new evidence as it stands, the Board Member's finding of the existence of IFA for the appellant in Honduras is clearly wrong." The appellant further submits that "the question that arises is whether the appellant would face any persecution in Honduras? It is the appellant's contention that the nature of the persistent harassment, threats, and living in a constant state of fear that the appellant's family has suffered constitutes as persecution."47 I believe the appellant's Counsel is referring to the alleged risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment as referred to in section 97 of IRPA and I will assess the IFA on this test only. [43] In reference to the first prong, the RPD Member found that the men feared by the appellant did not have the motivation to find the appellant in the proposed IFA locations. The RPD Member also found that the appellant failed to establish that the men would look for him in the proposed IFA location. The RPD member made a finding that the threat feared by the appellant is localized. The RPD member based this determination on facts presented to her which include the fact that none of the other family members have been pursued in Danli. The RPD member finds: In regards to the safety of the two Internal Flight Alternatives, the World Fact Book at National Documentation Package (NDP) 1.3 of Exhibit 448 indicates that the population of Honduras is 8.5 million people. You testified that Danli is a small city of approximately 44,000 people and it is located approximately two hours by car southeast of Tegucigalpa. As previously noted, the panel has considered that no action has been taken against any member of your family who continues to live in Danli including your mother, step-father, two sisters and a brother despite the preponderance of your evidence being that everyone in the family has been threatened. You testified that the threats were issued directly to your brother, that "he is the one dealing with them." He now works in agriculture and construction in different locations outside Danli in rural areas of the same department, El Paraiso. He continues to fear for his safety if he returns to Danli. You testified that he has had no contact with the gangs outside Danli and that you believe the gang is waiting for him to come back. Another brother, Emerson, lives in Valle Department where he has a job as an administrator in a hospital. You testified he has not lived in Danli for years and is not well known there. He has received no threats from the gang members and the panel notes his letter in support of your claim evinces no concern for his own personal safety. [44] The RPD member asked the appellant "Since these threats started in July 2014, have there been more or continuing threats?"49 The appellant testified "the threats are directly to my brother."50 The RPD member noted that there is no credible evidence that anyone in the appellant's family, who are living in Danli, have been threatened. The RPD member also finds that the appellant's brother, who was threatened by the men, lives in rural areas in Honduras and there is no credible evidence that he has had any contact with the agents of harm outside Danli. Another brother lives in Valle Department and there is no credible evidence that anyone has threatened him. These findings are made all based on facts presented by the appellant at his hearing. This is important in an IFA analysis - would the appellant be safe from those he fears in another location within his home country? In my assessment of the evidence, I agree with the RPD Member that the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence that the men he fears have the motivation to find him in the proposed IFA locations. Furthermore, when taking into consideration the situation of the brothers that have left Danli, there is no persuasive evidence in the record that the men have the motivation to pursue the appellant and has continued to do so outside of Danli. The RPD member asked the appellant "Since he's [brother] left town, he hasn't been threatened because he's not around, is that what you are saying?"51 The appellant testified "Yes he hasn't but he moves from one place to another in countryside to survive."52 However, again, the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence that his brother is being pursued outside of Danli. Based on my review of the evidence, I find that I have no reason to disagree with the RPD Member's conclusion that the appellant would be able to live safely in the proposed IFA locations, while taking into consideration all the facts surrounding the appellant's situation. [45] As mentioned earlier, the Court has said that the onus is on the claimant, in this case the appellant, to show that he does not have an IFA. I find, on a balance of probabilities and on my own assessment of the evidence, that the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence to support his allegation that the men he fears have the motivation to find the appellant in the proposed IFA locations in Honduras. Thus, I find no reasons to disagree with the RPD Member's conclusion given the facts surrounding this claim. [46] Having found that, on the balance of probabilities, there is no danger of torture or risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the identified IFA, the issue becomes whether it would be unreasonable for the appellant to seek refuge there. Bearing in mind that, as discussed earlier, the appellant bears the onus of demonstrating, on a balance of probabilities, that the proposed IFA is unreasonable, having considered the conditions in the proposed IFA and all the circumstances of this appeal, including those particular to the appellant, I find that it is not objectively unreasonable for the appellant to seek refuge in the proposed IFA location. [47] In reference to the second prong for IFA, the appellant submits that . . . the Board Member failed to consider the geography of Honduras, or that in the present appeal the geography of Honduras ought to be considered, with respect to the appellant's relocation within Honduras as well as what other Hondurans had been subjected to within Honduras and the lack of protection available to them there. [48] The appellant is not clear as to what argument he is trying to make here by not providing a further explanation as to how the geography of Honduras affects the appellant's ability to live in the proposed IFA locations. However, I note that the RPD member questioned the appellant on the second prong of the IFA and based on the facts presented at the hearing, she found that, on a balance of probabilities, that it is reasonable for him to seek refuge in the proposed IFA locations. The RPD member took into consideration the appellant's work experience and asked the appellant whether he could find work in the proposed IFA locations. The appellant testified "yes." The appellant did not provide any persuasive evidence of why he could not live reasonably in the proposed IFA locations in reference to the 2nd prong of the IFA test. Much of the appellant's memorandum refers to persecution and 'racial or social background' but he has not provided clear arguments as to how all this relates to his ability to live in the proposed IFA locations. The appellant also refers to the Board member 'ignoring reasonable explanations' but again, he has not providing any direct evidence of what the Board member ignored. I note that the appellant has Counsel representing him before the RAD. However, given the lack of explanations for the arguments presented in the memorandum of this RAD appeal combined with my own assessment of the evidence before the RPD and RAD, I find the RPD member has not erred in her assessment of IFA as it pertains the appellant's situation. [49] Therefore, I find the RPD Member's assessment as it relates to the second prong of the IFA test is accurate, and I find the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence, either to the RPD nor the RAD, that he could not live reasonably in the proposed IFA locations. [50] The appellant has not provided evidence to meet the onus on him to meet the two prongs of the IFA test. I have not found anything in my review of the evidence before the RPD and the RAD that would indicate that he faces, on the balance of probabilities, a danger of torture or risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and it would be unreasonable for the appellant to live in Valle or Roatan, the proposed IFA locations in Honduras. [51] In summary, having considered all the evidence, I find that I agree with the RPD that the appellant has an IFA in Honduras and therefore is not a person in need of protection. REMEDY [52] For all these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD in accordance with paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, namely, that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is therefore dismissed. (signed) "Rena Dhir" December 2, 2015 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., 2001, c. 27. 3 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR). 4 Exhibit 2, AR. 5 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR). 6 Exhibit 2, AR. 7 Exhibit 2, AR. 8 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 9 Exhibit 2, AR. 10 Exhibit 3, RPDR, RPD Oral Hearing CD - 01:31:16. 11 Subsection 110(4) of the Act. 12 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 13 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 14 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. 15 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 16 Eng v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 17 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 18 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 19 Njeukam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859. 20 Yetna v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CF 858. 21 Wahgmo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 923. 22 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 23 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494, para. 41. 24 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, para. 27. 25 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, para. 28. 26 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, para. 33. 27Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, para. 54. 28 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, para. 37. 29 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 30 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, para. 54. 31 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 32 Eng v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711; Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702; and Spasoja v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 913. 33 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 34 Djoussou v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1080. 35 Siliya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 120. 36 Garcia Kanga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 482. 37 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 38 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD, oral hearing. 39 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 (FCA). 40 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589, 163 N.R. 232 (F.C.A.). 41 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 42 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 43 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589, 163 N.R. 232 (F.C.A.). 44 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 45 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD, oral hearing. 46 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 47 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 48 Exhibit 3, RPDR, National Documentation Package (NDP), Honduras, December 23, 2014, Item 1.3. 49 Exhibit 3, RPDR, RPD Oral Hearing CD - 00:51:30. 50 Exhibit 3, RPDR, RPD Oral Hearing CD - 00:51:32. 51 Exhibit 3, RPDR, RPD Oral Hearing CD - 00:52.45. 52 Exhibit 3, RPDR, RPD Oral Hearing CD - 00:52:47. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB5-01844 RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB5-01844