TB9-10221

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-10221 TB9-10222 TB9-10223 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 17, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Dilani Mohan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Naseem Mithoowani Barrister and Solicitor Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] These are my reasons for allowing the appeal by the Appellants: XXXX XXXX XXXX (Mr. M), XXXX XXXX (Mrs. A), and their daughter, XXXX XXXX (XXXX). The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected their refugee claims because of credibility and the availability of an internal flight alternative (IFA) for the Appellants in Chittagong or Sylhet. The Appellants dispute the RPD's findings. After independently reviewing the record, I find that the RPD's decision is wrong and that the Appellants are persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND [2] The Appellants are citizens of Bangladesh. They claimed protection because they fear that Mr. M's brother, XXXX XXXX (XXXX), and his Awami League (AL) thugs will kill or harm them. It is alleged that XXXX is a criminal in their home town of XXXX and that he is responsible for voter intimidation and other criminal activity aimed at increasing or securing support for the AL. [3] The Appellants claim that their problems with XXXX began after Mr. M's father passed away and gave his sons XXXX XXXX XXXX. Because he was living in Dhaka at that time, Mr. M did not use the XXXX he inherited, so XXXX took care of XXXX XXXX. Mr. M claims that, when he lost his job in 2001 and tried to access XXXX XXXX, XXXX sent thugs to beat him. After that beating, Mr. M fled Bangladesh for XXXX where he began an XXXX XXXX. Mrs. A and XXXX joined him in 2003. The Appellants lived in XXXX for several years, growing their business and wealth. XXXX came to Canada in 2013 on a student visa. That same year, Mr. M returned to Bangladesh. He claims that his other brother, XXXX, had requested his presence because it appeared that XXXX may have allowed Mr. M to reclaim it. Mr. M claims that he attended a meeting with his brothers in XXXX 2013 for this purpose, but nothing was resolved. He claims that the situation worsened when, on XXXX 20, 2013, XXXX was shot to death in an assassination attempt targeting Mr. M. This prompted Mr. M to return to XXXX, but the situation there was also worsening for foreigners. Mr. M and his family were attacked multiple times by extremists and robbed by their employees. Eventually, Mr. M and Mrs. A decided to leave. By that time, in 2016, XXXX had developed a XXXX XXXX and required her parents' support, so Mr. M and Mrs. A were granted visas to visit XXXX in Canada. However, before coming here in 2017, Mr. M consulted with his lawyer and friend who advised that it would be safe for him and Mrs. A to return to Bangladesh. The Appellants claim that, shortly after arriving in Bangladesh in XXXX 2017, Mr. M's brother sent his thugs to attack him. Mr. M claims that his wife and former Counsel filed a police report and that, once he was released from hospital, he and his wife fled to XXXX, but they received a threatening phone call the following day indicating that their whereabouts were known and that they must withdraw their police complaint. Mr. M and Mrs. A then left Bangladesh a few days later for Canada and claimed refugee protection here along with their daughter, XXXX. The Appellants further allege that, after arriving in Canada, XXXX initiated a criminal complaint against Mr. M, which has resulted in an arrest warrant being issued for him. The Appellants claim that the threats from XXXX are ongoing. [4] The RPD rejected their claims on XXXX XXXX, 2019. Although the Appellants were found generally credible, in that the RPD accepted that a dispute over ancestral XXXX exists and that XXXX is a criminal who uses violence to intimidate voters, the RPD found that some of their allegations were either not credible or not established by the evidence. The RPD found that XXXX was not affiliated with the AL and that the people who attacked Mr. M in XXXX 2017 were not connected to the AL. The RPD found there was insufficient evidence that XXXX had filed a complaint against Mr. M in 2017 or 2018 and that there was not evidence that Mrs. A or XXXX would face gendered persecution or cumulative discrimination. Finally, the RPD found that the Appellants have viable IFAs in Chittagong and Sylhet. Arguments on Appeal [5] The Appellants argue that the RPD's findings were microscopic and speculative. They also argue that the RPD erred on both prongs of the IFA assessment. The Appellants have produced several pieces of new evidence, and they have requested an oral hearing. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION (RAD) [6] The RAD must do its own analysis of the record to decide whether or not the RPD's decision was wrong. The RAD generally does not owe any deference except in cases where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence. The RPD did not have a meaningful advantage in this particular case. The standard applied on this appeal is therefore one of correctness. NEW EVIDENCE [7] The law1 states that the Appellant can only present evidence that arose after their claim was rejected, or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. It is up to the Appellants to make full and detailed submissions about how any of the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of the law and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.2 [8] In addition, if the new evidence meets one of the factors set out in the law, then, the second step of the analysis is for the RAD to apply the adapted Raza factors endorsed in Singh.3 In Singh, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the RAD should assess the admissibility of the new evidence for its credibility, relevance and newness. The RAD is not to consider the fourth Raza factor of materiality to the admission of new evidence, which is a consideration for subsection 110(6) and the request for an oral hearing.4 [9] The Appellants have 12 documents which consist of letters from their Bengali lawyer, a Bengali hematologist; documents related to the criminal case against Mr. M (general diary, charge sheet, primary information and arrest warrant); affidavits from Mr. XXXX XXXX, Mr. XXXX XXXX and Ms. XXXX XXXX; a letter confirming the date of Mr. M's mother's death; a list of the XXXX AL members; and a psychotherapist's report. For the reasons that follow, I am allowing all of these documents, except the letter from the XXXX Union Parishad, the list of AL members, and the affidavit by Mr. XXXX, into evidence. Not admitted as new evidence Letter from the XXXX Union Parishad, dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 [10] Although this letter post-dates the RPD hearing, I do not find it relevant, and I therefore do not allow it into evidence. The record already contains a death certificate for Mr. M's mother, and I do not find that the date of death is a contested fact. I therefore do not find this evidence relevant or new, and since it does not meet the Singh criteria, it is not admissible. List of Awami League members for XXXX XXXX Branch, undated [11] The list is undated, but XXXX explains in her affidavit that XXXX was only recently appointed to the position of XXXX XXXX with the XXXX AL. She explained that, at the time of the hearing and to the best of their knowledge, XXXX did not XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX with the AL. I note that the document does not have a date, which makes it impossible for me to confirm when XXXX was XXXX XXXX I find that the Appellants could have tried to get this evidence prior to the RPD's decision, and therefore it does not meet the requirements under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I am therefore not admitting this as new evidence. Affidavit of XXXX XXXX (Mr. M's cousin), dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 [12] This document post-dates the RPD hearing and relates to Mr. XXXXs efforts to obtain the list of Awami League members. The Appellants have not explained why they requested the list after their hearing and when they believed XXXX had no title within the AL. They have not explained why MrXXXX XXXX affidavit could not have been provided before the RPD reached its decision. The affidavit does not meet the legal requirements and therefore is not admitted. Admitted as new evidence Letter from Bengali XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 [13] In her affidavit, XXXX explains that she was not aware that a letter from a medical professional in Bangladesh would be required since she had asked her Counsel about it but had been told that this was not necessary. I find that XXXX has established that it was not possible for her to have obtained this letter even though she could reasonably have been expected to provide it before the RPD reached its decision. I also find that the letter is credible since it comes from a XXXX in Bangladesh and that it is relevant because it speaks to XXXX ability to get treatment for her condition and, therefore, to relocate safely within Bangladesh. The information is new because the only previous information comes from a Canadian doctor who may not necessarily be able to speak to conditions in Bangladesh. I therefore find that this letter meets the requirements under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the requirements of newness, relevance and credibility under Singh. Letter from Advocate XXXX XXXX XXXX and attached criminal case documents (general diary, charge sheet, primary information and arrest warrant) [14] This letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2019, comes from the Appellants' current or new lawyer in Bangladesh, who was retained sometime after the RPD hearing. The letter encloses the criminal case documents which the Appellants could not obtain prior to the decision, having only learned of the case through the correspondence of their former Bengali counsel roughly 10 days before their hearing. Similarly, the arrest warrant could not be obtained because it was issued after the hearing, and the Appellants claim they were not aware of it until hearing about it through Mrs. A's brother in late XXXX 2019. The RPD made its decision on XXXX XXXX, 2019. The Appellants therefore had less than one month in which to find new counsel and to request their help in getting these documents. The letter from Advocate XXXX explains that he received the request in XXXX XXXX XXXX, mere weeks before the RPD's decision was made. As a result and even though the dates of the general diary, charge sheet, primary information and arrest warrant precede the RPD's decision, I find that these documents were not reasonably available to them at the time the RPD's decision was made. I therefore find that these documents satisfy the criteria under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [15] With respect to the credibility, relevance and newness of these documents, I find them all relevant and new because they provide details about the criminal case against Mr. M. This information was not available through the Appellants' former lawyer in Bangladesh. I find the documents credible because they come as attachments from a lawyer who is presumed not to have a vested interest in the outcome of the Appellants' claim. Additionally, I reviewed the original documents and see nothing on their face that causes me to doubt their authenticity. Nor do I see anything in the National Documentation Package (NDP) for Bangladesh to suggest that warrants issued by a District Judge Court cannot be obtained by Counsel. I note that Advocate XXXX explicitly stated that the warrant was obtained directly from the courthouse and that the other documents were obtained at the police station. Based on the evidence about the sourcing of these documents, I find that they are credible. Affidavit from Mr. XXXX XXXX (Mrs. A's brother), dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019 [16] The affidavit from Mr. XXXX relates a visit by XXXX and police officers after the warrant against Mr. M was issued. Since this visit allegedly occurred in late XXXX 2019, I accept that this information was difficult to provide, given the limited time, to the RPD before it reached its decision only a few weeks later on XXXX XXXX, 2019. I find that the affidavit meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I further find this evidence credible since it is a sworn statement. I find it new because it relates to recent events about which the RPD had not heard, and I find this evidence relevant because the event involves XXXX XXXX For these reasons, Mr. XXXX affidavit is admitted. Affidavit of XXXX XXXX (Mr. M's sister-in-law), dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 [17] The Appellants claim that Ms. XXXX only recently resumed contact with them through mutual acquaintances. The Appellants claim that they were previously unable to contact Ms. XXXX by phone. I accept this information as evidence that the Appellants could not have produced this letter at an earlier time. Moreover, the letter from Ms. XXXX post-dates the RPD's decision, and I therefore accept that it meets the requirements under IRPA. I find the letter relevant and credible because it comes from Mr. M's widowed sister-in-law, and it relates to the allegation that Mr. M's brother was murdered. Since no information was previously presented from Ms. XXXX, and because there was no first-hand or witness evidence, I also consider this evidence new. This letter therefore satisfies the Singh criteria, and I allow it into evidence. Report from psychotherapist, Ms. XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 [18] This report post-dates the RPD's decision and comes at the request of what appears to be a new physician. Although the Appellants had provided some psychological evidence at the hearing, and although I find they could reasonably have been expected to seek out a psychological assessment in advance of the RPD hearing, I find that this report meets the requirements of the IRPA. The referral to this psychotherapist occurred on XXXX XXXX, 2019, and I find that this satisfies the requirements of subsection 110(4). I further find the report relevant because it speaks to Mr. M's XXXX XXXX and capacity to testify to the facts of his case. I find the report credible because it comes from a trained mental health professional, and I find the information in the report new because it provides a level of detailed analysis of Mr. M's mental health that was not previously before the RPD. I therefore allow this evidence into the record. An oral hearing is not required [19] I do not find that the evidence raises any serious issues with respect to the Appellants' credibility that are central to the decision on their claims. Consequently, I will not convoke a hearing. ANALYSIS [20] The Appellants' new evidence provides greater clarity and detail on issues, such as the false criminal case, that the Appellants could not have testified to during their hearing, and for which the RPD drew negative credibility inferences. For the reasons that follow, I am overturning a number of the RPD's credibility findings and conclude that the new evidence establishes the absence on an IFA for the Appellants in Bangladesh. Because I find that the Appellants face a risk to their lives because of targeting by XXXX, I will not be addressing the claims by Mrs. A or XXXX regarding the alleged risks that they face on the basis of gender. [21] Credibility was a factor in the RPD's decision. The Appellants have argued that the RPD's credibility assessment was based on microscopic and speculative findings that should not have been used to find some of their allegations not credible. I agree in some cases and find that the Appellants were generally credible with respect to their core allegations. [22] Like the RPD, I find that the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. M and XXXX are in an ongoing dispute over inherited XXXX and that XXXX is a criminal who uses violence to intimidate voters. I find that the RPD erred in its other findings. For example, I disagree with the RPD's conclusions that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX with the AL and that the people who attacked Mr. M in XXXX 2017 were not connected to the AL. I also disagree with the RPD's findings that XXXX had not filed a complaint against Mr. M in 2017 or 2018. Credibility findings that I am overturning XXXX affiliation with the AL [23] The RPD found that XXXX did not have any connection to the AL and that he was just a criminal who used his criminal connections to intimidate voters and influence elections. I am overturning this finding because I agree with the Appellants that there is evidence to show that political parties like the AL often align themselves with criminal elements who are then rewarded for their service to the party. Therefore, even if they do not hold political office, it is certainly plausible that XXXX would have been politically connected. I find that the RPD's rejection of XXXX political affiliation, while accepting his criminal activity and intimidation of voters, ignores XXXX purpose in the latter. Surely, if one is engaged in intimidating voters into voting for a particular party, it is because they stand to gain some benefit. I find that this was sufficient, in itself, to establish a connection to the party. However, I note that the Appellants have now produced evidence which credibly establishes that XXXX has held the position of Organizing Secretary since at least XXXX 2017.5 I therefore accept the Appellants' allegation that XXXX is connected to the AL and that the RPD's negative credibility finding is in error. XXXX pursuit of Mr. M is supported by his connection to the AL [24] After reviewing the record, I find that the heart of this appeal lies in determining whether XXXX minions belong to him or to the AL. If his minions belong to him, they do whatever he asks, whether the demands are personal or related to benefits to be gained from the AL. If the minions come from the AL, then their actions must be considered to be directed by someone in the AL who sees some benefit to the party from pursuing Mr. M. I find that this distinction is inherent to understanding the RPD's decision, particularly its finding regarding the 2017 incident in which Mr. M claims he was assaulted in XXXX by AL thugs acting on XXXX order. [25] The Appellants argue that the RPD did not make a clear finding about the 2017 assault allegation. I disagree. The decision states "[t]he panel believes that XXXX XXXX likely sent goons to intimidate or scare the principal claimant, to prevent him from claiming rights to the XXXX."6 I find that the RPD accepted that this assault occurred, but it did not find that the assault was committed by members of the AL because of insufficient evidence on which to establish that allegation. I do not find this to be a question of credibility, but rather one of sufficiency of evidence to demonstrate that XXXX thugs were acting as supporters of the AL instead of as gang members acting on XXXX orders to settle a personal vendetta. [26] I agree with the RPD that the evidence before it was insufficient to establish that the thugs whom XXXX had sent to assault Mr. M belonged to the AL rather than to him. However, the Appellants' allegation was not that XXXX needed to borrow thugs from AL but that he used his own gang members to support his personal ambitions within the AL. Mr. M's testimony that the thugs claimed to act for the AL seems to be an exaggeration, but not one that is fatal to the claim. I find that the purpose of any exaggeration was to stress the connection between XXXX followers and the AL and to demonstrate that XXXX would be protected if he were to harm the Appellants. [27] In my view, the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that XXXX is a criminal leader who has the ability to command a troop of people to do as he wishes for both his benefit and that of the political party he serves. The significance of XXXX political connections is essential to his ability to evade criminal prosecution and conviction. As the country evidence suggests, these political connections are what give criminals like XXXX the audacity to commit crimes because they know they will be met with impunity. Because I find that XXXX goons do not need to be independently linked to the AL, I find there is neither an issue of credibility nor sufficiency of evidence that would support the RPD's conclusion that there is no link to the AL. Police complaint and phone call after the 2017 assault [28] The RPD also reasoned that the Appellants would not have been pressured to withdraw a criminal complaint that did not mention either the AL, XXXX, or the names of Mr. M's assailants. Based on this implausibility, the RPD found that the Appellants had not received a phone call warning them to withdraw their police complaint on the day they arrived in XXXX. [29] The Appellants have pointed out that the report only left out XXXX name and reference to the AL because the police officers refused to include that information.7 The Appellants argue that common sense suggests that XXXX would demand the withdrawal of the complaint because, even though no one is named, the existence of the complaint could lead to an investigation. I do not find this explanation compelling because the point of the complaint being taken without the names is effectively a superficial remedy. The Appellants argued that the police refused to take a complaint where the accused were identified. There is little reason to believe that these same officers or their colleagues would be willing to then investigate a report that they had thwarted from the outset. [30] The more compelling explanation offered by the Appellants is that the very act of filing the complaint is an act of provocation that needed to be quashed. I also note that the act of provocation in the Appellants' claim is actually Mr. M's presence in Bangladesh, since that is what allegedly led XXXX to target Mr. M again out of fear that he will try to reclaim his XXXX. For these reasons, the combination of the order to withdraw the complaint and the subsequent false case filed against Mr. M suggest that XXXX is attempting to intimidate Mr. M and prevent him from ever trying to hold his brother accountable or to exercise his right to his XXXX. I find that the call was one among a string of efforts by XXXX to intimidate his brother, and I therefore overturn the RPD's finding that the threatening call never took place. Case against Mr. M [31] The RPD found that XXXX had not filed a false case against Mr. M because he was not able to provide details about the case and because it found Ms. M's testimony evolving. I have reviewed the transcript of the hearing and find that there was no evolution of Mr. M's testimony. Although Mr. M at times confused the year the case was lodged (2017) with the year he received news of the case, I find that he quickly corrected himself. Mr. M only stated once that he received news of the case in 2018. At all other times, he consistently stated that he only learned of the case through the letter from his Bangladeshi lawyer, which he received on XXXX XXXX. Given the date, the fact that the year had only recently changed from 2018 to 2019, I do not find it a grievous inconsistency that Mr. M stated once that he learned of the case in 2018. [32] I further note that Mr. M was not stating that he received the letter from his lawyer in 2017. He was stating that, through the XXXX 2019 letter from his lawyer, he learned that a case had been filed two years earlier, in 2017. Although Mr. M could have tried to amend his narrative to reflect the new information, I note that the letter from his lawyer was only received seven days before the Appellants' hearing, and the RPD Rules would not have permitted the late amendment to the narrative without an application. The decision to simply testify orally at the hearing about the incident under these circumstances does not, in my view, raise credibility concerns. [33] As a result of all of the above and the case documents and arrest warrant that the Appellants have submitted, I find that the RPD's determination that no case exists is incorrect. The Appellants' allegations about the false case are in keeping with country documents which indicate that the filing of false cases and charge sheets is not unheard of in Bangladesh. In a 2015 survey of 15,206 Bengali households, 5.3% reported that false cases were filed against them, and 2.2% had false charge sheets filed against them.8 According to the Immigration and Refugee Board's (IRB's) own research in the Response to Information Request (RIR), the fabrication of allegations in Bangladeshi courts is not uncommon, and it is usually the complainant who fabricates and files these cases in order to harass the accused individuals.9 Other evidence indicates that the police fabricate cases as well.10 I accept, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. M is the subject of a vindictive and false case filed against him and that there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Bangladesh. [34] Having found that Mr. M is the subject of a criminal complaint initiated by his brother and which has resulted in a warrant for his arrest, I find that it is not necessary for me to address the credibility concerns raised by the RPD regarding the Appellants' allegations about XXXX murder and the letter from Mr. M's mother. Although I have some concerns about the credibility and reliability of the letter from Mr. M's mother, because it was written by her XXXX and delivered many months after her passing, I do not find that this outweighs the risks established by the evidence of the false case against Mr. M. I therefore turn to consider the availability of state protection for the Appellants and the potential for them to relocate elsewhere in Bangladesh. State Protection [35] The objective country evidence shows that the police in Bangladesh are often implicated in illegal or criminal activities because of rampant corruption, much of which is linked to the motivations of politicians and other politically connected individuals.11 Other information indicates that, even if the police wanted to help, they are so poorly resourced that they are ineffective and generally unable to provide adequate protection.12 [36] I find that the country documents corroborate the Appellants' claims that the police refused to take their complaint or would only do so if the names of the politically connected individuals were removed in order to protect against job loss.13 One report states that: ..."Always, the ruling politicians and their powerful allies control the police from centralised and decentralised hierarchies. They control and influence the process of recruitment, posting, promotion, and rewarding of the police, preferring nepotism and corruption against merits and professional competence". ...14 [37] Given XXXX position as both an established criminal and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX AL committee, I find that he has the political connections and clout to be granted impunity for his actions. The result, on a balance of probabilities, is that the Appellants will not find protection forthcoming if any of them are targeted by XXXX men directly or indirectly. The Appellants do not have a viable IFA in Chittagong or Sylhet [38] The test15 to determine whether refugee claimants should be required to seek safety elsewhere in their country of origin is two pronged. The first prong asks whether there are any locations in the country of reference where a refugee claimant may live without facing a serious possibility of persecution. That assessment involves considering how motivated the agents of persecution are in finding the claimant and their capacity to reach them. If a safe location can be identified, then the RPD must consider the second prong of the test, which asks whether it would be reasonable under the circumstances to ask a person to relocate to that place. The claimants bear the burden of proof to show that they would be at risk anywhere in Bangladesh and specifically in the potential IFA areas of Chittagong or Sylhet in this case. [39] I find that the test fails on the first prong. I have already found that XXXX has used his followers to violently assault Mr. M; tracked him upon relocation from XXXX to XXXX XXXX threatened him to withdraw his complaint; and initiated a false case against Mr. M. These findings establish, on a balance of probabilities, that XXXX is motivated to find Mr. M and to harm him or his family members, by extension, in order to prevent any challenge to his appropriation of Mr. M's XXXX. These findings also establish that XXXX has the resources to locate Mr. M and to pressure law enforcement agents to bend to his will. [40] Because the problems with impunity and corruption are nation-wide, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. M and Mrs. A do not have a safe IFA in Chittagong, where they were previously found, or in Sylhet. Setu [41] Even though XXXX was not directly threatened by XXXX, I find that she would be at risk because of her relationship to her father. I further find that it would be unduly harsh or unreasonable to ask XXXX to relocate to Chittagong or Sylhet on account of her medical condition. I note that the XXXX in Canada and Bangladesh confirm that XXXX has a XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX has stated that Bangladesh has limited access to frontline therapies that would help XXXX and that there is risk in her case because her condition has not stabilized. On this basis, I find that XXXX does not have a viable IFA anywhere in Bangladesh. CONCLUSION [42] On the basis of the totality of the evidence and the findings above, I find that the Appellants have demonstrated that the RPD's decision was incorrect and that they face risk to their lives because of XXXX XXXX dispute between Mr. M and his brother. [43] I therefore allow the appeal. I set aside the RPD's decision and substitute a determination that the Appellants are persons in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the IRPA. (signed) "Dilani Mohan" Dilani Mohan March 17, 2020 Date 1 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 2 Rule 3(3)(g)(iii), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 3 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, cited in M.C.I. v. Singh (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 4 M.C.I. v. Singh (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 313, Police complaint. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10, RPD's Reasons and Decision, para 35. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 41, Narrative. 8 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 1.9, United Kingdom (UK) Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note, Bangladesh: Background information, including actors of protection, and internal relocation, Version 2.0", January 2018, at p. 19. 9 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 9.4, IRB, RIR BGD105614.E, "Whether the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Dhaka issues order sheets and arrest warrants...", November 18, 2016, at p. 6. 10 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 4.4, Asylum Research Consultancy, "Bangladesh Query Response: Awami League (AL) and supporters of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP)", December 15, 2016, at p. 24. 11 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 1.9 (supra, endnote 8), at p. 6, s. 2.2.3, and p. 12, s. 6.4.2; see also item 2.1, US Department of State, "Bangladesh: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018", March 13, 2019, at pp. 7-8; see also item 4.4 (ibid.), at p. 23. 12 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 4.4 (ibid.), at p. 25. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Amended BOC Narrative, at p. 41; and pp. 272-274, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 38-40; see also NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 4.4 (ibid.), at p. 25. 14 NDP for Bangladesh (February 28, 2020), item 4.4 (ibid.), at p. 26. 15 Rasaratnam v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-10221 TB9-10222 TB9-10223 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français