MC0-03689

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-03689 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision April 1, 2021 Date de la décision Panel K. Qureshi Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Hind Mali Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Appellant) is a citizen of Nigeria. The Appellant's allegations are as follows. [2] The Appellant was a founder and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX church in Akure, Ondo state, Nigeria. On August 15, 2017, his church organized an outdoor crusade which was attended by some women who worked at a nearby brothel called "XXXX XXXX." The church helped these women to acquire new skills and as a result they began to leave the brothel. The exit of workers angered the brothel owners and as a result they sent thugs led by a goon named "XXXX XXXX XXXX" to threaten and harm the Appellant and his wife. On September 13, 2017, the Appellant relocated and went into hiding at a church in Lagos. However, on November 2, 2017, some individuals approached the church inquiring about the Appellant. As a result, on XXXX XXXX, 2017 the Appellant fled to the United States (USA) on an existing visa. While he was in the USA, he was notified that on January 14, 2018, another pastor from his church was injured in a hit and run, and that two of his children were approached by men asking about the Appellant. Fearing he was unable to return to Nigeria, the Appellant travelled to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2018 and filed a claim for refugee protection on February 6, 2018. [3] The Appellant's claim was heard on December 10, 2019 and rejected on January 22, 2020 on the basis of Internal Flight Alternatives (IFA) available in Abuja, Port Harcourt, Benin City and Ibadan. The Appellant appeals to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). DECISION [4] I dismiss the appeal. The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The determinative issue is IFA. NEW EVIDENCE The evidence presented by the Appellant is partially accepted [5] According to the law,1 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have brought to the RPD before the decision. [6] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible, and relevant before I can accept it.2 [7] The Appellant submits the following new evidence: a. Psychotherapy progress report dated July 3, 2020 b. Various boarding school receipts dated May 13, 2019, November 15, 2019, and January 27, 2020 Psychotherapy progress report is accepted as new evidence [8] The Appellant submits a Psychotherapy progress report dated July 3, 2020. As this document was generated after the rejection of the claim, it meets the requirements of subsection 110(4). Regarding the factors in Singh and Raza, the document is credible as it is generated from an Ontario-licensed psychotherapist, is relevant as it pertains to the second prong of the IFA analysis, and is new as it contains updated information regarding the Appellant's mental health. Therefore, the Psychotherapy progress report is accepted as new evidence. School receipts are rejected as new evidence [9] The Appellant submits various receipts as proof that he enrolled his two younger sons in boarding school for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years as a result of the threats against him.3 The receipts from 2018-2019 predate the rejection of the claim and therefore do not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4). While the Appellant explains he only received these receipts after the hearing and it took time for his wife to obtain them, the Appellant has not provided a detailed explanation or any dates for when the receipts were requested, when they were provided to his wife, and when she provided them to the Appellant. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that the receipts were not reasonably available until after the rejection of the claim. [10] Regarding the receipts from January 27, 2020, although they post-date the rejection of the claim, it is not the date of a document which is determinative. Rather, the Appellant's purpose for providing the receipts is to demonstrate his children were enrolled in boarding school in 2018. That is, the receipts from January 27, 2020 pertain to information that pre-dates the rejection of the claim and the Appellant has not sufficiently explained why they were not reasonably available earlier, as discussed previously. Therefore, I do not find the receipts from January 27, 2020 are new for the purposes of subsection 110(4). [11] The receipts are rejected as new evidence. Oral hearing is rejected [12] Subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) gives the RAD the discretion to hold an oral hearing if new evidence has been accepted that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, that is central to the decision with respect to the appellant's claim and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the appellant's claim.4 [13] The request for an oral hearing is rejected on the basis that the Psychotherapy progress report does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant. ANALYSIS [14] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.5 [15] The Appellant submits the RPD erred in concluding he has safe and viable IFA's in Abuja, Port Harcourt, Benin City, and Ibadan. [16] The test for assessing an IFA is two-pronged and is set out in the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Rasaratnam.6 First, I must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of an appellant being persecuted in the part of the country where an IFA exists and/or the appellant would not be personally subjected to a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the IFA. Secondly, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the appellant, for an appellant to seek refuge there. Both prongs must be satisfied to find that an appellant has an IFA. Once the issue of IFA has been raised and the potential IFAs have been identified, the burden of proof rests with the appellant to show that they do not have an IFA. First prong of the IFA analysis: Agents of harm do not have means and motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA. [17] The RPD concluded that the agents of persecution, the brothel owners and Ade-Basket, did not have the means or motivation to track the Appellant to the IFAs.7 [18] Regarding motivation, the RPD did not accept that the brothel's significant loss of workers up until December 2019 was all related to the brief outreach by the Appellant's church in August 2017. Also, that the Appellant had not demonstrated the connection between the persecution and incidents of "rough men" coming to the neighbourhood in Lagos, a hit and run of another pastor in Akure and his sons being approached in Akure. Furthermore, that the Appellant's wife and sons continue to live in Akure and attend the same church. Regarding the capability of the agents of persecution to locate the Appellant in the IFAs, the RPD stated the Appellant had not provided evidence of his alleged high profile and publicity as a XXXX in Nigeria. The RPD also did not accept that the Appellant could be located through his Banking Verification Number (BVN), SIM card registration, voter's card, or driver's licence. The RPD also did not accept that news articles provided by the Appellant to establish that XXXX XXXX XXXX is connected to government authorities who could use their influence to track the Appellant across Nigeria. Finally, that the Appellant did not establish the brothel owner's have the influence or connections to track him in the IFAs. [19] The Appellant submits the RPD ignored his narrative and an email from his wife, that the articles regarding XXXX XXXX XXXX are pertinent even if they do not mention the Appellant, that the RPD required definitive proof of harm which exceeds a "balance of probabilities," failed to accord the Appellant the presumption of truth and did not take into consideration the Appellant's testimony.8 [20] Based on my independent assessment I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the brothel owners or XXXX XXXX XXXX have the means and motivation to find him in the IFAs, for the following reasons. a. XXXX XXXX XXXX does not have the means or motivation to seek the Appellant in the IFAs [21] Regarding XXXX XXXX XXXX motivation or interest in the Appellant, according to his narrative, XXXX XXXX XXXX was "hired" by the brothel to beat up the Appellant.9 Also, at the hearing, the Appellant testified that XXXX XXXX XXXX was hired by the brothel to "enforce the daily running of the brothel" and settle scuffles, and that he knew this because the thugs hung around outside the brothel.10 Finally, although this was not mentioned in his narrative, at the hearing the Appellant testified that XXXX XXXX XXXX collects commissions or illegal taxes from the brothel.11 Based on my independent assessment, I do not find the foregoing establishes that XXXX XXXX XXXX has ongoing interest in the Appellant, for the following reasons. [22] First, the Appellant's narrative suggests that XXXX XXXX XXXX interest in him was only to the extent of carrying out work that he was hired by the brothel to do. That is, to warn and attack the Appellant to stop his outreach because workers were leaving the brothel. As XXXX XXXX XXXX fulfilled his job, I do not find, based on the Appellant's narrative, that XXXX XXXX XXXX would be motivated to continued pursuing the Appellant. [23] I acknowledge, however, that at the hearing the Appellant also stated that XXXX XXXX XXXX collects illegal taxes and commissions from the brothel. The Appellant goes on to say in this appeal that XXXX XXXX XXXX lost profit because of his preaching.12 Based on my independent assessment, I do not find these assertions are reliable evidence of XXXX XXXX XXXX motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA, for the following reasons. [24] First, the Appellant's testimony regarding a commission arrangement between the brothel and XXXX XXXX XXXX is vague and lacks reliability. This allegation was not included in his narrative and, rather, appears to be based on information in an email13 that was sent to him from his wife on December 2, 2019, 8 days before the hearing. However, a review of the email indicates that the allegation of XXXX XXXX XXXX earning commission is information that arose in 2019, more than two years after the incidents in 2017. I find that the large gap in the timing of this information undermines that it accurately reflects what financial arrangement, if any, XXXX XXXX XXXX had with the brothel at the time of the Appellant's outreach. Also, the information in the email is based on a conversation the Appellant's wife had with, what appears to be, a random woman who was looking for her daughter that used to work in the brothel. It is unknown how or from where this woman learned about XXXX XXXX XXXX earning commission from the brothel. Overall, I find the Appellant's allegation that XXXX XXXX XXXX earns commission from the brothel lacks reliability due to the foregoing concerns regarding timing and being based on, at least, third-hand hearsay. I find the foregoing undermines the suggestion that XXXX XXXX XXXX has an ongoing motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA. [25] Also, although the Appellant appears to allege XXXX XXXX XXXX lost profit because of his outreach,14 I note that in this appeal the Appellant actually takes issue with the RPD suggesting the brothel is no longer "profitable." Specifically, the Appellant says, "the claimant did not say that the brothel is not profitable anymore...he said that the brothel lost business because of the departure of the girls this does not mean the business is no longer profitable."15 That is, the Appellant outright says he is not suggesting the brothel is not profitable. I find this further undermines the insinuation that XXXX XXXX XXXX lost revenue as a result of the Appellant's outreach and, as a result, has the motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA. [26] Overall, based on the foregoing, I do not find the Appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that XXXX XXXX XXXX has any ongoing interest in seeking out the Appellant in an IFA. As an aside, I acknowledge the Appellant believes the presumption of truth "required" the RPD to accept his statements regarding the motivation of the agents of harm to pursue him in the proposed IFAs.16 I do not accept the Appellant's submission in this regard. The presumption of truth does not "require" the Board to accept speculation and hearsay as fact. [27] Regarding XXXX XXXX XXXX means of finding the Appellant in an IFA, I have reviewed the four articles he submitted. I do not find they establish that XXXX XXXX XXXX has the means or motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA. Specifically, the information and people described in the articles generally pertain to Akure or Ondo state. That is, the articles do not demonstrate that XXXX XXXX XXXX operates or has influence outside of Akure or Ondo state. I find this undermines that XXXX XXXX XXXX would be able to locate the Appellant in the IFAs or that he would be interested in venturing outside of Akure or Ondo state in order to find the Appellant. [28] Finally, the Appellant alleges that the RPD ignored evidence such as his narrative and an email from his wife.17 I am not persuaded by the Appellant's argument. The Appellant has not explained why he believes the RPD ignored this evidence, but it is trite law that the Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in its decision.18 Notably, the RPD even expressly referenced the narrative.19 Therefore, I do not find the RPD erred in this regard. b. Brothel owners do not have the means or motivation to seek the Appellant in the IFAs [29] Regarding the brothel owners, I do not find the Appellant has established that they have the means or motivation to locate him in the IFAs. [30] Regarding motivation, the Appellant asserts that at the time of his outreach in August 2017, the brothel had 80-100 workers.20 The Appellant stated 10 of the workers left the brothel right after the outreach. Subsequently, after he left Akure himself, he heard from his wife that an additional 8 workers left. At the time of the hearing, the Appellant testified he had heard from his wife that the brothel only had 20 workers, the vast majority of whom are new. The Appellant states that the drop to 20 workers is all indirectly related to his outreach in 2017.21 Based on my independent assessment, I do not find the RPD erred by not accepting that the brothel's loss of workers up until December 2019 was all related to the brief outreach by the Appellant in August 2017, for the following reasons. [31] First, I find the assertion that the brothel owners would be motivated to seek the Appellant in an IFA on a forward-facing basis because of an exodus of workers over many ensuing years based on a brief outreach, is speculation. The Appellant has not provided any evidence of this assertion aside from his own personal belief. However, there are other plausible reasons for the brothel's loss of workers. For example, at the hearing the Appellant mentioned the brothel engages in sex trafficking.22 However, according to a report by Human Rights Watch,23 Nigeria has made many steps to address the problem of sex trafficking such as endorsing most international instruments on human trafficking, playing a key role in continental anti-human trafficking initiatives, improving awareness, investigation, and prosecution of trafficking cases, and identification, protection, and assistance for survivors, such as access to family reunification, shelters, counseling, access to health care, skills training, business set-up, and financial support. At the state level, Ondo state in particular has formed taskforces against human trafficking. Therefore, while I do not conclude that the brothel's loss of workers is certainly a result of government initiatives, I do find that the Appellant's assertion that the brothel lost 60-80 workers because of his brief outreach years ago is speculative - particularly in the face of other plausible reasons for the exodus of workers. [32] Regarding the hit and run of another pastor from the Appellant's church, there is no evidence that this is related to the Appellant. I acknowledge in the narrative the Appellant conveys the drivers of the vehicle told the pastor that "we will deal with you and your pastor."24 However, the Appellant was not a witness to this incident and the Pastor has not provided independent corroboration of this himself. Therefore, I do not find a connection has been established between the hit and run and the Appellant's allegations of persecution. In any event, the hit and run incident occurred in Akure and is not demonstrative with respect to the brothel owner's motivation to seek the Appellant in an IFA. Regarding the Appellant's sons being approached by men who said they will get the Appellant, as this incident also occurred several years ago in Akure, I also do not find this is demonstrative with respect to the brothel owner's motivation to seek the Appellant several years later in an IFA. [33] I acknowledge the Appellant's assertion in this appeal that the agents of harm will be motivated to pursue the Appellant in an IFA in order to send a warning to other churches.25 Based on my review of the evidence, the Appellant made no such assertion in his narrative or in testimony and therefore I find this submission in this appeal is an effort to bolster the Appellant's claim. In any event, this submission is entirely speculative. [34] Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing, I do not find on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant has demonstrated the brothel owners would be motivated to seek him in an IFA on a forward-facing basis. [35] Regarding the brothel owners' means of finding the Appellant, I agree with the RPD that the Appellant had little information regarding the brothel owners' profile. In fact, I note that it was only in an amendment to the narrative a couple of weeks before the hearing that the brothel owners were even first named.26 This information, again, appears to be based on an email from the Appellant's wife who learned of this information from a random woman.27 The Appellant asserts that the brothel owners are financially powerful and therefore banks would want to make them happy as clients and would give out the Appellant's personal information as a result.28 I do not accept this assertion because it is based on speculation. Also, as an aside, I note that brothels are illegal in Nigeria29 and, if anything, this would undermine the suggestion that they engage in official regular day-to-day banking in the same manner that legal organizations do. [36] Concerning the incident of "rough men" coming to his neighbourhood in Lagos, I agree with the RPD that there is insufficient information to establish a connection between this incident and the brothel owners. Even if it is connected, Lagos is not one of the proposed IFAs. [37] Regarding the Appellant's assertion that the brothel owners have networks all over the country and "do sex trafficking all over the country."30 Again, this is all speculation. There is no further evidence or even any details of this. For example, the Appellant did not provide any details such as the names of these other brothels, their locations, or whether any of these brothels are in the IFAs etc. The Appellant bears the burden of proof of establishing the IFAs are not safe. I do not find vaguely asserting the brothel owners have connections around the country is sufficient to discharge that burden. [38] In terms of possible publicity arising out of the Appellant's work as a XXXX in the future, I note that the Appellant suggested at the hearing that resuming his religious vocation in the IFAs is likely not an option for him. Specifically, because this would entail attracting congregants from other church colleagues, which would be a betrayal to his colleagues and show a lack of integrity.31 Therefore, if the Appellant does not resume his religious vocation in the IFAs, then there is no risk of him being located because of possible publicity arising out of this line of work. However, even if the Appellant does return to his previous vocation, I have already found above that neither XXXX XXXX XXXX nor the brothel owners have the motivation to seek him in the IFAs. [39] Finally, there is no evidence that the brothel owners are aligned with any politicians such that they might obtain access to the Appellant's information if he relocates to one of the IFAs. c. Conclusion on first prong of the IFA analysis [40] Overall, on the basis of the foregoing, I do not agree with the Appellant's submission that the RPD appeared to require definitive proof under the first prong of the IFA analysis.32 I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has not established that either Ade-Basket or the brothel owners have the means or motivation to locate him in the IFAs. Second prong: Relocation to the IFAs is not objectively unreasonable [41] In respect of analyzing the reasonableness of a proposed IFA under the second prong, the Federal Court of Appeal has held there is: [A] very high threshold for the unreasonableness test. It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized. This is in sharp contrast with undue hardship resulting from loss of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and expectations.33 [42] The Court has reiterated the importance of not lowering that threshold.34 [43] Regarding the second prong, the RPD found relocation to the IFA's did not rise to the level of undue hardship. [44] The Appellant submits the RPD disregarded or did not engage with his mental health condition, and neglected information that he provided regarding the lack of mental health facilities in Nigeria and in other National Documentation Package (NDP) documents.35 [45] The Appellant provided a Psychotherapy progress report36 which I accepted as new evidence and have considered. I note, first, that the report determines that the Appellant's "stressors are related to his immigration status" and "he continues to experience ongoing stressors related [to] his immigration process." While it is clear that removal from Canada may bring about negative psychological effects, this is not determinative for the purposes of the second prong of the IFA analysis.37 [46] Second, the report states "it would be therapeutic for Mr. XXXX to remain in Canada as he is able to access the mental health services here" [emphasis added]. That is, the language of the report does not suggest that ongoing mental health treatment for the Appellant is crucial or necessary or that there will be seriously detrimental consequences otherwise. The threshold for unreasonableness of an IFA is high. While I acknowledge mental health treatment is generally "therapeutic," I do not find that a possible lack of widespread availability of mental health facilities in Nigeria for the purposes of "therapeutic" treatment rises to the high level of undue hardship. Rather, the report suggests the Appellant has made significant improvements with respect to any mental health concerns. For example, the report says that the Appellant "reports having benefitted from therapy" and that he has "made significant progress with regards to these strategies. He became so motivated that he started his own church." I acknowledge there is reference to "major depression." However, this appears to be based on a cursory test as demonstrated by the author's own description of it being "completed in minutes by the client and scored rapidly by the clinician." There is also no formal diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, nor is the writer of the report eligible to make such a diagnosis. Also, the Appellant has not provided a further Psychotherapy progress or discharge report demonstrating that the recommendation for an additional 10 sessions was implemented despite the amount of time that has elapsed between the progress report and this decision. There is also no evidence that the Appellant has required continued monitoring by any mental health practitioner, or that a physician has determined that his condition requires psychopharmacologic intervention. In the event that the Appellant did actually undergo an additional 10 sessions, presumably these would have had a beneficial impact on his mental health. [47] Furthermore, while the Appellant raised issues with forgetfulness at the hearing and the psychological report indicates that his condition may interfere with his ability to testify, a review of the transcript indicates the Appellant was able to provide coherent and responsive testimony which was also quite specific and detailed in some respects. For example, he was able to name specific churches he had worked with many years ago in specific IFAs.38 I find this undermines any suggestion that the Appellant's psychological functioning is seriously hampered. Also, while the initial XXXX XXXX39 indicates the author does not believe the Appellant would be able to access mental health services in Nigeria, the author did not state what this opinion is based on. Also, neither of the two psychological reports reference any adverse effect or risk to the Appellant's mental health if he was to relocate to the IFA's which have been determined to be safe and are away from Akure where the past harm occurred. [48] Finally, as noted by the RPD, there are some mental health facilities in Nigeria. [49] Overall, based on the foregoing, I do not find that any possible mental health issues the Appellant has would make relocation to the IFAs objectively unreasonable. [50] Regarding employment in the IFAs, it was the Appellant's evidence that resuming his religious work is likely not an option for him as it would entail attracting congregants from former church colleagues, which would be a betrayal and show a lack of integrity.40 The RPD did not accept that the only option available to the Appellant in terms of returning to his religious vocation would be to establish his own church.41 The Appellant re-iterates in this appeal that returning to the church is not a prospect and that as a 50 year old with limited education, he lacks other employment prospects in Nigeria.42 [51] Based on my independent assessment, I agree with the RPD, the fact that the Appellant had professional relationships with other pastors in the IFAs does not prevent him from re-establishing himself in a religious vocation in the IFAs. Specifically, Ibadan has a population of 3.16 million, Port Harcourt 2.34 million, Benin City 1.5 million and Abuja 2.44 million.43 Also, the majority of southern Nigeria is Christian. Therefore, while I acknowledge the Appellant's integrity is important to him, I do not find the IFAs are small locales with zero room for additional religious institutions. That is, it is difficult to find that relocation to the IFAs is objectively unreasonable because resuming preaching would constitute such a betrayal to other pastors that this vocation is completely out of the question. However, even if this is the case and the Appellant is unwilling to resume his religious work, I nevertheless find he has other employable skills. According to the Appellant's testimony at the hearing, in Canada he has worked in various manufacturing facilities and was able to successfully complete training to become a XXXX XXXX.44 According to the psychological progress report, he also undertook activities to commence his own church in Canada. I find the foregoing demonstrates that even at the age of 51, he has the resourcefulness and capability to retrain into a new occupation. Regarding, the difficulty of finding employment in Nigeria, while I accept this is a challenge, I do not find it rises to the level of undue hardship and that this is a condition faced by the population generally. The Appellant also has the support of his wife and older children, one of whom is University-educated. [52] Regarding other factors such as accommodation, religion, indigeneship, language, ability to travel to the IFA etc., the Appellant has not raised any concerns in this regard. I also do not find the Appellant faces any concerns in these respects which would rise to the level of undue hardship. Rather, I note the Appellant has some familiarity in the IFAs having testified that he has travelled widely throughout Nigeria.45 [53] Finally, the Appellant submits the RPD's reliance on the revoked Jurisprudential Guide (JG) for Nigeria weakens its decision.46 I am not persuaded by the Appellant's submission in this regard. A reading of the RPD decision indicates it considered the Appellant's personal circumstances, such as his work experience and limited education, and did not rely on NDP evidence that was outdated at the time of the decision. The Appellant also has not presented evidence of the RPD relying on outdated information from the JG. The sole fact of the revocation of the JG does not automatically render every decision that relied on it to be "weakened...to the point that it is unreasonable." The Federal Court has indicated that an analysis of the second prong that is not a "perfunctory recitation" of the JG, is valid.47 [54] Overall, based on the foregoing, I do not find relocation to the IFAs would rise to the level of undue hardship. CONCLUSION [55] Based on the foregoing analysis, I find that the Appellant would not face a serious possibility of persecution, nor would he face one of the harms set out under section 97 of the IRPA48 in the IFAs, and that the conditions in the IFAs are not such that it would be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellant, for him to seek refuge there. There is a safe and reasonable IFA in Abuja, Benin City, Port Harcourt, and Ibadan and therefore the RPD's analysis is correct. [56] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) K. Qureshi K. Qureshi April 1, 2021 Date 1 Subsection 110(4), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza FC 385. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 35. 4 Subsection 110(6), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 5Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 6 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, pp. 6-10, paras 11-24. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 40-47, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 3-10, paras 18-57. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, Claimants Story (C-16), p. 190, para 2. 10 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 27. 11 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 27. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 44, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 7, para. 42. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, Claimants Documents, p. 222. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 44, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 7, para. 42. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 46, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 9, para 51. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 44, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 9, para 44. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 40, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 3, paras 18-21. 18 Forvil v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 585, para 34. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, p. 9, RPD Reasons, p. 7, para 15. 20 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 44-45. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 42, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 5, para 29. 22 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 30, line 30. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria, (November 29, 2019), Item 5.4: ?"You Pray For Death": Trafficking of Women and Girls in Nigeria. Human Rights Watch. August 2019, at pp. 6 and 20-21. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, Basis of Claim, p. 25, para 8. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, P. 44, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 7, para 43. 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, Claimants Story (C-16), p. 190, para 4. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, Claimants Documents, p. 222. 28 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 38. 29 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), Item 16.10, CORI Thematic Report, Nigeria: Gender and Age, Country of Origin Research Information, December 2012, Chapter 21, p. 123. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 45-46, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 8-9, paras 48-50. 31 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 37-38, 46, 49. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 4, 10, paras 26, 85. 33 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164, para 15. 34Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 589, paras 15-16. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 48-49, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 11-12, paras 60-69. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 20, Pyschotherapy Progress Report, p. 1. 37 Feboke v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 155, para 59. 38 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 48. 39 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, C-2, p. 147. 40 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 37-38, 46, 49 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, p. 14, RPD Reasons, p. 12, para 29. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 50-51, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 13-14, paras 70-74. 43 NDP for Nigeria (November 29, 2019), Item 1.4, EASO Country of Origin Report: Nigeria. Country Focus, European Union, European Asylum Support Office, June 2017, pp. 16-17. 44 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 18-19. 45 Transcript of (December 10, 2019) RPD Hearing, p. 16. 46 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 51, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 14, paras. 75-79. 47 A.B. v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2021 FC 90, para. 65. 48 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-03689 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français