TB4-06406

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-06406 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision November 19, 2014 Date de la décision Panel S.S. Kular Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Sarah Boyd Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) (the Appellant), a citizen of Iran,1 appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. [2] The Appellant submits that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD, and either find the Appellant to be a refugee, or in the alternative refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination before a differently-constituted panel. [3] The Appellant is not submitting new evidence pursuant to Section 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; however, the Appellant is requesting that a hearing be held at the RAD pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA.2 The Minister is not intervening in this Appeal. DETERMINATION [4] Pursuant to Section 111 (1) (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),3 the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination, before a differently-constituted panel. The appeal is allowed. BACKGROUND [5] Due to her political activities, the Appellant fears persecution by the authorities in Iran. Due to her sexual orientation as a lesbian, the Appellant fears harm at the hands of her husband and fears persecution by the authorities. As a lesbian she also fears the society at large in Iran. [6] The Appellant alleged that she was involved in women's rights issues in Iran and supported organizations associated with the XXXX XXXX. She alleged that on XXXX XXXX, 2013, she was involved with a women's rights event in XXXXand spoke publicly about women's equality, taking off her hijab along with many other women there. The event was raided by the police; the Appellant somehow managed to escape. The following day, the authorities from Vezarat-e Ettela'at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (VEVAK) came to her house, and they arrested the Appellant. The Appellant was blindfolded and taken to a room; she was held there for four days. She was interrogated and tortured. The Appellant was released after signing that she would not attend further gatherings. [7] On XXXX XXXX, 2013, the Appellant came to Canada to visit family. While in Canada, the Appellant attended the Pride parade where her pictures were taken. The Appellant's daughter posted the Appellant's pictures taken at the Pride parade on Facebook. The Appellant's husband saw her pictures on Facebook, and has threatened to kill and/or harm the Appellant. [8] While in Canada, the Appellant has also learned that the Iranian authorities (VEVAK) visited her home asking her whereabouts. She learned that the authorities had raided her XXXX XXXX and found materials about the Appellant's group XXXX XXXX XXXX She also learned that two women from her group, XXXX and XXXX, had been arrested. The authorities ordered the XXXX closed and put their own locks on the doors. [9] Due to her political activities, the Appellant fears harm upon return to Iran. The Appellant filed her claim for refugee protection on September 23, 2013. On February 21, 2014, the Appellant submitted an amendment to her Basis of Claim (BoC) narrative in which she alleged that since coming to Canada she has realized that she is attracted to women and thus would face persecution upon return to Iran due to her homosexuality. [10] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on December 5, 2013 and May 7, 2014. In the decision of June 24, 2014, the RPD rejected her refugee claim. [11] The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony was lacking in credibility relating to the main reasons the Appellant decided to file her claim for refugee protection. Since the RPD found the Appellant's credibility lacking with respect to the central parts of her claim, and RPD found the Appellant's other allegations she put forth, including her allegation that she is a lesbian, also lacking in credibility. [12] The Appellant submits that the RPD made various errors in rejecting her refugee claim. The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to apply the Gender Guidelines to facts about how the Appellant ought to have acted as a political activist. The Appellant submits that the RPD did not consider her psychiatric report in relation to finding her credible regarding her sexual orientation as a lesbian. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred both in fact, and in law. [13] The Appellant submits that the RAD set aside the decision of the RPD, and either find the Appellant to be a refugee, or in the alternative refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination before a differently-constituted panel. APPLICATION FOR AN ORAL HEARING [14] The Appellant is requesting a hearing at the RAD pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA.4 The Appellant has submitted no new evidence as per requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA. Regarding the requirement of new evidence to hold a hearing at the RAD, the Appellant submits: "The reference in s. 110(6) to "documentary evidence" is, it is submitted, a reference to the record before the RAD, whether it is limited to the record which was before the RPD or not."5 [15] Regarding the Appellant's request for a hearing at the RAD, the Appellant refers to a recent Federal Court decision in Huruglica6 and further submits: While the statute clearly provides that hearings are to be an exception rather than the rule, and while it is not argued that a hearing is required in every case, it is submitted that, for the same reasons the RPD is required to hold a hearing, and under the Singh7 principles, fairness will require the RAD to hold a hearing when serious questions of credibility arise.8 [16] The RAD considers the Appellant's submissions. [17] Section 110(3) of the IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [18] When read together, sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [19] Based on the above, the RAD rejects the Appellant's application for a hearing at the RAD. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [20] The Appellant submits that the standards of correctness on errors of law, and reasonableness on other errors has been applied by the RAD and upheld in at least one Federal Court case.9 The Appellant supports those standards in her submissions. The RAD considers the Appellant's submissions,10 and the case law submitted.11 [21] In considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD, while the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. The RAD is a relatively new body; however, it now has the benefit of some Federal Court jurisprudence which speaks to the appellate tribunal's role in relation to that of the RPD. [22] In Iyamuremye, the Court found itself: [E]ntirely in agreement with the RAD that the standard of review to be applied to findings of fact made by the RPD is reasonableness. It is well established that an appellate body must review the findings of a trial court by applying a correctness standard to findings that involve questions of law and by applying a reasonableness standard to those involving questions of mixed fact and law....12 [23] The Court went on to hold that the RAD must review the evidence that was before the RPD and conduct its own, independent assessment of that evidence to determine whether the lower tribunal had properly considered the evidence and "reasonably justified its conclusion".13 [24] In the subsequent case of Alvarez, the Court clarified the role of the RAD in relation to the RPD.14 It held that the RAD is not to undertake a process of judicial review, but rather must perform its own assessments of the facts in order to determine whether the RPD made an error of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a "palpable and overriding error."15 In the Court's view, the lower tribunal's ability to hear evidence viva voce makes it better situated than the RAD to make findings of fact, and therefore the appeal tribunal should show deference to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law. In contrast to its ruling in Iyamuremye, here the Court found that the RAD erred by assessing the decision of the RPD against a standard of reasonableness, but then required the use of a higher standard. The Eng case, released on the same day as Alvarez, contained the same analysis of the issue of standard of review. [25] In Malhotra,16 issued after Alvarez and Eng, the Federal Court considered another decision of the RAD, in which the tribunal applied a standard of reasonableness to the RPD's decision under appeal. Although the Court did not specifically address the RAD's selection of the standard of review, it observed that the RAD had applied a standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD's decision did not contain any error which justified the intervention of the Court. [26] More recently, the Court, in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.17 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.18 [27] While the Court had endorsed the standard of reasonableness in Iyamuremye, and accepted it in Malhotra, it found in Huruglica that the application of such standard was in error. In contrast to Alvarez and Eng, the Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error. In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal." As instructed by the Court, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. [28] In this appeal, the RAD adopts and will follow guidance from the case law in Huruglica. MERITS OF THE APPEAL The Appellant's Pleadings19 [29] Based on the Appellant's submissions, the RAD finds the Appellant argues the following issues relating to the RPD's findings and determination in this case: 1. The RPD failed to apply the Gender Guidelines. 2. The RPD ignored the Appellant's psychiatric report. 3. The RPD's credibility findings were both unreasonable and based on errors of law. 4. The RPD made speculative and unreasonable credibility findings. 5. The RPD focused on minor issues in the Appellant's testimony. 6. The RPD failed to consider the cumulative grounds of persecution. 7. The RPD ignored the Appellant's evidence relating to her participation in protests in Canada, and neglected to examine witnesses. 8. The RPD having made a negative credibility finding, failed to consider the objective evidence. The RPD's Findings20 [30] The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness. The RPD found no credible evidence to establish that that the Appellant was an activist or was actively engaged in anti-regime activities to an extent that she would have come to the attention of the authorities in Iran. The RPD found the Appellant not credible regarding her political activities in Canada. The RPD accepted that the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and comes from a family of Kurds XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The RPD noted that the documentary evidence does refer to Kurdish political supporters and sympathizers being at risk in Iran; however, the RPD found that merely being a Kurd in Iran does not necessarily mean getting into trouble with the authorities as has been alleged in this case. The RPD found that the Appellant provided insufficient persuasive evidence to establish her sexual orientation and her identity as a lesbian. Therefore, the RPD found the Appellant not credible in her alleged fear of persecution due to her alleged identity as a lesbian. The RPD determined the Appellant has not satisfied the burden of establishing a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground or a risk of harm if she were to return to Iran. THE RAD ANALYSIS [31] The Appellant submits that the RPD made various errors in rejecting her refugee claim. [32] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds the RPD erred in failing to appropriately apply the Gender Guidelines21 and engage the psychiatrist's report in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility, and in failing to consider the Appellant's profile as a whole. The RAD's reasons follow. The Appellant as an "Activist" on Women's Rights Issues [33] The Appellant alleged that she was involved in women's rights issues in Iran and supported organizations associated with the XXXX XXXX.22 She alleged that they would distribute women's rights literature as they were supporters of XXXX XXXX XXXX23 She alleged that on XXXX XXXX, 2013, she was involved with a women's rights event in XXXX and spoke publicly about women's equality, taking off her hijab along with many other women. The event was raided by the police; the Appellant somehow managed to escape. The following day, the authorities from VEVAK came to her house, and they arrested the Appellant. The Appellant was blindfolded and taken to a room; she was held there for four days. She was interrogated and tortured. The Appellant was released after signing that she would not attend further gatherings. The Appellant alleged that while she has been in Canada, the authorities (VEVAK) have gone to her home looking for her; and that they have also raided her XXXX and took away her computer and documents from there. The Appellant alleged that she would be arrested and tortured by the authorities (VEVAK) if she were to return to Iran. [34] The RPD did not find the Appellant's account of the XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 rally and the subsequent problems arising out of the day's events, including the Appellant's arrest, detention, and torture, credible. The RPD found the Appellant not credible because she was lacking in detail regarding the activities of the group in which she was involved. The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to appropriately apply the Gender Guidelines. The Appellant submits that the Gender Guidelines are particularly important to the RPD's assumptions about how the Appellant as a woman "ought" to have acted as a political activist on women's rights issues in Iran. The Appellant quotes an excerpt from the Gender Guidelines: "In a society where women are 'assigned' a subordinate status and the authority exercised by men over women results in a general oppression of women, their political protest and activism do not always manifest themselves in the same way as those of men." 24 [35] The Appellant submits that the above from the Gender Guidelines was directly applicable to her regarding her political activities in Iran. Based on the totality of the evidence submitted to the RPD, the RAD finds the RPD did not appropriately apply the Gender Guidelines in this case, considering this Appellant's particular situation and circumstances. [36] Based on the foregoing, the RAD finds the RPD erred in law by failing to appropriately apply the Gender Guidelines in this case. The Appellant's Sexual Orientation: [37] The Appellant alleged that she is a lesbian. This was not disclosed in the Appellant's original BoC narrative.25 The RPD wrote that the Appellant alleged at the third sitting of the claim that she is a lesbian.26 The Appellant submits that the RPD made a serious error in fact in asserting that the Appellant had only raised the allegation that she is a lesbian at the third sitting on May 7, 2014.27 The RAD reviewed the RPD Record and finds that the Appellant had disclosed to her psychiatrist on her first (in December 2013) of the three meetings (the other two were held in January and February of 2014) that she has lesbian tendencies which she had always suppressed.28 The Appellant communicated with the psychiatrist with the help of an interpreter (Mr. XXXX XXXX XXXX who was the Appellant's XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX) counsellor, whom the Appellant trusted as well. Thereafter, the Appellant's counsel was advised of the Appellant's sexuality. Subsequently the Appellant's counsel requested postponement of the Appellant's hearing; the postponement was granted. On March 17, 2014, the Appellant's counsel submitted an amendment to the Appellant's BoC narrative disclosing that the Appellant is a lesbian.29 The hearing resumed on May 7, 2014. [38] At the RPD, the Appellant was asked why she had not originally included in her BoC that she is a lesbian. The Appellant testified that this is something that she came to realize since being in Canada and felt safe to disclose. [39] Relating to this, the RPD wrote: "The claimant provided no evidence that she has been in a same-sex relationship, nor is she affiliated with any organizations. When asked if she has undertaken any activities with the gay/lesbian community she said, "No". While the panel is aware that none of such activities are required nor do they indicate a sexual preference, there is nothing to base the claimant's allegations on, except for her own testimony. Given the numerous credibility problems with the claimant's evidence, the panel finds that this allegation is also lacking in credibility."30 [40] In this respect, the RAD finds that the Appellant is from a country where women are oppressed, and homosexuality is socially unacceptable and legally prohibited. The Appellant attended the Pride parade; one of her photos in attendance at the Pride parade was put up on Facebook by her daughter. The Appellant's husband discovered the photo and threatened to denounce the Appellant to the authorities. Regarding the late disclosure of her sexual orientation, the Appellant alleged that this is something she came to realize since being in Canada and felt safe to disclose. Further, the Appellant submitted a psychiatric report.31 Dr. XXXX clearly states that the Appellant shared her sexual identity with her for the first time because it is forbidden in Iran and thus she had always supressed her homosexual tendencies. Dr. XXXX also diagnosed the Appellant as having XXXX XXXX. Dr. XXXX wrote in her report that the Appellant told her in their second meeting that she is gay, but has never "done anything about" her interest in women, such as dating. [41] The Appellant alleged that the RPD did not consider her psychiatric report in assessing her credibility and the basis of her claim. In consideration of all of the above, the RAD finds the Appellant's submission that the RPD ignored the Appellant's psychiatric report is valid. Based on the totality of the evidence submitted to the RPD, including the proceedings of the hearing, the RAD finds the RPD erred in law by ignoring the Appellant's evidence. [42] Further, the RAD finds that although the psychiatric report does not reflect on the potential credibility-related shortcomings in the Appellant's evidence; nonetheless, the psychiatric report is relevant in offering support to the Appellant's explanation for some of the credibility issues raised by the RPD. The RAD finds Dr. XXXX report addresses several of the RPD's concerns relating to the Appellant's late disclosure of her sexual orientation as a lesbian, and therefore, serves as a relevant and probative document in support of the Appellant's allegations that she is a lesbian. In regard to the Appellant's allegations that she is a lesbian, the RAD finds the RPD's reasons for decision32 clearly show that the RPD did not engage the psychiatrist's report in its deliberations. [43] Based on the above, the RAD finds the RPD erred by failing to engage the Appellant's psychiatric report/assessment in this case, and thus by ignoring the Appellant's evidence. Delay in Claiming: [44] The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013; she was admitted as a visitor. The Appellant filed her claim on September 23, 2013. About three and a half months prior to her arrival in Canada, the Appellant was arrested in Iran, detained for four days, and tortured while in custody. The Appellant was released from detention after signing an undertaking that she would not participate in any gatherings in the future. The Appellant testified that her husband was very furious when she returned home after missing for four days. The Appellant testified that during her interrogation the authorities referred to the political activities of her family, and thus the authorities threatened the Appellant not to participate in any such activities. The RPD asked the Appellant, given her alleged fears of her husband's threats and violence, her ongoing wish to be an activist, and her four days of detention and torture, why she did not file her claim for refugee protection when she arrived in Canada in XXXX 2013. The Appellant replied that her intention upon coming to Canada was to visit family in Canada. The Appellant added that after the detention and interrogation she thought that she had satisfied the authorities that she was not involved. The Appellant also added that she has family and friends in Iran. In consideration of the above, i.e., her family having a political history that was known to the authorities, she is a women's rights activist, due to her alleged political activities she had been detained and tortured by the authorities, her siblings had been granted asylum in various countries in the past, the RPD found the Appellant's explanation for delay not satisfactory. [45] The RAD is aware that a delay in making a refugee claim is not a determinative factor in and of itself, but it is a relevant consideration for the decision maker in assessing the Appellant's fear of returning to his own country of nationality. It is reasonable to assume that a person with well-founded fear of persecution will attempt to apply for refugee protection without unreasonable delay. [46] Regarding the delay in claiming in this case, the RAD notes the Appellant testified that she filed her claim after learning that the Iranian authorities had gone to the family home, arrested two of her friends, raided her XXXX and took away her computer and papers. The RAD acknowledges that the Appellant's XXXX was raided in XXXX, and that she filed her claim a couple of months later in September. The RAD also noted that the Appellant had status in Canada during the three months prior to filing her refugee claim.33 The RAD finds, in consideration of the totality of the evidence in this case including that the Appellant was in status prior to filing her claim, the three months delay in claiming, in this Appellant's particular situation and circumstances, not significant. The Appellant's Kurdish Ethnicity and Family History in Iran: [47] The RPD accepts that the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and comes from a family of Kurds who XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.34 The RPD further states that the objective documentary evidence does refer to Kurdish political supporters and sympathizers as being at risk.35 Despite the above, the RPD found the Appellant would not be at risk upon return to Iran due to her merely being a Kurd in Iran, and because the RPD did not find the Appellant credible regarding her alleged political activities in Iran and in Canada. In this respect, the RAD finds the RPD contradicted itself by describing the Appellant's profile as a Kurd, coming from a family of Kurds who XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and quoting objective documentary evidence showing Kurdish political supporters and sympathizers as being at risk, and then finding that the Appellant would not be at risk. The RAD acknowledges that the RPD did not find the Appellant credible regarding her being politically active in Iran and in Canada; regardless, the RAD finds the RPD did not consider the Appellant's profile as a whole, and thus erred in fact. [48] The RAD finds the RPD erred in law by not appropriately applying the Gender Guidelines, and by not engaging the Appellant's psychiatrist's report in its assessment of the Appellant's evidence. In addition, the RAD finds the RPD was wrong in not considering the Appellant's profile as a whole. Moreover, the RAD finds these errors tainted the RPD's overall assessment of the Appellant's credibility. Therefore, the RAD concludes that the RPD decision cannot be sustained. [49] The Appellant asks that the RAD set aside the decision of the RPD, and either determine the Appellant to be a refugee or, in the alternative refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. [50] Section 111(1)(c) of the IRPA allows the RAD to refer a matter back to the RPD only if it is wrong in law, in fact, or in mixed law and fact, and if the RAD cannot make a decision to confirm the determination or to substitute another determination without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD [51] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds there is insufficient evidence in the RPD record upon which the RAD could base its own determination. In order to make its own determination, it would be necessary for the RAD to convene an oral hearing in this case. It is clear from Section 110(3) of the IRPA that the oral RAD hearings are to be the exception, as the RAD "must proceed on the basis of the record of the proceeding of the Refugee Protection Division....".36 Section 110(6) of the IRPA gives the RAD discretion to hold a hearing if there is new documentary evidence which meets certain requirements, including that it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim.37 The Appellant has not submitted new evidence. Since there is no new evidence at the RAD, the RAD cannot hold a hearing. [52] As outlined above, the RAD cannot confirm the RPD decision, cannot substitute its own determination, and cannot hold an oral hearing in this case; therefore, the RAD refers this matter back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. [53] Based on the foregoing, the RAD finds the RPD erred in fact, and in law. Therefore, the RAD finds the RPD's determination that the Appellant has not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, nor, on a balance of probabilities, that she would be subjected to a danger of torture, or to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to Iran cannot be sustained. DISPOSITION [54] Pursuant to Section 111 (1) (c) of the IRPA, the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination, before a differently-constituted panel. [55] This appeal is allowed. (signed) "S.S. Kular" S.S. Kular November 19, 2014 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 1. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Further Submissions, received at the Board on August 22, 2014. 3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 4 Appellant's Further Submissions, received at the Board on August 22, 2014. 5 Appellant's Further Submissions, received at the Board on August 22, 2014, p. 1. 6 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 7 Quoted by the Appellant: Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177. 8 Appellant's Further Submissions, received at the Board on August 22, 2014, p. 3. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, para. 8. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Cases Attached, pp. 19-560. 12 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 2 13 Iyamuremye, para. 3. 14 Alvarez, Ismael Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7218-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702; the same reasons are given in Eng, Sengloem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7281-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711. 15 Alvarez, para. 33. 16 Malhotra, Sunil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6899-13), Bédard, August 1, 2014, 2014 FC 768. 17 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 18 Huruglica, para. 45. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision. 21 Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, March 9, 1993, Update: November 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002 under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 2, paras 12-13, and 15. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 6, p. 13. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, para. 11. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 2. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, para. 22. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum., para. 14. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 10, Dr. pain's Report, p. 654. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 10, Amendment to Narrative, pp. 446-447. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, para. 22. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, pp. 653-675. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, paras. 21-22. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 1. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, para. 25. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, para. 26. 36 IRPA, Section 110(3). 37 IRPA, Section 110(6). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-06406