TB8-11677

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-11677 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision 17 August 2020 Date de la décision Panel S. Thompson Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Rashid Khandaker Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Iran, is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated April 17, 2018, which refused his claim for refugee protection. [2] For the following reasons, I dismiss this appeal. BACKGROUND OF APPEAL The Appellant's claim, the RPD's decision, and the Appellant's arguments before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) [3] The Appellant came to Canada as a visitor on XXXX XXXX, 2016. While he was in Canada, the Iranian authorities interrogated his wife and searched the appellant's home, finding anti-regime political papers in a set of boxes left with him by a friend. That friend, when arrested by the authorities, told them that the boxes belonged to the Appellant. Fearing that authorities in Iran would arrest and torture him upon his return to that country, the appellant filed for refugee protection on November 3, 2017. [4] In a decision dated April 17, 2018 the RPD refused his claim. The RPD found the Appellant failed to establish that he is Christian. It characterized his testimony as evasive, vague and evolving, and lacking in credibility about key elements of his claim. The RPD also found the Appellant failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain evidence in support of his claim. The RPD concluded the Appellant's supporting documents were insufficient to remedy his overall lack of credibility. [5] On appeal to the RAD the Appellant submits the RPD: 1. Erred in law by improperly analyzing his claim; 2. Failed to recognize the appellant's fear about the threat of arrest for possessing anti-state materials and Christian faith; 3. Erred by giving no weight to relevant documentary evidence he submitted; and 4. Erred by focusing on minor inconsistencies. DECISION [6] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [7] The Appellant has asked to submit certain documents1 as new evidence in accordance with subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). According to the law,2 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [8] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.3 [9] As well, on September 5, 2019 the Appellant sent the RAD Registry a copy of a letter from Reverend XXXX XXXX, the XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in North York, Ontario dated XXXX XXXX, 2019 in support of his appeal. This document is not part of the Appellant's Record and is therefore not included in the scope of his subsection 110(4) new evidence application. Out of an abundance of caution, however, I have proceeded to determine whether this letter should be admitted into evidence in accordance with Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules4. [10] Rule 29 of the RAD Rules allows for the submission of documents and/or written submissions not previously provided with the appellant's record. According to Rule 29(3), the Appellant's application must include an explanation of how the document not included in their appeal record "meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the [IRPA] and how that evidence relates to the person, unless the document is being presented in response to evidence presented by the Minister." [11] Sub-Rule 29(4) requires the RAD to consider "any relevant factors" in deciding whether to allow the application, including: 1) the relevance and probative value of the documents; 2) any new evidence the document brings to the appeal; and 3) whether "the subject of the appeal, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions" as part of their record. Decision on the application to admit new evidence Rule 29 Application [12] The support letter from Reverend XXXX XXXX, the XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in North York is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, while the Appellant's Record was received by the RAD Registry on September 3, 2019. The Appellant's affidavit in the Rule 29 request record states that he received Rev. XXXX letter "after filing [his] Appeal Record." He states further that he forwarded a copy of the letter to the RAD Registry "informally" before applying under Rule 29 for it to be admitted. [13] I consider that the Appellant had little control over the date on which Rev. XXXX chose to draft his support letter. Moreover, the fact the Appellant sent it directly to the registry before filing a Rule 29 application through his lawyer suggest he was making his best efforts to disclose the letter to the RAD for it to consider as part of its decision-making. Having read the letter, I consider that it is relevant to my assessment of the RPD's determination of the Appellant's claim, or to my independent assessment of whether the Appellant has a forward-looking risk of persecution, as it provides information on the Appellant's religious practice in Canada in the period after the RPD's refusal of his claim on April 17, 2018. I therefore admit Rev. XXXX support letter into evidence. Subsection 110(4) Application [14] The Appellant's baptismal certificate5 was issued on XXXX XXXX, 2019, and thus post-dates the RPD's refusal of his claim on April 17, 2018. The document therefore satisfies the statutory requirement of newness stated in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I find further that the certificate, in addition to being credible on its face, also satisfies the implicit criteria of relevancy and novelty stated in the Singh and Raza judgments. I therefore admit the baptismal certificate into evidence. [15] The Appellant has also disclosed a support letter from one XXXX XXXX, the owner of the XXXX XXXX XXXX in Ontario, dated XXXX XXXX, 2019. As the letter post-dates the RPD's refusal of his claim on April 17, 2018, it satisfies the statutory requirement of newness stated in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I find further that the letter satisfies the implicit criteria of credibility and novelty stated in the Singh and Raza judgments. [16] Having read the letter, however, I find it is not relevant to my assessment of the RPD's determination of the Appellant's claim, or to my independent assessment of whether the Appellant has a forward-looking risk of persecution, as it fails to provide information about the central issues underlying the Appellant's claim. I therefore decline to admit this letter into evidence in these proceedings. REQUEST FOR AN ORAL HEARING UNDER S. 110(6) OF IRPA Legal test for an oral hearing under s. 110(6) of IRPA [17] According to subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) of the IRPA, the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal unless there is new evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, is central to the RPD decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.6 Decision on appellant's request for an oral hearing [18] In my independent assessment the baptismal certificate does not raise a serious issue with the Appellant's credibility. As there is no need to convene an oral hearing, I will determine this appeal in writing only. ANALYSIS [19] In determining this appeal, I have considered: the contents of the RPD Record and the Appellant's Record, with the exception of the documents not admitted as new evidence; the audio recording of the Appellant's RPD hearing; and documents in the current compilation of the National Documentation Package (NDP) for Iran. [20] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.7 I will apply the correctness standard of review after independently assessing the record in order to determine whether the RPD erred. I will only show deference to the RPD's credibility assessment and/or to its weighing of the oral evidence in situations where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. If I find the RPD had a particular advantage, my reasons will explain why. Notice regarding any document or written submissions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic [21] On June 15, 2020, the Board provided Counsel with a notice related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This notice advised Counsel that they have 30 days from the date that they receive this notice to submit any document or written submission in support of the appeal. They were also advised that any document or written submissions in support of the appeal will be accepted without an application and that the other requirements of Rule 29 and 110(4) continue to apply. Counsel has not submitted any document or written submissions in response to this notice. Allegations of incompetent representation by counsel before the RPD [22] The Appellant submits his right to a fair RPD hearing was compromised by the "'manifestly incompetent representation'"8 of his counsel whom he alleges "failed to present his case properly, [and] especially [did] not [present] evidence properly".9 Additionally, the Appellant's sworn statement states only that his "former counsel failed to present [his] case properly, especially [his] life risks in Iran relating to [...] alleged anti-state material and [his] Christianity."10 [23] The test for counsel incompetence is stated in the Federal Court's reasons for judgment in Moryakina: To succeed, Ms. Moryakina must show that her lawyer's incompetent behaviour resulted in a miscarriage of justice (R v GDB, 2000 SCC 22, at paras 26-27). Her allegations must be specific and supported by the evidence (Memari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1196, at para 36). She must also show that the lawyer's conduct caused her prejudice in the sense that the outcome of the decision would likely have been different if the lawyer had acted competently (Jeffrey v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 605, at para 9). This is a very strict test (Betesh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 173, at para 15).11 [24] In short, "evidence of counsel's incompetence must be so clear and unequivocal and the circumstances so deplorable that the resulting injustice caused to the claimant is blatantly obvious".12 [25] In light of the Federal Court's guidance, and as the Appellant blames his outcome before the RPD at least in part on the incompetence of his former counsel, I would have expected him to have disclosed documents showing he had complained about his previous counsel's conduct to the body that licensed the counsel to practice. I have not, however, seen any evidence of such a complaint. Nor has the Appellant disclosed evidence of any communication with his former counsel to support the complaint at paragraph nine of his sworn statement. [26] Federal Court case law asserts that absent evidence of "substantial prejudice to an individual by incompetent counsel" that gives rise to a miscarriage of justice, however, "persons have to accept the consequences of their choice of counsel".13 As the evidence submitted by the Appellant is insufficient to support his submission that the RPD's refusal of his claim is due either wholly or in part to inadequate representation by his former counsel, I reject his submissions concerning the alleged incompetence of his former counsel before the RPD. The Appellant's opportunities to present evidence to the RPD [27] The Appellant submits the RPD denied him a "reasonable opportunity to present related evidence"14 in support of his claim. I have reviewed the RPD Record and in my independent assessment nothing in it supports the Appellant's submission that the RPD denied him a chance to present evidence in support of his claim. [28] The Appellant's oral hearing took place over two sittings. Near the start of the first sitting of the hearing the RPD asked the Appellant if "any evidence or documents or pictures [...] anything you tried to get to corroborate or support your claim that you couldn't get?" The RPD asked again: "for your claim, was there any documents or pictures or evidence you tried to get but that you couldn't get?" The Appellant testified, "Yeah I have some evidence, but they are in Iran and I don't have any access to them." When the RPD asked "Which evidence?" the Appellant testified, "for example, if you give my name to the airport [...] you will see that I will be arrested upon arrival." The RPD asked what other evidence the Appellant had tried to get. He testified that there had been a warrant for his arrest issued in Iran. The RPD asked the Appellant why he didn't have access to these two things he mentioned. The Appellant testified that "my wife hasn't received the warrant directly, so she doesn't possess that one".15 [29] The RPD then asked the Appellant about his name at the airport, and whether he had tried to get evidence about that. The Appellant testified that he did not have that. He testified further that his wife was arrested for two days and that because of this he did not have any other things. When the RPD then asked him how he knew he would be arrested if he gave his name at the airport, the Appellant testified that his wife had told him, and that she knew this because she was detained for two days and that was why Iran's Revolutionary Guards had told her they were after him and they were checking for him, and that his wife had told authorities the Appellant was in Canada.16 [30] The RPD inquired after the Appellant's efforts to gather evidence to support the allegations at the heart of his claim. Thus, even if the Appellant was not aware that he needed to support his claim with documents, he was on notice of the need to do so shortly after the start of the first sitting of his hearing. [31] According to the RPD Reasons, in the first sitting the Appellant testified that he requested a letter from his former colleague XXXX, someone who featured prominently in the allegations set out in his Basis of Claim (BOC) narrative, but that he asked XXXX to send a letter that was not for his RPD hearing.17 [32] When asked why he had not tried to get a support letter from XXXX the Appellant described XXXX as "only a worker".18 This contradicts his BOC, which describes XXXX as "an activist against the regime"19 in Iran and "[his] friend" who "under torture and interrogation" told authorities in Iran that anti-regime materials discovered in the Appellant's home "belonged to [the Appellant]."20 [33] By the second sitting the Appellant had disclosed an e-mail that purported to be from his former colleague XXXX.21 This shows the Appellant was aware of the need to provide documents to support his risk allegations and did so at the second sitting. Moreover, as discussed below, the RPD accepted these documents into evidence. The foregoing shows the Appellant was not denied a chance to present evidence in support of his allegation that he had been targeted by authorities in Iran. I therefore reject the Appellant's submission on this point, and find that the RPD gave him the chance to present evidence in support of his claim at first instance. [34] The Appellant's submission that the RPD denied him a "reasonable opportunity to present related evidence"22 in support of his claim is without merit. The RPD's weighing of the Appellant's evidence [35] The Appellant's submissions also state he "has already presented all reasonably available supporting evidence (including by not limited to [the] e-mail from his former co-worker, XXXX and his son, XXXX in support of his [claim])" but that "all relevant evidence did not get proper consideration by the RPD."23 [36] The RPD considered both e-mails and found it could not verify the authenticity of XXXX e-mail, not only because it emanated from the Appellant's son's e-mail address, but also because there were no identity documents attached to it. The RPD placed "less weight" on the e-mail.24 [37] The RPD findings outlined in the preceding paragraph, concerning the two e-mails disclosed by the Appellant25, are also relevant to the Appellant's submission that the RPD failed to give "proper weight to all evidence including two emails from his son and co-worker."26 [38] I have read the e-mails the Appellant submitted. The content of the e-mail from the Appellant's son XXXX broadly echoes the Appellant's professed subjective fear- "[w]hen the Sepah and authorities raided to out house and again they came back a few times"27, for example - but fails to provide enough detail to place the events it describes at dates and times that corroborate the Appellant's allegations of being targeted by authorities with specificity. As a result, I find this e-mail warrants little weight for the purpose of establishing the Appellant's allegation that he was targeted by the authorities in Iran for events in that country related to his alleged conversion to Christianity. [39] According to the e-mail purporting to be from the Appellant's friend XXXX, the Appellant's son XXXX called XXXX "and asked [him] to confirm [his] Christianity when [the Appellant was] in Iran."28 However XXXX e-mail is also non-specific in its account of the Appellant's interactions with him prior to the latter's departure from Iran. For example, it states "you were with me a few times in the church house to learn about Jesus and how you can be a Christian"29 without specifying when the Appellant came to the "church house". I find the letter warrants little weight for the purpose of establishing that the Appellant was ever targeted by authorities in Iran for engaging in activities related to his alleged conversion to Christianity in that country. [40] In my independent assessment the RPD did not err in its weighing of the Appellant's evidence. The RPD's concerns with the Appellant's evidence [41] The Appellant submits: first, that the RPD "acted unreasonably by only pointing out the inconsistencies" in his evidence "instead of assessing [his] explanation relating to his claim"; and second, that "relatively minor inconsistencies should not be used for negative credibility finding[s]."30 [42] Having independently assessed the record, I cannot accept the first submission. The RPD considered two instances of inconsistency in the Appellant's evidence. The first concerning "the discrepancy between his BOC narrative and testimony with regard to whether he considered his conversion to be in 2014 (3 years before signing his BOC) or 2013 (5 years before the hearing)."31 [43] First, the Appellant's submissions do not dispute that his evidence on this point was inconsistent. Second, the RPD's Reasons show that it did consider the Appellant's explanation for the inconsistency in his evidence.32 In my independent assessment, the RPD did not err in its assessment of the Appellant's explanation. [44] This is also true concerning the Appellant's evidence about when he learned of his friend Masood's political activities. The RPD asked the Appellant to explain "when and how he learned of Masood's political involvement"33 but rejected his explanation as "vague and evasive", finding that "[o]nce the inconsistency was put to him, he evolved his testimony."34 In my independent assessment, the RPD did not err in its assessment of the Appellant's explanation for this inconsistency. [45] Nor do I accept the Appellant's characterization of these inconsistencies as "relatively minor" as they concern when he first considered himself Christian and also his connection to Masood, whose anti-regime political activities in Iran allegedly prompted the authorities in that country to raid his home and target the Appellant. [46] It is logical to expect the Appellant would have been able to testify clearly on these points, as they relate to the allegation at the heart of his claim - which is that he will be targeted in Iran on account of his Christian identity. In my independent assessment the Appellant's testimony on this point did not credibly support his allegations. I find the RPD did not fail to consider the Appellant's explanation for problems in his evidence, and I reject the Appellant's submission on this point. [47] Based on the foregoing, I find the RPD did not err in finding the Appellant was generally lacking in credibility. In my independent assessment, the evidence is insufficient to establish the Appellant was ever a target of persecution on account of his imputed Christian faith or his imputed political opinion based on his activities in Iran. The Appellant's sur place claim [48] As part of his appeal the Appellant disclosed two items of new evidence. The first, a baptismal certificate, shows that he was baptised at the Church of XXXX XXXX XXXXin Toronto on XXXX XXXX, 2019. The second is a letter from Rev. XXXX XXXX, the XXXX XXXX of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. According to this letter, the Appellant has attended the church "since XXXX of 2018" and is "a regular attendee at [the] Sunday Farsi Language worship services and Wednesday evening Bible Study. [...] He has completed a multi-week Baptismal course".35 [49] The Appellant submits this document is "of critical importance because they support [his] argument"36 that "his life will be in danger" upon returning to Iran because of his Christian faith37, and that his decision to baptised in Canada is grounds for a sur place claim - that is, a claim arising from actions taken in Canada. [50] The Federal Court of Canada's reasons for judgment in Ejtehadian state as follows: In assessing the Applicant's risks of return, in the context of a sur-place claim, it is necessary to consider the credible evidence of his activities while in Canada, independently from his motives for conversion. Even if the Applicant's motives for conversion are not genuine, as found by the IRB here, the consequential imputation of apostasy to the Applicant by the authorities in Iran may nonetheless be sufficient to bring him within the scope of the convention definition.38 [51] My independent assessment of the Appellant's sur place claim is concerned with whether there is "credible evidence of [his] activities while in Canada"39 that might lead the authorities in Iran to believe the Appellant is a Christian convert from Islam, regardless of whether his motives for converting are genuine or not. [52] The country evidence in the current NDP compilation for Iran shows not only that Iran's government does not recognize converts from Islam to Christianity as Christians, but that conversion from Islam to any other religion is prohibited under Iranian law. The country evidence also shows that in Iran converts to Christianity from Islam experienced disproportionate levels of harassment, surveillance, detention and arrest by state authorities. Upon arrest, Christian converts were reportedly subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse by agents of the Iranian state.40 [53] This objective country conditions evidence establishes that if the Appellant is perceived by Iran's government to be genuine Christian convert upon returning to that country, he faces a serious risk of persecution. Furthermore, the Appellant would be unable to avail himself of state protection as Iran's government would be the agent of his persecution. [54] As I have already found the RPD did not err in finding the Appellant's risk of persecution in Iran based on his alleged past activities in that country was discredited, I expect a much higher degree of proof of the sincerity of the Appellant's Christian beliefs and practice in support of his sur place claim.41 [55] I am mindful that Rev. XXXX is well-placed to comment on the frequency and regularity of the Appellant's attendance at church and on his pre-baptismal studies. I acknowledge that Rev. XXXX believes that the Appellant "is living a Christian life" and he believes that "if [the Appellant] were not able to continue to participate in these Christian activities he would suffer spiritually."42 [56] However, the Appellant's sworn statement speaks very little about his church activities in Canada after the RPD's determination of his claim. It states only that he "regularly attend[s] at the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Toronto" and was "Baptized on XXXX XXXX, 2019" without providing any further detail about his Christian life in Canada following the RPD's refusal of his claim. [57] I accept, based on the baptismal certificate, that the Appellant was baptised in XXXX 2019. Having considered Rev. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019 support letter in light of the Appellant's other evidence in support of his sur place claim, I am unwilling to substitute his assessment of the Appellant's Christian faith as genuine for the assessment I am required to make. [58] For the reasons stated above I find the evidence tendered in support of the Appellant's sur place claim fails to establish that the Appellant would be perceived to be a genuine Christian by authorities in Iran. The Appellant's sur place claim therefore fails. CONCLUSION [59] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) S. Thompson S. Thompson 17 August 2020 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 25-26. 2 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 [Singh]; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza, 2007 FCA 385 [Raza]. 4 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, (SOR/2012-257), Rule 29. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 25. 6 See Malambu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 763 at paras. 28-36 and 59. 7 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 6. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 35 at para. 4. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 23 at para. 9. 11 Moryakina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1455, 12 Parast v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 660 at para. 11 (Martineau J). 13 Robles v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 374 at para. 31 (Heneghan J). 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 6. 15 Audio recording of hearing in RPD file no. TB7-21514 on April 6, 2018 at timestamps 00:10:22 to 00:12:57. 16 Audio recording of hearing in RPD file no. TB7-21514 on April 6, 2018 at timestamps 00:13:02 to 00:14:32. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 10 at para. 33. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 11 at para. 35. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, p. 21, question 2(b). 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, p. 21, question 2(b). 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 11 at para. 36. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 6. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 5. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 14-15 at paras. 50-53. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, pp. 116-121. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 6. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, p. 117. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, p. 120. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, p. 120. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 7. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 7 at para. 20. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 7 at paras. 20-21. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 16 at para. 58. 34 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons for Decision, p. 16 at para. 59. 35 Exhibit P-3, Support letter from XXXX XXXX (XXXX), dated XXXX XXXX 2019. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 36 at para. 5. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 37 at para. 8. 38 Ejtehadian v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 158 at para. 11 (Blanchard J) [Ejtehadian]. 39 Ibid., at para. 11. 40 National Documentation Package, Iran, 29 March 2019, items 1.9, 12.1, 12.10, 12.13, 12.15 and 12.18. 41 See e.g. Cao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1174 at para. 28. 42 Exhibit P-4, Appellant's Rule 29 Application, dated March 12, 2020. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-11677 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français