VC0-01806

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC0-01806 VC0-01807 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision April 15, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Cheryl Braden Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Mbong E. Akinyemi Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss this appeal. [2] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant) and XXXX XXXX XXXX (Associate Appellant) are citizens of Nigeria. They allege that they fear harm from the Principal Appellant's extended family in XXXX, Nigeria because the Principal Appellant has declined to accept an appointment as the XXXX XXXX of their family cult. [3] The Appellants left Nigeria on XXXX XXXX, 2017 for the United States, and then proceeded to Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 to make their refugee claim. The Minister intervened in the Appellants' claim on credibility and identity grounds. [4] The Appellants' claims were heard before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) on January 22, 2020 and rejected on February 11, 2020. The RPD accepted that the Appellants' identities are established on a balance of probabilities and that their claims are credible but found that they have viable internal flight alternatives (IFAs) in Abuja and Port Harcourt. [5] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its assessment of the means and motivation of the agents of persecution to locate them in the proposed IFA locations, erred in its analysis of the reasonableness of the IFAs with respect to the Appellants' indigeneship and religion, and erred by failing to consider and apply the Gender Guidelines1 in evaluating the IFAs. [6] Following my independent review and analysis of the record and the arguments in this appeal, I find that the determinative issue is IFA, and that the Appellants have a viable IFA in Abuja. DECISION [7] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [8] Subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)2 sets out that an appellant may only present evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. Where evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) will then go on to consider the factors of newness, credibility and relevance affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza and Singh.3 [9] Further, as the Appellants' new evidence was provided after the appeal was perfected, I will consider the factors set out in Rule 29(4) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, which are the relevance and probative value, any new evidence it brings to the appeal, and whether or not the Appellants, with reasonable effort, could have provided the evidence and submissions with their Appellants' Record.4 [10] The Appellants commenced their appeal on February 28, 2020. On March 15, 2020, the filing deadlines were temporarily suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 12, 2020, a Practice Notice was issued regarding the resumption of timeframes, indicating that any appellant's records that were due between January 1, 2020 and August 18, 2020 must be submitted no later than August 19, 20205. The Practice Notice also referred to a Communique on RAD Graduated Return to Business which specified timeframes for submitting additional documents. The Communique indicates that additional documents submitted in perfected appeals would be accepted without a formal application under Rule 37, but that the provisions of Rule 29 and s.110(4) of IRPA would continue to apply, with due consideration to be given to the novel circumstances of COVID-19. [11] The Appellants submitted their Appellants' Record on August 4, 2020, and as of that time, their appeal was perfected. Their record contained no new evidence but did contain an affidavit from the Principal Appellant sworn before the Appellants' counsel on June 26, 2020, as well as a memorandum signed by counsel on July 10, 2020. [12] On August 11, 2020, the Appellants submitted additional evidence and submissions for their appeal pursuant to RAD Rule 29. The evidence consists of a number of articles regarding the country conditions for women in Nigeria6, as well as a group of documents that are specific to the Appellants' personal situation in Nigeria7. [13] The Appellants submit that the new evidence was not available to them at the time of the RPD hearing, and further submit that they could not reach counsel because of the COVID-19 pandemic and related business closures. They argue that the documents are relevant and probative as they speak to the continuing persecution of the Appellants and demonstrate the hardship to the Appellants in relocating to the IFAs. Some of the country conditions evidence is accepted as new evidence [14] The Appellants argued in their original appeal memorandum that the RPD erred in its analysis of the IFAs by failing to consider the Gender Guidelines as they relate to the Associate Appellant, noting that none of the proposed IFA locations provides a guarantee against sexual and gender-based violence, which has "reached an alarming high as recent disclosures which will be submitted as new evidence, rape and abuse of women is becoming a pandemic all over Nigeria and no where is safe in Nigeria"8. [15] It is clear, given this statement in the Appellants' memorandum, that the country conditions evidence relating to recent gender-based violence in Nigeria was available to the Appellants at the time that they perfected their appeal. They have given no explanation for failing to include these documents in their record, beyond a broad statement that they were unable to meet with their counsel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. I note that these articles contain printing headers that show they were printed off the internet on June 16, 2020 and June 19, 2020, and I find it reasonable to expect that such evidence could have been forwarded to counsel electronically. Moreover, I note that the Principal Appellant did meet with counsel on June 26, 2020 to swear his affidavit. For those reasons, I find that with reasonable effort, this evidence could have been included in the Appellants' Record, which weighs against its admissibility pursuant to Rule 29. [16] At the same time however, I find that these documents are relevant and probative with respect to the current country conditions in Nigeria and that they bring new evidence to the appeal with respect to recent incidents of gender-based violence and the government's response to it. I find that overall, the rule 29 factors weigh in favour of accepting this evidence. [17] The evidence must also be considered against the usual requirements for new evidence set out in s.110(4) and Singh/Raza. [18] The first article, from the Fair Observer9, is dated November 29, 2019, prior to the date of the RPD decision. In the absence of submissions to explain why this evidence was unavailable or why the Appellants could not have been reasonably expected to present it to the RPD, I find that the document is inadmissible under s.110(4). [19] The remaining articles all post-date the RPD decision and report on events that happened after the RPD decision, thus they are admissible under s.110(4). I also find that they meet the jurisprudential requirements for new evidence, as they bring new and relevant information to the appeal about the current country conditions in Nigeria and are taken from sufficiently credible news sources. As such, all of the remaining country conditions articles10 are accepted as new evidence in this appeal. The claimant-specific documents are rejected because they are not credible [20] I now turn to the documents that relate specifically to the Appellants' personal situation: a. An email dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2020 from the Appellants' son in Nigeria11; b. An email dated XXXX XXXX, 2020 from the Principal Appellant's friend in Nigeria enclosing an excerpt of a newspaper dated XXXX XXXX, 202012; and c. An affidavit dated XXXX XXXX, 2020 from the Associate Appellant's cousin in Nigeria13. [21] These documents relate to two events that are alleged to have taken place after the RPD decision - a newspaper advertisement allegedly published by the agents of persecution in a Nigerian newspaper seeking information about the whereabouts of the Appellants, and an alleged attack on the Associate Appellant's cousin by the agents of persecution in Port Harcourt, Nigeria in XXXX 2020. [22] Having considered the rule 29 factors as well as the admissibility requirements of s.110(4) and Singh/Raza, I find that this evidence is not credible, and I reject it as new evidence. Given that my finding that the documents are not credible is determinative of their admissibility as new evidence, I have focused my analysis on that finding. [23] I note that both of these events are alleged to have occurred before the date of perfection of the Appellants' appeal, and the Appellants' knowledge of these events prior to the perfection of the appeal is evidenced by the email from their son dated XXXX XXXX, 2020 which refers to both events. However, neither of these alleged events were referred to in their memorandum or the Principal Appellant's affidavit that was included in the record, signed on July 10, 2020 and June 26, 2020 respectively14. [24] There is no explanation provided for their failure to include this information or evidence in their record, beyond a broad statement that it was not available at the time of the RPD hearing and they could not reach counsel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Clearly, they were in touch with counsel on June 26, 2020, given that counsel witnessed an affidavit on that date; moreover, the evidence could have been forwarded to counsel electronically. [25] The cousin's affidavit was sworn on XXXX XXXX, 2020 and indicates that the affiant could not swear it before that date due to pandemic lockdowns; while I accept that this is reasonable, I note that the Appellants did not perfect the appeal until August 4, 2020 and were clearly aware of this attack prior to the date of perfection of their appeal, yet inexplicably failed to mention it at all. [26] I do not find that the Appellants have established that they could not have included evidence about these two new events in their appellant's record, and more importantly, I find that their failure to mention this important evidence in their record, or to provide a reasonable explanation for their failure to do so within their Rule 29 submissions, casts doubt on the credibility of the evidence overall. [27] I also find that the evidence regarding the alleged attack on the Associate Appellant's cousin is both fortuitous and implausible in the circumstances. This cousin is alleged to have taken custody of the Appellants' three children after the Appellants left Nigeria in XXXX 2017. One of the RPD's key findings was that the failure of the agents of persecution to seek out the Appellants' children in Lagos suggested that they would be unlikely or unable to seek out the Appellants if they returned to Nigeria and settled in an IFA location such as Port Harcourt. The Appellants argued at length against this finding in their memorandum dated July 10, 2020 but did not mention any new attacks or efforts made by the agents of persecution. Now they have presented evidence that predates their memorandum, indicating that the cousin was attacked in an IFA location, some three and a half years after she took custody of the Appellants' children. [28] The Appellants' evidence before the RPD was that the agents of persecution visited the Associate Appellant's parents looking for them shortly after they left Nigeria in XXXX 2017, and that they had also approached the Principal Appellant's brother, who submitted an affidavit indicating that he had been "seriously pressured" to reveal the Appellants' location by the persecutors15. They also sent a letter to the Principal Appellant's family indicating that the Appellants were required to attend a festival in Nigeria in XXXXor XXXX 201816. This was the extent of the actions alleged to have been taken by the agents of persecution following the Appellants' departure from Nigeria. [29] Under the circumstances, I find it implausible - as in clearly unlikely and outside of the realm of what could be reasonably expected17 - that the agents of persecution would pursue the Appellants' children through their caregiver over three years later, and not in her usual place of residence but in a different location hundreds of kilometers away, coincidentally being one of the locations suggested by the RPD as a potential IFA location. I further note that the affidavit describes that the cousin was assaulted and hospitalized as a result, but provides no medical evidence to support this allegation, which I would expect to be reasonably available under the alleged circumstances. [30] Further, while I have no specific concerns with the content of the newspaper advertisement, I find that its fortuitous timing after years of inaction from the agents of persecution, as well as the Appellants' failure to reasonably explain the absence of any mention of this alleged new development in their Appellants' Record - which was filed well after the newspaper's publication, and well after the Appellants' son's email which references the advertisement - is sufficient cause to reject the document as new evidence on credibility grounds. [31] I further note that even if I accepted the newspaper advertisement as new evidence, it would have little weight overall, given that the Appellants have provided no information as to the source publication or how widely it is distributed, which is highly relevant and important in consideration of the large population and geographical area of Nigeria. [32] For the above reasons, I find that the cousin's affidavit, newspaper advertisement and related emails are not admissible as new evidence, and I reject them all. No oral hearing [33] The Appellants have requested an oral hearing. Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA provides that the RAD may hold an oral hearing if new evidence is accepted that raises a serious credibility issue with respect to the appellant, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim, and if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the claim. As the new evidence that was admitted does not relate to the Appellants' credibility, the RAD will proceed without an oral hearing. ANALYSIS [34] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.18 [35] The RPD found that the determinative issue in this appeal is IFA and found that the Appellants have safe and reasonable IFAs in Abuja and Port Harcourt. [36] Following my independent review and analysis of the record and the arguments in this appeal, I find that the Appellants have a viable IFA in Abuja. In light of this finding, which is in itself determinative of the appeal, it is not necessary for me to consider whether Port Harcourt is also a viable IFA, and I decline to undertake that additional analysis. [37] The Federal Court has confirmed that there is a two-pronged test for evaluating the viability of a proposed IFA as follows19: 1) The Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists. 2) Conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there. [38] Once an IFA is proposed, the onus is on the claimant to establish that the proposed IFA fails to meet one or both prongs of the test20. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Appellants have failed to establish that they would be subject to a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFA, or that it is objectively unreasonable for them to relocate there in consideration of their particular circumstances. The Appellants have a safe IFA in Abuja [39] The RPD found that the Appellants had not established that the agents of persecution have the means or motivation to seek them out in Abuja. The panel noted that there is a general difficulty in locating individuals within Nigeria, even for police or state agents, and found that the Appellants' allegation that their persecutors are powerful and well-connected such that they have a reach throughout Nigeria was speculative, as they could not explain or give any details about their alleged connections. [40] The RPD further placed a great deal of weight on the fact that the Appellants' three children had remained in Lagos with the Associate Appellant's cousin and had not been located by their persecutors. The panel found that notwithstanding the Appellants' explanation that the children's whereabouts had been hidden from the persecutors, the fact that the children had not been found with a relative in the same city where the Appellants had lived contradicted the Appellants' beliefs that the persecutors have the means and motivation to locate the Appellants in an IFA location. [41] The Appellants first argue that the RPD erred by applying an unreasonably high evidentiary standard and requiring corroborative evidence of their persecutors' ability to locate them. They submit that corroborative evidence of the profiles of their persecutors' network is not reasonably available and argue that the absence of information about the persecutors' connections does not mean that they do not exist, or that they do not have influence as alleged. They argue that the panel should have accepted their sworn testimony given that the panel identified no contradictions in their testimony or other credibility concerns, and further argue that the insufficiency of their evidence does not mean that the evidence that was presented is not credible. [42] I find that the RPD correctly assessed this evidence. The Appellants are correct that the insufficiency of their evidence does not mean they are not credible witnesses, however the issue here is not the Appellants' credibility but rather, whether they have provided sufficient evidence to establish that their persecutors have the means and motivation to locate them in the IFA locations. [43] Moreover, I do not find that the presumption of truthfulness established in Maldonado21 assists the Appellants here. I accept that the Appellants are telling the truth that they believe the persecutors can find them in the IFA locations through their connections, however I do not find that they have established that this belief is objectively well-founded. The Maldonado principle does not mean that a claimant's beliefs or speculations must be presumed to be factually accurate just because those beliefs or speculations are sworn or affirmed to in testimony. [44] I agree with the RPD that the Appellants' evidence as to the alleged powerful connections and reach of their persecutors was speculative, in that they were unable to describe to whom the persecutors were connected or how they would use these connections to locate the Appellants. It was not that the RPD expected corroborative evidence, but rather, an explanation of who the persecutors are connected to, how they are connected, and how they would use their influence to locate the Appellants in an IFA location. The Appellants were only able to provide vague information about the alleged connections. As such, I agree with the RPD that the Appellants' assertion that the persecutors could find them with these connections was speculative and does not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the persecutors actually have sufficient connections, influence and power to find the Appellants in an IFA location. [45] The Appellants also argue that the RPD erred by considering the ability of the police to locate people. They submit that it is common knowledge that the police are used by the rich to privately search for persons even though it is outside of their duties, and that the general ineffectiveness of the police is largely caused by their abuse of their powers and acceptance of bribes. Thus, while the police are ineffective at providing protection, wealthy individuals can have access to the police and their connections for their own purposes. The Appellants further argue that the RPD's consideration of the ability of the police to locate persons in Nigeria is not rationally related to the IFA analysis given that they fear members of the Principal Appellant's family, and not the police. [46] I reject these arguments. The Appellants submitted before the RPD that they feared that their persecutors would locate them through high-ranking government connections. It is thus logical and appropriate for the panel to consider the overall ability of state agents such as the police to locate individuals in other areas of Nigeria - while the police are not the agents of persecution, they are alleged to be a tool of the persecutors. [47] The RPD considered the objective evidence and concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that police in one state have the capacity to locate individuals in other states. The Appellants have not pointed to evidence that contradicts that finding, or indeed, to any objective evidence at all in support of their arguments in this area. While the objective evidence in the National Documentation Package describes that the police are subject to corruption and bribery, I do not find that it establishes that it is common knowledge that the police are used by the rich to privately search for people, nor does it establish that they would be generally capable of conducting such searches effectively. [48] Finally, the Appellants argue that the RPD erred by finding that their persecutors' failure to locate their children in Nigeria contradicts the Appellants' position that the persecutors could find them in the IFA locations. They note that their children are very young, do not work, and are less likely to be found or recognized; further, the Appellants have taken steps to shelter their children with the Associate Appellant's cousin, who is not known to the persecutors. They argue that by contrast, the Appellants are adults who are known to the persecutors and will have public profiles in the IFA locations since they are adults who need to work and interact in society. [49] I do not find the Appellants' arguments to be compelling. I agree with the RPD that the fact that the children have been living undisturbed in Lagos, the same city where they lived with their parents previously, suggests that the persecutors lack the ability or motivation to find them. I adopt the RPD's analysis and findings in this regard22. [50] Having reviewed the RPD's findings and considered the evidence and the Appellants' arguments, I find that the RPD correctly concluded that the Appellants have failed to establish that their persecutors have the means and motivation to find them in Abuja, on a balance of probabilities. I therefore conclude that they have not established that they will face a serious possibility of persecution, or a risk of s.97 harm on a balance of probabilities, if they relocate to Abuja. The Appellants have a reasonable IFA in Abuja [51] The RPD went on to consider the reasonableness of the proposed IFAs, noting that the Appellants testified that they were concerned about language barriers, cultural barriers and finding work in the IFA locations. [52] The RPD considered the objective evidence with respect to the impact of indigeneship on internal relocations in Nigeria and found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that indigeneship would be a significant barrier for the Appellants to relocate to Abuja. The panel noted that while the evidence establishes that non-indigenes can face discrimination in some areas, indigeneity and ethnicity are less important issues in large cities such as Abuja, a large, diverse city that attracts workers from all over Nigeria and has a demographically dominant non-indigenous population. The RPD also noted that there is no language barrier for individuals like the Appellants who speak English. [53] The RPD acknowledged that the Appellants would face some barriers such as a higher cost of living and high competition for employment but concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the conditions in Abuja would render it unreasonable to expect them to locate there. [54] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its analysis of reasonableness in consideration of their indigeneship and religion, and erred in its analysis of the Associate Appellant's claim as it relates to gender-based risks which were not raised before the RPD, but which the Appellants now argue render the IFA unreasonable for her. For the reasons that follow, I reject the Appellants' arguments and find that the proposed IFA in Abuja is reasonable in consideration of all of the circumstances, including those personal to the Appellants. Indigeneship, language, accommodation and employment [55] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its analysis of the factor of indigeneship, pointing to objective evidence which establishes barriers to relocation for non-indigenes including discrimination and the inability to access public services, employment and accommodation. [56] I note that much of the objective evidence cited by the Appellants23 is broad-based evidence that addresses the background and impacts of indigeneship across Nigeria. However, I note that the more recent report cited by the Appellants goes on to address the specific impacts of indigeneity in Abuja. This report was also cited and relied upon by the RPD and was the basis upon which the RPD made its overall findings. [57] The report indicates that Abuja is a large, diverse city that does not apply discriminatory practices based on indigeneship at the local government level, and even has protective legislation in place that is absent in other parts of Nigeria. It concludes that the largest challenges for individuals relocating to Abuja from other parts of Nigeria are financial, including the ability to find employment and accommodation. The ability to find accommodation is directly related to the ability to find work and earn a living. Although the employment market is said to be competitive in Abuja, I find that the Appellants' profiles weigh in favour of finding employment, noting that the average Nigerian citizen has only nine years of education24, while the Appellants have both completed post-secondary education and have professional work experience. I find that their personal profiles weigh in favour of their ability to find employment in Abuja. [58] The RPD also concluded, based on the same report, that there would be no language barrier for the English-speaking Appellants in Abuja. The Appellants have not disputed this finding, and I agree with it. [59] The Appellants have also argued on appeal that the RPD erred by failing to consider the impact of their religion on the reasonableness of the IFA, submitting that as Christians, there is more than a mere possibility that they can face serious violence in Abuja. They rely on objective evidence indicating that incidents of violence against Christians are "'more likely to occur' in Abuja than in Lagos"25. The report cites one attack by Boko Haram on a church in 2011, as well as a few other instances of attacks on the general population in Abuja. [60] I do not find that this evidence establishes more than a mere possibility that the Appellants will be harmed in Abuja due to their religious identity as Christians. The fact that it is more likely to occur in Abuja than Lagos does not establish that there is a serious possibility that it would occur. I note that Abuja has a population of over three million, such that the small number of attacks described in the objective evidence is insufficient to establish that there is a serious possibility that the Appellants would be involved in such an attack in the future, or render the IFA location as unreasonable on that basis. [61] For those reasons, I find that the Appellants have failed to establish that the proposed IFA in Abuja is unreasonable in consideration of the factors of indigeneship, language, religion, employment, and accommodation. The Associate Appellant's gender-based claim [62] Finally, the Appellants argue that the RPD erred by failing to consider the Associate Appellant's claim in accordance with the Gender Guidelines, submitting that the panel's failure to consider or mention the Gender Guidelines is a fundamental omission. They argue that in accordance with the Gender Guidelines, the reasonableness of a woman's recourse to an IFA must be considered in terms of her ability to travel safely to the IFA location and stay there without facing undue hardship. [63] I do not find that the RPD erred by failing to consider the Gender Guidelines with respect to the IFA, given that no specific concerns were raised by the Appellants in this regard, and given that the IFA was considered in the context of the Appellants relocating together to the IFA location as a married couple, with the support of one another. The case of Utoh26 relied upon by the Appellants can be distinguished, as a case of a single female claimant who is therefore not similarly situated to the Associate Appellant herein. [64] The Appellants submit that the claim as it relates to the threat of female genital mutilation is a gender-based claim, and this is not disputed. However, the Appellants have not identified how the RPD erred other than their broad assertion that failing to apply the Gender Guidelines is an error, nor have they identified how the Associate Appellant's gender presents a barrier to her relocation to Abuja as a married woman accompanied by her husband. I do not find that any such barriers arise perceptively from my review of the record. [65] The Appellants further submit that it is not only their own ability to travel to the IFA location that must be considered, but also the ability of the persecutors to access the IFA location. It is not clear how this relates to the Associate Appellant's gender, or how it supports their argument that the IFA is not reasonable in consideration of her gender or gender-related factors. Moreover, the issue of access to the IFA location by the persecutors is an issue of safety, not reasonableness, and is subsumed in my analysis of safety above. [66] The Appellants also argue that the RPD erred by failing to address the issue of gender violence which remains common in Nigeria, submitting that the Associate Appellant remains a target of sexual abuse, domestic violence and discrimination because she is a woman. They argue that there is more than a mere possibility that women can be raped anywhere in Nigeria, including the IFA locations. In that regard, the Appellants have submitted new evidence of country conditions in Nigeria27, which they argue establishes that "women in Nigeria are the subject of constant rape and sexual abuse" since June 2020, and therefore establishes the serious possibility that no woman can be safe in Nigeria, as they argue in their further memorandum28. [67] The articles presented by the Appellants focus on a few high-profile cases of sexual violence and attacks that occurred recently in Nigeria. The evidence indicates that as a result of this spate of high-profile cases, women's rights groups and various government officials and organizations have called for action to be taken to reduce and prevent gender-based violence and to strengthen the capacity of Nigerian law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute cases. [68] I do not diminish the seriousness of these attacks, or of the harm caused by such violence. Further, as noted in the jurisprudence cited by the Appellants, it is settled in law that the risk of rape and gender-based violence has a nexus to the Convention. However, the issue that I must determine is whether there is a serious possibility of gender-based persecution for individuals who are similarly situated to the Associate Appellant29. The Appellants argue that rape and other forms of gender violence is prevalent and endemic throughout Nigeria, such that the risk of persecution now alleged by the Appellants is alleged to apply to all women in Nigeria. [69] Having reviewed the evidence before me, I do not find that it establishes that the level of sexual violence is sufficiently high that it exposes all women in Nigeria to a serious possibility of such harm. [70] While it is acknowledged that the statistics provided in the evidence are significantly reduced by underreporting, I note that these figures in the hundreds and low thousands are very small in comparison to the overall population of Nigeria of approximately 214 million people, approximately half of whom are female30. Moreover, I note that a great deal of the evidence refers to the risks of sexual violence to young girls and children, who can be distinguished as a different, more vulnerable group in comparison to the situation of women generally. I further note that the Appellants' submissions have at times conflated the general risk of gender-based violence to all women in Nigeria with the risks of other gender-based violence that is based on personalized circumstances, such as domestic violence and wife abuse. [71] The new evidence indicates that a state of emergency has been declared across Nigeria with respect to gender-based violence in June 2020. The declaration was made jointly by the governors of all 36 Nigerian states through the Nigerian Governors Forum, an "umbrella body... which 'exists to foster collaboration... on matters of public police and to promote good governance'"31. This action was in turn supported publicly by the President, who has committed to taking complementary actions to strengthen the laws around gender-based violence, call for the creation of sex-offender registries, and create awareness32. I conclude based on the evidence before me that the declaration of a state of emergency is a governance tool that serves to bring awareness to the issue and call for action to harness and coordinate government resources in response. [72] The threshold for unreasonableness of an IFA is high, requiring actual and concrete evidence of conditions that would jeopardize the lives or safety of the Appellants in relocating to the IFA locations. In light of my analysis above, I do not find that the new evidence establishes that there is an epidemic of sexual violence in Nigeria such that all women in Nigeria face a serious possibility of gender-based persecution, or that the prevalence of gender-based violence is sufficiently high so as to render the proposed IFA of Abuja unreasonable. CONCLUSION [73] The Appellants have a viable IFA in Abuja. [74] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Cheryl Braden Cheryl Braden April 15, 2021 Date 1 Chairperson Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Ottawa, Effective date: November 13, 1996. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 3 Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 (CanLII); Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 230. 4 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR 2012/257. 5 "Practice Notice on Resumption of Time Limits at the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD)", IRB, signed on June 12, 2020, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rad-business-resumption.aspx. 6 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, August 11, 2020, at pp. 1-73. 7 Ibid., at pp. 76-82. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 39. 9 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, August 11, 2020, at pp. 1-2. 10 Ibid., at pp. 3-73. 11 Ibid., at p. 82. 12 Ibid., at pp. 76-78. 13 Ibid., at pp. 79-81. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 13, 41. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at p. 119. 16 Ibid., at p. 115. 17 Al Dya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 901 (CanLII). 18 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145 (CanLII), [2019] 2 FCR 597. 19 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 20 Cardenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1194 (CanLII). 21 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302 (CA). 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at pp. 7-8, paras. 14-16. 23 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 13.1: ?Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; obstacles faced by non-indigenes when relocating to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017- October 2019), IRB, Response to Information Request (RIR) NGA106361.E, October 30, 2019; also Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), item 16.14: Whether a member of an ethnic group can be identified by physical characteristics, manner of dress, or by any other means; obstacles faced when relocating to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt, IRB, RIR NGA104216.E, November 20, 2012. 24 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6: ?Nigeria. The World Factbook, United States: Central Intelligence Agency, November 18, 2020. 25 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.5: ?Situation of Christians, including those living in northern cities, Lagos and Abuja; state protection (2011-October 2015), IRB, RIR, NGA105320.E, November 17, 2015. 26 Utoh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 399 (CanLII). 27 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, August 11, 2020, at pp. 3-73. 28 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, August 11, 2020: Appellants' Further Memorandum, at paras. 14-15. 29 Dezameau v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 559 (CanLII), at para. 26. 30 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6, supra, endnote 24. 31 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, August 11, 2020, at pp. 21-22. 32 Ibid., at pp. 18-19. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC0-01806 VC0-01807 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français