TB9-31481

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-31481 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision December 8, 2020 Date de la décision Panel E. Bobkin Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Phillip J.L. Trotter Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss the appeal brought by XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant). [2] The Appellant was born in India in 1992 to Tibetan parents in a Tibetan refugee settlement. Both of her parents were born in India in 1959 and 1964. The Appellant alleges that, while she may be entitled to Indian citizenship, she cannot access this right because she cannot get a passport. She alleges that she is at risk of deportation from India to China where she will be persecuted based on her Tibetan ethnicity. The Appellant came to Canada to study XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX with an intention to remain in Canada, but after learning her family could not support her to remain here, she claimed refugee protection. [3] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) determined that the Appellant had citizenship in India. The RPD held that the Appellant had not established any significant impediment to exercising her citizenship rights nor had she made reasonable effort to overcome any impediment to accessing her Indian citizenship or shown it would not be reasonable for her to do so. The RPD held that the Appellant had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that she had Chinese citizenship or would be deported there. The RPD found that the Appellant did not face a risk of persecution in India. [4] The Appellant alleges that the RPD erred. She alleges there are significant impediments to the Appellant obtaining Indian citizenship, and it is not reasonable for her to be required to demonstrate this personally. She argues that, if she is required to demonstrate this personally, she has done so. The Appellant argues that she is at risk in India because of the expiry of her resident certificate (RC). The Appellant has submitted new evidence on appeal but has not requested an oral hearing. [5] I find that the RPD's decision is correct. The determinative issue is Indian citizenship. I find that the Appellant has not made reasonable efforts to overcome potential impediments to obtaining her Indian citizenship nor has she established that it would not be reasonable for her to do so. I find that the Appellant has not established a serious possibility of persecution, or a section 97 risk, on a balance of probabilities, in India. DECISION [6] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [7] According to the law,1 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD's decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [8] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.2 If there is admissible evidence, I must determine whether the test for an oral hearing is met. [9] The Appellant submitted the following as new evidence: (a) her own affidavit; (b) a letter from a lawyer she consulted in India; (c) a legal opinion on her case from an Indian lawyer; (d) a letter from her sister and evidence her sister obtained about deportation of Tibetans to China; (e) an affidavit from Counsel's office and a decision of the RPD. [10] I find that paragraphs 6-11 and 13 of the Appellant's affidavit are admissible, and the remainder of the evidence is inadmissible. The RPD's decision is not new evidence but is admissible under rule 3(3)(f) of the RAD Rules. The Appellant's affidavit [11] I find that paragraphs 6-11 and 13 of the Appellant's affidavit are admissible. The remainder of the affidavit is not. [12] Paragraphs 1-5 of the Appellant's affidavit is a re-statement of her basis of claim form and what occurred at her refugee hearing. This evidence is not new, as required by the case law. I have the transcript and recording of the hearing and the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form, and, therefore, all of this evidence is before me in that form. [13] Paragraph 12 of the Appellant's affidavit is an explanation of steps she made after her hearing to speak to the Indian Consulate about her documentation and applying for a passport.3 The Appellant states that she went "after my hearing" and explains "I did not go earlier as I did not even known there was an Indian Consulate in Toronto until the RPD Member asked me whether I had gone to apply for an RC or passport."4 I find that this explanation does not establish that the evidence was not reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of her claim for two reasons. First, the Appellant was represented by competent Counsel throughout the process. Counsel ought to have advised the Appellant to make this inquiry in advance of her hearing. Second, even if the Appellant was not aware of this prior to her hearing, her hearing occurred on August 15, 2019, and the decision was not rendered until October 30, 2019, over two months later. The Appellant had ample time to obtain this evidence in that period and has not explained why she did not do so. Her Counsel made post-hearing submissions and submitted evidence twice in September 2019, and she could have submitted this evidence at that time. [14] The Appellant could have approached the Indian Consulate sooner, and, therefore, the evidence does not post-date the rejection of the claim. Additionally, given that the Appellant had Counsel and the RPD brought up the issue of approaching the Indian Consulate at the hearing, I find that the Appellant has not established that the evidence in paragraph 12 is evidence she could not reasonably have been expected to provide in the circumstances prior to the rejection of her claim. [15] Paragraphs 6-11 of the affidavit are explanations for how the Appellant obtained other evidence which she is putting forward as new evidence. Given that the Appellant only decided to obtain this other evidence after the rejection of her claim, I find that these paragraphs are evidence which arose after the rejection of the claim. They meet subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and are new under the case law. They are relevant to my assessment of the new evidence and are in the form of a sworn affidavit and are, therefore, credible for admission. I admit these paragraphs. I do not find these paragraphs meet the test for an oral hearing. As I am not admitting the other evidence, the testimony in these paragraphs about how the documentation was obtained is not determinative of the appeal. Additionally, I accept that the Appellant obtained the documents discussed in these paragraphs as credible. Therefore, this evidence does not raise a serious credibility issue. [16] Finally, with regard to paragraph 13, this is an explanation for a finding in the RPD's decision which was not put to the Appellant at the hearing. Therefore, I find that this evidence could not have been presented prior to the rejection of the claim. It is new, pursuant to subsection 110(4) and the case law. It is relevant to one of the RPD's findings, and it comes in the form of a sworn affidavit and is credible for the purposes of admission. I accept the statement in this paragraph as credible, and I find it does not raise a serious issue of credibility, and, therefore, I am not holding an oral hearing based upon this evidence. Letter from Indian Lawyer [17] The Appellant submits a letter from an Indian lawyer whom she alleges she contacted in 2015 to discuss Indian citizenship.5 This evidence does not post-date the rejection of the claim, as the Appellant met this lawyer in 2015, prior to coming to Canada. The Appellant does not argue that this evidence was not reasonably available to her prior to the rejection of the claim, and I find there is no evidence to establish this. The Appellant argues that she did not think to get this letter until after receiving her negative RPD decision because the RPD questioned the credibility of this meeting, and, therefore, she decided to get this letter, and it is something she could not reasonably have been expected to provide earlier. I disagree. [18] The Appellant was asked at the RPD hearing whether she had a letter from the lawyer,6 and her own Counsel asked her if she could find this person, and she said she could ask her father to look into this.7 Therefore, the Appellant was clearly aware of the importance of this document, at least from the time of the hearing. As discussed above, over two months elapsed from the time of the hearing to the time of the decision. The Appellant has not explained why she did not attempt to get this document in this time. Therefore, she has not established that this was evidence she could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of her claim. The letter is inadmissible. Legal Opinion [19] The Appellant presents a legal opinion from an Indian lawyer on her ability to exercise her citizenship right in India.8 Counsel argues that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to provide this evidence previously.9 The Appellant argues that she did not know she could get a legal opinion like this, and that is why she did not obtain it earlier.10 I am not persuaded by this explanation. [20] First, Counsel stated at the hearing that he was going to attempt to get an Indian legal opinion.11 Second, the legal opinion is dated XXXX XXXX, 2019, which is over one month before the decision was rendered. Therefore, the Appellant was clearly aware of the importance of this evidence prior to the rejection and has not explained why they could not have been expected to provide this evidence, at least, at the time of the hearing or when the opinion was dated. [21] Moreover, the evidence does not post-date the rejection of the claim, and the Appellant has not explained why she did not submit this prior to the rejection of her claim. Counsel submitted post-hearing written submissions and evidence to the RPD on September 19, 2019 and September 24, 2019 and has not explained why this report was not submitted at this time.12 Without further evidence, given the date on the report, I find the Appellant has not established that this evidence was not reasonably available to her prior to the rejection of her claim. [22] The legal opinion, therefore, does not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Evidence from the Appellant's Sister [23] The Appellant provided an affidavit from her sister explaining her steps to get status in Australia and her fear of being deported to China and a letter from a man in Australia who assisted the Appellant's sister and was aware of a Tibetan who was at risk of deportation to China.13 The evidence is inadmissible. [24] All of the evidence deals with events which pre-date the Appellant's refugee claim and, therefore, does not post-date the rejection of the claim. The Appellant has not stated that this evidence was not reasonably available to her at the time of her decision. Rather, she states that she did not know about this because her sister only told her after her claim was rejected, and she did not ask her sister about this, as her sister is reserved.14 Therefore, her Counsel argues that she could not have reasonably been expected to provide this evidence. I am not persuaded. [25] First, the RPD asked the Appellant about her sister and her sister's status in Australia.15 Therefore, at least from the point of the RPD hearing, the Appellant ought to have been aware that evidence about her sister's status was relevant to her claim. Second, the Federal Court has held that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) is not an opportunity to fix a deficient record or conduct a better search for evidence.16 The Appellant had competent Counsel before the RPD. It was within her control to speak to her sister about whether she had any relevant evidence. Given that the Appellant's sister is similarly situated to her, I do not find it reasonable that the Appellant did not enquire into this prior to the rejection of her claim. Therefore, I find the Appellant has not established that this is evidence that she could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of her claim. The evidence is inadmissible under subsection 110(4). Affidavit from Counsel's Office and RPD's Decision [26] The Appellant submits an affidavit from a law clerk in Counsel's office attaching a decision of the RPD finding a Tibetan claimant not a citizen of India.17 The decision is admissible under rule 3(3)(f) of the RAD Rules which permits the Appellant to submit any legal authority the Appellant wishes to rely on. It does not fall under the new evidence scheme. The affidavit is unnecessary and, therefore, irrelevant, as a RPD decision can be filed under this rule, and the sole purpose of the affidavit is to explain the issuance of the RPD's decision. THE ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [27] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.18 There is an exception to this, where the RAD defers to the RPD if the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence. I do not find this case falls into the exception. Therefore, I will be looking at whether the RPD's decision was correct. ANALYSIS [28] The law is clear that the Appellant is entitled to Indian citizenship. Pursuant to India's Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, a person born in India between July 1, 1987 and the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 is a citizen if either of their parents is a citizen of India at the time of their birth.19 The Appellant was born in India in 1992. Both of her parents were born in India in 1959 and 1964.20 They are citizens of India because the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 states that every person born in India between 1950 and July 1, 1987 is a citizen of India.21 The determinative question in this appeal is whether the Appellant can access this citizenship, by obtaining a passport, and, if so, if she faces a risk in India which would make her a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. [29] I find that the Appellant has not made reasonable efforts to overcome potential impediments to obtaining her Indian citizenship nor has she established that it would not be reasonable for her to do so. I find that the Appellant has not established a serious possibility of persecution, or a section 97 risk, on a balance of probabilities, in India. I, therefore, confirm the RPD's decision. The Appellant's Right to Indian Citizenship [30] The RPD held that the Appellant had not taken reasonable steps to obtain her Indian passport and that she had not established that it would not be reasonable for her to do so. The Appellant argues that her efforts of speaking to a lawyer in India are reasonable steps to overcome the impediment, and, in any event, the evidence shows that there are significant impediments, and it is not reasonable for her to be required to make efforts to overcome them. I agree with the RPD. [31] The test for determining a country of nationality was set out in Williams22 and Tretsetsang23 as follows: ... a country of nationality includes a country where the claimant is a citizen and where the claimant may face an insignificant or minor impediment to accessing state protection from that country but may not include a country where the claimant is a citizen and faces a significant impediment to accessing state protection from that country.24 [32] Where there is an allegation that there is an impediment to accessing or exercising citizenship rights the Appellant must establish that: (a) The existence of a significant impediment that may reasonably be considered capable of preventing the claimant from exercising his or her citizenship rights of state protection in that country of nationality; and (b) That the claimant has made reasonable efforts to overcome such impediment and that such efforts were unsuccessful such that the claimant was unable to obtain the protection of that state.25 [33] Regarding reasonable efforts, the Federal Court of Appeal stated the following: What will constitute reasonable efforts to overcome a significant impediment (that has been established by any particular claimant) in any particular situation can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. A claimant will not be obligated to make any effort to overcome such impediment if the claimant establishes that it would not be reasonable to require such claimant to make any such effort.26 [34] The RPD answered no to both parts of the Tretsetsang test. On the first question, I find that the issue of a significant impediment is not determinative. On the second question, I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has not made reasonable efforts to overcome any impediments and that she has not established that it would not be reasonable to require her to do so. Is there a significant impediment to accessing Indian citizenship? [35] The RPD held that the evidence of impediments to accessing citizenship were not significant. Specifically, the RPD held that, while there was some evidence that despite the law, Tibetans have been denied passports, but the Appellant has not tested this personally, and she has the means to challenge a refusal in court if she had to.27 The RPD also held that the fact that the Appellant's RC expired was not a significant impediment because she could renew it abroad, and she made no efforts to do so or because she could have it reinstated.28 The RPD also concluded that any requirement to surrender an RC to apply for a passport would not constitute a significant impediment because the Appellant personally had not shown she depended on the benefits of the RC significantly.29 [36] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in finding that there were no impediments and that the evidence shows significant impediments.30 The Appellant argues that there is objective evidence that Tibetans continue to be refused passports, despite the law and court decision, and that other panels of the RPD have made this finding.31 The Appellant argues that it was an error for the RPD to conclude, without asking the Appellant, that she could go to court to challenge a refusal of her passport and that a requirement to litigate is a significant impediment.32 The Appellant argues that, because her parents "did not have citizenship", she would be less likely to obtain it than someone born before 1987 because her parents never applied for it.33 The Appellant also argues that, to attempt to obtain citizenship, she would have to surrender her RC which would put her at risk.34 [37] I do not find the other RPD decision cited by the Appellant particularly persuasive because I do not have the evidence in that file.35 Additionally, I find the analysis on citizenship in India in that file is not particularly robust given that risk in India was the determinative issue. Therefore, I do not find the decision is on all fours with this appeal. [38] I agree with the Appellant that there is objective evidence that Tibetans face difficulties in obtaining passports, and I agree that the Appellant may not have the financial ability to challenge a refusal in court. I also agree that there is an added step for the Appellant to assert her rights because she must prove her parent's birth (although, as I will discuss below, the Appellant can do this). However, even accepting for analysis, without making a finding, that the RPD erred and these are significant impediments, this is not determinative. [39] The test set out in Tretsetsang is conjunctive. The Appellant must show significant impediments and reasonable efforts to overcome the impediments which were unsuccessful (or that it is unreasonable for her to make such efforts). For the reasons below, I find the Appellant fails on the second prong of the test regardless of the outcome of the first. Did the Appellant make reasonable efforts to overcome any significant impediments to accessing Indian citizenship? [40] The RPD considered the Appellant's efforts to access Indian citizenship. The Appellant testified that, in 2015, she met a lawyer who informed her that she could not get a passport. The RPD either found this lacked credibility, because it was omitted from the BOC, or that it was not reasonable efforts because the conversation was "casual" and brief and because the lawyer did not ask where her parents were born or ask to see any documents about her parents.36 The RPD held that the Appellant's other effort of speaking to the Tibetan community did not constitute reasonable efforts.37 [41] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in finding the evidence about meeting a lawyer lacking credibility.38 I do not find this determinative. I accept, for the purpose of analysis, that the meeting occurred as testified to before the RPD. The Appellant also argues that this meeting is sufficient to discharge her obligation to make reasonable efforts to overcome impediments.39 I disagree. [42] I find that the conversation with the lawyer in 2015 did not constitute reasonable efforts because, as noted by the RPD, the Appellant gave incorrect information to the lawyer and did not provide the lawyer with appropriate information and documentation to advise her. The Appellant was asked about this at her hearing: MEMBER: Okay, so you did an internet search. Did you talk to a lawyer? CLAIMANT: Yes, I did...in (inaudible) I asked one of the lawyers and asked him...I told my intent to become Indian citizen. So he asked the same question when were you born and then he asked me about my parents' citizenship. So when I replied that both my parents do not have that, then he said I cannot ask for citizenship.40 [43] However, as noted above, the Appellant's parents do have Indian citizenship. They simply have not obtained passports. However, they have RCs indicating that they are born in India,41 and, according to their letters, they also have identity certificates (ICs),42 which indicate the place of birth.43 Given that this documentation establishes that they are born in India, between 1950 and 1987, which is the requirement the Appellant has to prove to show she is an Indian citizen, the discussion with the lawyer cannot be reasonable efforts given she did not explain this to the lawyer or provide any of these documents to the lawyer. This is particularly so given the Appellant's personal circumstances, including the fact that she is university educated and not unsophisticated. [44] Prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim, she was in Canada for twenty-two months (almost two years). She had Counsel for at least sixteen months.44 This was ample time for her to approach the Indian state in Canada to attempt to get a passport. The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by assuming that the Appellant could have applied for a passport within Canada and that there is no objective evidence that any Tibetan born in India can apply for a passport from within Canada.45 I do not find this argument persuasive. [45] First, the RPD Member did not make a finding on applying for a passport from abroad but, rather, applying to renew the Appellant's RC from abroad. Moreover, there is evidence that an Indian citizen can apply for a passport for the first time from abroad. As noted in a Response to Information Request (RIR) on the record, the Consulate General of India in Toronto sets out a procedure for applying for a new passport in Canada.46 The Appellant has not submitted any admissible evidence that this process would not apply to Tibetans. The Appellant did, generally, assert that her lack of a valid RC would block her from applying for a passport, but I do not find this established by the RIR which discusses surrender of an IC and/or an RC,47 and the case law which states that it is reasonable to expect a Tibetan to approach the government with an IC to attempt to assert citizenship under the Tretsetsang test.48 [46] For these reasons, I concur with the RPD that the Appellant has not established that she made reasonable efforts to overcome any significant impediments to exercising her Indian citizenship rights. Is it reasonable to require the Appellant to make any particular efforts to overcome impediments to accessing citizenship rights? [47] The Appellant argues that, because there are significant impediments to accessing citizenship, she does not need to show she made a reasonable effort to obtain a passport when she was in India.49 I find that this is a misstatement of the law. If I accept the Appellant's argument, there is no need for the second part of the Tretsetsang test because the significant impediment is the end of the analysis. However, the Court is clear: the Tretsetsang test has two steps: (1) establishment of a significant impediment; and (2) establishment of reasonable efforts to overcome significant impediments being unsuccessful. The question of whether it is unreasonable to make any particular effort goes to the second step of the test and not the first step. Therefore, it is necessary to do more than assert that there is a significant impediment to succeed under the Tretsetsang test and to establish that it is unreasonable to make any particular effort to overcome a significant impediment. [48] As set out in Pasang, in determining whether it is reasonable for the Appellant to make any particular efforts to overcome significant impediments the decision-maker must consider the "personal implications" for the individual in taking these steps taking into account factors such as education, employment, residence and reliance on the benefits conferred to Tibetan refugees in India. [49] As noted by the RPD, the Appellant is XXXX educated and has travelled internationally. She has a history of working as a XXXX. I find she possesses a level of knowledge and experience to have the ability to make reasonable efforts to overcome any significant impediment to exercising her citizenship right. Additionally, as noted by the RPD, the Appellant has not provided evidence that she depended upon the benefits provided by the Central Tibetan Administration.50 [50] The Appellant argues that it would be unreasonable for her to take steps to overcome her impediments to citizenship because she argues that returning to India and surrendering her RC, in order to obtain citizenship, would put her at risk.51 However, as discussed above, the Appellant made no efforts in the twenty-two months in Canada prior to the rejection of her claim to attempt to apply for her passport in Canada, where there is no concern about mistreatment based on the lack of having a valid RC. [51] I note that the Federal Court commented on this in obiter in Pasang stating: Mr. Pasang says that if he were to relinquish his RC and IC in order to apply for Indian citizenship from within Canada, and if his refugee claim were refused, he would be left in an invidious position. I agree. In any event, this is not the basis upon which the RAD denied his refugee claim.52 [52] In my view, this statement is obiter and not binding. Moreover, I do not have the full record of Pasang before me. Finally, again, as stated above, this step could have been done well before the Appellant even made a refugee claim, as she retained Counsel to advise her about obtaining status in Canada. Had she surrendered her RC and/or her IC in Canada and been refused a passport, she could have then made a claim with clear evidence that she met the test in Tretsetsang. Therefore, I do not find the Appellant's argument establishes that it is unreasonable for her to take reasonable steps to overcome the significant impediments to obtaining her citizenship. The Appellant's claim for Protection against India [53] The RPD concluded that the Appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or of a section 97 risk in India because the Appellant had access to education and employment, was able to move in India and travel abroad, and she had not established a risk of deportation. Therefore, the RPD determined that there was no serious possibility of persecution or a section 97 risk, on a balance of probabilities.53 [54] The Appellant argues that where a Tibetan person born in India satisfies the Tretsetsang test they need not make a claim in India.54 The Appellant argues that, if she returns to India without citizenship, she is at risk of harm in the form of being fined, detained and deported to China by Indian authorities; this is based upon her lack of a valid RC.55 [55] I agree with the Appellant in part. If I had found that the Appellant had satisfied the Tretsetsang test such that she had demonstrated she could not access her citizenship rights in India then there would be no need to claim protection from India, as India would not be a country of reference. Were the Appellant in this position, I would have to consider whether China was a country of reference or whether the Appellant is stateless and what her risks in those situations might be. However, as explained above, I did not make that finding. Therefore, there was no error in the RPD considering the Appellant's claim against India. [56] As for the Appellant's arguments on risk, I do not find them persuasive. They are all predicated on the Appellant living without access to her citizenship right in India. As discussed above, the Appellant has not established that she is in this position. The Appellant has not established any risk in India as a citizen there. Moreover, at her hearing, she testified that, if she could obtain her Indian citizenship, she would like to do this, indicating she does not have a subjective fear of India.56 The Appellant did not indicate that India was a country she feared persecution in when filling out her BOC but, rather, indicated only "Tibet/China."57 The Appellant had the assistance of Counsel in preparing her BOC.58 [57] For these reasons, I concur with the RPD's decision that the Appellant has not established a serious possibility of persecution, or a section 97 risk, on a balance of probabilities, in India. CONCLUSION [58] The RPD correctly concluded that the Appellant had not established that it was beyond her control to exercise her rights of citizenship in India, pursuant to Tretsetsang, and that the Appellant had not established a claim for protection against India. That being said, the Appellant's circumstances, including any hardship she may face in India, her experience as a XXXX in India, and her education in Canada in the field of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX may give rise to grounds for a humanitarian and compassionate application which is not within my jurisdiction to grant. [59] For these reasons, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Erin Bobkin E. Bobkin December 8, 2020 Date 1 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 2 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 5. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 5. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 7. 6 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 13. 7 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 31. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 9-20. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 50. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 4. 11 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 33. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 26, 47. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 23-27. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 4-5. 15 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 13-14. 16 Arafa, Abubeker v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-840-18), Walker, January 3, 2019, 2019 FC 6; and Hassan, Nuuradin Jamal v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4182-18), Fothergill, April 12, 2019, 2019 FC 459. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 29-40. 18 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 5. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 70, 170, 172. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 5. 22 M.C.I. v. Williams, Manzi (F.C.A., no. A-241-04), Décary, Létourneau, Nadon, April 12, 2005, 2005 FCA 126. 23 Tretsetsang, Chime v. M.C.I. (F.C.A, no. A-260-15), Ryer, Webb, Rennie (dissenting), June 9, 2016, 2016 FCA 175. 24 Tretsetsang, 2016 FCA 175, at para. 67. 25 Tretsetsang, 2016 FCA 175, at para. 72. 26 Tretsetsang, 2016 FCA 175, at para. 73. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 9. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 9. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 52. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 52, 56. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 54-56. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 56. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 59. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 32-40. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 8-9. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 9. 38 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 58. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 60. 40 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 12. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 170, 172. 42 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 168-169. 43 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 165. 44 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 78. 45 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 61. 46 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 236-237. 47 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 237. 48 Dakar, Tenzin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3062-16), Gleeson, April 7, 2017, 2017 FC 353, at paras. 26-28. 49 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 60. 50 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10. 51 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 59. 52 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 57; and Pasang, Thinley v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6585-18), Fothergill, July 10, 2019, 2019 FC 907, at para. 23. 53 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10-12. 54 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 62. 55 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 62-69. 56 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 19. 57 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 20. 58 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 22. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-31481 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français