TB4-04615

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04615 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision January 23, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Eve Sehatzadeh Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either find him to be a protected person or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is ethnically Somali and a member of the Ogaden clan. He claied that he lived in the Ogaden region in the southeastern part of Ethiopia. He alleged that his sister was accused of supporting the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and was detained, tortured, and killed by Ethiopian security authorities. He too was detained and abused, but was released after agreeing to act as an informant. Instead he fled the country, travelling to Kenya, Cuba, and Panama before arriving in the United States (U.S.). He sought asylum in the U.S., and an interviewing officer reported that the Appellant had established a credible fear of persecution.1 However, an immigration judge denied his claim for protection,2 and he was ordered removed from the U.S. He came to Canada, where he claimed refugee protection. [4] The Appellant's refugee claim was heard on September 26, 2013. By a decision of May 6, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim. The panel found that the Appellant had not established his identity, and further found that he was not credible in his allegation that he was sought by the authorities in Ethiopia. [5] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD erred in its credibility determination. He also asks the RAD to admit new evidence in support of his appeal: an original school document, and the envelope in which it was couriered to Canada; and an affidavit of Abdi Noor Ibrahim, who declares that he knows the Appellant well and can attest to his identity. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected3 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] It is for an Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.4 [8] While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such document, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [9] The RAD has, in many appeals to date, applied the factors set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza.5 While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of Section 113(a). The Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.6 [10] In Iyamuremye,7 the Federal Court accepted the RAD's application of the factors in Raza to new evidence submitted on an appeal under IRPA. Subsequently, in Ghannadi,8 the Court held that the RAD should consider the factors in Raza, but noted that these are merely considerations to be taken into account and not necessarily determinative of admissibility. Most recently the Court, in Singh,9 found that the factors in Raza are based specifically in the language of Section 113(a) and are not transferable in the context of an appeal before the RAD. The Court found that it was unreasonable for the RAD to strictly apply the Raza factors without distinguishing its own role from that of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) Officer who is bound by Section 113(a). [11] In Singh, the Court wrote that ...in order for there to be a "full fact-based appeal" before the RAD, the criteria for the admissibility of evidence must be sufficiently flexible to ensure it can occur. Often, the evidence at stake will be essential for proving the factual basis of the errors the claimant alleges were made by the RPD. This consideration becomes all the more pertinent in light of the strict timelines a claimant now faces for initially submitting evidence before the RPD. A claimant now has 50 days to present all documents from the date he or she made the claim; the previous legislative scheme required the documents 20 days prior to a hearing, which, on average, took much longer to take place. When the RPD confronts a claimant on the weakness of his evidentiary record, the RAD should, in subsequent review of the decision, have some leeway in order to allow the claimant to respond to the deficiencies raised.10 [12] The Court also held that the "main issue is whether the evidence 'was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably (or 'normally' according to the French version) have been expected in the circumstances to have presented.'"11 [13] The Court did not discuss Iyamuremye or Ghannadi in its analysis of Sections 110(4) and 113(a). It did, however, certify the following question: "In considering the role of a PRRA officer and that of the RAD of the Immigration and Refugee Board, sitting in appeal of a decision of the RPD, does the test set out in Raza for the interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA, SC 2001, c 27 apply to its subsection 110(4)?" [14] While the certified question has not yet been answered, the RAD must nevertheless continue to consider new evidence, such as that which has been submitted in support of this appeal. While it may be inappropriate to strictly apply the factors in Raza, given that they are not specific to Section 110(4) and were not crafted for use in an appellate process, the RAD's consideration of new evidence cannot end with the application of the test in Section 110(4). To limit its analysis to that provision would be to ignore other provisions of IRPA-such as Sections 162(2) and 171(a.3)--as well as established jurisprudence based on statutory provisions almost identical to Section 110(4). Such a restricted analysis would also require the RAD to accept "new" evidence even if it is irrelevant, immaterial, or lacking in credibility. [15] The RAD presumes that Parliament, in creating Section 110(4), was well aware that this provision is almost identical in wording to Section 113(a)-which provides a strong indication that Parliament intended the test from Raza to be used by the RAD.12 [16] The RAD will therefore undertake an analysis of any proposed new evidence, not only for its timeliness, which is largely the focus of Section 110(4), but also for its evidentiary value. In doing so, the RAD will look to the factors in Raza but will not be strictly bound by them, and in applying any Raza factors must distinguish its own role from that of a PRRA officer. [17] Section 171(a.3) of IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility and trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [18] While IRPA makes specific reference to the credibility of evidence received by the RAD, there is no corresponding provision which addresses relevance. However, in the RAD's view, it is obvious that evidence must be assessed for its relevance.13 Apart from the support from the case law, it would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [19] It is therefore appropriate for the RAD to consider whether new evidence is relevant, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [20] The RAD will also consider whether the proposed new evidence is material. In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal described this factor: "Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered." This factor may, in the RAD's view, set an inappropriately high standard in the context of a RAD appeal. [21] An officer determining a PRRA application must not engage in a review of the applicant's negative RPD decision. The PRRA process exists to determine whether a risk to the applicant has arisen between the date of issue of the RPD's decision and the date of the applicant's pending removal from Canada,14 and the officer has no power to reconsider or set aside the RPD's decision. A PRRA will in most cases take place a year or more after the RPD's decision.15 In this context, the definition of materiality set out in Raza makes good sense: the new evidence must be so significant that it would have led to a different outcome before the RPD. [22] However, as the Court noted in Singh, the RAD context is considerably different. The RAD is not restricted to making a new assessment of the risk faced by the Appellant, though this could occur as a result of new evidence presented upon appeal. The RAD appeal is meant to be decided within four or five months of the RPD's decision. The Appellant may challenge the decision of the RPD, and the RAD has broad powers to review that decision for errors of fact or law, or mixed fact and law, to confirm the decision, to confirm on other grounds, to set aside the decision and substitute another, or to set aside the determination and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. It is of paramount importance that the RAD may look only to admissible new evidence when considering whether to hold a hearing under Section 110(6).16 [23] The Court's definition of materiality, which is appropriate for evidence presented in support of a PRRA application, seems overly restrictive when applied to evidence submitted in an appeal to the RAD. If the RAD would apply the materiality factor as set out in Raza, it could lead to the rejection of evidence that is capable of showing that the RPD's decision was in error, only because that evidence is not so strong that it would have resulted in the acceptance of the refugee claim had the evidence been before the RPD. Further, the RAD is not asking-as the PRRA officer is under Raza-whether the RPD decision would have been different. The RAD is considering whether the RAD thinks the determination should have been different or whether the RPD decision was in error. [24] For example, it is not uncommon for the RPD to reject a refugee claim on the basis that the claimant has not established his or her identity, as was the case here. In such situations, the RPD is not required to go further to consider the evidence of persecution.17 A claimant rejected by the RPD on the basis of identity-perhaps because identity documents were still in transit from the country of origin at the time of the refugee hearing-might appeal to the RAD and present as new evidence such recently-received documents. However, those documents might be rejected by the RAD if it considers their materiality as defined in Raza: whether the refugee claim would probably have succeeded if the documents were made available to the RPD. In many cases, the establishment of identity does not in and of itself warrant the acceptance of a refugee claim, and therefore, the Appellant's newly-obtained identity documents could be rejected by the RAD as lacking materiality. [25] In the RAD's view, this restrictive approach to materiality is not consistent with the broad powers given to the RAD. While the PRRA officer is required to focus on a single issue-risk to the applicant-the RAD is required to consider both whether the RPD decision is in error and, after having reviewed all of the evidence, whether the Appellant is a protected person. An approach that focuses on whether the evidence is material enough to affect the outcome of the RAD appeal rather than the RPD's decision is therefore preferred. [26] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4). (a) The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible and trustworthy. (b) The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence-whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence), of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal.18 (c) The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it would be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of IRPA. [27] If the proposed new evidence does not meet each of the factors above, the RAD may choose not to admit it. These factors, however, are not exhaustive, as the RAD may consider other factors as appropriate in the circumstances. [28] The Appellant's proposed new evidence consists of the original of his school certificate, along with the envelope in which it arrived,19 as well as an affidavit from a childhood friend, attesting to the Appellant's identity.20 [29] It is not necessary for the RAD to consider whether the school certificate meets the test in Section 110(4); even if it does, it is not necessary for the RAD to admit it in this appeal. The document is presented in response to the RPD's finding that a copy of that school certificate had no probative value. For reasons set out below, the RAD finds that the Appellant has established his identity through the evidence considered at the oral hearing and it would therefore serve no purpose to admit this document. [30] The Affidavit of Mr. XXXX, however, post-dates the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. The Appellant and the Affiant have explained why the Affiant's evidence was not available to be presented to the RPD, as neither knew that the other was in Canada until June of 2014. As such, the evidence meets the test in Section 110(4). It is also relevant and material to a key issue in the Appellant's refugee claim. Oral Hearing and Further Documents [31] While the RAD must not ordinarily hold an oral hearing, Section 110(6) of IRPA permits it to do so when there is new evidence, which raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [32] In the RAD's view, the affidavit sworn by the Appellant's new identity witness meets the test in Section 110(6), as the evidence therein speaks directly to a determinative issue, identity, in the Appellant's refugee claim. For this reason, the RAD ordered a hearing, which took place on October 15, 2014. The RAD restricted the hearing to the following issue: "The Appellant's identity, including but not limited to the evidence XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX with respect to the Appellant's identity. The Appellant is directed to make the witness available to testify at the hearing."21 [33] At the hearing, the Appellant testified with respect to his identity while Mr. XXXX was excluded from the hearing room. Mr. XXXX was subsequently questioned at length about his relationship to and knowledge of the Appellant. The testimony of both witnesses was highly consistent with each other and with the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BoC) document. As Mr. XXXX himself has been accepted as a Convention refugee, the RAD panel asked whether he would disclose his own BoC document for the RAD to review. He agreed, but counsel for the Appellant asked to consider the matter and make post-hearing submissions. [34] On October 31, 2014, the Appellant disclosed the BoC and RPD decision from Mr. XXXXs refugee claim. As these documents were specifically requested by the RAD panel, they are accepted as evidence in this appeal. [35] The Appellant also made an application to submit another document: a better copy of his Ethiopian identity card. The RPD had faulted him for providing a poor copy and gave the document no weight;22 the Appellant contacted his counsel in the U.S. in July of 2014 to request any original documents from that lawyer's files. The U.S. counsel replied that he did not have original documents, but he enclosed a clear copy of the Appellant's I.D. card. The Appellant applies under RAD Rule 29 to present the copy as new evidence. [36] The RAD will not consider this application to admit further documents, as this appeal can be decided in the Appellant's favour without considering the application or admitting the documents. Role of the RAD [37] While this appeal rests in part on new evidence, it also challenges findings made by the RPD. As such, it is necessary to consider the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD. [38] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [39] The Federal Court, in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.23 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes. The Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error.24 [40] The Appellant submits that the RAD must follow Huruglica, and engage in its own assessment of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD has committed an error. [41] In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal". The RAD will therefore review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. The Appellant's Identity and Credibility [42] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in rejecting his identity documents and finding that he had not established his identity. He also presented new evidence, in the form of Mr. Ibrahim's affidavit and testimony, about his identity. [43] For reasons set out below, the RAD finds that the Appellant's new evidence does establish his identity. As such, it is not necessary for the RAD to consider the RPD's findings in respect to the Appellant's identity documents. The RAD will note, however, that the RPD erred when it found that the Appellant's grade school certificate "does not indicate that the document was issued in Ethiopia or that the school is located in Ethiopia."25 In fact, the top of the certificate contains the title "Somali National Regional State," and lists the school as "XXXX XXXX."26 The Somali state is a division of Ethiopia, located in the south-east of that country, and Kabri-Dahar is a major centre within that state.27 [44] The RAD has considered the Appellant's evidence in respect to his identity, both the evidence in the RPD record and the evidence received by the RAD in support of this appeal. The RAD questioned the Appellant and his witness at some length, and their evidence was highly consistent in respect to how they knew each other and their relationship in Ethiopia. The witness also corroborated key elements of the Appellant's refugee claim. The RAD has reviewed the witness' own BoC form; it is consistent with his evidence, including his testimony that he grew up in the same town as the Appellant. The RAD, having considered the evidence in the RPD record as well as the evidence heard in the oral hearing, finds that the Appellant has established his personal and national identity. [45] The RAD must also consider the issue of credibility, and this will include an analysis of the RPD's credibility findings. The RPD found the Appellant's testimony to be "inconsistent, contradictory and implausible." It reached this conclusion on the basis of three credibility concerns: apparently contradictory evidence about how long the Appellant operated his sister's store, a contradiction in his evidence about why he was arrested, and the implausibility of his recruitment as an informant for the Ethiopian security forces. [46] The RPD considered the Appellant's oral testimony that he opened his sister's shop for one day after she was arrested, but he was forced to close it because he attracted the attention of the special police. The panel noted that, in his BoC form, the Appellant stated that his sister was arrested XXXX XXXX, 2006 and that he continued running her store until March 13, 2007. The Appellant testified that he intended the statement in his BoC to mean that he ran the store for one day, but the RPD found that this did not explain the apparent inconsistency. The RPD went on to find that this contradiction was "an indication that his allegations lack credibility," and on this basis, disbelieved his allegation that he was threatened and beaten for running his sister's shop. [47] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD improperly made credibility findings on the basis of a microscopic examination of his evidence. The RAD agrees. While there is an apparent inconsistency in the Appellant's evidence-his BoC states that "I continued running my sister's XXXX XXXX until XXXX XXXX, 2007"-this inconsistency is not significant when considered in context. The Appellant gave consistent evidence that he was beaten by soldiers on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2007 for running the store, so the only issue here is the use of the words "continued running" in the BoC. The Appellant told U.S. authorities that he was beaten in XXXX of 2007 for opening the store;28 he wrote this in his BoC form; and he testified to this effect in his RPD hearing. In this context, it was wrong for the RPD to disbelieve that he was beaten only because of the phrasing used in his BoC narrative. [48] The RPD also made a negative credibility finding in respect of the reasons for which the Appellant was arrested. The Appellant testified to the RPD that Ethiopian authorities suspected him of supporting the ONLF because some distant relatives who attended his sister's funeral were associated with that organization. The RPD noted that the BoC does not include mention of these individuals or their connection to his arrest, and made a negative credibility finding. [49] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD was again microscopic in its assessment of the evidence, as his BoC specifically stated that people who knew the family came to the house bringing money and food; the next day he was arrested for having raised funds for the ONLF. The RAD agrees that the RPD's finding here was in error. The Appellant gave consistent evidence, to both U.S. and Canadian authorities, that his sister was accused of assisting the ONLF, and that he was suspected of the same. His BoC narrative indicated that money was brought to his sister's funeral, and that shortly thereafter he was arrested for raising financial support for the ONLF. He did indeed omit the allegation that some of his distant relatives were linked to the ONLF, but when considered in the context of his overall consistent evidence, it is difficult to see how this could significantly impact his credibility. [50] Finally, the RPD found it implausible that the Ethiopian special police released the Appellant from detention so that he could become an informant for them. The RPD questioned the Appellant about why the police would believe him to be a suitable informant but he could not provide a good explanation. The RPD found it implausible that the police would "invest their time and resources into having the claimant act as an informant with no clear goals or purpose. I also do not find it plausible that the ESP would detain and question the claimant for eighteen months and at no time provide him with the names of those they believed he was associated with."29 [51] The RPD's implausibility finding here is erroneous. The Federal Court has cautioned that the RPD "...must be careful when rendering a decision based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu." Plausibility findings should only be made in the clearest of cases.30 This is not the clearest of cases. In fact, the RAD cannot ascertain the basis for the RPD's conclusions about how the Ethiopian Special Police operate. Does that organization always have a clear goal and purpose before it invests its time and resources into releasing a tortured detainee to spy on his alleged associates? What was the basis for the conclusion that this police force would, while detaining and torturing a suspect, tell him the names of those he was accused of associating with? The RPD made no reference here to objective evidence about methods used by security forces in Ethiopia; the RAD notes, however, that documents before the RPD indicate that the authorities do indeed release detainees who commit to providing information on banned insurgent groups.31 It is a serious error for the RPD to conclude, absent any corroborating evidence, that the agents of persecution are logical, organized or have a certain method of operations. In doing so, the RPD took western standards and assumptions and applied them to an Ethiopian police organization known for its human rights violations.32 [52] Because of its concerns with the Appellant's credibility, the RPD gave no weight to a detailed medical report from a Canadian doctor,33 who examined the Appellant and found injuries consistent with his claims of torture. [53] For reasons set out above, the RAD finds that the RPD erred in its credibility determination, which was based on a microscopic examination of the evidence as well as an inappropriate implausibility finding. Determination [54] The Appellant is entitled to the presumption of truthfulness. His evidence was largely consistent, from his U.S. claim to his BoC to his RPD hearing to his RAD hearing. He also provided detailed and consistent evidence from his witness, Mr. XXXX, whose credibility was bolstered by the provision of his own BoC, which was also highly consistent with his testimony before the RAD. [55] The Appellant has presented credible evidence that his sister was arrested, tortured, and killed as a suspected ONLF affiliate, and that he was detained and tortured for the same reason. He provided Canadian medical evidence corroborating his injuries, and oral testimony from a witness who spoke to the difficulties experienced by the Appellant's family. After he fled the country, his father was arrested by the special police, and the Appellant subsequently lost contact with his mother as well. He fears that, upon return, he will be detained, tortured, and killed as an ONLF suspect who previously fled from the police. Having considered the evidence, the RAD finds that there is a reasonable chance that the Appellant will be persecuted on the basis of his ethnicity and perceived political opinion upon return to Ethiopia. [56] The RAD finds that the Appellant has established, with credible evidence, a well-founded fear of persecution in Ethiopia. As the state is the agent of persecution, he cannot expect adequate state protection in his particular circumstances, nor can he avail himself of a viable internal flight alternative. CONCLUSION [57] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee, as he has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his ethnicity and his perceived political opinion. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld January 23, 2015 Date 1 RPD's Record, Page 72. 2 RPD's Record, Page 62. 3 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 4 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 5 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 6 Ibid, Raza, paras. 13-15. 7 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 45. 8 Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014; 2014 FC 879, paras 17-18. 9 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014; 2014 FC 1022, para 56. 10 Ibid., Singh, para. 55. 11 Ibid., Singh, para. 58. 12 The presumption of consistent expression holds that "it is presumed that the legislature uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings." Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008) at Pages 214-215. 13 There is a great deal of support for this view. "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 14 Cupid, Keturah Laverne v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-1737-06), Snider, February 16, 2007; 2007 FC 176, paras. 4, 25 and 26. 15 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), s. 112(2)(b.1). 16 Singh, para. 53. 17 Liu, Yanfen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4384-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 831, para. 18. 18 See Raza at para. 13.4; also David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 3d ed. (Irwin Law, 2002) at 24: "Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence." 19 Appellant's Record, Page 17 (copy); the original was also provided to the RAD. 20 Appellant's Record, Page 18, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX. 21 Notice to Appear for a Hearing, September 22, 2014. 22 Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 9. 23 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 24 Ibid., para. 45. 25 Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 8. 26 RPD's Record, Page 77. 27 RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Ethiopia, 31 January 2014, Item 3.1, Page 28. 28 RPD's Record, page 70. 29 Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 22. 30 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776, 208 FTR 267, para. 7. 31 RPD's Record, NDP for Ethiopia, January 2014, Item 10.2, "They Want a Confession" Page 42. 32 Ibid., Item 2.1, Pages 2 and 6. 33 RPD's Record, Page 84, Report of Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04615