TB8-12896

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-12896 TB8-12897 / TB8-12898 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision November 27, 2019 Date de la décision Panel James Sloan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Howard P Eisenberg Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] This is an appeal of an April 27, 2018 decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) determining that Appellants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. For the reasons that follow, I reject the appeal. [2] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the female Appellant) and her children, a son and a daughter (the minor Appellants), are seeking refugee protection in Canada based on a claim that they fear persecution in Hungary because they are a mixed-race family. The female Appellant was born in Hungary; however, her husband (and the father of the minor Appellants), XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Mr. XXXX), was born in Nigeria and moved to Hungary in 1999. The female Appellant's family did not fully accept her September 2000 marriage to Mr. XXXX. They were even less accepting of him after he was jailed for attempted fraud in October 2000. [3] The Appellants claim that, in or about 2015, the discrimination against them became much worse due to the xenophobic positions taken by Prime Minister Orbán's government and a fear in the country of an influx of refugees. Two of the female Appellant's superiors at work made derogatory (and, on one case, somewhat threatening) remarks about immigrants and mixed-race families and she felt she needed to quit her job. In addition, the female Appellant was attacked by a dog when she attempted to protect her son from racist abuse. The minor Appellants were harassed and insulted because of their mixed-race. Mr. XXXX has been unable to find employment in Hungary. [4] The Appellants left Hungary on XXXX XXXX, 2017. Their joint Basis of Claim form was signed on July 17, 2017. REQUEST FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW EVIDENCE AT APPEAL [5] The Appellants seek the admission of a newspaper article, dated May 11, 2018, reporting on Prime Minister Orbán's re-election and his desire to end liberal democracy. I find that the article, which arose after the RPD's rejection of the Appellants' claim and pertains to current conditions in Hungary, meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the requirements of Singh.1 It is admissible. HEARING [6] The Appellants have requested that the RAD hold a hearing in relation to the new evidence. However, they provide no explanation as to how the new evidence would meet the three elements of subsection 110(6), all of which must be met in order for me to hold a hearing. It does not, of course, fall to me to create arguments on behalf of the Appellants-especially given that they are represented.2 Nonetheless, I have reviewed the proposed new evidence and the record and am unable to see how a hearing could be required in this case. The evidence does not raise a serious issue with respect to the Appellants' credibility that justifies allowing their claim. Consequently, the request for a hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) must be denied. DETERMINATIVE ISSUE [7] The determinative issue in this case is whether the Appellants face a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood that they will be subjected to a danger of torture, a risk to their life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon their return to Hungary. STANDARD OF REVIEW [8] In my review of the RPD's decision, I will apply a standard of correctness.3 This is not a case where the RPD enjoyed a meaningful advantage in making its findings.4 ANALYSIS [9] The RPD found that 1. the Appellants did not face a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of other harm upon their return to Hungary, whether based upon the discrimination they suffered in the past in Hungary or on a forward-looking basis; 2. aspects of the female Appellant's evidence lacked credibility; 3. the Appellants lacked subjective fear; and; 4. the Appellants had not rebutted the presumption that state protection exists in Hungary. [10] The Appellants argue that all of the RPD's findings were incorrect. [11] I will begin by considering where there is a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of other harm, based on the assumption that the female Appellant's testimony does not lack credibility and that the Appellants do not lack subjective fear. Given my finding that they do not face a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of other harm, I need not consider whether or not the RPD's analysis of the female Appellant's credibility and the Appellants' lack of subjective fear was in error. Nor do I need to consider whether or not the Appellants rebutted the presumption of state protection. 1. Is there a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of other harm [12] I will consider a) whether the past experiences of the Appellants in Hungary amounted to persecution and b) whether, based on such past harm (if any) and the objective documentation, the Appellants face a serious possibility of persecution on forward-looking basis. I will also consider c) whether the evidence shows that their return to Hungary would subject them to a danger of torture, a risk to their life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, as per subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. a) Did the Appellants' treatment in Hungary amount to persecution? Abuse suffered [13] The Appellants' evidence of abuse, discrimination or mistreatment, based on the female Appellant's status as the wife of a Nigerian-born man and based on the minor Appellants' status as people who were visibly of mixed race (as well as being part of a mixed-race family), was as follows: a. The female Appellant's family did not accept her marriage; b. Eating out or going to night clubs was difficult because the female Appellant was part of a mixed-race couple; c. Acquiring accommodation was difficult because the female Appellant was part of a mixed-race couple (she was rejected by 20-30 landlords); d. When he was in kindergarten the son was called a racial epithet by another child; e. The minor Appellants would face periodic harassment based on their race; f. When he was six months old, skinheads called the son a racial epithet and called the female Appellant a "slut"; g. The female Appellant's social media community, including her family, made racist posts about killing foreigners before they got to the border; h. One of the female Appellant's superiors at work told her that she was lucky her husband was alive (given that he had been born outside Hungary) and lucky that nothing had happened to her family yet (given that the minor Appellants were mixed-race); another of the female Appellant's superiors at work gave her a book about how immigrants are destroying Europe; and when the female Appellant quit her job she was told she had never belonged at the workplace due to her "type of family"; i. The minor Appellants had problems with racist abuse: they do not have friends, they were frequently called racial epithets in public, the daughter cannot wear her hair naturally without being teased, the son was followed home by young men who called him racist names; the son did not want go to school for fear of being humiliated; the son felt compelled to give up wrestling because people refused to wrestle with him and spectators shouted racist comments about him; j. On April 1, 2016, the female Appellant confronted some boys who were harassing the son and the boys released their dog, resulting in the female Appellant being bitten on her hand and arm; k. Mr. XXXX has been unable to find employment in Hungary; l. Mr. XXXX is frequently called racial epithets in public; and m. The female Appellant feared leaving her home during the referendum and fears that the family home will be attacked. [14] The RPD found that none of these harmful events individually or all of them collectively amounted to persecution. [15] The Appellants argue that the RPD did not provide a clear explanation as to why the discriminatory incidents they experienced in the past did not rise to persecution. My analysis [16] Because, unlike the RPD, I am operating on the assumption that the female Appellant is credible and the Appellants have a genuine subjective fear, I will consider the incidents of discrimination or harassment experienced by the Appellants in the past anew. Consequently, I need not address the Appellants' claim that the RPD failed in its duty to provide a clear explanation in this regard. [17] In considering the harm suffered by the Appellants, I will take into account the Appellants' argument that the RPD largely misunderstood the nature of their reason for fleeing Hungary: first, they stress that their fears did not did not rise to a "serious level"5 until after Hungary's refugee crisis in 2015 or 2016;6 second, they make clear that they did not suffer from discrimination in health care;7 and, third, they state that any problems with housing8 or education9 were not factors in their decision to leave Hungary. Because items a)-f) above took place when their mistreatment had not risen to a serious level, I will focus on items g)-m) in my analysis of whether their treatment in Hungary amounted to persecution. I will not have regard to the situation in Hungary regarding heath care, housing or education. Legal definition of persecution [18] Before assessing the nature of the Appellants' past treatment in Hungary, including whether it rose to the level of persecution, I will turn to the definition of the term "persecution." The term has not, of course, been defined in the Refugee Convention10 or the IRPA. As such, I will have regard to the case law for guidance in relation to the definition and, in particular, when discrimination or harassment may amount to persecution. [19] The Supreme Court of Canada, in reliance on the scholarship of Professor James Hathaway, defined persecution as follows: "'sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.'"11 In another of case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that "[t]he essential question is whether the persecution alleged by the claimant threatens his or her basic human rights in a fundamental way."12 The Federal Court of Appeal in Sagharichi, while recognizing that "the dividing line between persecution and discrimination or harassment is difficult to establish...",13 found that, with persecution, the mistreatment suffered or anticipated must be serious and systemic. The systemic element of persecution refers to "the element of repetition and relentlessness found at the heart of persecution."14 [20] I will have these factors in mind when considering the nature of the past discrimination or harassment suffered by the Appellants in Hungary, as well as later, when considering whether there is a serious possibility of their suffering persecution if they return there. Hostility to immigrants on Facebook (item g) above) [21] The objective evidence suggests that the general public's hostility to immigrants in Hungary has increased in recent years (or at least that they have become more overt in expressing it). Whatever the cause-a fear of immigration, Prime Minister Orbán's rhetoric, the Jobbik party, etc.-this is an alarming trend. It is not surprising, therefore, that this xenophobia would manifest in social media posts. I find that this underscores the increased hostility to immigrants in Hungary; however, I do not find that this type of rhetoric is sufficiently serious to constitute persecution. Employment discrimination (item h) above) [22] In considering whether the treatment of the female Appellant at work amounted to persecution, the RPD had regard to the fact that the female Appellant left her job of her own volition and that she did so on May 31, 2017, less than a month before leaving Hungary for Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2017. While, according to the evidence, no measures were taken to dismiss the female Appellant, the fact that she felt the need to resign due to the xenophobia in the workplace, and in particular the hostility directed at her, is significant. I am of the view that the xenophobia suffered by the female Appellant was discriminatory; however, I do not find it to have been sufficiently serious or systemic to have amounted to persecution. Racist abuse suffered by the minor Appellants (item i) above) [23] As noted, the Appellants do not claim that the minor Appellants were discriminated against in education. I will consider the abuse suffered by them as being in the nature of general racist abuse. I do not find that discrimination against the minor Appellants was sufficiently systemic or serious to have amounted to persecution. Attack on the female Appellant by a dog (item j) above) [24] The motive of the children who released the dog that harmed the female Appellant was clearly discriminatory in nature-whether their objective was to harm her because of her the mixed-race son or her foreign-born or black-skinned husband. While there have been numerous expressions of racism against the Appellants, this is the only event that resulted in a physical attack. I consider it to be a one-off event and not part of a series of physical attacks or a pattern of systemic conduct. I do not find that this attack amounted to persecution. Employment discrimination against Mr. XXXX (item k) above) [25] Because Mr. XXXX, while part of the family, is not a part of this claim,15 evidence relating to past discrimination against him does not impact on my analysis of the past discrimination against the Appellants or the question of whether any such discrimination amounted to persecution. The treatment of Mr. XXXX may, however, be relevant to the forward-facing treatment of the Appellants. I note, however, that while I accept the Appellants' evidence as truthful, the evidence that relates to Mr. XXXX treatment in Hungary is second-hand and, in some cases, speculative. Moreover, his inability to find work may be affected by matters unrelated to the colour of his skin, such his having been jailed for attempted fraud. Racial abuse of Mr. XXXX (item l) above) [26] I accept that Mr. XXXX faced racial abuse in Hungary. However, as noted, because he is not a part of this claim, this is not relevant to my analysis of the past discrimination against the Appellants or the question of whether or not it amounted to persecution. The treatment of Mr. XXXX may, however, be relevant to the forward-facing treatment of the Appellants to the extent he is a similarly situated person. Fears held by the female Appellant (item m) above) [27] I accept that the female Appellant genuinely holds these fears. However, the incidents she fears have not occurred; they are speculative only. Aside from the single attack by a dog, the female Appellant has not suffered from attacks based on her being part of a mixed-race family. Conclusion on past treatment [28] As discussed above, none of the instances of abuse or discrimination or harassment testified to by the female Appellant amounted to persecution. Discrimination based on the colour of one's skin or the colour of the skin of one's loved ones is deeply objectionable. However, when I have regard to the harm suffered collectively, I do not find it was sufficiently serious or systemic to threaten the Appellants' basic human rights in a fundamental way. b) Do the Appellants face a serious possibility of persecution [29] While my analysis looks at the Appellants' past treatment separately from their forward-facing risk, it is clear that the latter may be informed by the former, especially in a case such as this one where I have found discrimination against the Appellants to have taken place in the past. Bearing that in mind, I will now consider the Appellants' particular circumstances and the general documentary evidence in order to arrive at a conclusion on whether they face a serious possibility of persecution upon return. Arguments of the Appellants [30] First, the Appellants argue that it is illogical to sympathize with the discrimination the Appellants may have faced and may face in the future, but at the same time doubt their credibility. They argue that the RPD "appears to be saying that [it] believes the Appellant and her children were discriminated against, but that the discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution."16 Second, the Appellants argue that the RPD failed to explain why the "incidents do not meet the level of discrimination that rises to the level of harassment."17 [31] Finally, they argue that the RPD's reading of the National Documentation Package (NDP) was selective and the documentary evidence is clear that there is considerable discrimination against non-nationals in Hungary. In support of this they refer to several documents relating to discrimination against Roma, foreigners, Jews, members of the LBGT+ community, refugees and asylum seekers. The argue that it is reasonable to extrapolate from the evidence showing hostility and discrimination against other minorities to show that anti-Black racism exists in Hungary. 1. Was the RPD illogical in accepting that they may have faced discrimination (and may face it in the future)? [32] The Appellants' claim that the RPD acted illogically appears to be based in the following statement it made at paragraph 56 of the Decision: I should also note that I certainly sympathize with respect to discrimination the [Appellants] have faced or may face, however the evidence herein does not establish the [Appellants'] allegations on a forward-looking basis with respect to persecution on the basis of their race. It is perfectly logical for the RPD Member to find that the Appellants suffered past discrimination and to sympathize with them. While the RPD highlighted credibility problems, it did not find that every aspect of the Appellants' claim regarding discrimination was false. Moreover, it is logical for it to find that this past discrimination (as well as possible future discrimination) does not rise to the level of persecution. Indeed, I share these findings. 2. Did the RPD explain why it did not find the harm amounted to persecution? [33] The RPD, after discussing the Appellants' claims, referring to the various programmes and initiatives that exist in Hungary to combat discrimination, and outlining its concerns regarding the Appellants' credibility and subjective fear, concluded that the cumulative harm did not rise to the level of persecution. Relying on the cases of Sagharaichi, Ward, and Chan, all discussed above, it held: "To be considered persecution the mistreatment suffered and anticipated must be serious; and must occur with repetition or persistence in a systematic way."18 [34] It is, of course, difficult to illustrate with perfect clarity why, in the view of a decision-maker, a harmful or discriminatory act does not meet the threshold of serious or systemic. Such a finding will be arrived at through considering the harm in the case, alongside the relevant documentary evidence, and applying the jurisprudence of the Court. The finding will also be informed, to an extent, by the decision-maker's own understanding of what type of conduct is serious and systemic and what is not. In this case, the RPD decision-maker did engage with the evidence, the documentary evidence, and the law-although as will be discussed immediately below, I have found that his engagement with the documentary evidence was selective-and, consequently, I find that the RPD did explain why it found that the harm in this case did not amount to persecution. 3. Was the RPD's analysis of the objective documentation selective? [35] The RPD described various programmes and initiatives that exist in Hungary to combat discrimination and assist disadvantaged people in relation to employment, health care, housing and education. Based on its reading of the objective documentation and, in some cases, its scepticism in relation to the Appellants' credibility, the RPD found: that, on a balance of probabilities, while the [Appellants] may experience discrimination in Hungary, the cumulative treatment of the [Appellants] on a forward-looking basis does not rise to the level of persecution. Moreover, there are significant systems, programs, and policies in place to provide resources, care and support for the [Appellants] if and when they might need, particularly with respect to security, protection, health care, education, employment, and hosing. And, the constitution and laws in Hungary explicitly prohibit discrimination based on race, and non-discrimination is a seriously protected right in the Hungarian legal system.19 In arriving at its finding, the RPD made only passing reference to problems that exist in Hungary, generally referring to the problems as matters that have been (or are in the process of being) fixed.20 I agree with the Appellants that its analysis was one-sided. As such, I will review the objective evidence, in particular, the evidence referred to by the Appellants, and arrive at my own conclusion. My finding regarding the existence of serious possibility of persecution [36] The RPD noted that there is a dearth of documentary evidence relating to the treatment of visible minorities in Hungary outside of the context of the treatment of Roma and that official statistical data does not elaborate on target groups. They argue, therefore, that it is "reasonable to extrapolate from both anti-Roma and anti-foreigner evidence to demonstrate that serious anti-black racism exists in the country."21 The Appellants also rely on documents or reports that indicate a "deterioration of the...situation regarding racism and intolerance, in particular targeting Roma, Jews, LGBTI people, asylum seekers and refugees" and a climate of impunity in the public sphere regarding derogatory remarks about "Roma, Jews, LGBT persons, asylum seekers and refugees".22 [37] While I agree that there is a paucity of evidence regarding anti-black sentiment in Hungary, I disagree that that evidence relating to the mistreatment of Roma, Jews, LGBT persons, asylum seekers or refugees may be taken to be reflective of anti-black racism. First of all, it would be an impossible exercise to attempt to discern the motives of Hungarian racists in order to determine the direction and scope of their hatefulness, i.e. whether a party such as the Jobbik party-a right-wing populist political party that is openly anti-Roma and anti-Semitic23-would also hate people with black skin, people of mixed race, or people who marry partners with black skin. Without some evidence that groups or individuals who are anti-Roma or anti-Semitic are also anti-black, it would be entirely speculative on my part to assume that they were. [38] Second, such an approach may be misleading. This is shown by a statistic from the NDP which does break down the nature of discrimination in Hungary. Between 2009 and 2013, incidents involving possible violations of a Hungarian law criminalizing incitement to hatred were broken down based on the target of the racists' attentions. The following statistics emerged: 62 per cent of the incidents involved Roma, 20 percent involved Jews, seven per cent involved LGBT persons, and the balance related to ethnic origin and skin colour.24 As such, it would clearly be misleading to take the view, as the Appellants suggest, that crimes against Roma, Jews or LGBT persons may be counted as crimes against persons based on their ethnic origin, country of origin or skin colour. Such reasoning would lead to the mistaken finding that 100% of the incidents described were based upon country of origin or skin colour, instead of the actual percentage of eleven. [39] Having said that, where the objective evidence refers to bigotry based on an individual's country of birth or his or her race, I will consider it to be prima facie relevant to this claim. Moreover, I accept the Appellants' statement that it is "incontrovertible" that xenophobic rhetoric is on the rise in Hungary and accept that that is also relevant to this claim.25 As the Appellants note, Prime Minister Orbán has openly called for only admitting individuals from predominantly Caucasian countries as refugees,26 spoken in favour or "ethnic homogeneity" and stated that "too much mixing causes problems."27 [40] However, very little evidence has been put forward showing the existence of bigotry leading to discrimination based on an individual's country of birth in Hungary. As regards the increase in xenophobia, even assuming it would be directed at a mixed-race family, the evidence that it would lead to discrimination against or persecution of the Appellants is very limited. As the Appellants have noted, the increase in xenophobia has led to increased hate speech;28 however, there is little evidence of an increase in other forms of discriminatory conduct. While the former may very well lead to the latter in some cases, it would be speculative for me to assume that it would in this case. [41] Having regard to all of the objective documentation, as well as to the Appellants' evidence relating to their personal experiences with discrimination and the discrimination suffered by Mr. XXXX, I find as follows: 1. There is a serious possibility that the minor Appellants will face discrimination based on their race. While the ugly spectre of racism exists throughout the world, including, of course, in Canada, the level of exposure to racism in Hungary is considerable and, by all accounts, growing worse under the premiership of Victor Orbán. I do not, however, find that the racism and discrimination that will result will be sufficiently serious or systemic that there is a reasonable possibility that it will rise to the level of persecution for the minor Appellants. 2. The possibility that the female Appellant, as a Caucasian woman, will face discrimination in Hungary is much less likely. It is true that it is possible that people who come to know the female Appellant's family situation may discriminate against her based on her having married a Nigerian man or being the mother of mixed-race children, as her superiors at work did. However, aside from a general increase in xenophobia in the country, including the deeply objectionable comment of Prime Minister Orbán regarding the mixing of races, there is no evidence that this type of bigotry is widespread in Hungary. Unlike the minor Appellants, whose status as children of a mixed-race couple may be determined from their appearance, the female Appellant's status as someone who married a Nigerian man is not apparent and, as such, less likely to be known. I find that there is not a serious possibility that the female Appellant will face discrimination rising to the level of persecution upon return to Hungary. c) Likelihood of harm under subsection 97(1) [42] There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Appellants will be subjected to a danger of torture, a risk to their life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon their return to Hungary. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that they will not be. 2. State protection analysis [43] As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Ward, that for treatment to amount to persecution, it must be a "sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection."29 I have found there not to be a serious possibility of persecution if the Appellants return to Hungary; consequently, I need not consider whether state protection would exist in the face of sustained or systemic violation of human rights. In the words of the Federal Court in Olah:30 The Applicants argue that the Officer erred in failing to conduct an analysis of the availability of state protection for Roma in Hungary. On this issue, I agree with the Respondent's submission that, where there has been no finding of a risk of persecution, an analysis of state protection is unnecessary. As the Officer did not find that the discrimination in this case rose to persecution, there was no requirement to conduct an analysis of the availability of state protection: see Mallampally v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 267 (CanLII) at para 41. CONCLUSION [44] I confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "James Sloan" James Sloan November 27, 2019 Date 1 Three factors were elaborated by the Federal Court of Appeal in the Singh case: newness, credibility and relevance (M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder, (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at para 64.) 2 The Federal Court has held that "[t]he RAD cannot be faulted for failing to consider arguments that were never raised." (Hoch v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 580 (CanLII), at para 8). 3 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at para 103. 4 Ibid., at paras 69-74. See also Rosas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145, at paras 124-125, relying on Guo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 317, at paras 15-19 and Jeyaseelan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 278, at paras 19-21. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 39, para 23. 6 The Legal Memorandum speaks of the "Immigration Crisis of 2015" leading to heightened xenophobia in early 2016. (Ibid., at p. 41, para 29). 7 Ibid., at p. 40, para 27. 8 The female Appellant's reference to the difficulty they had finding an apartment because of the skin colour of Mr. XXXX and the children was background only. (Ibid., at pp.40-41, para 28.) 9 Ibid., at p. 41, para 29. 10 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html and UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html. 11 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85, at pp. 733-734. (Ward) The passage in internal quotation marks is from James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991), at p. 108. 12 La Forest J. (in dissent) in Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, at 635, cited by the Supreme Court in Ward, ibid. 13 Sagharichi, Mojgan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-169-91), Isaac, Marceau, MacDonald, August 5, 1993, at 2. Reported: Sagharichi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 182 N.R. 398 (F.C.A.). 14 Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 390. There may be instances where persistence or repetition should not be regarded as a necessary element, e.g. where the harm is not of a nature that it would be inflicted repeatedly. As the Federal Court observed: "I think it is settled law that, in some instances, even a single transgression of the applicant's human rights would amount to persecution." (Muthuthevar, Muthiah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2095-95). 15 He was living in Austria at the time of the hearing. (Recording of the RPD Hearing, at mins 29-30). 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 41-42, para 32. 17 Ibid., at p. 42, para 34. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 18-19, para 53. 19 Ibid., at 19, para 54. 20 For example: "While problems have been noted in the development of the centralized [education] system,...the government has stated that centralization will eliminate long-standing imbalances and will create a fairer system...." (Ibid., at p. 17, para 48.) 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 43, para 39. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Hungary, August 31, 2017, item 2.11, at p. 9. Because the Appellants have relied on the NDP for Hungary dated August 31, 2017 in their)Legal Memorandum, my references are to that version of the NDP. I note, however, that I have also considered the current NDP in assessing forward-looking risk in accordance with the Board's Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings, June 5, 2019 (https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/national-documentation-packages.aspx), at s. 5(II). 23 NDP for Hungary, August 31, 2017, item 2.11, at p. 15. 24 Ibid., at p. l5. 25 See, e.g., NDP for Hungary, August 31, 2017, items 2.1 and 2.2 and the newspaper article admitted by the Appellants as new evidence at appeal (Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp 22-26). 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at p. 195. 27 Ibid., at p. 201. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 43-44, paras 41-43. 29 Ward, supra endnote 11. 30 Olah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 921, at para 35. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-12896 TB8-12897 / TB8-12898 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 16 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français