TB5-05252

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-05252 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 30, 2015 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Anthony P. Navaneelan Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has not submitted new evidence and does not request an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD, substitute its own decision, and declare her to be a protected person pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). In the alternative, the Appellant asks the RAD, if it has any concerns about issues beyond Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), to refer the matter back to the RPD for a new hearing pursuant to section 111(c) or that she be given both notice of the issues by the RAD and an opportunity to respond before any final decision is made. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. This appeal is allowed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Ukraine, she will be harmed by her ex-boyfriend because he had been abusive towards her in the past and continues to pursue her. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on April 9, 2015. By a decision of May 4, 2015, the RPD rejected the claim, finding that the Appellant has a suitable and viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Kiev and it would be objectively reasonable for her to relocate there. The Appellant submits that the RPD's IFA findings were made without regard to the evidence or the jurisprudence of the Federal Court. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [5] What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? The Appellant refers to the decisions of the Federal Court in Huruglica,1Husian2 and Ching,3 among other cases, and submits that, as the availability of an IFA was the only issued raised by the RPD in its reasons, the RAD should restrict its independent assessment to that issue or otherwise provide notice to her and provide her with an opportunity to respond. [6] The RAD notes, in Huruglica, the Court considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD. It found that the RAD had erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.4 [7] Justice Phelan stated the following in Huruglica: Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error." [8] Considering the Court's decisions in Huruglica, Husian and Ching, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, recognizing and respecting the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own determination. If the RAD seeks to make findings on issues that were not raised by the RPD in its decision, the RAD will notify the Appellant of those issues and she will be given a chance to respond. Jurisprudence regarding Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) [9] In assessing whether a viable IFA exists, the Board is guided by the cases of the Federal Court of Appeal. If there is a safe haven for refugee claimants in their own country, where they could live free from harm, they are expected to avail themselves of it, unless they can show it is objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to do so.5 The IFA must be realistic, attainable and accessible. Barriers to getting to the IFA must be reasonably surmountable and the refugee claimant cannot be required to encounter great danger or undergo undue hardship either in travelling there or in remaining there. Refugee claimants should not be compelled to hide out in an isolated region of their country, like a cave in the mountains, or in a desert or a jungle, if those are the only areas of internal safety available. But neither is it enough for refugee claimants to say that they do not like the weather there, having no friends or family in the region or not being able to find suitable work there. The fact that a refugee claimant may be better off in Canada economically, physically or emotionally, than they would be in their own country, is not a factor to consider when assessing the reasonableness of an IFA.6 If it is objectively reasonable to live in the IFA without fear of persecution or risk of harm, then IFA exists and the claimant is not a refugee. Consequently, if there is a safe haven for claimants in their own country, where they would be free of persecution, they are expected to avail themselves of it unless they can show that it is objectively unreasonable for them to do so. It is not a matter of the claimant's convenience or the attractiveness of the IFA, but whether one should be expected to make do in that location before traveling half-way around the world to seek a safe haven, in another country. 7 [10] In order to determine whether a viable IFA exists, the Board must consider a two-pronged test: 1. The Board must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the refugee claimants being persecuted or, that the refugee claimants would not be subject personally to a risk to their life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or to a danger of torture, in the part of the country to which it finds an internal flight alternative exists; and 2. Conditions in that part of the country must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the refugee claimant, for the refugee claimant to seek refuge there.8 [11] The refugee claimant always bears the burden of proof to show that he or she would be subject personally, on a balance of probabilities,9 to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the entire country and specifically in the potential IFA area named.10 RPD findings, Appellant's arguments and assessment of refugee claim [12] Power and influence of ex-boyfriend's father - The RPD noted the Appellant's allegation that her ex-boyfriend's father is a powerful man in the city of XXXX, that he holds a significant position at XXXX XXXX and has a lot of money. It found that the Appellant's oral testimony regarding her ex-boyfriend's father unconvincing. It noted that the Appellant's lack of knowledge regarding the position her ex-boyfriend's father holds and her lack of confidence as to whether or not his position is powerful caused it to question the credibility that he is a powerful man in the city of XXXX. It also found it unreasonable that the Appellant did not make an attempt to obtain evidence to establish the influence and power her ex-boyfriend's family has in Ukraine and did not find it credible that she did not know what to do with the evidence if she were to obtain it. The RPD drew a negative inference from this and found that if the family of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend is as powerful as alleged there would be some evidence to establish this. The RPD found that the Appellant had not established on a balance of probabilities that her ex-boyfriend's father has a powerful position with XXXX XXXX XXXX or that he has any power or influence in the city of XXXX. [13] The Appellant refers to the Federal Court decisions in Asadnejad, 11 Vargas12 and Aguilera13 and submits that it was not open to the RPD to draw a negative inference from the lack of certain corroborating documents showing the influence the father of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend has in XXXX. She notes that the RPD had confirmed at the conclusion of her testimony at her hearing that it found her to be a generally credible witness and it believed her account of the abuse and rape she had suffered from her ex-boyfriend. [14] The RAD concurs with the Appellant and finds that the RPD erred in its findings concerning the lack of corroborative documents noted above. It is important to note that the RPD indicated at the Appellant's hearing that it did not have concerns about the Appellant's general credibility and found her to be credible on the substance of her claim regarding her ex-boyfriend. Upon a review of the evidence, including the recording of the hearing, the RAD finds that the Appellant was a credible witness. There were no significant inconsistencies, omissions or other anomalies in the Appellant's evidence that were not reasonably explained. Furthermore, the testimony of refugee claimants carries with it a presumption of truthfulness.14 The RPD failed to provide sufficient and adequate reasons to discount the Appellant's testimony with respect to the power and influence of her ex-boyfriend's father. Moreover, the RPD failed to indicate what information in particular it was looking for or expecting the Appellant to provide and if that information was indeed available in documentary form. Therefore, it was wrong for the RPD to draw a negative inference from the Appellant's lack of effort to obtain uncertain documentation that may or may not exist or that was or was not readily available to the Appellant. The Federal Court in cases such as Asadnejad, Vargas and Aguilera noted above have indicated that a negative inference cannot be drawn by the Board from the lack of a particular corroborating document when it otherwise has no concerns with the refugee claimant's credibility. [15] Ex-boyfriend's father and his connection to police - The RPD noted the Appellant's allegation that police in XXXX did not take her case seriously because her ex-boyfriend's father used his power to intervene and therefore he will use this connection with police to find her. It noted that the e-mail message from the Appellant's father fails to mention the father of the Appellant's boyfriend as the reason why police refused to offer assistance and found that if it was the reason he would have written it. The RPD noted documentary evidence indicating that domestic violence is a serious problem in Ukraine and police show indifference and are often reluctant to investigate accusations of violence occurring in relationships. It found it more likely than not that police refused to investigate the Appellant's case due to the reasons reported in the documentary evidence rather than the influence of the father of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend. The RPD also referred to its previous finding noted above and found that the Appellant failed to establish a connection between the police and her ex-boyfriend's father. It also found that the Appellant's relocation to Kiev will not be impeded by any police interference. [16] The Appellant asserts that she specifically testified that the police instructed her father to withdraw her police complaint due to interference, and under threat, by her ex-boyfriend's father. She submits that the RPD had no basis for rejecting her testimony in this regard. She argues that the only credibility concern cited by the RPD was its own previous finding as to the lack of corroborating evidence of the influence of her ex-boyfriend's father however there was no basis for that adverse credibility finding and it cannot be used as the sole buttress for a further adverse finding. The Appellant submits that the RPD appears to have simply preferred a different and entirely speculative account of events over the sworn testimony of an otherwise credible witness based solely on country condition documents. She further submits that the Federal Court, including its decision in Coitinho,15 has been clear that preferring country condition documents in this manner is arbitrary and unreasonable. [17] The RAD concurs with the Appellant and finds that the RPD erred in its analysis and finding that the Appellant failed to establish a connection between the police and her ex-boyfriend's father. The RPD was wrong to partially base this finding on a previous erroneous finding noted above. Furthermore, the RPD erroneously engaged in speculation when it found it more likely than not that police refused to investigate the Appellant's case due to the reasons reported in the documentary evidence rather than the influence of the father of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend. Since the RPD found the Appellant to be credible on the substance of her claim regarding her ex-boyfriend and there were insufficient grounds to impugn her credibility about her ex-boyfriend's father and his connection to police, the RPD reached an indefensible conclusion regarding the influence the Appellant's ex-boyfriend and his family have with police. [18] The Appellant also notes that the RPD took issue not with what the e-mail message from her father said but rather with what it did not say with greater specificity. She submits that the RPD's finding that the reference in her father's e-mail message to "people who are in power" did not refer to her boyfriend or his family is not tenable in light of the e-mail message as a whole. She points out that her father's e-mail message states that he can confirm that everything that happened to his daughter is true and her allegations, which her father endorsed, included the allegation that her ex-boyfriend's father had used his influence to compel the police to shut down the complaint against his son. She also points out that the sole person referenced in the e-mail message, besides herself, is her ex-boyfriend, and it strains credulity for the RPD to assert that her father's reference to "people who are in power" suddenly refers to anyone but her ex-boyfriend and his family. The Appellant submits that the RPD's analysis of her father's e-mail message runs afoul of the well-established principle that the RPD must assess documentary evidence for what it does say and should not impugn a refugee claimant's credibility based solely on what that document does not say. [19] The Appellant's argument noted above has merit. The Appellant's father indicates in his e-mail message16 that he can confirm everything that happened to his daughter. He also indicates that he and his family, as ordinary citizens, cannot fight against the people who are in power in Ukraine. These statements corroborate and do not contradict the Appellant's sworn testimony. The RPD misconstrued the information that the e-mail message contained. Furthermore, the RPD was wrong to make an adverse finding about information that was missing from the e-mail message or information it thought ought to have been included in the e-mail message. The Federal Court has consistently warned that a negative inference should not be drawn based upon what a document does not say, even though what the document does say is consistent with the Appellant's evidence.17 [20] Ex-boyfriend and his ability to find Appellant - The RPD noted the Appellant's allegation that her ex-boyfriend would be able to find her in Kiev because he found her when she moved to her cousin's house in XXXX. It found that the ability of her ex-boyfriend to find her in at her cousin's house did not establish on a balance of probabilities that he would be able to find her in Kiev. It noted that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend located her at her cousin's house in the same city where she resided but he was unable to find her when she was staying at her grandmother's house located outside of the city where she resided. [21] The RAD notes that, although the Appellant indicated at her hearing that her ex-boyfriend did not find her at her grandmother's house, the RPD did not take into account the length of time she stayed at her grandmother's house. According to the Appellant's BoC18 and her Schedule A - Background/Declaration,19 although there is no indication as to the number of days she stayed at her grandmother's house, it was after her release from hospital on XXXX XXXX, 201420 and before her departure from Ukraine on XXXX XXXX, 2014; therefore a maximum of 14 days or two weeks. The fact the her ex-boyfriend was unable to find her at her grandmother's house in the 14 days she was staying there does not necessarily mean that he was not actively looking for her or that he would not locate her or would not find her there eventually. The fact that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend asked the Appellant's mother for the Appellant's whereabouts and has relayed threats through the Appellant's mother well after the Appellant stayed at her grandmother's house indicates that he has an ongoing interest in finding the Appellant and reflects his propensity to harm her. The fact that he had not found the Appellant in the 14 days she lived with her grandmother is not necessarily indicative of his inability to find her since the actions of the Appellant's boyfriend during this time period are unknown. Based on the above, it was wrong for the RPD to draw any conclusions from the fact that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend did not find her during the two weeks she resided at her grandmother's house. [22] Resident registration system in Ukraine - The RPD noted the Appellant's statement that her ex-boyfriend will be able to find her in the city of Kiev because he will be able to bribe the XXXX XXXX Office to obtain her address. It noted documentary evidence and found that it would not be an easy task and the law did not permit just anyone from obtaining this information. It also noted information from a women's rights centre in Ukraine indicating that if a woman re-registers in a new location, and an offender does not know where she moved to, he will not be able to find her. The RPD found that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend would not be able to locate her if she relocated to Kiev. [23] The Appellant submits that the RPD confined its analysis to asking whether a corrupt employee inside the XXXX XXXX Office would release her resident information illegally. She argues that the RPD fails to consider whether a corrupt police officer outside the XXXX XXXX Office would request it on her ex-boyfriend's behalf. She submits that the documentary evidence confirms that police have easy access to the XXXX XXXX Office's data for even private matters. [24] The RAD notes that while the RPD found that it would not be an easy task and the law did not permit just anyone from obtaining residency information in Ukraine, it did not consider that the profile of Appellant's ex-boyfriend in its analysis. The Appellant's uncontradicted evidence indicates that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend is from a wealthy family. The father of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend holds a position at XXXX XXXX XXXX. He has influenced the actions of the authorities to not arrest and prosecute his son for the harm he inflicted upon the Appellant. The Appellant's ex-boyfriend himself has started to XXXX XXXX. His profile establishes him as not just anyone but someone with wealth and influence. Furthermore, documentary evidence indicates that police officers have access to the registration system and, although they should use registration information while on duty, in practice they can also use it for private matters.21 Considering the profile of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend and the ability of corrupt officials and police officers to obtain and provide the Appellant's ex-boyfriend with her residency information, the RAD finds that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend would be able to locate her if she relocated to Kiev or elsewhere in Ukraine. The RPD was wrong to find that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend would not be able to locate her if she relocated to Kiev. [25] Corruption and the registration system - The RPD noted the submission from the Appellant's counsel that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend can gain access to the resident registration database due to the high level of corruption in Ukraine. The RPD indicated that simply because it is possible for someone to disclose residency information illegally, it does not mean on a balance of probabilities that it will be done in the Appellant's circumstances. It also indicated that because corruption is occurring in government institutions does not necessarily mean on a balance of probabilities that corruption is occurring in all offices or in all circumstances. The RPD found on a balance of probabilities that the evidence did not establish that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend will be able to bribe XXXX XXXX Officials in Kiev in order to obtain the Appellant's address, if she were to move there. The RPD also found on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend did not have the resources to search the entire country of Ukraine to find her in Kiev. It concluded that the Appellant's boyfriend would not be able to locate the Appellant in Kiev and therefore she would be able to live in Kiev free of persecution. [26] The Appellant submits that the RPD grossly undervalued the degree and prevalence of corruption in all parts of the Ukrainian state. She notes documentary evidence indicating that corruption was widespread in Ukraine and occurring with impunity. She notes documentary evidence indicating that corruption remained pervasive at all levels in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and in society. She submits that this lends itself more readily to an inference that her ex-boyfriend would not only possibly but probably be able to locate a corrupt official or police officer to obtain the resident information on his behalf. [27] The Appellant notes that all persons in Ukraine must inevitably register their propiska (a residency permit and migration recording document), and registration is unavoidable and inevitable in Ukrainian life. She submits that registration also places those fleeing from violent and abusive partners at unacceptable risk. The Appellant submits that the evidence demonstrates that her ex-boyfriend (and/or his family) would more likely than not have the influence to obtain her residency information through powerful connections with police or through run-of-the-mill bribery corruption and there is the likelihood that she would be located by her ex-boyfriend if she were to return to Ukraine. [28] The RAD notes the United States Department of State report indicating that there is pervasive corruption in all branches of government and there were significant cases of abuse and impunity involving law enforcement personnel.22 Although the RPD found on a balance of probabilities that the evidence did not establish that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend will be able to bribe XXXX XXXX Officials in Kiev in order to obtain the Appellant's address if she were to move there, it did not consider that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend could obtain the Appellant's address by other means such as bribing other officials or police or by simply using his influence to gain the information. Furthermore, the RPD was wrong in finding that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend did not have the resources to search the entire country of Ukraine to find her in Kiev when the evidence established that he is from a wealthy family and has the means to obtain such information. The RAD finds that the RPD erred in concluding that the Appellant's boyfriend would not be able to locate the Appellant in Kiev and therefore she would be able to live in Kiev free of persecution. [29] Summary regarding first prong of test - The RAD finds that the Appellant provided credible evidence that her ex-boyfriend has the desire to continue his relationship with her and the motivation to harm her. The RAD also finds that the Appellant provided credible evidence regarding the means, ability, and influence of her ex-boyfriend to locate her in the Ukraine and to avoid arrest and prosecution. As submitted by the Appellant, the evidence convincingly demonstrates that the family of the Appellant's ex-boyfriend has powerful connections with the police in XXXX XXXX as demonstrated when they successfully shut down a police investigation into a sexual assault. The RAD concurs with the Appellant that with these connections it is more likely than not that the family of her ex-boyfriend could gain access to basic information to which police have ready access to, such as the resident registration system, and this would negatively impact the availability of an IFA anywhere in Ukraine. Considering the above findings, the RAD finds on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious possibility of the Appellant being persecuted in Kiev and throughout Ukraine. [30] Reasonableness of the IFA - The RPD considered the argument from the Appellant's counsel that, with no family relations and as an XXXX pound, eighteen year-old female, it is objectively unreasonable to expect the Appellant to live in the city of Kiev on her own. The RPD found that the Appellant's profile did not set her apart from any other adult living in Kiev. It considered the current situation in Ukraine and found that the documentary evidence indicates that Kiev had not been affected by the civil war and the migration of displaced persons. The RPD found that it was not unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate to Kiev. [31] Considering that the RAD has found on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious possibility of the Appellant being persecuted in Kiev and throughout Ukraine there is no need to consider the second prong of the IFA test noted above. However, even if the first prong of the test was not met, the RAD finds that the second prong is not met either. The RAD finds that it would be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellant, for her to seek refuge in Kiev or another part of Ukraine. The RPD was wrong to find that the Appellant's profile did not set her apart from any other adults living in Kiev. [32] The RAD finds that the RPD did not give adequate consideration to the Appellant's age, stature, marital status, cultural background, education, lack of employment history and lack of familial ties outside of XXXX in its finding that she has a suitable and viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Kiev and it would be objectively reasonable for her to relocate there. The Appellant is an 18 year old woman who has never lived outside her parent's home or the home of relatives. She has strong family ties with her family members in the XXXX area of Ukraine and with her grandparents in XXXX, Canada. She currently lives with her grandparents in Canada. The Appellant attended secondary school in Ukraine up to XXXX 2014 and intends to continue her education. She stands XXXX centimeters tall and weighs XXXX kilograms. She has never worked, except for helping her father at his XXXXstore. It is likely that Appellant's profile sets her apart from other adults living in Kiev. The Appellant is a young, unsophisticated woman who heavily relies on her family for support. Considering the above, the RAD finds that it would be unreasonable for the Appellant to seek refuge in Kiev or another part of Ukraine. SUMMARY [33] The Appellant was abused by her boyfriend in Ukraine and the evidence shows that he continues to be interested in having a relationship with her and harming her. The evidence also shows that the Appellant's ex-boyfriend has the motivation and means to pursue the Appellant throughout Ukraine and has the influence with the authorities to avoid arrest and prosecution for crimes he commits. Considering the Appellant's gender, her marital status, her age, her stature, her lack of economic means, her lack of significant familial support in Ukraine outside of XXXX, and a history which includes domestic or gender-based violence, combined with a lack of adequate state protection and a lack of a viable internal flight alternative in Ukraine, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant has satisfied the burden of establishing a serious possibility of persecution should she return to Ukraine. The RAD, therefore, concludes that the Appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [34] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "M. Pettinella" M. Pettinella September 30, 2015 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 Husian, Ahmednoor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4857-14), Hughes, May 27, 2015, 2015 FC 684. 3 Ching, Wai Kheong v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1272-14), Kane, June 9, 2015, 2015 FC 725. 4 Huruglica, para. 45. 5 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). 6 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ranganathan, [2001] 2 F.C. 164 (C.A.). 7 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). 8 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 9 Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 239 (F.C.A.). 10 IRPA, s. 97(1)(b)(ii). 11 Asadnejad, Hamid Reza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5711-13), Harrington, April 23, 2014; 2014 FC 379. 12 Vargas, Monica v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-11574-12), Strickland, May 22, 2014, 2014 FC 484. 13 Aguilera, Antonio Lopez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4703-11), Harrington, February 8, 2012, 2012 FC 173. 14 Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302. 15 Coitinho, Jorge Alberto Rodriguez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5710-02), Snider, July 26, 2004, 2004 FC 1037. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 338. 17 Arslan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2013 FC 252, at para. 88. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 28. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 42. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 273. 21Exhibit RPD-1, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package(NDP) for Ukraine (12 February 2015), item 14.4. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 117, 124. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-05252