TB4-10827

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-10827 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision February 4, 2015 Date de la décision Panel L. Favreau Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Solomon Orjiwuru Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX a citizen of Nigeria, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and find him to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection or, in the alternative, refer his claim back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is bisexual. He was involved in intimate same-sex relationship with the same man for approximately XXXX XXXX. In XXXX 2013, his wife uncovered the relationship after she located photographs and text messages between him and his same-sex partner. His wife informed the members of his family about the same-sex relationship and as a result, the Appellant was attacked and beaten by members of his family. After being treated in the hospital, the Appellant fled to XXXX where he remained in hiding. The Appellant confided in his friend Mr. XXXX, a Nigerian XXXX living in China. Mr. XXXX helped the Appellant travel to China to work as his XXXX XXXX. In XXXX, 2013, the Appellant traveled to Canada on a valid tourist visa and in XXXX 2014, he initiated his claim for refugee protection. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on August 12, 2014. In a decision of October 14, 2014, the RPD rejected the Appellant's claim, finding that the Appellant was not credible. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in making its credibility findings. ROLE OF THE RAD [6] Counsel has made submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. However, the RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,1 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error". [7] While there has been some conflict in the case law from the Federal Court regarding the standard of review to be applied by the RAD when reviewing RPD decisions, Justice Martineau in Alyafi2 has said that, in the face of this conflict, the Federal Court should allow the RAD to apply either approach as long as the question of the scope of the appellate review of the RPD's decisions has not been settled by a final judgment by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. [8] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person is need of protection. Deference will be afforded to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. New Evidence Presented on Appeal [9] As provided for in s. 110(3) of IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. S. 110(4) of IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [10] The Appellant has tendered the following proposed new evidence in support of his appeal. (1) An affidavit from the Appellant dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; (2) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; (3) Certificate of Death for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, 2014; (4) Medical Certificate of cause of death for XXXX XXXX XXXX (5) Police report dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; (6) A photograph showing the affiant, together with her husband XXXX XXXX and the Appellant; and (7) Funeral brochure for XXXX XXXX. [11] The Appellant submits that the proposed new evidence meets the test of s.110(4) of IRPA because the evidence is new, credible, material and relevant and was not reasonably available to him. The Appellant argues that the evidence also meets the modified criterion of Raza3as defined in Singh.4 The Appellant argues that the evidence not only post-dates the hearing into his refugee claim but establishes the nature of his ongoing risk in Nigeria. [12] The Appellant makes further submission about articles taken from the Internet;5 however, no such articles were tendered in this appeal. The inclusion of this paragraph of argument appears to have been inadvertently included in this memorandum. [13] The RAD's analysis of the admissibility of the proposed new evidence must begin first with the test set out in s. 110(4). In assessing whether the proposed new evidence meets the statutory provisions of s. 110(4), the RAD considered the following: (1) First, did the evidence arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim? Here the RAD may consider whether the evidence is capable of proving the current state of affairs in the country of feared persecution, or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the rejection of the refugee claim.6 (2) The RAD will consider not only the date on which the document came into existence, but the timing of the event or circumstance which the document seeks to prove.7 For example, an affidavit or newspaper article may have been created after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, but the information in the document may be several years old, and the RAD may therefore find that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, despite the date of the document. (3) It is important to note here that s. 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing, but rather after the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Where a document arose after the hearing but before the rejection of the refugee claim, it is necessary for the RAD to consider whether the Appellant could have presented the document to the RPD by way of a post-hearing submission. (4) If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered, and the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document.8 (5) Second, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, it must consider the next factor in s. 110(4). If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the rejection, has the Appellant established that the evidence was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before it rejected the claim, 9 or that it proves a fact that was unknown to him at the time of the hearing?10 If so, the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document. (6) Third, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, and that it was reasonably available at the time of the rejection, it must consider the final part of the s. 110(4) test: could the Appellant reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence prior to the rejection of his refugee claim? If so, the evidence need not be considered.11 If the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to present the evidence to the RPD, the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence. [14] In the case at hand, the RAD notes that the Appellant has stated in his affidavit that he did not know and could not reasonably have known of the death of Mr. XXXX XXXX He argues he only became aware of the facts after the determination of his claim. However, the Appellant's declaration that he did not know until after the determination of his claim is unsupported by a fulsome explanation or evidence of when he first learned of the death of Mr. XXXX. [15] The RAD finds there is a requirement on the Appellant to provide an explanation about why the proposed new evidence meets the statutory requirement. The Court has held that if an applicant believes that the evidence meets the requirements of paragraph 113(a), it is up to the applicant to provide explanations as to why it conforms to the statutory requirement.12 For example, if the evidence pre-dates the RPD's decision, it is the duty of the person submitting the new evidence to provide why it had not been placed in front of the RPD under the express statutory requirements under paragraph 113(a).13 [16] Under a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), the Federal Court has held that it is the applicant's obligation to provide an explanation as to why the evidence could not have been presented to the RPD. Evidence can be rejected for this reason and this is in conformity with the requirements set out in the IRPA and found in Raza.14 [17] Similarly, the Refugee Appeal Division Rules15 (RAD Rules) provide that the Appellant's record must contain: (i) a written statement indicating whether the Appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, and (ii) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding how any documentary evidence that the Appellant wants to rely on in the appeal meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and how that evidence relates to the Appellant. [18] The RAD has considered the recent Federal Court decision in Singh16 and finds that there is nothing in the decision which takes away the burden of the Appellant to provide an explanation of how the proposed new evidence meets the test set out in s. 110(4) of IRPA. [19] The Appellant's only explanation was that he did not know about the evidence until after the determination. The RAD notes that all of the proposed evidence was relative to events which occurred prior to the Appellant's hearing and determination of his claim. The RAD finds that the Appellant's explanation that he did not hear about the death of Mr. XXXX is insufficient and that further explanation is required to demonstrate how the proposed new evidence meets the statutory requirements. [20] In order for the RAD to determine if the Appellant could not have reasonably been expected to present the evidence to the RPD, the RAD finds it is incumbent on the Appellant to present sufficient persuasive argument beyond simply stating they did not know about the evidence. The declaration that the Appellant did not know about the evidence requires further explanation of the circumstances that prevented the Appellant from not learning about facts which were readily available. [21] Furthermore, the RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided an explanation why there was a delay in learning this information given that there is evidence in the record that he was in contact with friends and acquaintances in his home community in Nigeria at a time when this information would have been available. In light of this evidence, it is reasonable to expect that the Appellant provide further explanation rather than to just rely on his own unsupported declaration. [22] In addition, the RAD finds it is also reasonable to expect that the Appellant include in his explanation information about when he first learned of the death of Mr. XXXX and from whom he learned the information. The RAD notes that there is nothing in the proposed new evidence which identifies when he first learned the information or who provided that information to him. [23] The RAD finds that this evidence was reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his claim and that the Appellant has provided insufficient persuasive explanation of why he could not reasonably have tendered that evidence prior to the rejection of his claim. Accordingly, the proposed new evidence is not admitted as evidence in this appeal. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [24] The Appellant submits that the RPD misstated, misunderstood, ignored and/or mischaracterized the evidence presented before it in coming to its credibility findings. Sexual orientation and relationship with same-sex partner [25] The RPD drew an adverse credibility finding based on the Appellant's vague, hesitant and evasive testimony concerning his sexual orientation and relationship with his same sex-partner. The RPD found the Appellant's description of his sexual orientation was vague and hesitant. The RPD further found that the Appellant's testimony concerning his approximately XXXX XXXX XXXX relationship with his same-sex partner was very vague and lacking in specific details; particularly considering the frequency of their contact with one another and the duration of their relationship. [26] The RPD drew a further adverse inference based on the Appellant's testimony concerning his failure to seek out and/or attend any Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) support groups in Canada. [27] The Appellant submits that "the RPD's failed to assess the Appellant's claim in the context of his cultural and social milieu" and thereby committed a reviewable error. The Appellant argues that the RPD did not take into account that a gay man from Nigeria could react differently from a gay man who grew up in Canada. The Appellant further argues many gay persons are not openly gay and that his reluctance to be open about his sexual orientation by identifying with the LGBT support group does not undermine his sexual identity. [28] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument does not in any way rebut the RPD's credibility finding arising from his vague, hesitant and evasive testimony concerning his sexual orientation and relationship with his same-sex partner. The RAD's review of the testimony verifies that the Appellant's testimony was vague, hesitant and lacking in specificity. The RAD finds that given the manner in which the Appellant testified and the lack of details he provided, it was open to the RPD to find that he was being evasive. The RAD further finds that his testimony in this regard undermines his allegations and his identity as a gay man. [29] The Appellant's argument in this regard was primarily focused on the RPD's finding regarding his failure to seek out or make contact with any LGBT groups in Canada. While the Appellant provided an explanation why someone from Africa may not want to "out" themselves, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not established that those circumstances apply to him. The Appellant has alleged that he was already "outed" with his family and community members in Nigeria and with his family in Canada. The Appellant alleges he has been gay all his life and that he could not obtain support or protection as a gay man in Nigeria. As such, the RAD finds it is reasonable to expect that he would seek the support and guidance of LGBT community here in Canada particularly in light of the fact he was hoping to establish his life as a gay man in Canada. The RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to draw an adverse inference from the Appellant's failure to seek out or to make contact with the LGBT community in Canada. [30] The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. The RAD further finds that the RPD's findings of fact in this regard should be afforded deference. Treatment of the Appellant's Supporting Corroborative Documents [31] The Appellant submits that the RPD unfairly afforded little weight to the letters17 he submitted from four individuals who independently confirm his sexual orientation as a gay man. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider the totality of evidence and explanation when assessing the letters. The Appellant further argues that the RPD erred when it gave little weight to the letters solely because there is general evidence that show that these types of documents are frequently forged. [32] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the RPD did consider the totality of the evidence when assessing these letters. The RAD also notes that the RPD did not reject these letters solely because of availability of fraudulent documents in Nigeria, but took into consideration inconsistencies between the evidence and the letters as well as inconsistencies on the face of the documents themselves including the lack of security features. In addition, the RPD also found that the letter from XXXX XXXX was silent on the allegations and the Appellant's sexual orientation. Furthermore, the affidavit of the Appellant's cousin in Canada was based upon information provided by the Appellant and did not include independent knowledge of the Appellant's sexual orientation. [33] Accordingly, the RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to place little weight on these letters. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. When Appellant's Same-sex Relationship Was Discovered [34] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in making adverse credibility findings about the Appellant's testimony concerning when his same-sex relationship was discovered. The Appellant argues that the RPD based its findings on a microscopic analysis. The Appellant further argues that the RPD's findings are not grounded in the evidence. [35] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the RPD found the Appellant's testimony about the timing and sequence of events involving his family's discovery of his same-sex relationship with XXXX to be hesitant, vague, and inconsistent. For example, the panel asked the claimant to describe when his problems first began in Nigeria. The claimant described his wife found text messages on his telephone from XXXX in early January. However, the claimant could not specify various details regarding this incident such as when the text messages had been sent by XXXX. The claimant similarly could not specify whether he had seen the text messages himself. In response to the panel's questions, the claimant later testified he found out about the text messages "when they [his family] came to attack". The panel asked the claimant to specify when that occurred. The claimant responded, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The claimant similarly provided inconsistent evidence as to when his wife found his text messages from XXXX. The claimant initially testified the date was the "XXXX XXXX XXXX of XXXX. He later testified it was closer to XXXX XXXX and elaborated that his wife immediately told his family and they confronted him right away. However, in his BOC, the claimant describes "ultimately she [his wife] discovered my relationship with XXXX but did not immediately confront me about it". In light of these inconsistencies, the panel takes a negative inference as to the claimant's overall credibility, as the timeline of these alleged incidents is a central element of his claim.18 [36] The RAD finds that the circumstances of the discovery of his sexual orientation are central to his claim for refugee protection. The RAD finds it reasonable to expect that he would be able to provide a fulsome, detailed and accurate account of those circumstances given the importance of these allegations to his claim for protection. The RAD finds that the RPD's findings are based in the evidence and are not microscopic in nature. The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. The RAD further finds that deference should be afforded the RPD's findings in this regard. Travel to China [37] The Appellant submits that the RPD drew an adverse credibility finding based on the timing of when the Appellant obtained his passport relative to when his problems began in Nigeria. The Appellant seems to argue that the RPD based its adverse credibility finding solely on the fact that the Appellant had obtained his passport shortly before he alleges that he experienced any difficulties in Nigeria due to his sexual orientation. [38] The Appellant submits that the RPD's plausibility finding is flawed. The Appellant argues that he provided the explanation that he required his passport for his job as a courier services manager and that the RPD misapprehended his evidence about his intentions to travel outside the country. [39] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the RPD based its findings in part on the Appellant's testimony that he obtained it without any plans to travel abroad. The RAD finds that the RPD's finding in this regard was made in the context of its broader findings with regard to the Appellant's testimony concerning when he first contacted Mr. XXXX about his problems and discussed the prospect of traveling to China. [40] The RAD finds that the RPD noted that the Appellant repeatedly changed his testimony regarding the date and circumstances of his travel to China, including when and why he told Mr. XXXX about his problems: The claimant's testimony varied from confiding in Mr. XXXX in early XXXX to then changing the date to late XXXX and then to "immediately after the attack". The claimant was also inconsistent as to when and where he first confided in Mr. XXXX. His answers varied from telling Mr. XXXX in person in XXXX in late XXXX XXXX XXXX to later changing the date and location to a telephone call to Mr. XXXX when the claimant was in the hospital on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The claimant then later testified he had actually confided in Mr. XXXX on a date even prior to XXXX. These dates were inconsistent internally within the claimant's testimony, as well as inconsistent with his own BOC and other evidence. In his BOC narrative, the claimant describes, "While I was in hiding, I reached to Mr. XXXX XXXX... I explained the problem I was having and he decided without hesitation to assist me by providing documentation to the Chinese Embassy in XXXX to show that I am his XXXX XXXX and on this basis I was granted a visa and fled Nigeria". However, this timing of events conflicts with the claimant's version of events provided during his testimony, i.e., that he called Mr. XXXX from the hospital and/or that he confided in Mr. XXXX prior to XXXX.19 [41] Furthermore, the RAD notes that in the letter from Mr. XXXX, he describes learning of the Appellant's problems in "XXXX XXXX 2013".20 However, Mr. XXXX written request to have the Appellant issued a visa to China is dated XXXX XXXX, 2013.21 [42] The RAD finds that based on these inconsistencies in the sequence of events, it was open to the RPD to draw adverse credibility findings. In this regard, the RAD finds the Appellant's argument fails. The RAD further finds that deference should be afforded to the RPD's credibility findings. Medical Report of Appellant [43] The Appellant submits that the RPD drew an adverse credibility finding based on a perceived inconsistency in the dates on the face of the medical report. The Appellant argues that the RPD's finding is based solely on the RPD's interpretation of when the medical report was drafted. The RPD stated in its reasons that the report indicated that the Appellant was at the clinic "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX January 2013" and "discharged XXXX XXXX 2013". RPD drew an adverse credibility finding based on the impression the letter was drafted before he was discharged from hospital. [44] The Appellant submits that the RPD misappropriated the evidence. The Appellant argues that a closer inspection of the letter makes it clear that the report was prepared in XXXX 2014 and that the inclusion of the words "this day" is merely an oversight by the author of the report. [45] The RAD finds that while it is true the medical report stamp is dated XXXX 7, 2014, the RPD did not base its findings of the reliability of this document and the Appellant's credibility solely on this perceived discrepancy. The RPD also based its findings in this regard on the Appellant's inconsistent testimony about when he went to the hospital. The RPD noted that He [the Appellant] initially stated that he went to the hospital in the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. He then stated that it was on XXXX XXXX. The panel asked the claimant to clarify if he went to the hospital on the same day of the attack. The claimant initially testified it was all on the same day. He later stated that it occurred over two days. The panel asked the claimant to explain his inconsistent evidence. The claimant responded, "maybe I did not get it right". The panel does not accept the claimant's explanation as reasonable under the circumstances and accordingly takes a negative inference as to the claimant's overall credibility. The panel similarly places very little weight on the medical note in terms of establishing the claimant's allegations, including his allegation he sought medical treatment after being attacked on XXXX XXXX and/or XXXX XXXX.22 [46] Given the Appellant's inconsistent testimony and the discrepancies between the Appellant's testimony and the medical report, the RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to place little weight on the medical report and to further draw an adverse credibility finding with regard to the Appellant's allegations. CONCLUSION [47] On the basis of the findings noted above and after its own assessment of all the evidence in the record including the transcript of the hearing, the RAD agrees with the RPD's finding that the Appellant has not established on a balance of probabilities that he is gay and that he was beaten and threatened due to his sexual orientation in Nigeria. The RAD agrees with the RPD that the Appellant has not provided sufficient trustworthy and credible evidence to establish his claim. The RAD finds that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [48] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. (signed) "L. Favreau" L. Favreau February 4, 2015 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 Alyafi, Aghiad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1091-14), Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 952. 3 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 4 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022. 5 P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, p. 116. 6 Raza, para. 13.3(a). 7 Raza, para. 16. 8 Raza, para. 13.5(b). 9 Raza, para. 13.5(a). 10 Raza, para. 13.3(b). 11 Raza, para. 13.5(a). 12 Bengabo, Serge Cedrick v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2750-08), Shore, February 23, 2009; 2009 FC 186, at para. 23. 13 Jessamy, Gracel Bernadet v. M.C.I. (F.C., nos. IMM-2302-09, IMM-2639-09), Phelan, May 4, 2010, 2010 FC 489, See also: Aleziri, Abdullah Mohammed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-360-08), Lagacé, January 15, 2009; 2009 FC 38 and Haque v. M.C.I. and M.P.S.E.P. (F.C., no. IMM-5356-08) O'Keefe, June 28, 2010; 2010 FC 703. 14 Tran, Hoa Van v. M.P.S.E.P. and M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3222-09), Beaudry, February 19, 2010; 2010 FC 175. See also Founding, Allen Robin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2182-09), Shore, May 14, 2009; 2009 FC 500. (This is a motion for a stay of removal. Leave to be heard was denied on July 7, 2009 by Justice Harrington.) 15 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2012-257/index. html. See RAD Rules 3(3)(d)(i) and (g)(iii), 5(2)(d)(ii), and 29(3). 16 Singh. Supra footnote 4. 17 RPD-1, RPD's Record, letter from XXXX XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX,XXXX XXXX. 18 P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, pp. 7-8, para. 15. 19 P-2, RPD's Reasons and Decision, pp. 8-9, para. 17. 20 RPD-1, Exhibit 4, p. 104. 21 Ibid. 22 P-2, RPD's Reasons and Decision, pp.9-10, para. 19. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-10827