TB9-05027

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-05027 TB9-05028 TB9-05029 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision February 21, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Joseph W. Richards II Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Dotun Mosun Davies Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Principal Appellant or PA), XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Minor Male Appellant or MMA), and XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Minor Female Appellant or MFA), citizens of Nigeria, appealed a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated February 12, 2019, rejecting their claims for refugee protection. [2] They have submitted new evidence in the form of a legal opinion from a Nigerian lawyer. They further request an oral hearing. [3] The Appellants fear persecution based on membership in a particular social group (women/family). At issue is whether an internal flight alternative (IFA) exists and, if not, whether the Appellants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [4] The appeals are dismissed. After a fulsome and independent analysis of the record, I find that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection, pursuant to section 96 and section 97 of the IRPA. BACKGROUND [5] The Appellants' claims are detailed in the narrative accompanying the PA's Basis of Claim (BOC) form of January 4, 2018 and are summarized in the RPD's reasons. The claims of the Minor Appellants are based entirely on the narrative of their mother, the PA. Amended narratives were completed on October 9, 2018 and January 7, 2019.1 [6] Counsel was invited to provide written submissions on the viability of Port Harcourt, Ibadan, or Benin City as internal flight alternatives, in light of the updated National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada's (IRB's) Response to Information Request (RIR) in item 5.9 was specifically brought to the Appellants' attention, as it addresses the issue of the relocation of female-headed households.2 Counsel's reply was received on January 20, 2020 and has been considered in reaching my decision.3 [7] The Appellants left Nigeria on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 and arrived in Canada, irregularly, seven days later.4 They fear persecution in Nigeria due to the demands from the family of the PA's husband that the MFA undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). The Appellants together fear being subjected to blood rituals by the family of the PA's father. [8] The RPD rejected the claims of the Appellants due to the PA's lack of credibility and the existence of an IFA in Port Harcourt. The Appellants argue that the RPD's negative credibility findings were microscopic, that there are reasonable explanations for any evidentiary inconsistencies, and that no viable IFA exists. [9] My reasons have taken into consideration the XXXX assessment of XXXX XXXX XXXX, who diagnosed the PA with XXXX XXXX with XXXX and XXXX XXXX. The report further states that the PA may have difficulty with XXXX, a finding that is particularly relevant in evaluating the PA's oral testimony.5 ANALYSIS Role of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) [10] The RAD reviews RPD decisions by conducting an independent assessment of the refugee claim. If the RAD's assessment differs from that of the RPD, the RAD may substitute its own decision.6 If the RPD has a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral testimony, then the RPD's finding may be accorded deference.7 Otherwise, the standard of correctness applies.8 [11] In this case, the RPD did not have a meaningful advantage. The Panel's observation that the PA "appeared flustered" when answering questions related to her father's funeral does not constitute a meaningful advantage.9 It is an isolated observation that I am equally capable of assessing by listening to the audio recording of the hearing. Accordingly, I have conducted an independent assessment of the oral and documentary evidence using the correctness standard. The RPD hearing was procedurally fair [12] The Appellants allege that the Panel Member rendered a "perverse and capricious decision" that relied on "western reasoning."10 While these allegations may only appear to be challenging the RPD's credibility findings, they also imply that the Appellants did not receive a fair hearing. To be clear, the Appellants have not specifically argued that a breach of procedural fairness occurred. Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the allegations, I have turned my mind to the issue in my independent assessment of the record. [13] Claimants have the right to be heard and the right to an impartial decision-maker. These rights are critical components of the rules of natural justice that this Board is bound to follow.11 If a potential breach of procedural fairness emerges perceptibly from the record, then I ought to evaluate it - even if it is not specifically raised by the parties.12 Following my assessment, I have concluded that the RPD hearing was procedurally fair. [14] In reviewing the audio recording of the RPD hearing, I did, however, notice a problematic series of questions by the Panel. After Counsel finished questioning the PA, the Panel Member announced a final 20-minute break, following which, oral submissions were to be provided.13 Once the hearing resumed, the Panel Member proceeded to examine the PA for seven minutes. The questions focussed on the PA's claim of being the eldest child and the related necessity for the PA to participate in certain family rituals connected to her father's death.14 [15] I appreciate that panel members enjoy a broad latitude in questioning witnesses. In this case, the Panel Member was attempting to test the credibility of the PA based on certain recently disclosed documents: a news article and a funeral programme.15 Even so, based on the RPD's findings, it is clear that culturally insensitive assumptions informed the questioning. For instance, the Panel: (a) equated the order of the PA's siblings in the funeral programme to their order of birth; (b) assumed two of the PA's siblings could not be born in the same year; (c) construed the positive remarks of the PA's husband in the funeral programme as a sign that marrying the PA did not produce contention;16 and (d) negatively interpreted the PA's demeanour as "flustered".17 [16] Viewed separately, these issues could be simply categorized as microscopic credibility findings. However, together, especially when added to the Panel Member's tone, they evidence the type of insensitivity that could call into question the fairness of the hearing. Two specific examples from the hearing illustrate the point. When the PA explained that, in her culture, the oldest male child normally appears first when siblings are listed, the Panel Member dismissively uttered, "That may be; that may be".18 As the PA began to elaborate on how her half-brother was raised in the family home, despite having a different biological mother, the Panel Member interrupted with a condescending recitation of a phrase in the funeral programme: "The marriage was blessed with 5 children."19 Side remarks and interruptions of this nature can discourage forthright testimony regarding complex culturally sensitive topics. [17] Nevertheless, these concerns must be analyzed in the context of the entire hearing. The hearing lasted over two hours and fifteen minutes. The PA was represented by Counsel, and the RPD did not interfere with that right. Counsel provided fifty-five minutes of uninterrupted closing submissions and submitted ample post-hearing disclosure to address the Panel's problematic questioning.20 Furthermore, the Appellants understood the case to be met. From the outset, the Panel Member meticulously identified the documents in the record, thoroughly explained how the hearing would proceed, including the PA's role as a designated representative, and highlighted the determinative issues (e.g. credibility, well-foundedness of fear, and ability to relocate to Ibadan, Port Harcourt or Benin City).21 Throughout the rest of the hearing, the PA was given the opportunity to respond to adverse evidence that was raised.22 Because the objectionable questioning occurred right before closing submissions, I find that the PA's earlier testimony was not prejudiced in any way. [18] Considering all of the above, the hearing was procedurally fair. It is important to mention that in reaching my decision on the outcome of these appeals, I have not relied on the RPD's credibility findings that resulted from the culturally insensitive assumptions, described above.23 New evidence is not admissible and an oral hearing is not permitted [19] The Appellants have filed new evidence in the form of a legal opinion from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a Nigerian barrister.24 This new evidence is included in the Appellants' Record that was filed on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. Appellants bear the responsibility of making full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to them.25 [20] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that new evidence may only be presented if it: (a) arose after the rejection of his claim; (b) was not reasonably available; or (c) could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have been presented, at the time of the rejection. [21] Necessarily implied from the purpose of subsection 110(4) are the conjunctive criteria of credibility and relevance.26 Even if subsection 110(4) is strictly satisfied, the new evidence will not be considered if it lacks credibility as to its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence or if it is incapable of proving or disproving a relevant fact to the refugee claim.27 [22] I find that the proposed new evidence is inadmissible because it does not fulfill the strict requirements of subsection 110(4). The claim was rejected on February 12, 2019. The fact that the opinion letter was signed on March 14, 2019 is not determinative. 28 Pursuant to the case law, it is the facts or circumstances established by the documentary evidence which must postdate the date of the rejection of the claim.29 In this case, the barrister's opinion seeks to prove that Port Harcourt is not a viable IFA. It summarizes the Appellants' claims, provides generic information about the human rights climate in Nigeria, and critiques the enforceability of Nigerian law. The ten-page document does not refer to any circumstances arising after February 12, 2019. After reviewing the sources cited, I note that every report, article, statute, case, or treaty is dated well before February 12, 2019. [23] The Appellants did not provide a reasonable explanation as to why this document could not have been provided before the rejection of their claim. The Appellants contend that they could not have anticipated the finding that Port Harcourt is an IFA.30 I find this argument without merit. Under the law, IFAs are an integral part of the refugee definition.31 During the hearing, the Appellants were given adequate notice that Port Harcourt was a potential IFA. The Appellants did not signal that they needed more time to prepare their case and did not request an adjournment to gather new evidence. In the eight days between the hearing and the decision, the Appellants did not make an application to submit post-hearing documents, pursuant to Rule 43 of the RPD Rules. Accordingly, I determine that the proposed new evidence was reasonably available and, at the time of rejection, could reasonably be expected to have been presented. [24] Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, a prerequisite for an oral hearing is admissible new evidence. As there is no such evidence in this appeal, an oral hearing cannot be held. Port Harcourt is a viable IFA [25] The determinative issue in this appeal is whether a viable IFA exists. Port Harcourt, Benin City, and Ibadan were identified at the RPD hearing as potential IFAs. For the following reasons, I find that the city of Port Harcourt is viable. Port Harcourt is safe [26] Counsel argues that the Panel Member failed to consider the subjective fear of the Appellants in assessing the IFA.32 Notwithstanding the Appellants' subjective fear, there must be an objective basis for that fear in Port Harcourt. The first step of the IFA analysis is to determine whether there is a serious possibility of the Appellants being persecuted and/or being personally subjected to danger in the proposed IFA.33 In this case, credible evidence that the PA's in-laws or the PA's family will pursue the Appellants if they relocated would warrant a determination that Port Harcourt is unsafe. After reviewing the record, I have found insufficient evidence to that effect. [27] The PA traces her risk of persecution to the fact that in 2006, she married someone from a different tribe which sparked much strife in both her husband's family and her own. The family of the PA's husband demanded that the PA undergo rituals. After the MFA was born in XXXX2008, the PA's in-laws began insisting that the MFA be circumcised. Once the PA's father died, her family insisted that she carry out a cleansing blood ritual. [28] Assuming without deciding that these core allegations are true, they do not explain why Port Harcourt is unsafe. When the PA was asked about relocating to Port Harcourt, she said that she feared the widespread influence of her husband's family; they are "powerful" and "get what they want".34 This testimony is unduly vague. The same is true of the PA's arguments that her "...husband's extended family have engaged the police previously to their advantage" and that the police are "corrupt".35 No specific incidents were referenced to credibly substantiate this alleged corrupt influence. Also, no corroborating affidavits, declarations, e-mails, or media reports were adduced. [29] I am instead left with the undisputed fact that the PA departed Nigeria on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, over 11 years into her marriage. During this extensive period, the PA was not subjected to any harmful rituals, and there were no attempts to perform FGM on the MFA. The Appellants remained in Nigeria for fifteen months after obtaining their visas for the United States, and they even travelled to the United Kingdom in 2014.36 Together, these facts are inconsistent with an objective basis for the Appellants' fear. I therefore find that there is no serious possibility that the Appellants will be harmed in Port Harcourt. The incidents of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014 and XXXX 2017 do not affect the safety of Port Harcourt [30] If the Appellants can establish that the agents of persecution have the means and motivation to track them down in Port Harcourt, then the proposed IFA would be unsafe. After reviewing the evidence, I find that neither the family of the PA's husband nor that of the PA's father have such interest. [31] I recognize that the PA alleges that she was kidnapped in Lagos on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014 and that she was confined for three days. She was not subjected to any rituals during that time, though her husband's uncles did threaten to kill her. The PA added in her testimony that she was beaten by her captors.37 Her husband's sister facilitated her escape. Despite the egregiousness of this event, the PA, upon her release, chose to remain in Lagos for the next three years. There is no credible evidence suggesting that the Appellants have been pursued by the family of the PA's husband since XXXX 2014. [32] The PA further claims that her father's family holds her responsible for her father's death, which occurred in XXXX 2017. Only a series of blood rituals - performed by the PA and her two children - can serve as a sufficient "cleanser" to avoid future calamities.38 To evade these dangerous rituals, the PA and her siblings decided to bury their father in Ibadan rather than in his hometown of Ile-Ife. To remain safe prior to the burial, the PA temporarily fled to Abuja. [33] The PA testified that she was "caught" in Abuja, but I find that this is likely an exaggeration.39 The revised narrative contends that the police arrested the friends that the PA was staying with - not the PA herself. The statement from one of these friends, XXXX XXXX XXXX, confirms that the police interrogated her regarding the PA's whereabouts, but it does not allude to an arrest.40 In any event, later in XXXX, the PA returned to Lagos where she peacefully remained for seven months before heading to the United States. Moreover, the port of entry notes indicate that the PA maintained the same residence in Lagos from XXXX 2012 to XXXX 2017.41 If the PA could live without incident in Lagos for these seven months in 2017, she likely would have been even safer if she relocated to a new address in another Nigerian city such as Port Harcourt. Port Harcourt is thus a safe IFA. Relocating to Port Harcourt is reasonable [34] I must now assess whether Port Harcourt is a reasonable IFA, under the circumstances. The PA put forward that social and political unrest, in addition to the fact that she would be negatively perceived as a single mother, make relocation to Port Harcourt impracticable.42 The PA also claims that living in Port Harcourt is expensive, and, as a result, she would be unable to access employment, social services, accommodation or health care.43 [35] I have considered the framework set out in the relevant Jurisprudential Guide and find it useful for this case.44 Though I am not bound by the Guide, I recognize that it ensures consistent adjudication in cases with essential similarities.45 As the Guide itself repeatedly acknowledges, each case turns on its own facts.46 The emphasis of the Guide is the relocation of single women,47 and so, when necessary, I will adjust my analysis to consider the fact that the Appellants are a family of four (including the PA's husband who resides in Nigeria). [36] The PA has not specifically described the social and political unrest in Port Harcourt. Nevertheless, Counsel correctly identifies barriers that single women face in relocating within Nigeria, citing item 5.9 of the NDP in particular. Systemic discrimination in housing and employment place women and non-indigenous residents in precarious positions.48 Counsel's submission to the RAD of January 20, 2020 references the absence of a support network in Port Harcourt which would leave the PA "...financially, emotionally and legally naked and alone."49 Moreover, as non-indigenes, it is alleged that the Minor Appellants would face barriers to education, and so their best interests need to be considered pursuant to the Child Guideline.50 [37] However, these challenges arise when there is a lack of male support. Though the PA asserts that her husband "would not leave his job as that is his means of survival," the evidence as a whole suggests otherwise, on a balance of probabilities.51 The PA testified that she intends to continue her marriage.52 Her husband has actively contributed to the Appellants' refugee claims by providing a copy of his passport, an affidavit, and a parental consent letter.53 E-mail correspondence dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019 attests to the couple's continuing communication.54 For these reasons, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the PA's husband would meaningfully support his family if they returned to Nigeria. The PA would therefore not be perceived as a single woman. [38] Furthermore, the PA has completed 16 years of education and holds a XXXX XXXX XXXXinXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.55 She worked as a XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX in Lagos for seven years (2007 to 2014).56 Her husband obtained a XXXX XXXX in Switzerland in XXXX XXXX XXXX management and continues to work in Lagos.57 The PA is concerned that if the family relocated together to Port Harcourt, her husband would have to resign his job in Lagos.58 I find that this type of hardship does not amount to "undue hardship" or "great physical danger" as mentioned in the Gender Guideline and the jurisprudence.59 The PA and her husband are both well-educated individuals with extensive employment histories. The PA's husband currently lives undisturbed in Lagos, and the couple correspond with one another via e-mail. The PA's husband could therefore assist in significantly mitigating any obstacles to securing housing or employment, if the Appellants returned. [39] I also note that the "best interest of the child" test referred to in the Child Guideline applies only to the procedures used for child claimants and the assessment of a child's evidence. Contrary to Counsel's suggestion, it does not provide an independent basis for determining that an IFA is unreasonable. Instead, it states, "With respect to the merits of the child's claim, all of the elements of the Convention refugee definition must be satisfied."60 To that end, it is noteworthy that school attendance of children 5 to 14 years old is over 76%; the MFA and the MMA are 11 and 9 years old, respectively. Non-indigene children are entitled to access primary and secondary education, even though there is some evidence that societal norms can discourage this access.61 [40] I am mindful of the PA's XXXX condition of XXXX XXXX with XXXX and XXXX XXXX.62 The country documentation indicates, "There is no form of XXXX illness for which treatment is not available in Nigeria" with treatment facilities located principally in urban centres.63 Citizens must pay for healthcare services, but this is a difficulty affecting all Nigerians. On a balance of probabilities, I find that the PA would be able to treat her health issues in Port Harcourt. [41] There is an extensive road network throughout Nigeria and major cities, such as Port Harcourt, have international airports. The federal constitution guarantees freedom of movement, though obstacles arise because of the importance of indigeneity. In large urban centres, these obstacles are reduced, and significant migrant communities have developed.64 [42] Overall, the burden is on the Appellants to point to specific obstacles that render the relocation to Port Harcourt objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh.65 The Appellants have advanced insufficient credible evidence to meet their burden. As a result, I find that Port Harcourt is a reasonable IFA. CONCLUSION [43] I dismiss the appeals and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) "Joseph W. Richards II" Joseph W. Richards II February 21, 2020 Date 1 See Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 53, 65. 2 Exhibit RAD-1, Member's Directive, Notice to counsel regarding updated NDP, January 8, 2020. 3 Exhibit P-3, Counsel's Reply to Member's Directive regarding updated NDP, January 20, 2020. 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 98. 5 Ibid., at p. 377. 6 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, November 7, 2014, 2014 FC 799, at paras. 54-55. 7 Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145, at para. 105. 8 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at paras. 70, 103. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons and Decision, at para. 21. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum, at p. 87 (para. 105); Affidavit of the PA, at p. 6 (para. 8). 11 See e.g. IRPA, s. 170(e); "Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada" (April 9, 2019), https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx, at paras. 29-30. 12 See e.g. Selvarahah, Ahilan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2174-13), Russell, July 31, 2014, 2014 FC 769, at para. 68. See also IRPA, s. 3(2)(c), (e). 13 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:13:45. 14 Ibid., at 01:15:00 - 01:20:20. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 392-402. 16 Ibid., RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para. 22. 17 Ibid., at paras. 21, 23. 18 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:17:15. 19 Ibid., at 01:18:05. See also Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 350, 400. 20 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:20:38 - 02:15:10; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 403-427. 21 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:07:00 - 00:07:45; 00:09:00 - 00:12:30. 22 See e.g. discussion about when the PA stopped working at Honda: ibid., at 00:30:30. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at pp. 10-12 (paras. 20-24). 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Exhibit "A", pp. 8-19. 25 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 26 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at paras. 63-65. 27 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para. 13. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Exhibit "A", p. 18. 29 Mavangou, Prisca Audrey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3722-18), Gascon, February 12, 2019, 2019 FC 177, at para. 26; Raza, supra endnote 27, at para. 16. 30 See Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum, p. 65 (para. 12). 31 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum, at p. 78 (para. 74). 33 Rasaratnam, supra endnote 31. 34 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:52:00. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, at p. 6 (para. 9). 36 See Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 125, 37 Ibid., at p. 66 (para. 6); Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:50:50. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 68 (para. 8). 39 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:53:10. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 68-69 (para. 10), 302 (third paragraph). 41 Ibid., at p. 94 (question 12, "Addresses"). 42 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:00:40. 43 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, at p. 6 (para. 11). 44 Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851, identified by the Chairperson, pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the IRPA, effective date: July 6, 2018. 45 Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. M.C.I. (F.C., nos. IMM-3433-17, IMM-3373-18), Crampton, September 4, 2019, 2019 FC 1126, at para. 70. 46 Ibid., at paras. 113-116, 118. 47 Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851, supra endnote 44, at para. 16. 48 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), item 5.9, IRB, RIR NGA106362.E, Whether women who head their own household, without male or family support, can obtain housing and employment in Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, and Port Harcourt; government support services available to female-headed households (2017-November 2019), November 20, 2019; item 1.8, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report: Nigeria, March 9, 2018, at 3.8-3.10, 5.24; and item 1.17, UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note. Nigeria: Internal relocation. Version 1.0, March 2019, at 2.2.5. 49 Exhibit P-3, Counsel's Reply to Member's Directive regarding updated NDP, January 20, 2020, at p. 2. 50 Ibid., at p. 5. 51 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, at p. 6 (para. 11). 52 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:01:35. 53 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 304-309, 313. 54 Ibid., at p. 389. 55 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:29:05. 56 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 93. 57 Ibid., at p. 304 (para. 6). 58 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:01:10. 59 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson, pursuant to Subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 13, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx , Section C, "Evidentiary Matters"; Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (C.A.), [1994] 1 F.C. 589, at para. 14. 60 Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson, pursuant to Subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, September 10, 1996 as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002 in paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir03.aspx, section A.I, "General Principle". 61 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), item 1.7, UK Home Office, Nigeria: Country Background Note: Nigeria, May 2019, at p. 14 (7.2.1); item 1.13, IRB, RIR NGA106361, "Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment...", October 30, 2019, at p. 10. 62 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 375-377. 63 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), item 1.9, UK Home Office, Nigeria: Medical and healthcare issues, 28 August 2018, at pp. 15-16. 64 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), item 1.8, supra endnote 48, at pp. 31-32; item 13.1, IRB, RIR NGA106361, "Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services...", October 30, 2019, at p. 13. 65 Jurisprudential Guide, supra endnote 44, at para. 29; Thirunavukkarasu, supra endnote 59, at para. 13. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-05027 TB9-05028 TB9-05029 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français