VB4-02427
The RAD, after conducting an independent assessment and giving limited deference to the RPD's credibility findings, found the appellant credible as a lesbian, concluded there was nexus to the Convention ground (membership of a particular social group), that state protection was unavailable and no viable internal...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- VB4-02427
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 13 February 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Appeal / Decision on Appeal by Refugee Appeal Division
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed; RPD determination set aside; appellant found to be a Convention refugee.
- Legal Topics
- Convention Refugee, Sexual Orientation, Credibility Assessment, Internal Flight Alternative, State Protection, Sur Place
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
XXXX XXXX XXXX
Appellant
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Appeal / Decision on Appeal by Refugee Appeal Division
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the RPD made unreasonable credibility findings
- 2 Whether the RPD failed to make a risk determination
- 3 Whether the RPD failed to properly analyze the sur place element
Ratio Decidendi
The RAD, after conducting an independent assessment and giving limited deference to the RPD's credibility findings, found the appellant credible as a lesbian, concluded there was nexus to the Convention ground (membership of a particular social group), that state protection was unavailable and no viable internal flight alternative existed in Ghana, and therefore set aside the RPD decision and substituted a finding that the appellant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of IRPA.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed; RPD determination set aside; appellant found to be a Convention refugee.
Orders
- Set aside the Refugee Protection Division determination dated July 23, 2014.
- Substitute the determination that the appellant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-02427 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is (are) XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal Appeal considered at Appel instruit à Date of decision February 13, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is (are) Roger Bhatti Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal personne(s) en cause Counsel for the Minister Alannah Hatch Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), a citizen of Ghana, appeals the July 23, 2014 determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD"). The claim was heard by the RPD on May 26, 2014 with a written decision being rendered on July 21, 2014. The RPD found that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "IRPA" or the "Act").1 DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the Act, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes the determination that, in its opinion, should have been made namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Act. BACKGROUND [3] Counsel for the appellant before the RPD is the same as RAD. The Minister has intervened before both Divisions. A transcript of the RPD proceedings has been included in the Appellant's Record (AR) and the Refugee Protection Record. The appellant does not seek to present "new" evidence to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of IRPA. BASIS OF CLAIM [4] According to the allegations set out in the appellant's Basis of Claim form (BOC),2 the appellant is a young woman from Ghana. She fled her home country on the basis of her sexual orientation. She is a lesbian. [5] The appellant realized she was attracted to young women when she was 16 years old. She had one lesbian relationship prior to leaving Ghana. This relationship started in XXXX 2010 and the woman's name was XXXX. [6] In XXXX 2013, the appellant's family had a gathering at which an older man, a Chief by of XXXX, was present. Her father announced that he had arranged the appellant's marriage to the Chief who was 32 years older than her. [7] The appellant refused to marry the Chief. Her father demanded to know why she would not marry the Chief, right in front of him. The appellant blurted out that she was attracted to women and that she was a lesbian. Her father punched and kicked her and left her on the floor. She was locked up in a room for three weeks. After the three weeks, her father asked her if she still considered herself to be a lesbian. The appellant told him yes. Her father hit her again and told the family that he was disowning her. [8] The Chief had told the community about the appellant being a lesbian. The appellant was harassed by people in the community on a regular basis. In XXXX 2013, the appellant was attacked by some young men. They tore off her dress but fortunately, a car came by and the men ran away. [9] The appellant confided in her aunt. Her aunt advised her to leave Ghana and that she would assist her in doing so. [10] In late XXXX of 2013, the appellant's father began talking openly about forcing the appellant to undergo female genital mutilation, or circumcision. This is in keeping with traditional practices and her father believed that the procedure would rid her of her desire to be with other women. The appellant fled to her aunt's house. Her aunt helped her hide at a friend's home. In the meantime, her aunt hired an agent to assist the appellant to leave Ghana. [11] The appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013. The agent told her to meet a man named XXXX. However, the man the appellant lived with began sexually harassing her. She fled to Vancouver where she met a Ghanaian Pastor who introduced her to another Ghanaian man. This man introduced her to her lawyer. The appellant made a claim for refugee protection in Canada. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [12] The appellant's submissions as to the grounds of this appeal can be summarized as follows: * Did the Panel err in law in making unreasonable credibility findings? * Did the Panel render a finding of credibility that was unreasonable and not in accordance with the evidence before it? * Did the Panel err in law by failing to make a risk determination? * Did the Panel err in law by failing to properly analyze the sur place element of this refugee claim? REMEDY SOUGHT [13] The appellant requests that the RAD allow the appeal and refers the matter to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted Panel. ROLE OF THE RAD [14] Although the Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [15] RAD, being a new division, has struggled with the standard of review to be used in RAD appeals based on several Federal Court cases that have differed in their approach of what standard should be used. Initially, RAD followed the Supreme Court of Canada (the "Supreme Court") case Dunsmuir3 as the leading case on standard of review. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court has said that there should be only two standards when reviewing decisions of administrative tribunals: unreasonableness and correctness. The standard of correctness applies to questions of law, while the standard of reasonableness applies to questions of fact, and mixed fact and law. [16] In recent months, the Federal Court has issued differing decisions on the role of RAD when conducting an appeal of the RPD determination. These decisions include the Federal Court cases Iyamuremye,4 Eng,5 Alvarez,6 Huruglica,7 Njeukam,8 Yetna,9 Wahgmo,10 Alyafi,11 among others. [17] The Federal Court in Iyamuremye addressed the question of the proper standard of review to be applied by the RAD in reviewing RPD findings and confirmed that the appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and mixed fact and law is reasonableness, and the appropriate standard of review for questions of law is correctness: That said, the Court finds that in assessing the reasonableness of the decision, the RAD should, at the very least, have reviewed the evidence that was presented before the RPD and conducted an independent assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD, on the basis of the facts and the conditions of the country in question, had properly considered the evidence and reasonably justified its conclusion.12 [18] In Alvarez, Justice Shore said that "the Court is of the view that the RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts."13 Furthermore, Justice Shore stated that "[w]hen analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error."14 Justice Shore also said in Alvarez that "the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error."15 [19] In Huruglica, Justice Phelan found that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. "It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection."16 Justice Phelan also states that, "that notion may well justify deference to a RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness' credibility is critical or determinative. Where there is no adverse finding of credibility, the policy rationale for deference is not sustainable".17 [20] Justice Phelan also found that the RAD's role should be to determine whether the RPD decision is wrong rather than look at whether it was a reasonable decision. Justice Phelan emphasized that the RAD's mandate is to conduct a fact based review. The RAD, Justice Phelan said "must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment... Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision." Furthermore: In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".18 [21] The Minister submits "that the RAD should show the RPD deference as the RPD had the benefit of hearing the Appellant's oral testimony and therefore was in the best position to assess the Applicant's credibility".19 [22] Counsel for the appellant submits "Issues of credibility, a question of fact, are reviewable against a standard of reasonableness."20 He did not provide any further submissions regarding the more recent Federal Court cases on the role of the RAD. [23] The Huruglica decision is the most thorough of all the recent cases and the first one where the Federal Court has certified a question for the Federal Court of Appeal. Again, I refer to paragraphs 54 and 55 of Huruglica which read as follows: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.21 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".22 [24] Following the Huruglica decision, many other cases have followed the Huruglica approach in what the role of the RAD should be in assessing an appeal. There is another line of authority that suggest that the standard that RAD should apply is that of "palpable and overriding error" (Eng23, Alvarez24, Spasoja25). In Alyafi26, Djoussou27, and Siliya28, the Federal Court notes that there are two competing approaches in the Federal Court jurisprudence and that the RAD Member is free to decide which approach to follow. [25] In Kanga, the Federal Court held: Furthermore, even where there is divided Federal Court authority on a point of law, I do not agree that the Board is required to explain why it has adopted one view over the other. Presumably, Federal Court jurisprudence speaks for itself and the Board has no obligation to offer any additional interpretation of the legal authorities that it chooses to rely upon in resolving a point of law.29 [26] In this appeal, and taking into consideration the Federal Court decisions regarding the role of the RAD, I will be applying the points set out in Huruglica. In this appeal, I have reviewed all aspects of the RPD's decision and have conducted my own independent assessment of all the evidence to determine whether the appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, while giving a certain deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellant's credibility and any other issues where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. As well, it is clear from the many recent Federal Court cases that have been previously mentioned, all agree that the standard of correctness should be used for any error of law found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [27] The appellant submitted a number of arguments to establish that the RPD's determination is erroneous and should be set aside by the RAD. I do not agree with all these arguments, and I am of the opinion that I do not need to address them all given that I am setting aside the determination of the RPD and substituting a determination that, in my opinion, should be made following my own assessment of the evidence submitted before the RPD and the RAD. [28] The RPD Member finds, in her decision, that "the determinative issue in this claim is the credibility of the claimant's allegations concerning her sexual orientation."30 The RPD Member finds that: Having considered the evidence before it, including other Ghana identification documents in evidence such as a Voter's Card and school records, the panel accepts, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is a citizen of Ghana. The panel draws a negative inference, however, in regard to the claimant's overall credibility as a result of contradictory and implausible evidence elicited from the claimant in regard to her identity documents, her place of birth, and the objective evidence concerning the removal of a counterfoil from her passport.31 [29] I have reviewed all the evidence before the RPD and the RAD, including the transcript32 of the oral hearing, in its entirety. In particular, in my review of questioning surrounding the identity documents, I find I disagree with the RPD. The appellant testified that her aunt hired an agent to make all the documents available for her to leave Ghana. Yes, the appellant did tell a Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer during an interview that she did go to the passport office. However, in the same interview, the appellant did retract and state that she did not go to the passport office.33 The RPD Member did not take this into account either-or in her reasons or her questioning. [30] The RPD Member acknowledged that credibility is always an issue in RPD proceedings and that there is presumption that sworn testimony of a claimant is true. I find that the RPD Member's exploration of the appellant's sexuality was erroneous. While there were inconsistencies in the documents before the RPD Member, I find that these inconsistencies do not overall undermine the credibility of the claimant. The RPD Member has drawn a conclusion regarding the claimant's lack of credibility based on identity documents that contained errors. Federal Court has made it clear in a number of cases that when assessing the credibility of a claimant, it is important to remember that all of the evidence , both oral and documentary, must be considered and assessed, not just selected portions of the evidence.34 Thus the RPD should not selectively refer to evidence that supports its conclusions without also referring to evidence to the contrary.35 Furthermore, when assessing all of the evidence, it must be assessed together, not parts of it in isolation from the rest of the evidence. Evidence should, therefore, be treated in a consistent manner.36 [31] As expressed in the oral hearing, I note that the appellant has taken efforts to have her passport checked for authenticity by sending it to Ghana. Moreover, I note that the appellant testified that her aunt hired an agent to help her with her documents to leave Ghana. I find these are all acceptable explanations for the inconsistencies found in the documents. As for the birth certificate, it is clear from the country documents that birth certificates are only issued for travel purposes. Counsel for the appellant pointed this out in his submission before the RPD.37 I find that the RPD Member failed to acknowledge in her reasons why these explanations were found not to be credible and how they relate to the appellant's sexuality. I find that RPD Member's reasons lacked in clear reasoning as to how these inconsistencies undermine the credibility of the appellant in her allegations - that she is a lesbian - which is the central issue in this claim. I find that the RPD Member has not reasonably assessed all the evidence before her in finding the appellant not to be a lesbian. [32] Assessing a refugee claimant's sexual orientation is a difficult task. I find the RPD Member erred in placing emphasis on events that were trivial to the appellant's allegation of being a lesbian. In Rusznyak,38 Justice Russell found that: (1) The reliance upon minor discrepancies in dates was too microscopic and unreasonable. (2) Because the RPD's credibility finding was cumulative, it is not possible to say whether, without these errors, it would have reached the same conclusions about general credibility. This means that the general credibility finding is unsafe and unreasonable. [33] The RPD Member questioned the appellant directly on her past and present experiences regarding her sexuality. The appellant provided details of these experiences. The RPD Member has not made any negative findings on these experiences. The RPD Member asked many questions relating to the appellant's relationship with XXXX. The appellant explained when they met and how their relationship developed over the years. The appellant states in her BOC form39 that she "had one lesbian relationship prior to leaving Ghana." Furthermore, the appellant provided explanations for what she considered a serious relationship. This issue was canvassed extensively in the oral hearing: Member: "Is it correct though to say that you had two relationships before you left Ghana?"40 Appellant: "No, I've had a sexual relationship but it wasn't a serious relationship like with XXXX."41 Furthermore, the appellant testified at the hearing that she had sexual relationships with other girls in Ghana but only had one serious relationship: Member: "How many of these not committed, not serious relationships have you had?"42 Appellant: "I've been with three other girls."43 [34] The appellant describes these three relationships as "...other relationships, but it wasn't a committed relationship."44 [35] The RPD Member asked the appellant "Why is it that you don't consider that your relationship with XXXX XXXX was serious if you were together for three years?"45 Appellant: "Because I - it didn't continue when I -I just don't have any feelings for her when I finish secondary school when I came out, so I don't consider that to be."46 [36] Based on the evidence before the RAD, the appellant did provide explanations for why she only wrote she had one lesbian relationship in Ghana despite her describing relationships with other women in Ghana at the oral hearing. However, I find that the RPD Member erred by not acknowledging these explanations in her reasons. Although I agree with the RPD Member that the appellant should be clear about her previous lesbian relationships, I find that the appellant's explanation in her testimony about what she considers a relationship is persuasive evidence that there has been a misunderstanding for both parties when referring to 'relationships'. Also, I find that the RPD Member did not explain clearly why she did not accept this explanation from the appellant. Overall, I find the appellant has adequately established that she is a lesbian. The RPD Member did not make a clear adverse credibility finding that the appellant was involved in same sex relationships in the past. In her oral testimony, the appellant was asked about her previous same sex relationships in Ghana and in Canada. The appellant provided details of those relationships to the RPD Member. In my review of the evidence, I do not find that there were major inconsistencies or contradictions that warrant a finding that the appellant is not a lesbian. I find the RPD Member made a clear error by failing to consider all of the evidence in her reasons. Thus, I find the RPD Member did not make clear findings that these relationships did not happen. [37] The RPD Member also dismissed the evidence from other sources, including the letter and witness testimony from a member of the XXXX XXXX XXXX,47 Ms. XXXX, and the appellant's roommate, XXXX, as being insufficient to establish that the appellant is a lesbian. A review of the recording of the hearing and the RPD Member's reasons indicates that the RPD Member questioned the witnesses. There does not appear to be any discrepancies between what was said by the appellant and the witnesses. [38] The appellant testified that her girlfriend in Ghana, XXXX, was upset with her and was not answering her phone calls. The appellant testified that she had planned on having XXXX be a witness by telephone at her refugee hearing. However, they had a falling out a week prior to the hearing as XXXX was jealous of the appellant's roommate. The appellant had told XXXX that her roommate was interested in pursuing a romantic relationship with the appellant and XXXX became jealous. The RPD Member found that "the panel also had concerns in regard to the claimant's testimony in regard to an absence of corroborating evidence from XXXX, in view of the claimant's testimony that the relationship was ongoing."48 Furthermore, the RPD Member found that: The claimant testified that until a week before the hearing she had expected XXXX to testify on her behalf by telephone and had spoken about this with her counsel, but she and XXXX had very recently had a falling out over XXXX suspicions concerning the claimant's relationship with XXXX. The panel notes, however, that the Board had no notice that XXXX would appear as a witness in this claim - which RPD Rule 44 requires be given ten days in advance of the hearing - either prior to the actual hearing date or prior to a previously scheduled hearing date in April 2014 which was postponed on short notice.49 [39] The RPD Member further finds that: In view of the panel's previous credibility findings in regard to the trustworthiness of the claimant's evidence, the panel gives little weight to the claimant's testimony that XXXX was going to testify on her behalf, and finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the alleged recent falling out that precluded any corroborative evidence from the claimant's alleged long-term partner from being in evidence is not credible.50 I find the RPD Member did not provide clear reasons as to whether she found the past relationship between the appellant and XXXX credible or not. The RPD Member only mentions the ongoing relationship. [40] Furthermore, XXXX absence as a witness before the RPD was later confirmed by XXXX when she was asked to testify as a witness. However, the RPD Member did not make any finding based on the fact that the witness also had the same explanation as to why XXXX was not a witness before the RPD. By giving no weight to XXXX testimony, the RPD Member did not provide or make any adverse credibility findings on the genuineness of the appellant's relationships with XXXX herself, and XXXX. The RPD Member cites in her decision that: The panel finds that neither the testimony of Ms. XXXX [XXXX] or of Ms. XXXX is sufficient to overcome the very substantial credibility problems identified in the claimant's evidence. Her inability to consistently relate her sexual history is fatal, in the eyes of the panel, to her alleged identity as a lesbian and by extension to the alleged risks that flow from her sexual orientation. This serious credibility finding is further supported by her inconsistent and implausible evidence concerning her identity documents.51 [41] Having reviewed the audio CD of the oral hearing, I find there is sufficient, credible evidence that attests to the appellant's sexual orientation as being homosexual. RAD notes the following when reviewing the audio CD of the hearing: 1. The appellant clearly described how and when she realized she was attracted to the same sex at age 16; 2. The appellant described her first friendship that led to a same sex relationship, being XXXX XXXX XXXX in a clear and coherent manner, and also mentioned her serious lesbian relationship with XXXX, her current girlfriend who lives in Ghana; and 3. The appellant described her experiences here in Canada as a lesbian; 4. The appellant had witnesses who confirmed the appellant's testimony. [42] Having found the appellant credible in her sexual orientation, I have also reviewed the country documentation on homosexuality in Ghana. It is clear from the country documentation that the appellant would not be able to live freely as a lesbian in Ghana. LGBT persons faced widespread discrimination in employment and education, as well as police harassment and extortion attempts. There were reports that police were reluctant to investigate claims of assault or violence against LGBT persons. The government took no official actions to investigate or punish those complicit in the abuse.52 [43] A section on the Law in Ghana on the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transexual and Intersex Association (ILGA) website stated that same sex activity between women was legal. Similarly, while a Ghana Web article of 7 June 2011 says that "Gays can be prosecuted", it noted that "the law is, however, silent on any form of punishment for lesbianism." Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons continue to be subject to societal harassment, discrimination, intimidation, and threats to their wellbeing. This can in individual cases amount to persecution and in general the Ghanaian authorities do not provide gay men, lesbians and bisexuals or those perceived as such with effective protection. Where gay men and lesbians do encounter social hostility they may be able to avoid this by moving elsewhere in Ghana. There are however likely to be difficulties in finding safety through internal relocation given that homophobic attitudes are prevalent across the country. 53 [44] The RAD also finds that all elements required by section 96 of the Act have been met in this case. The appellant has a nexus to the Convention ground of membership in a particular social group, being a lesbian from Ghana. I also find that the appellant has rebutted the presumption of state protection in consideration of the country conditions. I also find the appellant does not have a viable Internal Flight Alternative in Ghana considering the country condition reports clearly note that a homosexual cannot live an openly gay lifestyle in the country without fearing persecution. I also find that it is not necessary to deal with the sur place claim raised by Counsel for the appellant in consideration of the outcome of this appeal. REMEDY [45] For all these reasons, I set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute the negative determination, and find that the appellant is a Convention refugee as per paragraph 111(1)(b) of the IRPA as she would face a serious possibility of persecution should she return to Ghana. (signed) February 13, 2015 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., 2001, c. 27. 2 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR), Basis of Claim (BOC). 3 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. 4 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 5 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 6 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 7 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 8 Njeukam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859. 9 Yetna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CF 858. 10 Wahgmo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 923. 11 Alyafi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 12 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494 at para. 41. 13 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702 at para. 27. 14 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702 at para. 28. 15 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702 at para. 33. 16 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 at para. 54. 17 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 at para. 37. 18 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 at para. 55. 19 Exhibit 4, Respondent's Record. 20 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR), Memorandum. 21 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 at para. 54. 22 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 at para. 55. 23 Eng v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 24 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 25 Spasoja, Francisca v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 913. 26 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 27 Djoussou v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1080. 28 Siliya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 120. 29 Garcia Kanga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 482. 30 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 31 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 32 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Transcript of Oral Hearing. 33 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Canadian Border Services Agency Interview, pg. 129. 34 Owusu, Kweku v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1146-87), Heald, Hugessen, Desjardins, January 31, 1989. 35 Polgari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 626. 36 Bosiakali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1381. 37 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Counsel's Submissions. 38 Rusznyak, Dezso v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 255. 39 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Basis of Claim. 40 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 218. 41 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 218. 42 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 219. 43 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 219. 44 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 220. 45 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 220. 46 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Oral Hearing Transcript, pg. 220. 47 Exhibit 3, RPDR. 48 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 49 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 50 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 51 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 52 Exhibit 3, RPDR, National Documentation Package (NDP) 14 March 2014, United States Department of State, Item 2.1. 53 Exhibit 3, RPDR, NDP 14 March 2014, United Kingdom Operational Guidance Note, Item.1.5 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-02427