TB9-35546

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-35546 TB9-35547 / TB9-35548 / TB9-35549 TB9-35550 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision February 22, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Dilani Mohan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Richard Odeleye Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] These are my reasons for dismissing the appeal by the Appellants: XXXX XXXX XXXX (Ms. E); and her children: XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX), XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX), XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX), and XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX). After independently reviewing the record I find that the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) is correct, for different reasons, and that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND [2] The Appellants are Nigerian citizens seeking protection from Ms. E's in-laws. Ms. E's husband, who is also the father of her children, is a member of a XXXX XXXX in Benin City. In XXXX 2019, Ms. E's husband refused his uncle's request to subject his twin sons, XXXX and XXXX, to the family's traditional rituals and blood oath-taking scheduled for XXXX 2019, after the boys reached age 10. A week later, Ms. E's husband's uncle and father went to their home and threatened to force the matter if they continued to refuse. The following month, the uncle returned with two youths and demanded that Ms. E hand over the twins to prepare for the rituals. Ms. E was assaulted when she refused and was sent to the hospital. She went to the police the next day but was told they do not get involved in traditional family matters. On XXXX XXXX, 2019, the Appellants went to live with Ms. E's aunt in Lagos. Two weeks later, her husband told her that his family knew where she was hiding. One week later, an anonymous caller told her that her twins would disappear and said her exact address. The Appellants fled to Abuja the next day to stay with Ms. E's husband's friend, but her husband's uncle soon learned their location. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, the appellants left Nigeria and came directly to Canada for protection. [3] The RPD rejected the Appellants' claims on XXXX XXXX, 2019 because it found that they had an internal flight alternative (IFA) in Port Harcourt. The RPD relied on the framework and reasoning in the decision TB7-19851, which was a designated as jurisprudential guide until April 6, 2020.1 Although the determinative issue was stated to the availability of an IFA, the RPD also found that the XXXX 2019 assault had not occurred, and that Ms. E was not threatened over the telephone while she was in Lagos. The RPD further found that Ms. E had relied on fraudulent medical or police reports, and that her behaviour was inconsistent with someone who was truly subjectively afraid. Arguments on appeal [4] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred by camouflaging a determination based primarily on credibility, in the language of an IFA analysis. They argue that the RPD must have found the evidence of Appellants' experiences credible in order to move to an IFA assessment, and that the RPD therefore wrongly attacked Ms. E's credibility and subjective fear. They argue that although the RPD found problems with the evidence, it did not make any conclusions about credibility, and that it speculated at times about the way Ms. E ought to have behaved. They further argue that the evidentiary problems that were highlighted, are insignificant, misinterpreted, or inconsistent with the Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Gender Guidelines),2 and that there was an insufficient basis for the RPD to find that Ms. E had relied on fraudulent documents. Finally, the Appellants argue that the RPD did not fully consider the evidence, Ms. E's profile, or the hurdles that she would face as a non-indigene and single mother of four children in Port Harcourt. Member's Directions regarding credibility issues [5] On January 21, 20213 the Appellants, through their counsel, were sent a request for submissions in response to several credibility concerns that arose from the evidence in the RPD record. Submissions were received on February 4, 2021.4 In his submissions, counsel argues that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) does not have the jurisdiction to raise credibility concerns that the RPD did not raise with the Appellants. He argues that, if responses to the credibility concerns that I raised are required, I am not permitted to convoke an oral hearing or to obtain evidence. He argues that I have no alternative but to send the matter back for redetermination. NEW EVIDENCE: [6] According to the law,5 I can only allow counsel's late submission if it is relevant and probative, brings any new evidence to the appeal, and if the Appellants could not reasonably have provided the new evidence with their perfected record. I must also consider the criteria under s. 110(4) of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),6 and assess whether the evidence is new, credible and relevant.7 Counsel's submissions were responding directly to new credibility concerns that were not put to the Appellants at their RPD hearing. Consequently, I find that the submissions could not reasonably have been provided before the RPD's decision, or at the time the appeal was perfected, because the Appellants could not have known that this was an issue. These submissions are therefore relevant and probative to the questions that were asked and are, in my view, new evidence. Since they come from counsel, I further find the source and circumstance of the submissions credible. The submissions are therefore allowed into evidence. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION (RAD) [7] I have applied the standard of correctness while reviewing the RPD decision and have conducted an independent assessment of the evidence before me. ANALYSIS [8] The determinative issue in this appeal are Ms. E's credibility and the sufficiency of evidence. The Appellants correctly point out that a large number of the RPD's findings were about Ms. E's credibility. However, I disagree with their statement that the RPD's credibility findings do not permit it to determine the claim on the basis of an IFA in Port Harcourt. Based on my reading of the RPD's reasons, I find that, although the RPD found that Ms. E was neither assaulted in XXXX 2019, nor threatened in Lagos, it did not disbelieve her evidence that her husband is a XXXX XXXX member or that his family want her twin sons to undergo traditional rites. As the Appellants correctly noted, the RPD raised concerns about some of Ms. E's other evidence but did not make any clear credibility findings on those aspects of the narrative. The RPD was obligated to consider the remaining untainted evidence and determine whether, on that basis, the Appellants had established their claim. In this instance, the RPD found that the Appellants had not, and that their claim fell on the issue of an IFA. Credibility [9] The RPD did not challenge Ms. E's credibility or her evidence regarding the following: * her husband's membership in the XXXX XXXX of Benin; * that the XXXX family have their own ritual practices that are followed; * that her sons are expected to participate in rituals once they are 10 years old; * that her husband's father and uncle called and visited them in XXXX 2019; and * that her husband's father visited their home on XXXX XXXX, 2019 to reiterate that they need to prepare the children for the ritual and oath taking. [10] Having considered both the oral and documentary evidence, I find that those facts have been established on a balance of probabilities. The remainder of the evidence, which I now turn to consider, relates to the assault against Ms. E in XXXX 2019, the threatening calls she received in Lagos and Abuja, and her evidence regarding the viability of an IFA in Port Harcourt. The RAD has jurisdiction to raise new issues [11] After reviewing the entire record, I raised concerns8 about inconsistencies between the Appellants' narratives, affidavits, testimony regarding the timing of the threatening call that Ms. E received in Lagos. I raised a second issue about inconsistencies between the Appellants' narratives and testimony, and the summary of Mr. E's experience of trauma that was provided in the XXXX report. None of these inconsistencies had been put to the Appellants by the RPD at their hearing. This was effectively the first time the Appellants were being notified that there were any credibility concerns on these points. [12] Counsel for the Appellants' argues9 firstly, that the RAD is not entitled to review the RPD's decision or the record on issues that the RPD did not find determinative. He argues that, because the inconsistencies that I identified in my review were neither raised by the RPD nor put to the Appellants during their RPD hearing, I would be acting outside of the law by seeking evidence from the Appellants on this new issue. He states that his submissions cannot be a substitute for the testimony that the Appellants would provide after being confronted with an alleged inconsistency. [13] I disagree with counsel on all three points. Firstly, as a RAD Member, I am obligated to conduct my own independent analysis of the record to decide whether or not the RPD's decision was wrong. While I am guided by the Appellants' Memorandum of Argument and the errors that they identify, I am not limited to considering only those arguments. As a neutral and independent adjudicator, I must make a decision that is grounded in a fulsome and meaningful engagement with the evidence. Sometimes this means raising issues that the RPD did not or pointing to evidence in the record that the RPD did not reference. [14] Secondly, the RAD is tasked with bringing resolution to appeals either by allowing and substituting a positive decision, dismissing and confirming a negative decision, or by allowing and sending a claim back to the RPD if the record is considerably deficient. That does not preclude the RAD from clarifying the record, by providing notice of new issues, if that allows the appeal to be determined. In the present case, the larger issue is credibility, and the Appellants have correctly noted that, even though the RPD stated that IFA was determinative, that determination was based on a series of credibility findings. Credibility was therefore already a live issue, as it is in any claim for protection. There is some caselaw which suggests that, under these circumstances, no notice is required to be given to the appellants since credibility was already a basis of the decision.10 However, in the present case and given the RPD's statement that IFA was determinative, notice was provided to the Appellants through their counsel of the issues being raised. Given the case law on the RAD's jurisdiction to raise new issues, I find that I am within my authority to seek clarification from the Appellants and that the principles of procedural fairness have been met because the Appellants were given notice of the issues.11 [15] Finally, I note that, despite being provided notice and two weeks to respond, Counsel did not provide any affidavits or other evidence from the Appellants in response to the questions raised. I note that Counsel is very experienced, having appeared before the RPD and the RAD multiple times. Counsel should therefore be aware that Appellants have the right to make applications to introduce late evidence via a Rule 29 application,12 and that they could have done so while also maintaining their right to a redetermination of their claim. [16] Ultimately, I find that counsel's submissions ignore the role and purpose of the RAD. I do not accept counsel's arguments and draw negative inferences from the lack of response to the credibility concerns that were raised. The XXXX 2019 assault [17] The RPD raised concerns about the credibility of this incident because of inconsistencies between Ms. E's testimony, narrative, and the related medical and police reports. The primary concern was that Ms. E repeatedly stated that she was bruised after being beaten and confirmed that the photos13 of her injuries showed bruising. She did not mention being burned by any substances. However, the medical report14 she produced stated that a corrosive substance was poured on her. When asked to explain the contradiction, Ms. E stated that she did not know why the medical report mentioned the use of a XXXX XXXX. On appeal, the Appellants argue that the medical report just expresses the opinion of a medical practitioner on how the injury was sustained. [18] I cannot accept this explanation. The report states "patient was said to have been assaulted by a group of boys and substance suspected to be XXXX XXXX XXXX on her." [emphasis added]15 This indicates that the medical practitioner was informed about the cause of the injury by someone, most likely Ms. E herself since no one else was present when the assault occurred. Moreover, in order to accept that this was an independent opinion held by the examining doctor, I would have to accept that the doctor saw some consistency between Ms. E's injuries and the typical appearance of corrosive substance burns. However, that does not reconcile with Ms. E's insistence that she was only beaten. I do not accept that the author, a Senior Medical Officer, would not know the difference between bruises and lacerations caused by a XXXX XXXX. Therefore, I do not find that the report reflects an independent opinion or speculation by the author of the medical note. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. E reported to the doctors that a XXXX XXXX was XXXX on her. I draw a negative inference about Ms. E's credibility regarding the cause of that hospital visit. While I do not find that the medical report is fraudulent, I find its credibility and reliability in supporting Ms. E's narrative is diminished. I give the report no weight in establishing that she was beaten by thugs working for her husband's uncle. [19] The photos that Ms. E provided as evidence of her injuries contain neither date nor location stamps. While the photos do show some injuries, there is insufficient detail accompanying the photos for me to find, on a balance of probabilities, that they were taken at the hospital, or that they are related to an assault by Ms. E's husband's uncle and his thugs. I have found Ms. E's credibility about her medical evidence undermined because of the significant inconsistency in the medical report. I find that the lack of detail in the photos does not revive Ms. E's credibility on this point. [20] The RPD also drew negative credibility inferences from Ms. E's vague descriptions of her assailants. She testified that her husband's uncle was accompanied by two muscular youths.16 When asked what language they spoke, she stated that they spoke Edo. She could not provide any further description. While I agree with the Appellants that people have different notions of what it means to describe someone, I disagree that the solitary descriptor of "muscular" is sufficient because of the duration of Ms. E's interaction with them, and because of the significance of that interaction. This was the first time that Ms. E was approached on her own, and she never stated that she was unable to see her assailants. Moreover, by her own admission,17 there was conversation or discussion that took place before the beating, giving her time to view the young men. Besides herself, there were only three other people involved and she already knew who the uncle was. It stands to reason that she would have taken some note of the two strangers accompanying him, enough to at least describe their complexion, height, dress, or other identifying characteristics. I therefore agree with the RPD that Ms. E's testimony on this issue was vague, and that it undermines her credibility regarding this incident. [21] I also note that, in the version of events relayed to her XXXX, Ms. E stated that her children were at school.18 This contradicts her testimony at the hearing, where she stated that her children had returned from school and were locked inside the house at the time of the assault.19 As I have already noted, although this inconsistency was put to the Appellants, they did not provide any response. I find that their silence on the issue further detracts from Ms. E's credibility generally, and in regard to this incident. [22] The RPD stated that Ms. E never included her hospitalization in her original narrative. The RPD questioned how she could forget something as significant as needing medical attention. I note that Ms. E mentioned her hospitalization in the narrative amendment20 and explained that she did not recall everything when she initially prepared her narrative. The RPD did not ask why it took so long for her to amend her narrative to include this fact, and I do not find her explanation unreasonable. I therefore find that the RPD erred by drawing a negative inference on this point. [23] Regarding the police report, I agree with the Appellants that the RPD was wrong to doubt the credibility of the document because it did not mention the use of XXXX XXXX. I find that the value of the document must be considered in light of Ms. E's testimony and other evidence, which is that she was assaulted. The outlier is the mention of a XXXX XXXX in the medical report, and I have given that report no weight. I cannot fault the police report for failing to mention something that I have found not credible, and I see nothing on the face of the police report to suggest that it is not credible or genuine. The availability of fraudulent documents in Nigeria is, on its own, insufficient to establish that the police report is forged or not genuine. [24] The Appellants have argued that the RPD failed to consider the Gender Guidelines in its analysis of Ms. E's evidence about the XXXX 2019 assault. They have not specified how the analysis failed to comply with the Guidelines. Based on my review, I see no obvious inconsistencies with the Guidelines, so I reject the Appellants' argument. [25] The evidence before me is insufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. E was assaulted on XXXX XXXX, 2019. As I have noted, Ms. E's testimony about her assailants was vague, and some of the meagre detail that she provided was only after asked direct questions, such as the language that the youths spoke. The affidavit21 from Ms. E's husband is silent on this issue. It does not mention the assault or any of the threats that were received. The affidavits from the two people who housed her while she was in hiding-her aunt22 and her husband's friend23-also do not mention the assault. The letter from her church in Benin City, though it refers to the assault and injuries, does not come from a first-hand witness, so I give it little weight. I therefore have only Ms. E's testimony and the police report. In light of the credibility concerns with Ms. E's testimony on this issue, I do not find the evidence sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the XXXX 2019 assault occurred. Telephone threats in Lagos and Abuja [26] Ms. E's evidence is that, following the XXXX 2019 assault, she took her children to hide in Lagos at the home of her Aunt, and that she was later threatened by telephone while living there. This is corroborated by an affidavit from Ms. E's aunt, stating that Ms. E came to her home on XXXX XXXX, 2019 and that she began receiving threatening phone calls while living there.24 [27] The RPD found that these threatening calls did not occur because Ms. E had opted to answer phone calls from unknown callers and not to change her SIM card despite going into hiding. I agree that, even if the RPD disagrees with the wisdom behind Ms. E's actions, that does not form a valid basis for discounting the credibility of her actions. There is nothing implausible about Ms. E's decision to either keep her SIM card or to answer the phone. [28] The RPD also drew a negative credibility inference from Ms. E's unwillingness to approach police in Lagos after receiving the call, because it was different police force and because Ms. E's reasons were also that she did not want to cause a scene. I am mindful that Ms. E has not pursued an education beyond secondary school and that her stated experience was that police would not be able to intervene in traditional and family matters. I find that, under the circumstances, her explanation is plausible. I overturn the RPD's negative inference. [29] That said, I agree with some of the RPD's credibility inferences. For instance, the RPD found Ms. E lacked credibility because, despite drafting her narrative only a few weeks after the threats occurred, she did not specify the dates of the threat calls she received in Lagos. Ms. E stated that 14 days after arriving in Lagos, her husband called to say that his family knew where the Appellants were hiding. In her original narrative she stated that 3 days after the phone call from her husband, she received a threatening call from an unknown person. In her narrative amendment, Ms. E stated that this threatening call came one week after her husband's call. That would make the date of the call, approximately XXXX XXXX. The Appellants left Nigeria on XXXX XXXX, only five days later, and they filed their claims on XXXX XXXX, less than three weeks after arriving in Canada.25 [30] The RPD drew a negative inference from Ms. E's failure to mention the exact date of the call. While I find that somewhat concerning, I find Ms. E's credibility is more damaged by the inconsistency in the dates and facts she has provided about the call. For instance, during her hearing, Ms. E confirmed that she received the threatening call on XXXX XXXX.26 That is a date that does not conform to either of the narrative timelines. She also stated to her psychotherapist, that the threatening call was made by her father-in-law, and that he spoke directly to her aunt only a few days after she arrived in Lagos.27 This version of events is not in line with either the narratives, or the testimony. And as I have noted, despite being notified of these inconsistencies, the Appellants have not provided any response or explanation. [31] Because this call notified Ms. E that she would not be able to hide in Lagos with her children, and because it prompted her relocation to Abuja, I find that it was very significant. It was more significant than the call from her husband one week earlier, in which he told her that his family knew where she was. The call from her husband did not motivate Ms. E to move elsewhere. It was the unknown caller who scared her into doing so. Given the significance of the call, I find the inconsistency around the date when it occurred, and the identity of the caller undermines Ms. E's credibility. I find the evidence does not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. E was threatened by her father-in-law, or by an anonymous caller while she was in Abuja. [32] Regarding the threats Ms. E received in Abuja, there are credibility concerns there as well. Ms. E's psychotherapist states that the Appellants moved out Ms. E's husband's friend's home on the same day that they arrived in Abuja because his home was too small. The report does not mention any threats being relayed to Ms. E through her husband or otherwise. [33] I find it significant that the only person available to provide evidence of the threats is Ms. E's husband. His affidavit does not mention any threats being relayed to him by phone in XXXX 2019. Although Ms. E testified that she did not speak with anyone except her mother, her husband provided an affidavit for her, which I find indicates that he is supporting her in her claim. [34] In fact, Ms. E's narrative and testimony do not reflect any kind of hostility from her husband or a history of abuse at his hands. For this reason, I find counsel's submissions that Ms. E is estranged from her husband, and that he is not supporting her to be unfounded and, in fact, contradicted by the available evidence. The psychotherapists report does not revive Ms. E's credibility [35] As I have noted throughout these reasons, the psychotherapist's report is based on a version of events that departs significantly from the narrative that Ms. E presented the to RPD.28 I have put these inconsistencies to the Appellants but have not received any explanation, let alone one that might be satisfactory. Although the report was produced by a psychotherapist with experience treating symptoms of mental illness, I note that a psychotherapist's report is only as reliable as the facts on which it is based. The XXXX experience, clinical approach, and conclusions are made unreliable because of the unexplained inconsistencies in the factual history on which the assessment was made. [36] I note that there is reference to a diagnosis of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) by Ms. E's doctor.29 However, family physicians are not authorized to provide such diagnoses. While I accept that Ms. E may have presented with symptoms consistent with XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX; the inconsistencies in the factual foundation of the report, make it unreliable in establishing that the cause of the symptoms are the threats from Ms. E's in-laws. I give the report little weight and find that it is insufficient to revive Ms. E's credibility. [37] Based on all of the above, I find that Ms. E has not established herself to be a credible witness, and that the deficiencies in her testimony are not adequately explained by cultural or psychological factors. I find that the documentary evidence, though sufficient to establish some of the Appellants' narrative, is insufficient in establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that they have faced or continue to face repercussions and threats for refusing to participate in any traditional family rituals or oath taking rites. As a result, I find that there is no reason to consider the availability of an IFA in Nigeria, since I find that the Appellants do not face a serious possibility of persecution from Ms. E's husband's family members. CONCLUSION [38] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD, for reasons different from the RPD's, that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Dilani Mohan February 22, 2021 Date 1 Immigration Refugee Board (IRB), Notice of Revocation of Jurisprudential Guide designation for TB7-19851, Effective date: July 6, 2018, pursuant to s. 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Policy on the Use of Jurisprudential Guides (Policy 2003-01, as amended on December 3, 2019), and following consultation with the Deputy Chairpersons of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/revocation-tb7-19851.aspx> 2 IRB, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, Effective date: November 13, 1966. 3 Exhibit RAD-1, Member's Directions, dated January 21, 2021. 4 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Directions, dated Febraury 3, 2021. 5 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, as amended, rule 29(4). 6 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, subsection 110(4). 7 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza 2007 FC 385. 8 Exhibit RAD-1, Member's Directions, dated January 21, 2021. 9 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Directions, dated February 3, 2021, at para 3. 10 Sary v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 178 . 11 Bouchra v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1063; See also Kwakwa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 600; see also Sary v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 178. 12 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, as amended, s. 29. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7 at pages 440-441. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7 at page 430. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7 at page 430. 16 RPD Hearing Recording, November 22, 2019 at 01:14:48 - 01:25:50. 17 RPD Hearing Recording, November 22, 2019 at 01:14:48 - 01:21:55. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, Psychotherapist's Report at page 400. 19 RPD Hearing Recording, November 22, 2019 at 01:14:48 - 01:20:00. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, Narrative Amendment at page 79. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Mr. E at pages 414-415. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Ms. E's aunt at page 419. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Mr. E's friend at page 417. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, Affidavit of Ms. E's aunt at page 419. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, Narrative Amendment at page 79. 26 RPD Hearing Recording, November 22, 2019 at 01:37:00 - 01:45:00. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, XXXXXXX Report at page 400. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, XXXXXXX Report at page 400. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6 at pages 397 and 399. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-35546 TB9-35547 / TB9-35548 / TB9-35549 TB9-35550 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français