MC0-05112
The appeal is dismissed because cumulative and material credibility defects (significant omissions in the BOC, inconsistent and implausible testimony including conflation of distinct violent groups, failure to pursue protection in the U.S.A., and documentary evidence that does not corroborate the alleged motivation...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- MC0-05112
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 30 March 2021
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Protection Appeal (refugee Appeal Division) / Decision on Appeal (written Reasons)
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; decision of the Refugee Protection Division confirmed
- Legal Topics
- Credibility Findings, Country Conditions, Convention Refugee Determination, Subsection 97(1) Risk, Documentary Evidence Weighting
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
XXXX XXXX XXXX
Appellant
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Protection Appeal (refugee Appeal Division) / Decision on Appeal (written Reasons)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the RPD erred in its adverse credibility findings
- 2 Whether the Appellant established a well‑founded fear of persecution under section 96 IRPA
- 3 Whether the Appellant established the risk of serious harm under subsection 97(1) IRPA
Ratio Decidendi
The appeal is dismissed because cumulative and material credibility defects (significant omissions in the BOC, inconsistent and implausible testimony including conflation of distinct violent groups, failure to pursue protection in the U.S.A., and documentary evidence that does not corroborate the alleged motivation or perpetrators) leave insufficient credible evidence to establish a well‑founded fear of persecution or subsection 97(1) harm on return to Nigeria.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed; decision of the Refugee Protection Division confirmed
Orders
- Appeal dismissed
- Decision of the Refugee Protection Division dated February 6, 2020 confirmed
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-05112 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 30, 2021 Date de la décision Panel N. Kaufman Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Gisela G. Barraza Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated February 6, 2020, rejecting his claim for refugee protection because it found the claim not to be credible. He alleges that he fears persecution and a risk to his life at the hands of the Fulani herdsmen (the herdsmen) and the Boko Haram terrorist group. He argues that the RPD erred, and asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute a positive determination or remit the matter to the RPD for redetermination. He does not seek to rely upon new evidence and does not request an oral hearing.1 My role is to consider all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.2 DETERMINATION [2] I dismiss the appeal because I find that the RPD was correct that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, nor a person in need of protection,3 because he has not credibly established that he faces a well-founded fear of persecution4 or harm5 upon return to Nigeria. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL Appellant's allegations [3] The details of the Appellant's allegations are included in his Basis of Claim Form (BOC),6 as amended,7 including his narrative,8 as amended,9 and in his testimony at the hearing. Briefly, the Appellant alleges that he fears persecution and death at the hands of what he variously describes as "the Fulani Herdsmen (Boko Haram)"10 and "the Boko Haram (Fulani Herdsmen)"11 (they are together referred to as the agents of harm) because he refused to agree to their request that his daughter marry the son of one of their members. He alleges that, on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, because of that refusal, the agents of harm attacked his home, seriously injuring the Appellant, killing his wife, and (the next day) partially burning down his house. After being released from hospital, the Appellant moved around, staying at various peoples' homes. He left Nigeria and travelled to the United States of America (U.S.A.) on a visitor visa, where he arrived on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. He returned to Nigeria in XXXX 2017, and remained there until XXXX 2017, when he returned to the U.S.A. He remained in the U.S.A. until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, when he crossed irregularly into Canada, and claimed asylum. He alleges that, if he returns to Nigeria, he will be killed by the agents of harm. RPD's findings and Appellant's arguments [4] The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness because of inconsistencies in and between his hearing testimony and his BOC narrative; behaviours that are incompatible with someone fleeing serious harm or death; allegations that are refuted by objective country evidence; and lack of spontaneity in his oral testimony.12 [5] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its credibility findings. He argues that the RPD's analysis of his testimony was both far too narrow and unreasonable, that the RPD was selective in its analysis and hyper-analyzed minor inconsistencies, and erred in its consideration of documentary evidence. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [6] I find that the Appellant has not credibly established his claim, and that he has not established that he faces a well-founded serious risk of persecution or subsection 97(1) harm upon return to Nigeria. [7] In assessing the credibility of the testimony of the Appellant, I am mindful that sworn testimony is presumed to be truthful. However, that presumption is rebuttable where testimony features inconsistencies, implausibilities, material omissions, or other reasons to doubt its truthfulness. For the reasons set out below, I find that the presumption of truthfulness has been rebutted. I find that there are material credibility issues that were not satisfactorily explained that cumulatively justify an adverse credibility finding against the Appellant. Credibility findings Conflating of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen and whether they operate in Ogun state [8] The RPD found that the Appellant conflated two very distinct groups, referring to them and regarding them as one entity or as interchangeable. As noted previously, in his narrative, the Appellant referred to his attackers and his agents of harm variously as "Fulani Herdsmen (Boko Haram)," and "Boko Haram (Fulani Herdsmen)," and he also stated in his amended narrative that his attackers were Fulani Herdsmen."13 At the hearing, he testified that he fears both Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen,14 while at times he testified that the attack on his home was by herdsmen,15 and at other times he testified it was Boko Haram.16 When asked again who he fears, he responded "[t]he Fulani Boko Haram."17 He stated that they are part of the Boko Haram organization, but they are the Fulani race, and while not all Fulani are Boko Haram, Boko Haram members are mostly Fulani.18 When asked why he stated in his narrative that it was Fulani herdsmen that he fears, he stated that for all of them, their job is to rear cows, which is why they are called herdsmen, and they move around with their cows.19 When confronted by the RPD with objective country documentation indicating that Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen are two separate groups, with Boko Haram being mostly in northern Nigeria, and the Fulani herdsmen being nomadic herdsmen who are mostly in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the Appellant testified that they are "interchangeable," that they "mix up" and "use each other," and that they "work together."20 He also testified that the attackers wanted one of their sons to marry his daughter, who is Christian, and is educated. [9] Country documentation is clear that Boko Haram and the Fulani herdsmen are not "interchangeable," and that they are two entirely separate groups. Boko Haram is a radical Islamic movement that seeks to impose a strict form of Islamic law in northern Nigeria. It operates in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.21 It opposes Christianity, and Christians have suffered violence at the hands of Boko Haram due to their religious beliefs.22 Reports indicate that Boko Haram fighters are usually ethnic Kanuris from the north-east of Nigeria, who rarely operate outside of their home territory, not even venturing west to the Hausa region, and certainly not way down south to the coastal areas.23 Its targets include individuals perceived as supporting "western" concepts such as secular education, such as XXXX (the Appellant's education is as a XXXX). While Christians (and Muslims) living in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa face a moderate risk of violence from Boko Haram, Christians residing in southern states face an extremely low risk of violence from Boko Haram.24 Other country documentation confirms that Boko Haram operates in the north-east region of Nigeria, and particularly in Borno state, although with some attacks in Adamawa and Yobe states.25 While persons in those areas who do not agree with or support their beliefs are likely to be at risk of serious harm or persecution, their attacks are largely confined to those areas, and the group has limited influence or capacity to target persons outside of that region; persons in areas outside of the north-east who oppose or challenge the aims of Boko Haram are unlikely to be at risk of serious harm or persecution from the group.26 Other reports indicate that Boko Haram has greater reach in the northern states, but has little reach or activity south of the middle belt states.27 Although the Appellant states in his memorandum that he "takes issue" with the RPD's findings that the Boko Haram is not active in Ogun State in south-western Nigeria (where the Appellant was living and the alleged attack took place),28 he does not say why, and he points to no country documentation indicating that Boko Haram operates in Ogun state. The obligation is on appellants to identify issues they believe should be addressed by the RAD and to make "full and detailed submissions" in their memorandum to the RAD regarding the errors that form the grounds of appeal, in addition to the location of the errors in the RPD's decision or in the transcript/recording of the hearing.29 It is neither logical nor reasonable to expect the RAD to search the record and find something to make the case for appellants.30 The Appellant has not complied with these requirements. [10] The Appellant's testimony that, in Nigeria," Christians marry Muslim [sic], Muslim marry Christian...we both work hand in hand in the country...[p]eople of all sort of religion marry Christian, it's normal, there is nothing against that,"31 is not reflective of the Boko Haram ideology and practice. Based on the overwhelming objective country documentation, it is not plausible or credible that a Boko Haram member would want his son to marry an educated Christian woman, and it is not plausible or credible that the alleged attack on the Appellant's home in Ogun state was carried out by Boko Haram. While I recognize the jurisprudential cautions that plausibility findings should be made only in the "clearest of cases," the documentary evidence and the conflicting testimony of the Appellant demonstrate that the allegation that the attack was perpetrated by Boko Haram is "clearly unlikely," based on both the country condition evidence and the Appellant's factual account, which is outside the realm of what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances.32 The allegation that the attack was perpetrated by Boko Haram undermines the Appellant's credibility generally, and regarding his allegation that the attack occurred, and regarding his alleged fear of persecution or harm. [11] Fulani Herdsmen are mostly Muslim nomadic herders who are engaged in violent, resource-based conflict, mostly but not exclusively, with farmers who are mostly Christian, and mostly in Nigeria's middle belt.33 While I accept that the documentary evidence establishes that herdsmen have engaged in serious and violent attacks, the objective country documentation overwhelmingly confirms that the threat of Fulani herdsmen violence is concentrated in the north or the Middle Belt, including the states of Kaduna, Adamawa, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa and Benue.34 One report explains that, although there are religious, ethnic and cultural aspects to the Fulani conflict, it is primarily resource motivated, and it is largely concentrated in the North Central and North East region with some incidents in other states including Delta, Edo, Ekiti, Kaduna and Kogi.35 The report notes that, while there have been reports of the conflict between farmers and herders affecting more than 20 states, they are concentrated on just five states: Adamawa, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa and Benue.36 Another report states that the conflict is centred in the Middle Belt, and although it has spread southward, it is still concentrated in the same five states in the North Central and North East geopolitical zones.37 Herdsmen violence is clearly a problem in the middle belt and the north, as well as some rural areas and on roads between cities in the south, but again, although the Appellant states in his memorandum that he "takes issue" with the RPD's findings that the Fulani herdsmen are not active in Ogun State, he has not provided the required submissions regarding the alleged error, and he points to no country documentation suggesting that they are present and active in Ogun state. [12] It is entirely unclear from his testimony, both written and oral, which group the Appellant alleges to be responsible for the alleged attack on him and his wife. The Appellant argues that he fears both. The Appellant's testimony that the herdsmen and Boko Haram are interchangeable and work together is not supported by the objective country documentation. There is no mention in the country documentation that substantiates any such connection, and, except for his own bald allegation, the Appellant does not point to any such evidence. They are distinct organizations/groups, with different compositions, different objectives, different areas of operation, and different targets. The Appellant's conflating of the two groups does not necessarily mean that the Appellant is lying, because he may believe what he says, but it does undermine the reliability of his testimony and his allegations regarding his fear of persecution or harm. Further, as noted by the RPD, country documentation does not corroborate that herdsmen were present in the area when the attack occurred. Something need not be impossible to be implausible. However, although it may be unlikely, the indication in the country documentation that herdsman violence has spread southward means that it is not implausible or incredible that the attackers (if an attack occurred) were herdsmen. Attacks on farmers and farming communities by herders do occur. In my assessment of the evidence, I do not draw an adverse inference from the Appellant's allegation that, if an attack occurred, it was carried out by herdsmen. Material omissions from the Appellant's BOC undermine his credibility Failure to mention demand for marriage of daughter in original BOC narrative [13] As noted by the RPD, the Appellant included in his amended narrative the allegation that the attack on his home resulted from his refusal to agree to the marriage of his daughter to the son of one of the herdsmen. It includes allegations of an initial visit to his home by the herdsmen and a series of five more increasingly aggressive visits, demands, and threats. None of this was mentioned in the Appellant's initial narrative. When the RPD asked the Appellant why these events were not mentioned in his original BOC narrative, the Appellant stated that he didn't think he had to put the reason in because it was at the border and he didn't think it was necessary to add all those details on the first one, and it was only later that he was advised that he was supposed to put a detailed reason.38 The RPD did not accept this as a reasonable explanation, and I agree. The omission of important facts and details from a BOC can undermine a claimant's credibility if not reasonably explained.39 As the RPD noted, the instructions on the BOC clearly state that a claimant must include everything that is important to their claim. They also state that the claimant is to provide details of threats, including what happened, when it happened, and what the claimant thinks is the reason for the threats.40 As the RPD also noted, this part of the story is at the heart of the Appellant's claim and is the reason he claims to have been targeted. [14] The Appellant argues that "the [RPD's] finding concerning the fact that [the Appellant] amended his initial narrative, which was written at the border without the presence of a lawyer, goes against the [A]ppellant's right to consult a lawyer and his right to amend his statement in order to add detail and ensure that it is complete before the hearing." I am not persuaded by this argument for two reasons. First, the adverse finding is made not because the Appellant amended his narrative, but because the allegations about the background and reasons for the targeting were not mentioned in the original narrative. While claimants are permitted and even encouraged to submit amendments to their BOC narratives to add additional relevant information, the failure to mention significant items known to the claimant in the original BOC narrative can lead the tribunal to question why such significant items were not mentioned originally. I acknowledge that the Appellant did amend his narrative - shortly before the hearing - but this does not explain why such a significant allegation was not included in the original narrative. Further, the original narrative was not written at the border without the assistance of legal counsel. The Appellant arrived at the border on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, and signed his initial immigration documents on May 3, 2018.41 However, his BOC, including the initial narrative, was completed on May 10, 2018, with the assistance of experienced immigration counsel.42 Another complete copy, again including the original narrative, was signed on September 17, 2018,43 again with the assistance of counsel,44 and was submitted to the RPD by counsel on September 18, 2018.45 [15] I find that the RPD correctly found that the Appellant failed to reasonably explain his failure to include, in his original narrative, the allegations concerning the events prior to the attack and the alleged reasons for that attack, which are significant allegations that are at the core of his claim. Even though the allegations were included in an amended narrative ten days before the hearing, the omission of these significant allegations from his original narrative justifies an adverse inference and undermines the credibility of the Appellant, both generally, and regarding the allegations regarding the attack and the motivation for the attack, that are central to his claim. Failure to mention repeated phone calls in BOC narrative [16] The Appellant testified at the hearing that he received repeated phone calls from the agents of harm monitoring his location after he relocated out of Ogun state following the XXXX 2014 attack, even though he changed his phone and his number several times. He also testified that he received a call from the agents of harm within a very short time after he returned to Nigeria in XXXX 2017 after having fled to the U.S.A. in XXXX 2016. When the RPD asked why these phone calls were not mentioned in his BOC narrative or in his amended narrative, the Appellant again stated that he did not know he was supposed to provide such extreme details. Again, the RPD did not find this explanation to be reasonable. It noted that he had been asked at the outset of the hearing if there was anything that he would like to add or change to his BOC, and the Appellant responded that there was nothing he wanted to add.46 The Appellant testified that his BOC, after the amendment, was true, complete and up to date.47 The RPD noted that the Appellant had submitted an amended narrative in which some allegations were added, but allegations regarding these phone calls were not added. [17] The Appellant argues in his memorandum that it is unreasonable to conclude that the Appellant is not credible because he did submit an amended narrative in connection with the evidence relating to the marriage request, and yet to also conclude that he was not credible because he did not amend his narrative to add allegations about the phone calls. This argument misses the point. As noted previously, the Appellant's credibility was not affected because he amended his narrative to add allegations relating to the marriage request, but because he did not include those significant allegations in his original narrative. In connection with the allegations regarding the phone calls, again, the issue is that these calls, about which the Appellant testified at the hearing, were not mentioned in his narrative (either original or amended). These phone calls are significant allegations. They are evidence supporting the alleged continued interest of the agents of harm in finding and harming the Appellant, and their continuing ability to locate him, and the phone call after he returned to Nigeria is alleged to be a factor in his decision to again leave Nigeria because he realized that things there would not get better as he assumed they would.48 [18] The same reasons mentioned in connection with the marriage request about why the Appellant's explanation is not reasonable, apply to the omission to mention these phone calls. I find the RPD correctly found that the Appellant failed to reasonably explain his failure to include in his BOC narrative the allegations of the repeated calls from the agents of harm. I find that these are significant allegations that should have been included in the BOC if the calls occurred, as alleged. The omission of these significant allegations from his narrative justifies an adverse inference and undermines the credibility of the Appellant, both generally, and regarding the allegations that the calls took place, and regarding his alleged forward-looking risk. Failure to claim asylum in the U.S.A. and the return to Nigeria from the U.S.A. [19] The RPD found that the Appellant's failure to claim asylum in the U.S.A. during his initial trip there from XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, to XXXX XXXX, 2017, "undermines the credibility of his prospective risk,"49 by which I understand the RPD to mean that it undermines his alleged subjective fear, which undermines his credibility. The RPD also found that the Appellant's return to Nigeria in XXXX 2017 "completely negates his risk of serious harm and is fatal to his credibility."50 The Appellant states in his memorandum that he "takes issue" with the RPD drawing a negative inference from the fact that the Appellant did not claim asylum during his stay in the U.S.A.,51 but provides no indication of the basis upon which he takes issue with that finding. This is not compliance with the requirement of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules) that an appellant's memorandum must include full and detailed submissions regarding the errors that are the grounds of the appeal.52 The Appellant does not "take issue" with or challenge the RPD's finding that the Appellant's return to Nigeria from the U.S.A. in XXXX "negates his risk of serious harm and is fatal to his credibility." [20] The RPD found that the Appellant gave evolving testimony in terms of why he did not seek asylum upon his arrival in the U.S.A. in XXXX 2016, or during his almost six-month stay, initially stating that he didn't know about refugee claims until he did research on the subject in around XXXX 2018, and then testifying that he tried in multiple ways to "regulate" his status, including discussing it with a friend who told him that there were multiple ways he could get papers, and introduced him to an immigration lawyer with whom he met, but could not afford their fees. This finding was not challenged on this appeal. The RPD noted that the Appellant did not mention in his narrative that he had consulted a lawyer in the U.S.A., rejected his explanation for omitting the allegation, and disbelieved his testimony about having done so. This finding was not challenged on this appeal. The RPD therefore found that it would be reasonable to expect that the Appellant would claim asylum in the U.S.A. during that visit. This finding was not challenged on this appeal. I have considered these unchallenged findings by the RPD, and in my independent assessment, I find that the RPD did not err and that its findings are correct. I agree that, if the Appellant genuinely feared serious harm or death if he returned to Nigeria, he would have taken further steps to investigate his options of remaining in the U.S.A. and, at a minimum, would have sought community assistance or the possibility of subsidized or free legal assistance, or would have investigated the possibility of applying on his own. His testimony that he just came to the U.S.A. hoping to live in the country53 is not credible. As for the RPD's unchallenged finding regarding the Appellant's return to Nigeria, although I do not agree with the RPD's choice of language in stating that it "completely negates his risk" and is "fatal to his credibility," I agree that returning to Nigeria undermines his alleged subjective fear and his credibility. The Appellant testified that he left because his visa was expiring and he was told he would not be able to return if he overstayed, but coupled with his failure to take meaningful steps to investigate the possibility of staying, his return does not reflect the actions of someone who genuinely believed that his life was in danger if he returned to Nigeria. Again, the RPD's finding on this issue is unchallenged. I note also that the Appellant overstayed his second permitted stay in the U.S.A., which expired on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018,54 and did not enter Canada until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, which is inconsistent with his alleged fear of overstaying his U.S.A. visa. Documentary evidence does not overcome credibility concerns Letter from village chief [21] The Appellant submitted as evidence what purports to be a letter dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014,55 (the day after the alleged attack), from "The Quarter Head Chief" of the community where the Appellant lived, addressed to the king of the town. The letter reports on an attack the previous day by "the Fulani Herdsmen (Boko Haram)," who invaded the town and "attacked the inhabitants." It states that "many people" including the Appellant and his wife were affected, that the Appellant's wife died from "shock and unconsciousness...due to the merciless beating and threat by the said Fulani Herdsmen," and that several people were injured, and houses were burned, including that of the Appellant and his wife. The letter also reports that, information at the disposal of the author reveals that there has been an argument between the Fulani Headsman [sic] and the Appellant before the day of the attack. The RPD gave the document no weight because of its findings that objective country evidence points to the fact that Boko Haram and the Fulani herdsmen are separate entities and that neither group is active in Ogun state. [22] The Appellant again "takes issue" with the RPD's finding that the report is worthy of no weight because it is inconsistent with objective country evidence.56 The Appellant does not make any other submissions about this specific document, but argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of all the documentary evidence because it has an obligation to weigh all the evidence, including evidence supporting the Appellant's story. The Appellant further argues that it is an error to state that all the documentary evidence has no probative value because the Appellant was already deemed not credible. I observe that the RPD did not find this document, or the other documents, to have no probative value because the Appellant was already found to be not credible. Rather, it considered and assessed the documents individually. I will now do the same. [23] I have found that it is not implausible, but unlikely that, if an attack against the Appellant's village took place, it was perpetrated by herdsmen. This letter is some evidence that an attack occurred, although it also conflates the herdsmen with Boko Haram, which detracts from its reliability. The letter states that the Appellant's wife's death was caused by a beating, but the Appellant testified that his wife was killed by a gunshot. The letter speaks of an "invasion" of the town in which "many people" were affected, "several people" were injured, and "houses" (suggesting more than one house) were burned. This description is not suggestive of a targeted attack against one family because of a personal grudge, but is more suggestive of an attack against a village or community of a type sometimes carried out by herdsmen as described in the country documentation. Although the author of the letter refers to information at his disposal that there had been a previous argument between the Appellant and herdsmen, the letter is not supportive of the Appellant's description of the attack against him and his wife. [24] I disagree with the RPD's finding that the letter is entitled to no weight. Although I have concerns about the reliability of the document, I do not have evidence suggesting that it is fraudulent. I find that it is entitled to some weight in support of the Appellant's allegation that an attack occurred on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, during which the Appellant was injured, and his wife was killed, but little weight in support of the Appellant's allegations concerning the cause of that attack. Medical report57 [25] The Appellant submitted what purports to be a medical report from the clinic where he was treated following the attack. The report states that he was bleeding from his mouth and nose, that he was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX), and that he was in a coma. He was admitted, managed for coma, and was "later discharged home after recovery from unconsciousness of five (5) days." [26] When the RPD asked the Appellant what injuries he sustained in the attack, the Appellant testified that his nose was cut requiring stitches to his right nostril, his nose was broken, and he XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX).58 The Appellant then testified that, on his second day in the hospital, he asked the doctor to discharge him after learning that his wife had died, and his house was burned. The RPD asked how he was able to speak to his doctor if he was unconscious in a coma. The Appellant did not immediately answer how he was able to speak to his doctor, but merely reiterated that he told them to let him go home and let them kill him because he had nothing to live for.59 Later in the hearing, counsel for the Appellant asked how long he was unconscious. The Appellant responded that he was unconscious for about three days, during which he was able to hear things, but he was unable to reply, speak or talk.60 The RPD noted that the Appellant did not spontaneously testify that he was in a coma. It found that the Appellant's testimony did not match the description in the medical report, and gave the report no probative value. The Appellant again "takes issue" with the RPD's finding that the report is worthy of no probative value because he did not spontaneously mention that he was in a coma and he testified that he XXXX XXXX XXXX, whereas the medical report only states that he XXXX XXXX.61 Again, the Appellant does not make any other submissions about this specific document or about why the RPD's finding is erroneous. [27] There is some lack of precision in the language used in the medical report. It is unclear whether the report intends to say that he was discharged after recovering from five days of unconsciousness, or that he was discharged after five days of recovery from unconsciousness. However, in my assessment, it does not matter which interpretation is correct. The Appellant's testimony is that he was unconscious for about three days, during which he could not speak. As the RPD observed, that is inconsistent with his testimony that he was asking the doctor, beginning on the second day, to be discharged, and was saying that they should just stop all the treatment and let him go home. The RPD correctly identified that the Appellant did not spontaneously answer that he had been unconscious or in a coma, and that his testimony that he XXXX XXXX XXXX is different from the medical report, which says he XXXX XXXX XXXX (although when the discrepancy about the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX was put to the Appellant, he testified that only XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on the day of the attack, but the rest were XXXX). I attach less significance to the lack of spontaneity and the XXXX XXXX XXXX, because those were not explicitly pursued further by the RPD at the hearing. However, the RPD was correct that the Appellant's testimony does not match the contents of the medical report, thereby casting doubt on the Appellant's testimony about what took place at the hospital. [28] I disagree with the RPD's finding that the report is entitled to no weight. I do not have evidence suggesting that it is fraudulent, but the inconsistencies diminish the weight I attach to the report. I find that it is entitled to some weight in support of the Appellant's allegation that an attack occurred on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, during which the Appellant was injured, but little or no weight in support of the Appellant's allegations concerning the cause of that attack. Late wife's death certificate62, and photos of house63 [29] The RPD accepted the death certificate as evidence that the Appellant's wife died on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, but found that, given that it does not indicate the cause of death, it does not corroborate the Appellant's allegations regarding the cause of that death, and that it was entitled to no probative value. The Appellant again "takes issue" with the RPD's "rejection" of the death certificate because it does not corroborate and does not compensate for the Appellant's lack of credibility. The RPD did not reject the death certificate. It accepted it as proof that the Appellant's wife died on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, but gave it no weight because it does not indicate the cause of death. I agree that the death certificate is evidence that the Appellant's wife died on the date alleged by the Appellant, so it is entitled to some weight. I find that it is entitled to little weight because it does not indicate anything about the cause or circumstances of her death. [30] The Appellant submitted as evidence photographs said to show his house after it was burned. The RPD gave the photos no weight because they do not corroborate the allegations that the agents of harm were the culprits and do not compensate for the claimant's lack of credibility. The Appellant again "takes issue" with the RPD's "rejection" of the photographs because they do not corroborate and do not compensate for the Appellant's lack of credibility. The RPD did not reject the photographs, but gave them no weight because they do not indicate who is responsible for the condition of the building. There is nothing tying the photographs to the Appellant's home, and I agree that the photographs have little or no value in corroborating the Appellant's allegations as to who is responsible for the condition of the house. The photographs are entitled to very little weight. Conclusion regarding credibility [31] I find that the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that there was an attack on the Appellant's village on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, and further establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant was injured, and his wife was killed in the attack. However, I also find that the Appellant has not established on a balance of probabilities, the identity of the attackers, or that that the attack was motivated by his alleged refusal to grant a request that his daughter marry one of the attacker's sons, or that the Appellant has been or will be threatened or harmed by his alleged agents of harm. The identified omissions from the Appellant's BOC of allegations that are at the heart of the claim significantly undermine his credibility and the credibility of his allegations that he faces a well-founded fear of persecution or harm. I am also influenced by the lack of subjective fear demonstrated by the Appellant's failure to take steps to investigate or pursue asylum in the U.S.A., and instead, return to Nigeria, and by his assertion that Boko Haram was behind the attack. I note that the attackers had the opportunity to kill the Appellant during the attack, if they wished to do so, and that the Appellant's daughter is no longer in Nigeria, but now lives in the United Kingdom. [32] I have carefully considered all the evidence, including listening to the full hearing recording, and the arguments of the Appellant. The burden of proof is on the Appellant to establish his claim. I have considered that there are aspects of the Appellant's testimony that are supported by documentary evidence. However, except for some identified minor, non-determinative errors, I find that the RPD's findings regarding the credibility of this claim were correct. I find the Appellant has not established that he is a credible witness, and has not established the elements of his claim. I find that he has not established that the attack on his home resulted from his alleged refusal of the marriage request, or was anything other than random violence. The identified credibility issues and concerns, taken cumulatively, undermine the credibility of the Appellant and his allegations to the point that there is insufficient credible evidence to establish the Appellant's claim, and the supporting documentary evidence does not overcome those issues and concerns (and in at least one case, adds to those issues and concerns). He has not established that he faces a well-founded, forward-looking serious risk of persecution or subsection 97(1) harm. [33] These findings are dispositive of the claims under both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [34] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) N. Kaufman N. Kaufman March 30, 2021 Date 1 The Appellant's Record does not contain the written statement required by Rule 3(3)(d) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules), SOR/2012-257. 2 Canada (M.C.I.) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 103. 3 Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 4 Pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 5 Pursuant to subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibt 2, pp. 26-35. 7 Ibid., pp. 37-50. 8 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 9 Ibid., Exhibit 6, pp. 136-138. 10 Ibid., at para. 9, p. 136. 11 Ibid., at para. 12, p. 137. 12 Ibid., RAD Reasons, para. 7, p. 5. 13 Ibid., Exhibit 6, para. 6, p. 136. 14 Audio recording of RPD hearing on January 9, 2020 (Hearing recording), at 14:35 to 14:51. 15 Ibid., at 15:43 to 17:55, 35:56 to 36:34 16 Ibid., at 22:10 to 23:03. 17 Ibid., at 49:55 to 52:41. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., at 53:02 to 53:45. 20 Ibid., at 56:40 to 57:33. 21 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.8, paras. 2.37, 2.38, 2.43, p. 12, para. 3.15, p. 17. Note: This reference and other references in these Reasons are to items appearing in the most recent NDP for Nigeria, which are either unchanged or are not materially different from the items in the version that was before the RPD at the hearing (November 29, 2019). 22 Ibid., paras. 3.14-3.15, pp. 16-17. 23 Ibid., item 7.4, para. 4.4.1, p. 16. 24 Ibid., item 1.8, para. 3.17, p. 17. 25 Ibid., item 7.4, sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.5, pp. 7-8. 26 Ibid., sections 2.4.8 to 2.4.9, p. 8. 27 Ibid., item 7.26, pp. 3-7. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum (memorandum), para. 5(b), p. 18. 29 RAD Rules, Rule 3(3)(g); Liu, Hong Zin v. Canada (M.C.I), 2017 FC 736 (Liu); Dahal v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2017 FC 1102 (Dahal), per Crampton C.J., at para. 30. 30 Kanawati v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2020 FC 12 (Kanawati), per Norris J., at paras. 23-24, citing Dahal, ibid., at para. 30, Dhillon v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2015 FC 321 at paras. 18-20, Ilias v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2018 FC 661 at para 39, Broni v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2019 FC 365 at para. 15, and Canada (M.C.I.) v. Chamanpreet Kaur Kaler, 2019 FC 883 (Kaler), at paras. 11-13; Liu, supra, at note 29, at para. 26, citing Mbokoso v. Canada (M.C.I.) 1999 FCJ No. 1806, at para. 8. 31 Hearing recording, at 1:00:56 to 1:04:25. 32 Dya v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2020 FC 901, at paras. 32, 35, 38, 39, 51, and 54. 33 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 7.31. 34 Ibid., item 12.1, at pp. 10-12; item 2.1, at p. 38; item 1.4, at p. 28; item 1.17, at p. 21; and item 7.20, at p. 7. 35 Ibid., item 1.18, at pp. 50-51. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., item 7.20. 38 Hearing recording, at 33:52 to 34:54, and 35:36 to 35.56. 39 Kanawati, supra note 30, at para. 18; Ogaulu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2019 FC 547, at paras. 18, 20; Osman v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 921, at para. 39; Loera Martinez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2010 FC 866, at para. 10; Abd v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2017 FC 374, at paras. 20-22; Rana v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2012 FC 453, at para. 21. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibt 2, question 2(a), p. 27. 41 Ibid., Exhibit 1, Generic Application Form, question 11, p. 108, and p. 112; Schedule A, p. 116; Schedule 12, p. 118. 42 Ibid., Exhibit 2, question 9(a), p. 34, and question 11, p. 35. 43 Ibid., question 11, p. 50. 44 Ibid., question 9(a), p. 45. 45 Ibid., p. 36. 46 Hearing recording, at 11:52 to 12:13. 47 Ibid., at 10:07 to 10:20. 48 Ibid., at 2:54:43 to 2:55:15. 49 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Reasons, para. 43, p. 10. 50 Ibid. 51 Memorandum, para. 5(f), p. 18. 52 RAD Rules, Rule 3(3)(g)(i). 53 Hearing recording, at 1:38:31 to 1:38:46. 54 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Recrd, Exhibit 1, p. 122. 55 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Recrd, Exhibit 6, p. 147. 56 Exhibit P-2, memorandum, para. 5(c), p. 18. 57 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, p. 149. 58 Hearing recording, at 1:13:55 to 1:15:27. 59 Ibid., at 1:18:15 to 1:21:32. 60 Ibid., at 2:11:07 to 2:13:24. 61 Exhibit P-2, memorandum, para. 5(g), pp. 18-19. 62 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, p. 145. 63 Ibid., Exhibit 7, pp. 132-133. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-05112 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français