TB5-08485

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-08485 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Redetermination of the Appeal Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision August 31, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Lesley Mason Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Deryck Ramcharitar Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of the Republic of Kenya (Kenya), appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant submits new evidence in his appeal. The Appellant requests an oral hearing under section 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). In a decision issued on July 29, 2015 the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appellant was not a credible witness and also that he had a viable internal flight alternative (IFA). The RAD's decision was set aside by the Federal Court on judicial review. According to a judgment by Mr. Justice XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX 2016, the appeal was referred back to the RAD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. After the Federal Court decision, the Appellant provided to the RAD a Supplemental Memorandum of Argument, dated June 29, 2016, with updated submissions. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. Background [3] The Appellant alleges he is a member of the XXXX tribe. He is a Christian. Since 2002 the Appellant has been a XXXX XXXX who specializes in XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX. [4] In XXXX 2002 the Appellant first encountered members of the XXXX sect when they approached him asking him to renounce his religion and join their sect. At that time the XXXX were recruiting people to support political candidates from the Kanu party in the upcoming election. The Appellant informed the XXXX that he would not renounce his religion. The XXXX shortly thereafter tried to recruit the Appellant by appealing to his tribal pride and stating that XXXX needed to gain political power. The Appellant advised the XXXX that his political beliefs were his own and he would vote freely. The Appellant was afraid of the aggressive behaviour of the XXXX. The XXXX approached him for a third time in XXXX 2002 and when he informed them that he would not join them they threatened to catch him. The Appellant was able to avoid the XXXX through his frequent international travel to attend various XXXX. [5] In 2005, around the time of a constitutional referendum, the XXXX were actively recruiting members to support Kenya's president who is a member of the XXXX tribe. When the Appellant's cousin, XXXX XXXX, a member of the XXXX sect, invited him to a XXXX oath ceremony, the Appellant refused the invitation. As a result, members of the XXXX sect began to threaten the Appellant. Again the Appellant was able to avoid problems with the XXXX when he traveled outside Kenya in XXXX 2005 to XXXX XXXX XXXX. When the Appellant returned to Kenya in XXXX 2005 he relocated to XXXX to start a new life with his wife and young son and to avoid problems with the XXXX. The Appellant believed he was safer away from the area where his own XXXX tribe resided. [6] In XXXX 2006 the Appellant's location was discovered by the XXXX. He was given an ultimatum to join the sect as well as an on-going payment of a protection fee or be killed. The Appellant refused their demands. [7] The Appellant traveled to Lebanon in XXXX 2006 to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and upon his return to Kenya in XXXX 2006 he relocated with his family to XXXX. The Appellant believed it would be harder for the XXXX to find him in this location. [8] In XXXX 2007, during a general election, the Appellant and those in his immediate community were evicted by the local tribe. The Appellant's home was destroyed by fire. Some people were killed. The Appellant escaped with his wife and child and briefly found refuge in a police station. In XXXX 2008 the Appellant and his family returned to his home village of XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant did not consider relocating to his wife's home area because by tradition this was a taboo and also because there was inter-ethnic fighting there. As a result of what had happened the Appellant was not well enough to continue training. However, he felt less fearful of the XXXX once his cousin, XXXX XXXX, died. The Appellant returned to XXXX in XXXX XXXX in 2009. [9] On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015 the Appellant found a note from the XXXX left under his door. The note demanded the Appellant to pay a tax. Around XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015 the Appellant received a second note with an ultimatum to pay for all the years he had lived in the village. The Appellant reported the incidents to the police; the police did not appear to take the Appellant's concerns seriously. The same day the Appellant received a call from a member of the XXXX sect informing him that the police could not help him. The Appellant realized that the XXXX were fully aware of his report to the police. The Appellant returned to the police the following day. He was advised that the police would investigate the matter. To date the Appellant has received no information from the police. [10] The second week of XXXX 2015 the Appellant sought safety with a friend about 230 kilometres from his village. [11] The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2015 with the intention of XXXX in a XXXX XXXX XXXX. During a telephone call to his wife she advised him to remain in Canada for his safety. The Appellant made a claim for refugee protection on May 22, 2015. [12] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on July 21, 2015. In a written decision issued on July 29, 2015 the RPD rejected the claim. [13] Appeal pleadings were received on September 4, 2015. In his appeal, the Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of his supposed reavailment and in it its assessment of Mombasa as a reasonable IFA. The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred when it found his claim had no objective basis. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [14] As provided for in section 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and refugee claimant. Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [15] The Appellant submits the following new evidence with his original Appellant's Record: a) The Appellant's Affidavit, dated September 3, 2015.1 b) A letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2006, published articles regarding a political crisis at the time of an XXXX XXXX in XXXX in XXXX 2006, and a copy of the Appellant's expired passport indicting travel to Lebanon in XXXX 2006.2 c) A letter, dated August 27, 2015, from XXXX XXXX, a village elder, and the envelope in which the letter was mailed from Kenya.3 d) Published articles regarding XXXX culture, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, various dates.4 e) Published articles regarding the XXXX sect, various dates.5 f) Published articles regarding al-Shabaab in Kenya, various dates,6 and a Government of Canada travel advisory to Kenya dated August 31, 2015.7 [16] The RAD is following the guidance in the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) decision of Singh8 on March 29, 2016, in determining the admissibility of new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The RAD's analysis of the admissibility of the proposed new evidence must begin first with the test set out in section 110(4). [17] If the proposed new evidence meets the tests set out in the statutory requirements the RAD will then go on to assess the FCA's considerations in Raza with the exception of materiality which is to be considered only in relation to section 110(6) of the IRPA. [18] In the case at hand, the RAD accepts document a), the Appellant's affidavit, in so far as it explains his reasons for providing new evidence. [19] Regarding document b), the Appellant submits that the RPD based its finding of lack of subjective fear, in part, on the Appellant's reavailment from Lebanon in 2006, but that the RPD did not question him during the hearing about his travels to Lebanon. The Appellant argues that document b) provides information as his first response to the RPD's particular concerns regarding reavailment from Lebanon. The RAD, having listened to the recording of the hearing, agrees with the Appellant. The RPD did not ask the Appellant to provide reasons for returning to Kenya from Lebanon in 2006. The RAD will assess the weight to be given to document b) within the analysis below. [20] In his affidavit, document a), the Appellant submits that during the hearing he did not have evidence regarding his cousin, XXXX XXXX, because his cousin's family was ashamed of his actions and it would have been a painful experience to have them write a letter about the circumstances of Mr. XXXX involvement in the XXXX. The Appellant also argues that the RPD suggested in its written decision that he should have obtained evidence from a village elder. The Appellant explains that he refrained from doing so because the International Criminal Court (ICC) is prosecuting members of the Kenyan government for their use of the XXXX to commit war crimes and his wife's request for evidence from an elder regarding the XXXX might bring suspicion upon her as an agent for the ICC. The Appellant explains further that given the RPD's focus on the lack of documentary evidence regarding his cousin he decided to take the risk and send his wife to obtain evidence from an elder. The Appellant submits that a village elder, XXXX XXXX, provided a letter, document c), only after being reassured by his own daughter that it was safe to do so. The RAD finds the Appellant's explanation satisfactory and, therefore, accepts the letter from a village elder. The RAD also wishes to note that according to the jurisprudence Justice Martineau held in Morka that in certain circumstances, where the claimant's account lacks credibility on key issues, it is reasonable to ground an adverse credibility finding on an absence of documentation to support an applicant's allegations.9 However, as discussed in its analysis below, the RPD found no contradictions in the Appellant's oral testimony but found the Appellant not credible because of a lack of documentary evidence. The RAD finds that the RPD erred in this respect. The RAD will assess the weight to be given to the letter within the analysis below. [21] Regarding document d), the Appellant submits that until he received the rejection of his claim he could not be aware of the RPD's concerns regarding the veracity of the two letters sent to him by the XXXX. The Appellant argues that he could not reasonably be expected to provide evidence that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX could be used by the XXXX on their correspondence. For the following reasons the RAD accepts the Appellant's submissions. According to the recording of the hearing, the Appellant was questioned by the RPD about the letters from the XXXX he provided as evidence. The Appellant testified that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX found on each letter is a symbol of the XXXX sect. The threatening letters from the XXXX is a critical aspect of the Appellant's claim and a key aspect of the RPD's negative credibility finding. However, as indicated in the previous paragraph, the RPD found no contradictions in the Appellant's oral testimony but found the Appellant not credible because of a lack of documentary evidence. The RAD finds that the RPD erred in this respect. The RAD will assess the weight to be given to the letter within the analysis below. [22] The Appellant submits that document f) provides evidence that it is clear that Al-Shabaab continues to commit numerous acts of violence, especially against Christians throughout Kenya, including Mombasa. The RAD appreciates that one of the two articles and the Government of Canada travel advisory post-dates the RPD's rejection of the Appellant's claim. Nevertheless, the RAD rejects document f) because similar evidence10 was available to the RPD for the Appellant's hearing. ROLE OF THE RAD: [23] As referred to in his Supplemental Memorandum of Argument, the RAD finds that the recent Federal Court of Appeal decision, in Huruglica,11 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE Did the RPD err when it found that the Appellant's claim had no objective basis? [24] The RPD found that the Appellant fabricated his story about being forced to join the XXXX and as such the RPD found that the Appellant's claim has no objective basis. The RPD based these findings on the lack of documentary evidence, such as identity documents of the Appellant's cousin, XXXX XXXX, and evidence in the form of notarized affidavits from friends, members of his family or village elders that XXXX XXXX fought for the XXXX in XXXX and was killed in the 2008 war. [25] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider the timing of the Appellant's claim and that the Appellant was approached for recruitment by the XXXX through his cousin over a period of years generally coinciding with elections. The Appellant argues that after his cousin died the XXXX began to extort him through threatening letters. The Appellant also argues that independent documentary evidence from the National Documentation Package (NDP) was on file for his hearing to support his claim that there was a war in late 2007 involving the XXXX sect. The Appellant submits that while the RPD did not dispute his profile as a Kenyan, a member of the XXXX tribe and a Christian, the RPD did not consider the risk of a person with his profile. The Appellant argues that the independent documentary evidence is clear that the XXXX try to extort money from members of its own tribe, the XXXX. [26] For the following reasons the RAD finds that the RPD erred in its finding that the Appellant's claim had no objective basis. [27] The RAD notes that the RPD stated in its reasons that "the panel is aware that testimony given under oath is presumed to be true, unless there is valid reason to doubt the truthfulness".12 The RAD finds that according to the recording of the hearing, there were no contradictions between the Appellant's testimony and information contained in his BOC form.13 The RAD finds that the Appellant made no apparent attempts to embellish his claim. [28] The RAD finds that the RPD's reliance on the lack of documentary evidence for its credibility findings is flawed. The RPD erred in this finding. In its written decision the RPD found no inconsistencies in the Appellant's testimony when compared to information the Appellant provided in his BOC form. The RPD may reasonably draw an adverse credibility inference from an Appellant's failure to present evidence supporting his claim if the account consists of a lack of credibility on key issues, stemming from clear inconsistencies and implausibilities in oral testimony. The RAD is guided by the jurisprudence for the proposition that the RPD is entitled to draw a negative inference from an Appellant's failure to provide corroborating evidence when there are inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony.14 [29] On its own the objective evidence referred to by the Appellant is not sufficient to support the Appellant's claim because the evidence establishes no nexus that might link this general documentary evidence to the Appellant's specific circumstances. However, the RAD has considered documentary evidence provided by the Appellant. [30] First, the RAD has considered the new evidence, document c), the letter dated August 27, 2015, from XXXX XXXX, a village elder, and a copy of Mr. XXXX Republic of Kenya identity card. Mr. XXXX states in his letter that XXXX XXXX was cousin to the Appellant. Mr. XXXX states that Mr. XXXX brought shame to his people for his criminal activities as a hardcore member of the XXXX. Mr. XXXX also states that Mr. XXXX died in XXXX 2008 when he engaged in a tribal war on the side of the XXXX. The RAD finds that the letter supports the Appellant's allegations regarding his cousin's activities within the XXXX and, thus, assigns significant weight. [31] For his hearing before the RPD the Appellant provided two letters from the XXXX, containing threats if the Appellant fails to pay a tax.15 As referred to above, the Appellant testified that each letter contains a drawing of XXXX XXXX, which is the symbol used by the XXXX because they are members of the XXXX tribe. The RAD has accepted into evidence document d), articles regarding the XXXX culture.16 Information contained in document d) indicates that the XXXX people have long revered and worshiped the XXXX XXXX as sacred. The letter from the village elder, discussed in the previous paragraph, indicates that the XXXX members gather under a XXXX XXXX and pray facing XXXX XXXX and use the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX during their rituals.17 The RAD notes that according to the independent documentary evidence the XXXX began as a religious organisation purporting a return to traditional XXXX spirituality and moral values.18 The RAD, therefore, accepts on a balance of probabilities the Appellant's submission that the XXXX XXXX is a symbol of the XXXX. Accordingly, the RAD assigns significant weight to the two letters from the XXXX and to the new evidence, document d). [32] The RAD, thus, finds that the Appellant's documentary evidence supports his allegations of extortion and threats to his life at the hands of the XXXX. Did the RPD err in its finding of lack of subjective fear as a result of the Appellant's failure to claim in various countries and his numerous reavailments? [33] The RPD found the Appellant lacked subjective fear because he failed to claim for refugee protection in the numerous countries to which he travelled beginning in 2002 and because he continued to return to Kenya after his many international competitions. [34] The Appellant submits that there is no reavailment where the Appellant believes country conditions have changed. In particular, the Appellant argues that in 2002 when he returned from XXXX XXXX in European countries, he had testified before the RPD that although he was afraid of the XXXX he knew the XXXX had approached him for political reasons during an election year. The Appellant states in his appeal that he testified at his hearing that he believed the XXXX were "pumped up because of all the nationalist rhetoric and would stop after the election". The Appellant submits that he returned to Kenya in 2002 and was not approached by the XXXX to join them until the election campaign of 2005. [35] The Appellant argues that just before he left for Europe in 2005 his life was threatened by the XXXX and he, therefore, made arrangements to move his family to Rongai where he met his wife and child upon his return to Kenya. The Appellant submits that returning to Kenya to protect his family does not undermine his subjective fear. The Appellant depends upon the jurisprudence.19 [36] The Appellant submits that his return to Kenya from Lebanon in 2006 to protect his family does not undermine his subjective fear. The Appellant argues that when his cousin located him in XXXX in XXXX 2006, he shortly thereafter travelled to XXXX in Lebanon to earn money to cover the cost of relocating his family to XXXX. The Appellant also submits that his new evidence, document b), provides information regarding the postponement of the XXXX in XXXX due to a political assassination and his subsequent participation in the XXXX XXXX XXXX later than originally scheduled. The RAD assigns some weight to document b) as it provides evidence of the Appellant's participation in a XXXX which could earn him money. [37] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred when it found he should have claimed for protection in Tanzania when he was there in 2008. The Appellant argues that it was not in 2008 but in 2009 when he travelled to Tanzania after recuperating in 2008 from being traumatized from the interethnic war while he lived in XXXX. The Appellant submits that during his hearing before the RPD he testified that he did not fear returning to Kenya in 2009 because his cousin, XXXX XXXX, had died in the interethnic wars and he felt he had no reason to now fear the XXXX. [38] For the following reasons the RPD agrees with the Appellant. [39] The RAD finds the Appellant's explanation for returning to Kenya in 2002 to be satisfactory. As events would prove, the Appellant was not approached by the XXXX again until the next election in 2005. Not only did the Appellant return to Kenya a number of times in order to protect his wife and child, he took measures to protect them by relocating the family. The Appellant relocated to XXXX after threats at the time of the 2005 election and relocated to XXXX in 2006 after his cousin, XXXX XXXX, found him. The RAD finds satisfactory the Appellant's explanation that he did not fear returning to Kenya once he learned his cousin died in early 2008. [40] The Appellant alleges that it was eventually necessary to leave XXXX in 2009 and return to his native village. The Appellant provided documentary evidence, in the form of a newspaper report, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2009, to support this allegation of interethnic fighting in XXXX which resulted in the death of more than XXXX people and the displacement of many more.20 [41] It was not until XXXX 2015 that the Appellant was again approached by the XXXX, but rather than trying to force him to join their organization, as they had done in the past through the Appellant's cousin, they were threating his life through extortion. The Appellant sought state protection on two separate occasions, to no avail, and then went in to hiding. The Appellant took the opportunity to leave Kenya in XXXX 2015 to XXXX XXXX XXXX in Canada. At the first opportunity he made a claim for refugee protection. [42] The RAD, therefore, finds that the Appellant's behaviour of not claiming for protection in the various countries to which he travelled and then returning to Kenya does not undermine his subjective fear. Internal Flight Alternative [43] The RPD found that the Appellant has a viable IFA in Mombasa, Kenya. The RPD did not accept the Appellant's testimony that he could not train for his XXXX pursuits in the warm climate of Mombasa. The RPD in its decision found that the Appellant had provided no documentary evidence to indicate that the XXXX are active in Mombasa. The RPD noted that the independent documentary evidence indicates that the XXXX sect was outlawed by the Kenyan government in 2002 and that the sect is primarily active in areas well west of Mombasa. [44] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider his oral testimony that as a Christian he feared living in Mombasa because of the presence of members of Al-Shabaab who commit violent, anti-Christian acts. The Appellant also submits that his new evidence indicates that former members of the XXXX have joined Al-Shabaab. The Appellant argues that he did provide evidence for his hearing before the RPD of the influence of the XXXX within the Kenyan police and among politicians and, as such, it is reasonable to find that the XXXX could find the Appellant through various channels of authority. The Appellant also argued that the RPD noted several times in its decision that the Appellant is a XXXX XXXX in Kenya. [45] While the RAD finds that the activities of Al-Shabaab in the coastal area of Kenya, including Mombasa, are a generalized risk for those who live there, for the following reasons the RAD finds that the Appellant does not have a viable IFA in Mombasa or any other area of Kenya. [46] As the Appellant submits, the RPD in its decision acknowledged that the Appellant is a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD concurs. The letter, submitted as new evidence from XXXX XXXX, the village elder, states that the Appellant is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.21 The RAD finds it reasonable that, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, the Appellant's whereabouts could be found. If the Appellant continues his XXXX pursuits, which he is not expected to give up in the IFA, his activities would be known by the general public in Kenya. [47] The RAD appreciates that the independent documentary evidence referred to by the RPD indicates that the XXXX are not centred in Mombasa. Nevertheless, the RAD finds that documentary evidence also indicates that their reach is as far as Mombasa. For example, the Operational Guidance Note (OGN) from the United Kingdom Home Office provides the following information. There are links between politicians and the XXXX, including President Kenyatta, further undermining the ability of the police to investigate crimes perpetrated by XXXX members. Some of those who tried to investigate the XXXX have been killed. [48] Apparently most people just don't bother to report threats from the XXXX to police because the police will not do anything.22 Evidence provided by the Appellant indicates that the police turn a blind eye to the activities of the XXXX and that some members of the XXXX have relocated to Mombasa and joined Al-Shabaab.23 [49] The RAD has considered the Appellant's profile as a XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD, therefore, finds it more likely than not that his whereabouts in Mombasa or any other part of Kenya would not go unnoticed. [50] The RAD, therefore, finds that there is a serious possibility of persecution of the Appellant in Mombasa. Thus, there is not a viable IFA for the Appellant in Mombasa. DISPOSITION [51] After carefully considering the RPD decision and carrying out its own analysis of the record, the RAD determines that the RPD erred in in credibility findings and in its finding regarding a viable IFA in Kenya. Based on its own analysis of the record, the RAD finds that the Appellant has established, with credible evidence, a well-founded fear of persecution in Kenya. The RAD has also found the Appellant does not have a viable IFA in Kenya. CONCLUSION [52] Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Lesley Mason" Lesley Mason August 31, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 158-161. 2 Ibid., pp. 165-176. 3 Ibid., pp. 177-182. 4 Ibid., pp. 183-196. 5 Ibid., pp. 197-199. 6 Ibid., pp. 200-241. 7 Ibid., pp. 242-255. 8 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 9 Morka, Maria Obianuju v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4120-06), Martineau, March 26, 2007, 2007 FC 315. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 263-269. 11 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 12 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.). 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 13-29. 14 Encinas, Migual Nagel Vasquez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4548-05), Noël, January 23, 2006, 2006 FC 61; Mejia, Selvin Manrique Villeda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-356-09), Pinard, October 29, 2009, 2009 FC 1091. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 166-167. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 183-196. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 166-167. 18 Exhibit RPD-1- RPD's Record, pp.119-162, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Kenya (December 23, 2014), item 1.4. 19 Shanmugarajah, Appiah v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-609-91), Stone, MacGuigan, Henry, June 22, 1992; Mohammadi, Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3219-02), Russell, September 5, 2003, 2003 FC 1028. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 255-258. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 177-182. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 119-162, NDP for Kenya (December 23, 2014), item 1.4. 23 Exhibit RPD-1- RPD Record, pp. 250-262 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-08485