TB6-18740

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-18740 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 1, 2017 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Richard Wazana Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "Appellant"), a citizen of Uganda, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of this appeal. The Appellant is requesting an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the matter be returned to the RPD for a new hearing under a differently constituted panel. Background [2] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she has a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the Ugandan government due to the Appellant's homosexual activities. Greater details may be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form1 and in the audio recording of the hearing. [3] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on November 23, 2016. A negative decision was rendered orally on that same day. The RPD found that the Appellant was unable to establish her identity as a lesbian with trustworthy and credible evidence. [4] Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. Appellant's Issues [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred: a) When the RPD found that the Appellant was not credible; and b) When the RPD misconstrued the psychological report. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] It is for the appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the appellants.3 Application of Section 110(4) [8] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the appellants could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claims. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [9] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claims, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [10] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [11] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.6 [12] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.7 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [13] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [14] In Singh,8 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason why the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza9 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance and newness, in addition to any express statutory provisions.10 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).11 [15] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [16] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.12 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [17] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness". Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.13 [18] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. The Appellant's proposed new evidence submitted pursuant to Section 110(4), IRPA 1) Police letter dated XXXX XXXX 2016; 2) Affidavit of XXXX XXXXdated XXXX XXXX2016; 3) Affidavit of XXXX XXXXdated XXXX XXXX2016; 4) Affidavit of XXXX XXXXdated XXXX XXXX2016; and 5) Complaint to the Law Society of Upper Canada including a copy to counsel and response from counsel's office. [19] The RAD has assessed the Appellant's affidavit as to how the proposed evidence meets the criteria of section 110(4). The RAD notes that the Appellant provides explanations as to why some of these documents were not available prior to the hearing, or what steps she had taken to obtain these documents prior to the hearing. RAD Rule 3, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii) speaks to the requirements of an appellant's memorandum and reads as follows: (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, (ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, (iii) how any documentary evidence referred to in paragraph (e) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the appellant, [20] The Appellant has fully complied with the above Rule 3; she has provided explanations as to why she is now submitting the proposed evidence. The Appellant clearly indicates that she is submitting these documents to refute the RPD findings that she was told by previous counsel that these documents were not necessary and that is the reason she obtained some of them at this time.14 [21] The Appellant has alleged incompetence by her previous counsel (XXXX XXXX or XXXX), has lodged an official complaint against that former counsel with the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) and has received acknowledgement from the LSUC as well as a reply from the office of previous counsel, all of which have been filed as new evidence. [22] The Appellant has submitted affidavits which she explains were available for the hearing before the RPD; however, she further explains that her counsel advised her that these documents were not required, resulting in the Appellant not obtaining and presenting them to the panel. The Appellant argues that due to the incompetence of counsel, the Appellant would not reasonably have known that these documents were required. [23] XXXX XXXX has responded to the complaint through XXXX's office with an affidavit authored by XXXX XXXX XXXX, an employee of XXXX. In her response, XXXX swears that she is aware of all the circumstances spoken to by the Appellant and that the Appellant was given ample opportunity and privileges to see XXXX at will. The affiant further swears that the Appellant's file was personally viewed by XXXX and that the affiant herself assisted the Appellant in her preparation for her hearing along with XXXX. [24] The affiant further swears that the Appellant was given a copy of the law firm's "hearing preparation package" (for which the Appellant signed receipt thereof) and that the Appellant was advised by counsel to provide a copy of a police summons to the Board. [25] Further, the affiant swears that the Appellant's allegation regarding instructions allegedly received from XXXX requiring the Appellant to remain on the 5th floor of the building in which the hearing would be held until counsel could determine whether the assigned judge for this claim was a good one or not, is an outrageous lie. [26] Finally, in her affidavit, the affiant swears that after the unsuccessful hearing, the Appellant returned to the law offices and stole the entire office file as well as a portable drive, returning these items only under threat by the law office. [27] As I have not received evidence from the Appellant refuting previous counsel's office's affidavit, I must presume that the Appellant does not have an issue with the affidavit. Accordingly therefore, I find that the Appellant's allegations against former counsel are unsubstantiated and hereby dismiss the complaint of a breach of procedural fairness. [28] In this case, the RAD looked at the literal provisions of subsection 110(4) of the Act in assessing the new evidence, asking itself two questions with respect to the new evidence; namely, (1) did the evidence arise after the rejection of the claim and was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and (2) was the evidence such that the Appellants could not reasonably have expected in the circumstances to have presented it at the time of rejection? [29] The RAD, after assessing the evidence in regards to the above questions, finds that the evidence, with the exception of item 5 (complaint to LSUC) does not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4). In answer to question (1), the Appellant is now submitting these documents as a result of the RPD impugning her credibility. There may have been a reasonable explanation as to why she did not submit these documents or attempt to get these documents prior to her hearing had she proven her allegations against previous counsel. Those allegations I have found to be unsubstantiated. As soon as the Appellant received a negative decision, at least a part of which was due to the lack of supporting credible documentation, she was able to get these documents (items of evidence #1, 2, 3 and 4) which she is now disclosing to the RAD as new evidence. [30] In regards to question (2), the Appellant was represented by counsel before the RPD. The Appellant, however, accuses counsel of incompetence resulting in a negative decision. Again, I have found that allegation to be unsubstantiated. Former counsel's office provided the Appellant with a "hearing preparation package" explaining exactly what the Appellant should be presenting in the way of support documentation to the Board. Therefore, the Appellant was on notice as to what she needed to adduce in order to make her claim. [31] The BOC form advises that the refugee claimant is "responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."15 [32] For the reasons iterated above, the proposed new evidence, except for item #5, all of which was reasonably available prior to the decision of the RPDF will not be allowed. The application to submit new evidence is dismissed. [33] Item #5 of the new evidence does pass the test of section 110(4). This evidence is evidence of a complaint to the LSUC and includes a reply from the LSUC, a notice to accused counsel and a reply from the office of accused counsel. Accused counsel's response refutes everything said by the Appellant. The Appellant has not replied to the accused counsel's reply. With no response from the Appellant, I must presume that the Appellant does not disagree with the statement of accused counsel and I therefore find the accusation to be not credible. If evidence is not credible, then it serves no purpose to allow it into evidence for the appeal. I am therefore dismissing item #5 as not credible. [34] As there is no new evidence received by the RAD, an oral hearing in accordance to section 110(6) may not be allowed. That application is also dismissed. [35] The RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. ANALYSIS The Role of the RAD [36] The RAD is an Appellate body governed by specific legislation16 and guided by the jurisprudence17 of the Federal Courts. The RAD's role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.18 Such an appeal "(i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD." [37] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states, that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.19 [38] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness,20 with no deference accorded to the RPD.21 [39] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings on credibility where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. [40] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [41] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason, that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [42] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [43] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from an intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD may determine the findings to be in error. [44] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. [45] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The Arguments [46] As noted and discussed above, the Appellant argues that there has been a breach of procedural fairness due to the incompetence of previous counsel. The Appellant has disclosed her complaint22 to the LSUC along with a letter of receipt23 of that complaint from the LSUC, a copy of the correspondence24 to previous counsel advising of the complaint and a copy of previous counsel's office response25 to the allegations in the Appellant's complaint. [47] Counsel submits that there are three requirements that must be met for negligence of counsel to establish a breach of procedural fairness. The three requirements are: 1) The Appellant must establish actual incompetence based on a precise factual foundation and sufficient evidence to establish the exact dimensions of the problem; and 2) The Appellant must demonstrate that the incompetence resulted in prejudice. That is, but for the alleged incompetence, the result of the original hearing would have been different; and 3) The Appellant must prove that his former counsel had an opportunity to respond to the complaint, or the matter has been referred to the proper governing body.26 [48] What I do not have is a response from the Appellant to previous counsel's defense of the complaint. As I have received no response to previous counsel's defense (submitted on or about XXXX XXXX, 2017, XXXX months ago), which was a reasonable defense, I must find that there is insufficient evidence before me to substantiate the Appellant's complaint against previous counsel. Therefore, the Appellant has failed to meet the first requirement needed to show negligence of counsel. The allegation of breach of procedural fairness is therefore dismissed. [49] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility. Counsel for the Appellant (counsel) argues that the Board undermined the Appellant's credibility as a result of the Appellant's failure to adduce a police report or notarized letters. The Appellant had testified that no letter was received from the police while she had written in fact that there was a letter from the police. Counsel argues that the reason for this inconsistency was that the Appellant's lawyer had advised her not to mention the summons (letter from the police). I do not believe that and have accepted the previous counsel's rebuttal of the Appellant's charges as that rebuttal went unchallenged. [50] Counsel argues that the Appellant's overall finding of incredibility was the direct result of her previous counsel's incompetence. I disagree. Not only have I accepted previous counsel's rebuttal to the Appellant's charges, but I have listened to the audio recording of the hearing. It is rife with inconsistencies and omissions. [51] Counsel argues that the inconsistency surrounding the issue of when (if) the police attended the Appellant's home (June 15, 2016 according to the Appellant's Schedule 12 document) is clarified by a copy of the police summons. Unfortunately, the summons was not presented as evidence at the hearing and is not in evidence for this appeal. Regardless of the existence of a summons, it was the sworn statement of the Appellant that the police attended her home on XXXX XXXX, 2016 which pre-dates the alleged "outing" of her homosexuality by almost a month. I find that this discrepancy undermines the Appellant's credibility. [52] Counsel argues that the RPD's credibility findings regarding the Appellant's TRV application are in error. The panel found that the TRV application was made prior to the date of the alleged precipitating incident of XXXX XXXX, 2016. The panel also found that there were inconsistencies between the TRV application, the BOC and oral testimony. Counsel cites case law27 which reminds the RAD that it is an error for the Board to use such errors or omissions on a refugee claimant's TRV to make a negative inference because people will falsify documents if necessary to escape persecution. Under normal circumstances, I would agree that jurisprudence favours the Appellant; however, in this particular case, it would appear that the TRV was applied for weeks before the alleged precipitating event. Further, even if the TRV had been applied for after the event and the Appellant felt it necessary to lie on the TRV in order to escape Uganda, once in Canada, having initiated a claim for protection, the lies should have been corrected in the BOC form. In this particular case, many of the lies were only corrected at the hearing after the panel had confronted the Appellant with them. For example, on the TRV application, the Appellant lists her "Aunt XXXX" as the person who assisted her in making the application while on the Appellant's BOC, she lists her father as the one who assisted her. [53] I have read the TRV and putting aside the minor discrepancies of who assisted the Appellant in preparation of it, the most important issue for the RAD is the date of the application as the panel has written that the credibility issue stems from the fact that the TRV was applied for prior to the precipitating incident. The panel erred on that issue. The TRV application is signed and dated on XXXX XXXX, 2016 which is almost XXXX XXXXafter the incident of XXXX XXXX, 2016. As the TRV application was made after the precipitating incident, it is therefore excusable that the TRV contained lies which, correct or not, the Appellant felt were necessary to aid in her escape from Uganda. I find that the RPD made an error of fact which resulted in negative credibility findings regarding the content of the TRV, which are unsubstantiated. [54] Counsel argues that the RPD erred when it dismissed, as having little or no weight, letters of support adduced from XXXX XXXX(Appellant's father), Ms. XXXX XXXX(Appellant's girlfriend) and Ms. XXXX (Appellant's childhood friend). These letters were given no weight based only on the fact that they were "not sworn, they are just typed out letters without any security features or any stamps and could have been produced by anyone."28 Counsel is correct. It is an error for the RPD to discount the evidentiary value of a letter of support simply because it is unsworn and with no security features.29 [55] The letter from XXXX XXXXis rather compelling. It appears to be a heartfelt letter from a father who is somewhat ashamed at his handling of his daughter's troubles. The letter appears to me to be written in a forthright and truthful manner, without embellishment yet with a modicum of embarrassment. I find this letter to be very credible and very relevant. [56] The letter from Ms. XXXX, the Appellant's girlfriend, is also very credible. Again, this letter does not appear to be embellishing anything but is written in a straightforward manner, telling the story from the eyes of the Appellant's best friend and lover. [57] The letter from Ms. XXXX is straightforward and again does not appear to be an attempt to embellish the situation. I find it to be credible. [58] Counsel argues that the panel paid little attention to the psychological report adduced at the hearing. I am unsure what more the panel could have or should have said regarding the report. I do not see any dispute from the panel regarding the qualifications of Dr. XXXX XXXX (psychologist) nor with the diagnosis made by Dr. XXXX. The panel is not qualified, nor did it suggest otherwise, to render an opinion on the diagnosis. The panel simply found that there was insufficient evidence to support the premise that the diagnosed issues were as a result of the Appellant's allegations. Dr. XXXXbases the opinion on the information given by the Appellant. Dr. XXXXbelieves the information is true and correct and writes the opinion accordingly. The panel has credibility issues with the Appellant based on some unresolved issues and consequently does not believe the story which is the basis of Dr. XXXX's opinion. If there are sufficient inconsistencies and omissions in testimony to make such a finding by the panel reasonable, then there is no error; however, the outstanding issues are really peripheral issues or issues not directly related to the core of the claim. For example, the fact that the rape of the Appellant was mentioned in the BOC but the ensuing pregnancy and abortion were not was a credibility concern for the panel. The pregnancy and abortion have nothing to do with the core of this claim/appeal, so are peripheral and should not be considered in making a negative, overall assessment. [59] The panel is correct, however, when the panel finds some minor faults with the psychological assessment document. The document claims that the Appellant's assessment was consistent with her BOC while the panel found inconsistencies between the BOC and the assessment. The specific inconsistencies dealt with the rape and the pregnancy and also with an alleged beating of the Appellant by her mother. All in all, however, the psychological assessment does assist the RAD in its decision making process. That assistance comes in the form of Dr. XXXX's statement: "She presents with difficulties with XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX and fear of police. These interfere with Ms. XXXX's functioning and affect her level of concentration, attention and ability to relax. She feels anxious and fearful of the possibility of suffering abuse or even death, if she were to return to her country of origin." [60] It is reasonable to find that these issues iterated by Dr. XXXX may account for some of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the Appellant. I find that it was an error to discount the psychological report simply because the content was well reported. [61] After a fulsome and independent analysis of the evidence adduced, I find that the RPD's overall credibility finding was in error. The errors included errors of fact (regarding the date of the TRV) and error of law (regarding findings on unsworn letters). [62] The RAD has found that the RPD did not dispute the core of the claim at any point in its Reasons and Decision. Thus, the RPD accepted that the incident of XXXX XXXX, 2016 did occur. Logically, if the RPD accepted that the incident of XXXX XXXX, 2016 occurred, the RPD must accept that the Appellant is a lesbian. The supporting letters confirm the Appellant's claims. [63] Homosexuality is a criminal offense in Uganda, punishable by life in prison. According to the supporting letters, which I accept as credible, the police in Uganda are aware of the Appellant's homosexuality and are in search of her. [64] I find that there is more than a mere possibility that the Appellant would face persecution for her membership in a particular social group (lesbians) should she return to Uganda. That persecution would be state sponsored and would occur anywhere in Uganda. Disposition [65] The RAD has found that the RPD decision will not stand. CONCLUSION [66] Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe May 1, 2017 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record at pp. 11 - 26. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, July 22, 2015, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 6 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54. 7 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 8 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 9 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 10 Ibid, Raza, paras. 13-15. 11 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 12 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 13 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 10-13, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, p. 11, Basis of Claim Form, p. 1 of 10. 16 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 17 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14, M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 18 Dhillon, paras. 14 - 18. 19 Huruglica, para. 103. 20 Ibid. 21 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 23-30. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 70. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 72-73. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 74-78. 26 Brown, Donovan Derrick v. M.C.I. (F.C, no. IMM-3364-12), Russell, November 8, 2012, 2012 FC 1305. 27 Quinteros v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), (1998) 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 980, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1363 (QL). 28 Exhibit RPD-1, p. 8, lines 25-27. 29 Paxi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-115-16), Russell, August 9, 2016, 2016 FC 905 at paras. 52-53. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-18740