TB9-02657

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-02657 TB9-02658 TB9-02659 TB9-02660 TB9-02661 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 26, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Dilani Mohan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Richard Odeleye Barrister and Solicitor Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] These are my reasons for allowing the appeal by the Appellants: XXXX XXXX XXXX(Mr. L), his wife, XXXX XXXX XXXX(Mrs. L), and their children: XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX), XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX) and XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX). They appeal a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated January 14, 2019, rejecting their claims for refugee protection. DETERMINATION [2] I am allowing this appeal. Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), I set aside the RPD's decision and substitute a determination that the Appellants are Convention refugees. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellants are all Nigerian citizens who jointly claimed refugee protection in Canada. The details of the Appellants' claim are set out in Mr. L's narrative, but I have summarized the essential facts below. [4] The Appellants allege that Mr. L is the son of the late XXXX XXXX XXXX, the XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX of Mr. L's birth town of Ikija. Mr. L's father died when he was a toddler, and his mother moved to another town, Oshogbo. Mr. L has alleged that his mother remarried in Oshogbo and that he was never told about his birth family, which included not only his father, but also two twin sisters who died not long after being subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM). Mr. L has claimed that he was constantly abused by and made to live in poverty by his step-family. Mr. L further alleges that, when he was denied further financial support as he approached the end of high school, he moved to Lagos where he worked, studied and met his now wife, Mrs. L. [5] Mr. L claims that his problems began when his in-laws insisted on meeting his family members prior to the marriage. He claims it was at that point that his mother told him about his birth father, and he traveled to Ikija to meet them. By then the town had experienced a number of hardships and they had determined through their oracle that the incorrect man had been named to take on the mantle of the XXXX XXXX. The oracle allegedly stated that Mr. L was the rightful heir to the title of XXXX XXXX, and shortly after his marriage, in 2012, Mr. L was given the opportunity to consider taking on the role. Mr. L is a Christian and did want the position but did not say so right away, nor did he inform his wife. However, he alleges that, a few years later, in 2015, his uncle died mysteriously, and since that uncle had been chosen to take on the kingship stool, his death caused the family to lose their chance at ruling the kingdom and gaining any of the contingent benefits. As a result, Mr. L claims that the pressure on him increased, and he was told that, if he chose to refuse the position of XXXX XXXX, his son, XXXX, would be initiated into the cult at the age of seven in order to take his place. Mr. L claims that he then told his wife about the problem, including information from his mother about the initiation rites which included Mrs. L's and their daughter's circumcision. They planned their escape and finally, in XXXX 2018, were able to leave Nigeria. [6] The RPD found the Appellants credible in their allegations of events that transpired in Nigeria and about their subjective fear of being forced to take on the mantle of XXXX XXXX, perform rituals contrary to their Christian faith, and undergo FGM. However, it concluded that the Appellants had viable internal flight alternatives (IFAs) in both Port Harcourt and Abuja. The Appellants' Arguments [7] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its IFA analysis by basing its findings on peripheral matters, relying on suspicion and conjecture, not accounting for relevant factors, and not considering differences between their case and the jurisprudential guide. [8] The Appellants did not submit any new evidence and did not request an oral hearing. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION (RAD) [9] The RAD conducts its own analysis of the record to decide whether or not the RPD's decision was wrong. The RAD generally does not owe any deference except in cases where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing credibility and weighing oral evidence. I do not find that the RPD enjoyed any meaningful advantage in this case. The standard applied on this appeal is therefore one of correctness. ANALYSIS [10] The determinative issue on appeal is the availability of IFAs for the Appellants. For the following reasons, I find that the RPD erred in its assessment of an IFA for the Appellants. I will first comment on the Appellants' credibility and the availability of state protection before turning to an assessment of the proposed IFAs. Credibility [11] I agree with the RPD's assessment of the Appellants' credibility. The Appellants provided detailed and generally consistent testimony. [12] I therefore accept, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. L is being sought by the members of his father's community to take over the position of XXXX XXXX. I further find that, on a balance of probabilities, the evidence establishes that the risks to Mr. L's family from initiation into that position would be FGM for Mrs. L and XXXX and that they would be forced to act in ways counter to their faith as Christians through initiation into the cult. State Protection [13] The country conditions evidence in the latest National Documentation Package (NDP) demonstrates that state protection is not likely to be forthcoming to these Appellants. I find the evidence demonstrates that, despite the introduction of laws banning FGM and carrying punitive sanctions for offenders, there have been no convictions or prosecutions.1 The lack of enforcement significantly undercuts any weight that the laws carry and the protection they offer, and law enforcement often steps aside in issues that involve tradition and custom.2 The evidence related to refusals of fetish or shrine priest positions is equivocal, but I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that refusal to take a priesthood position can be met with hostility and serious consequence.3 The evidence indicates that many fetish priests are well connected to organized crime and other corrupt sources of power4 and that "people working for shrines can be responsible for killing or harming those who offend the shrine."5 The evidence also indicates that as Nigeria's justice system deteriorates, these shrines gain influence.6 It is reported that many communities regard refusal of an inherited role as a big problem that invites divine wrath on the community and the individual.7 And, finally, the documentary evidence suggests that there are no protections designed to address this issue.8 [14] Although refugee claimants are expected to seek protection from their state, it is recognized that states may sometimes be unwilling or unable to protect. In this instance, I find the evidence establishes that state agents are unwilling to provide protection because of the perception that the Appellants are dealing with a family matter. I find that the Appellants' testimony-that they sought police protection but were advised to simply resolve the family matter on their own-is supported by the documentary evidence about police attitudes towards traditional or customary matters. I therefore find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellants would not get state protection to address their fear of the cult members in Ogun State or Lagos where they previously resided, and I must consider whether they could reasonably find safety elsewhere in Nigeria. For the reasons that follow, I find that they cannot. First prong of the IFA analysis: safe alternatives elsewhere in Nigeria [15] The test for the availability of internal flight alternatives requires firstly that decision-makers identify potentially safe alternative locations within the country where the Appellants could live. The RPD, in this case, suggested both Port Harcourt and Abuja. The Appellants claimed that these locations were not safe because the cult members could easily find them based on the types of employment that Mr. and Mrs. L would undertake and because the cult was connected and powerful. [16] The RPD found that the Appellants' problems were limited to Ikija town in Abeokuta, Ogun State.9 It found that there was no evidence to demonstrate that Mr. L's community had sought him out after he left Nigeria.10 The RPD further found that the Appellants would not be easily located in large cities like Abuja and Port Harcourt due to the size of the population and the objective evidence suggesting that people fearing non-state agents of persecution can usually find safety elsewhere in the country.11 It found that the jurisprudential guide (TB7-19851)12 applied13 and that Mr. L would be able to find employment that would not bring him to the attention of his family members, particularly since it found no evidence that the Appellants had been sought outside of Ikija.14 Finally, the RPD concluded that the Appellants had not produced evidence to show that Mr. L's community had the influence or means to use state agencies or other resources in order to find them.15 Subjective Fear and IFA [17] On appeal, the Appellants argue that the RPD should have carried out a thorough analysis of their subjective fear before reaching a conclusion that they would be safe in the proposed IFAs.16 I disagree and find that the RPD did not err. [18] The availability of a safe alternative location for the Appellants is not determined on the basis of their fear of relocation. Appellants may be genuinely fearful of relocation to any other part of their country, but that fear may not necessarily be objectively supported by the evidence. Application of the Jurisprudential Guide [19] The Appellants also argue that the RPD wrongly applied the Jurisprudential Guide because the facts underlying that case and those of their claim are significantly different. Their counsel stressed that the jurisprudential guide dealt with a claim based on FGM and forced marriage while the Appellants' claim was about spousal abuse, attempted abduction, and threats perform rituals involving a minor appellant.17 [20] I see no evidence in the record that this claim relates to spousal abuse or attempted abduction, nor has Counsel referred to any such evidence. Moreover, I do not see how that distinction would affect an analysis of whether the persecutors would have means and inclination to pursue the Appellants. I therefore find that the RPD did not err. [21] The Appellants also argued that the Jurisprudential Guide was wrongly relied on because the size and population of the IFAs do not, on their own, make the IFA locations viable. I agree with the Appellants' argument about the value of geographical size and population to the IFA analysis, but I disagree that the RPD erred by referencing this information. The RPD was not saying that the IFAs were viable solely because of their size, location and population. Rather, the RPD also considered whether the Appellants would struggle on the basis of the language and ethnicity, their education and employment history. Therefore, I find that the RPD did not err. The threats feared and access to safety [22] The Appellants argue that the RPD did not consider how the risk faced by each of the Appellants would impede their ability to seek safety in the proposed IFA locations. The Appellants have not argued with any clarity how the specific threats against the Appellants would prevent them from finding safety in an alternate part of Nigeria where their persecutors are unlikely to find them.18 [23] I have already determined that, if found, these Appellants would not likely be able to access protection. Rather, the question is whether the Appellants can move to a part of Nigeria where they would not be found. I find that the Appellants' argument does not address that issue. I do not see any evidence on the record to show that the Appellants would be at a greater risk of being found in the proposed IFAs because of the threats that they face. Motivation of the persecutors and the Appellants' credibility [24] The Appellants argue that, because the cult in Mr. L's community is very personally and emotionally motivated to find the Appellants for their benefit and that of their community, the Appellants will not be safe in the IFAs.19 They further argue that the intensification of pressure on Mr. L to be initiated into the position of XXXX XXXX and the threat to induct his son into the position as an alternative demonstrate the strong motivation of the cult since the Appellants' credibility was not doubted.20 [25] I agree with the Appellants that their uncontradicted evidence must be considered and that the RPD erred for failing to do so. Although this was not argued on appeal, I find that the RPD erred principally because it claimed that there was no evidence that the Appellants were pursued after they left Nigeria. Despite this finding, I ultimately find that the RPD was not wrong on the first prong of the test to find that the Appellants have internal flight alternatives available to them. [26] The record contains updates to Mr. L's narrative in the form of statements by him,21 Mrs. L,22 and a sworn statement by Mrs. L's father XXXX.23 In those updates and evidence, the Appellants provided evidence that Mr. L's uncle and community members had visited the home of Mrs. L's father, XXXX, to inquire into the Appellants' whereabouts. The evidence indicates that there was violence involved since Mrs. L's brother was assaulted. I find that the RPD's decision reflects an ignorance of this evidence and, further, that it disturbs the RPD's finding that no evidence was presented to suggest that the Appellants were not sought after their departure from Nigeria. [27] However, this evidence still only demonstrates that Mr. L's family and community attempted to search for the Appellants through his family members in Ogun State. And despite being asked why they could not have relocated elsewhere in Nigeria,24 the Appellants never explained how they could be found. The Appellants only explained the cult or fraternity was in business and would find Mr. L because he would have to advertise in order to support himself as a self-employed man.25 Although I find the Appellants credible, the simple statement that the fraternity or cult are in business26 is insufficient to establish that, on a balance of probabilities, they have the resources or network to locate the Appellants anywhere in Nigeria. Consequently, I find that the Appellants provided insufficient evidence to establish that they could be found if they moved further away to locations like Abuja. [28] The Appellants have argued that they demonstrated the desperation and ability of the persecutors to find them "any place they might be in Nigeria". I disagree. For the reasons stated above, the evidence they raised was insufficient to establish that, on a balance of probabilities, they could or would be found in the proposed IFA. Consequently, I find that the Appellants have not established that they face a risk of persecution, of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment throughout Nigeria, and I find that a potential internal flight alternative is available for them in Abuja. Second prong of the IFA analysis: [29] The RPD found that it would not be unduly harsh to require the Appellants to relocate to Abuja because they spoke English, had a post-secondary education and a history of employment, and because of the size and demographic of the proposed IFA locations. [30] The Appellants have argued that the RPD was wrong to rely excessively on the findings in the Jurisprudential Guide, particularly because there are significant factual differences between the two cases. Most notably, the Appellants note that the Jurisprudential Guide involves a single woman aged 22 while the Appellants are a five-member family in which the parents are aged 41 and 38. They argue that the RPD did not consider their testimony explaining that they could not live freely in Abuja or Port Harcourt or that they have no home or work in that city which would necessitate starting over. They argue that, because Nigeria has no housing or financial support system, they will be exposed to danger and hardship. They further argue that Mr. L would not be able to resume his old employment without advertising and putting himself at risk and that, due to issues around indigeneship, they will be less likely to find work. Finally, the Appellants have argued that Mr. L's mental health status will make it difficult for them to relocate and that the RPD's failure to fully account for these particularities led to an incorrect conclusion regarding the viability of an IFA for their family. [31] For the following reasons, I agree with the Appellants and find that the RPD incorrectly assessed the reasonableness of their relocation to the IFAs of Abuja or Port Harcourt. [32] The main problem, in my view, lies with the RPD's treatment of Mr. L's psychological evidence. The Appellants argued that the RPD did not consider how Mr. L's trauma would affect his ability to relocate to a place where he has no job, housing or support.27 They point out that Mr. L's ability to testify at the hearing and his improvement in Canada does not mean that he will be able to cope in the IFA locations.28 I agree. Psychological evidence [33] The psychological evidence before the RPD included a detailed report by Dr. XXXX XXXX,29 a registered psychologist of considerable experience. He conducted an assessment described as lasting around one hour and in which he relied on self-reporting and also applied a clinical test.30 At the end of this process, Dr. XXXX diagnosed Mr. L with unspecified XXXX XXXX XXXX and stressor-related disorder.31 Dr. XXXX recommended further psychiatric evaluation and treatment, noting that Mr. L's "condition will deteriorate with exposure to further threats of harm".32 Earlier in Dr. XXXX report, he stated that "thought disorder was evident in the form of rambling and tangential responses. Mr. XXXX denied experiencing difficulty thinking clearly or finding it difficult to making [sic] decision. He lacks insight into the abnormalcy of these symptoms." 33 [34] Further psychological evidence in the record includes Mr. L's referrals for psychiatric treatment or support.34 At the time of the hearing, Counsel indicated that the referral was pending. I accept that Mr. L has made efforts to continue treatment and, although the Appellants did not produce any evidence of Mr. L's treatment on appeal, I find that the attempt to continue treatment strengthens the weight given to his mental health evidence. [35] Regardless, I find that the question at issue is whether I accept the diagnosis made by Dr. XXXX. Following the instruction of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kanthasamy,35 if I accept the diagnosis, I ought not to undermine its significance by focusing on whether or not treatment is ongoing. Instead, I must consider the consequences of that diagnosis on Mr. L and his family, if they were to be returned to Nigeria. [36] I find that Dr. XXXX report contains a detailed account of the interview questions and responses, as well as commentary as to conclusions and inferences that the doctor had drawn. For example, in his report, Dr. XXXX states that Mr. L reported symptoms of major mental illness and identifies these as the experience of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Dr. XXXX cites the descriptions provided by Mr. L about these XXXX XXXX XXXX. Dr. XXXX also wrote that "thought disorder was evident in the form of rambling and tangential responses", that "Mr. L... denied experiencing difficulty thinking clearly or finding it difficult to making [sic] decisions" and concluded that Mr. L "lacks insight into the abnormalcy of these symptoms."36 This suggests to me that there was a process to the assessment involving clinical interaction, observation, and application of clinical knowledge in interpreting the observations. [37] I have already found that Dr. XXXX warning that Mr. L will find it impossible to testify was not supported. However, I accept Dr. XXXX psychological assessment and diagnosis. I find that, although the RPD also accepted Dr. XXXX assessment, it considered the implications of the diagnoses largely from the lens of Mr. L's ability to testify at his hearing and in terms of his ability to work.37 It did not consider Mr. L's ongoing need for treatment, the efforts he was making to access treatment in Canada, or to situate that information in the context of the availability of treatment in Nigeria and how that might affect his and his family's ability to relocate to another Nigerian city. [38] The RPD noted that Mrs. L testified to her husband's progressive improvement in terms of his mental health. The RPD also noted that Mr. L has found new employment in Canada, and it subsequently found that these claims and facts were not consistent with Mrs. L's concern that Mr. L would not be able to find work in Nigeria.38 [39] I note that Dr. XXXX expressed that Mr. L's mental health would deteriorate if he is exposed to further threats of harm and that much of Mr. L's psychological improvement has been the direct result of his presence in Canada. I further note that there is evidence in the National Documentation Package that speaks to the poor state of mental healthcare in Nigeria. One report states that there is "[l]imited access to health, social and educational services"39 and that Nigeria's mental health care system "is neglected".40 The same report goes on to state that "[t]he main risks are that the suffering of the affected person is initially underestimated by their mental health staff, the affected individual themselves and their friends and family, and help is sought only when their symptoms worsen to the point where family and community members fear they are 'crazy', or they are wrongly diagnosed and incorrectly treated."41 Finally, and I emphasize that the report states "[a]lthough in Nigeria there is no available data on the quality and efficacy of mental health services, it is reasonable to assume that the limited number of psychiatrists, psychologists, counsellors, social workers and community workers in the country are not trained or prepared to deal with the increased needs the crisis is generating."42 [40] I am aware that the report I have cited refers to the intensification of mental health care needs in Nigeria as a result of the trauma inflicted by the conflict with Boko Haram. However, the cited report highlights the lack of investment by Nigeria into the mental healthcare system generally, the lack of information and resources on which to assess the adequacy of the available supports, the extent to which social stigma and poor training of health care professionals can affect mental health outcomes, and the limited number of mental health and social work professionals who can properly address the needs of Nigerians coping with mental health problems. [41] Another more recent report notes that there is evidence of availability of in- and out-patient treatment by psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychiatric nurses in public facilities.43 However, I find it difficult to conclude that this translates into adequate accessibility given the evidence that there are less than 300 psychiatrists to meet the needs of a population of about 180 million people.44 This same report reiterates the fact that mental health care is not a priority for the Nigerian government and that mental health issues are still highly stigmatized.45 [42] This information, considered alongside the evidence of Mr. L's diagnosis and clinical observations of his own lack of insight into his condition, presents the context that the RPD should have considered. I find that, in this context and given this particular individual, the RPD was wrong to conclude that Mr. L's mental health would not be a strong impediment to relocation.46 I find that the evidence demonstrates that Mr. L's mental health is likely to deteriorate upon return to Nigeria and that this will intensify his mental health needs in a country where the adequacy of his access to mental health supports is questionable and that this creates a significant risk for Mr. L. Having concluded that it would be unreasonable for Mr. L to relocate to Abuja on account of his mental health needs, I find that no IFA is available to him and that he consequently is a Convention refugee. [43] I must, however, continue to assess whether IFAs are available for Mrs. L and the children because I have to assess the claims of each individual Appellant. Having found that Mr. L is a Convention refugee, the following analysis considers the availability of an IFA for Mrs. L and her children on the presumption that Mr. L would not return to Nigeria after being granted refugee protection. Thus, my analysis proceeds on the understanding that Mrs. L would be returning to Nigeria alone with the children. And for the following reasons, I conclude that it would be unreasonable to ask Mrs. L to relocate to Abuja as a single mother raising three children. IFAs for Mrs. L and the children [44] I find the Appellants' arguments that this case is distinguishable from the Jurisprudential Guide compelling. The evidence demonstrates that, although it may be reasonable to demand a young single woman to relocate to a major city, it would be unreasonable to demand the same of a single mother with many children. [45] The country documents show that women face considerable economic discrimination. The law does not require equal pay for women and does not prohibit gender-based discrimination in hiring.47 It also states that women are generally marginalized48 and that it is common for women to face demands for sexual favours in order to gain employment.49 Moreover, the evidence establishes that single women face stigma and varying degrees of societal abuse and sexual predation.50 It reflects a reality in which women living without a man have limited access to resource and services, including housing and employment.51 Finally, it is noted that there are no comprehensive laws protecting women and girls against violence,52 which is extremely disconcerting given the widespread nature of rape53 and sexual harassment54 as well as the inconsistent and minor sentences that are handed down to those convicted of such offences.55 [46] In the preamble to its findings on the availability of IFAs, the Jurisprudential Guide notes that the evidence suggests that it would not be unduly harsh for women to relocate, especially if single and without children to support".56 That decision also does not account for the information contained in the Response to Information Request (RIR) NGA105523 that deals specifically with the question of single women in Abuja. It does, however, refer to another report which finds that women-headed households are generally better off in large southern cities than in the North, but it nevertheless notes that local governments do discriminate based on indigeneship.57 It reiterates that women living without male family support struggle with the cost of running a home and encounter economic discrimination.58 That report notes that women have higher rates of unemployment, including among educated women in urban areas.59 [47] I find that there are significant distinguishing factors between the facts underlying the Jurisprudential Guide and the facts of the case at hand. I further find that the country conditions and personal supporting evidence of the Appellants establishes that, on a balance of probabilities, Mrs. L would face undue harsh conditions in attempting to relocate to Abuja with or without her husband. I find that the evidence establishes that, as a single mother with three children to support and living in a city like Abuja, where she is not indigenous, would place her in a particularly vulnerable position. Her lack of familiarity with local dialects, her single status, lack of supports in the city, and her need to secure both housing and employment in an environment where both she and her daughters are at high risk of sexual harassment, rape and exploitation create the harsh conditions that negate the viability of an IFA in Abuja. Accordingly, I find that the test for an IFA for Mrs. L and her children fails at the second stage, and I therefore conclude that no IFAs are available to them. CONCLUSION [48] On the basis of the totality of the evidence and the findings above, I find that the Appellants have demonstrated that the RPD's decision was incorrect and that they face a serious possibility of persecution on the basis of their membership in a particular social group-persons and their family members wanted for recruitment into a cult. [49] I therefore set aside the RPD's determination and substitute a determination that the Appellants are Convention refugees, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the IRPA. (signed) "Dilani Mohan" Dilani Mohan September 26, 2019 Date 1 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.28, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), RIR NGA105628, September 13, 2016, at pp. 8-9; see also item 5.21, IRB, RIR NGA105404, January 25, 2016; see also item 5.34, United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Nigeria: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), Version 2.0, August 2019, at s. 2.5.1 and s. 6.6. 2 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.28, at p. 9. 3 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 12.11, IRB, RIR NGA103485, July 6, 2010; and item 13.7, IRB RIR NGA103996, November 13, 2012. 4 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 12.11, at p. 3. 5 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 12.11, at p. 3. 6 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 12.11, at pp. 2-3. 7 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 12.11, at p. 5. 8 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 13.7, IRB RIR NGA103996, November 13, 2012, at p. 6. 9 Exhibit RPD-1 RPD Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 20. 10 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 21, 25. 11 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 23. 12 Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851, identified by the Chairperson, pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the IRPA, effective date: July 6, 2018, at para 18. 13 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 17. 14 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at paras 24-25. 15 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 26. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 14. 17 Ibid., Appellants' Memorandum, at para 17. 18 Ibid., Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 18-21. 19 Ibid., Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 18-21. 20 Ibid., Appellants' Memorandum, at para 22. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 227-228. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 218. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 219-220. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Transcript, at p. 125. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Transcript, at pp. 125-129. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Transcript. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 38. 28 Ibid., Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 38-39. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Dr. XXXX Report, at pp. 179-183. 30 Ibid., Dr. XXXX Report, at pp. 179-180. 31 Ibid., Dr. XXXX Report, at p. 182. 32 Ibid., Dr. XXXX Report, at p. 182. 33 Ibid., Dr. XXXX Report, at p. 180. 34 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 213-216. 35 Kanthasamy, Jeyakannan v. M.C.I. (S.C.C., no. 35990), Abella, McLachlin, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Gascon, (Moldaver and Wagner dissenting), December 10, 2015, [2015] 3 SCR 909, 2015 SCC 61. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Dr. XXXX Report, at p. 181. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para 30. 38 Ibid. 39 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.7, Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Practice Network, Humanitarian Exchange Number 70, The Lake Chad Basin: an overlooked crisis?, October 2017, at p. 28. 40 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.7. 41 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.7, at pp. 28-29. 42 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.7, at p. 29. 43 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 1.9, United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note. Nigeria: Medical and Healthcare Issues. Version 2.0, August 28, 2018, at ss. 9.1.5-9.1.6. 44 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 1.9, at s. 9.1.2 . 45 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 1.9, at ss. 9.1.3-9.1.4. 46 See Okafor, Sara v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6848-10), Beaudry, August 17, 2011, 2011 FC 1002; see also Olalere, Mary Oluwatobi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3828-16), Russell J., April 20 2017, 2017 FC 385, at para 60. 47 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, United States Department of State, Nigeria: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, March 13, 2019, at p. 35. 48 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1. 49 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, at p. 34. 50 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.22, IRB, RIR NGA105523, June 30, 2016, at pp. 1-2. 51 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.22, at p. 2. 52 Supra endnote 47, NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, at p. 33 53 Supra endnote 47, NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, at p. 32 54 Supra endnote 47, NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, at p. 34 55 Supra endnote 47, NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 2.1, at p. 32 56 Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851, identified by the Chairperson, pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the IRPA, effective date: July 6, 2018, at para 18. 57 NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.9, IRB, RIR NGA103907, November 19, 2012, at p. 3. 58 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.9, at p. 4. 59 Ibid., NDP for Nigeria (August 20, 2019), item 5.9, at pp. 4 and 6. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-02657 TB9-02658 TB9-02659 TB9-02660 TB9-02661 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 17 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français