TB4-02518

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-02518 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision July 16, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Roslyn Ahara Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Clarisa Waldman Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister Bobbette JONES-KEITA Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Turkey, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. He requests the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the determination and substitute a positive determination or, in the alternative, refer the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111 (1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD refers this claim to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL: Express statutory conditions: [3] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection of the claim. [4] If the statutory requirements have been met, the panel must then consider the factors in Raza,1 in which the Federal Court of Appeal set out factors to be considered in assessing "new" evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA, Section 110(4), it is based on the very similar wording of Section 113(a) for the PPRA. The Court held that new evidence should be considered for its newness, credibility, relevance, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions. Newness: [5] Is the evidence new in the sense that it is capable of: * Proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD, or * Proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or * Contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD (including a credibility finding)? If not, the evidence need not be considered. Credibility: [6] Evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4) must be assessed for credibility. The RAD must determine whether the evidence is credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence. Relevance: [7] The RAD must consider whether the evidence is relevant to the appeal. Is it capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered. Materiality: [8] Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered. [9] The following evidence was submitted by the Appellant to the RAD and must meet the test described above in order to be admissible. * A letter dated XXXX XXXX, 2014 from XXXX XXXX, which post-dates the rejection of the claim on February 28, 2014. This individual indicates that he has known the Appellant since 2008, is a XXXX, and is aware of his problems in Turkey. Through one of this individual's connections, who works at XXXX XXXX XXXX (the source he cannot reveal), he received information on XXXX XXXX, 2014 that the Appellant is known to be an atheist, Jewish and an enemy of the Government and Islam. There is also information indicating that the Appellant is known to have claimed refugee protection in Canada. Along with this letter is attached the credentials of XXXX XXXX, and the envelope in which the letter was sent. * Newspaper articles, dated 2012 and 2013, prior to the rejection of the claim on March 7, 2014, which corroborates some of the information contained in Mr. XXXX letter. * Medical note dated XXXX XXXX, 2014 from St. XXXX XXXX XXXX which appears to be an assessment for "anxiety," with prescriptions for XXXX and XXXX. Minister's Notice of Intervention received XXXX XXXX, 2014: [10] The Minister concurs that Raza sets out the applicable test for "new" evidence, however in the particular circumstances, submits that this claim does not meet the requirements. [11] Specifically, the Minister submits that the letter from Mr. XXXX XXXX, as well as the articles relating to the Turkish military and GBT, do not constitute new evidence pursuant to s. 110(4) of the IRPA as it was evidence that was reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his hearing. Furthermore, the Minister submits that the Appellant could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the time of the rejection of his claim. The Minister notes from the letter that the Appellant has known Mr. XXXX since 2008. Moreover, the Minister submits that Mr. XXXX was aware of the Appellant's experiences in the Turkish Army. [12] The Minister further submits that Mr. XXXX states in his letter that he used his "intelligent units (sic) connection" to check if the Appellant "is" being followed. The Minister notes that Mr. XXXX does not state when he initiated the "check" to determine if the Appellant is being followed. The Minister argues that the use of the present tense is ambiguous and begs the question as to his being followed in Turkey or in Canada. The Minister further submits that the two newspaper articles should not be viewed as new evidence as they are not relevant or material to the Appellant's claim. Moreover, Mr. XXXX letter states that an event took place in XXXX 2014, which is in the future. APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS AND REPLY TO THE MINISTER RE NEW EVIDENCE: [13] Counsel submits that the letter from Mr. XXXX XXXX as well as the articles relating to the Turkish military and the GBT constitute new evidence pursuant to s. 110(4) of the IRPA as it was evidence that was not reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his claim or, in the alternative, evidence that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection of his claim. He further submits that this evidence meets the test in Raza as it is clearly material to the case at bar. He further argues that this evidence should be considered by the RAD as it contradicts findings made by the RPD in its reasons, and this evidence could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the RPD hearing as the Appellant could not have anticipated that the RPD would raise the plausibility concerns that it did in its reasons for decision. [14] In response to the Minister, with respect to Mr. XXXX letter, counsel submits that this letter relates directly to the risks the Appellant faces should he return to Turkey, as he has been labeled a traitor of the state due to his political and religious beliefs. It was through the author's contact with an insider that he was able to learn that the Appellant is "an enemy of the government and Islam," and further that the Appellant has been tracked to the U.S. and Canada. [15] Counsel submits that this information within the letter relates to an event that occurred after the Appellant's claim for protection was decided. Counsel submits that this information was only obtained on XXXX XXXX, 2014 and the length of the Appellant's friendship with the author is irrelevant, as is his knowledge of the Appellant's past instances of persecution. [16] Moreover, counsel submits that the information contained in the letter from Mr. XXXX is credible, given the author's profession as a XXXX with over 30 years of experience, as well as his work at the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, along with his identification. Counsel argues that it is not unreasonable that Mr. XXXX would have connections within the Turkish government agencies, such as the intelligence, and he has offered to act as a witness for the Appellant. The RAD accepts that the XXXX 2014 event was simply a typographical error. RAD'S CONCLUSION [17] While, as the respondent argues, the XXXX has known the Appellant since 2008, what is relevant is when the XXXX received the information. The RAD is unable to determine if any efforts were made prior to this to obtain this information from this unknown source or when contact was made to obtain this information. [18] I will deal with the admittance of this new evidence from the Appellant's friend, who is a XXXX and has worked at the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, in conjunction with my credibility finding. The medical evidence, however, is not relevant to the material aspects of the claim, and, therefore, is not admitted, as it is simply a medical prescription for XXXX and XXXX, with no explanation of the relevance. The newspaper articles do not meet the Statutory requirement; they pre-date the rejection of the claim and could reasonably have been provided at the RPD hearing. The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument that he could not have anticipated plausibility findings is unreasonable. When an Appellant appears before the RPD, he is expected to be able to respond to questions posed, or provide an explanation why he cannot. Plausibility findings have been made by the RPD and a response to these findings is not a factor to consider in the context of "new" evidence. Accordingly, these articles are not admitted. Background: [19] The Appellant fears persecution, torture and risk to his life due to his atheism, his perceived religion, and his political opinions. The Appellant graduated from military high school and then he continued at the Air Force Academy and graduated with a XXXX XXXX XXXX degree. The Appellant worked mostly in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. However, his superiors ordered him to terminate some of his military personnel due to their wives' religious lifestyles, failing which he would be punished. On XXXX XXXX, 2002, because the Appellant was determined not to obey such an order, he was disciplined in accordance with military law; five days of confinement in a locked room. [20] In XXXX 2004, the Appellant's battalion commander saw a Bible on his table and asked if the Appellant had converted to Christianity, however the Appellant told him he was an atheist. On XXXX XXXX 2004, the base commander accused the Appellant of being a Christian missionary. The Appellant objected, indicating that he had no intention of spreading any religious beliefs, however he was told that he would be under surveillance by the Turkish Armed Forces. He was punished with five days of administrative restriction. He was held at his workplace for five days and, in XXXX 2004, the Appellant was placed on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX duties until XXXX 2006. He was transferred to XXXX and on XXXX XXXX, 2007 he applied to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in order to do a Masters program. Although he was accepted into the program, his XXXX XXXX refused to allow him to attend. [21] On XXXX XXXX, 2008, the Appellant was accused of verbally criticizing the General Chief of Staff and some commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. When the Appellant refused to sign a statement, he was beaten. As a punishment, he was confined to a locked room for seven days. [22] On XXXX XXXX, 2009, the Appellant was assigned to another unit. The chief of his unit used to call the Appellant to his office to educate him about Islam. In XXXX 2010, the Appellant learned from a close friend, who worked at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX that he was under surveillance. His ranking was at the bottom and he was always being criticized by his superiors and told to change his religious views. Although he wrote a complaint to the administration, he did not receive a reply. For that reason, on XXXX XXXX, 2010, the Appellant appealed his ranking to the Military High Administrative Court. The case was dismissed after officials attempted to have the Appellant withdraw his complaint. He received a further confinement of seven days on XXXX XXXX, 2010. [23] On XXXX XXXX, 2012, the Appellant left the base to get a tattoo on his left forearm - "XXXX XXXX XXXX" in Hebrew. When an individual observed this on XXXX XXXX, 2012, the Appellant was taken to the intelligence room by three superior officers and interrogated, beaten and asked if he was Jewish. Although the Appellant does not claim to be Jewish, his maternal grandmother was born Jewish but he was raised by Muslim adoptive parents. The Appellant admires the Jewish, as a result. That same day the Appellant made a complaint against the three officers who interrogated him and beat him. The Lieutenant General refused to accept his complaint. He then attempted to resign from the army on XXXX XXXX, 2012, but was told he had to wait to apply at the beginning of the year; meanwhile, he was sent to a lower level unit on the outskirts of XXXX. [24] On XXXX XXXX, 2012, the army accused the Appellant of holding materials unlawfully at his home and a search warrant was issued. His apartment was raided, his computer, Old Testament and Christian Bible were seized. They refused to give the Appellant a copy of the warrant. On XXXX XXXX, 2012, the intelligence unit called the Appellant to the office; he was interrogated and falsely accused of being a missionary. He was beaten and told to go to Israel. On XXXX XXXX, 2012 he was punished with seven days' confinement. [25] On XXXX XXXX, 2013, the Appellant submitted his petition to resign from the army, his application was accepted and he was discharged as of XXXX XXXX, 2013. His superior in intelligence personnel told him that he would prevent him from obtaining a job anywhere in Turkey. He also threatened to report him to the radical Islamists because "I am an atheist and a Jew." [26] The Appellant moved to Istanbul, and took part in the XXXX XXXX protests between XXXX XXXX and XXXX, 2013. He witnessed overt police brutality, and argued with police which led to his detention on XXXX XXXX, 2013. He was taken to XXXX XXXX XXXX, where his personal belongings were seized, including his cell phone and camera and his ID information was recorded. He then decided to leave Turkey. His U.S. visa was issued on XXXX XXXX, 2013 and he left on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013. COUNSEL'S SUBMISSIONS: [27] Counsel for the Appellant is asking the following:- * Did the RDP err in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility? * Did the Panel err in its treatment of the corroborative documentary evidence? * Did the Panel err in its assessment of the Appellant's profile and risk of persecution? [28] In general, the Appellant submits that the RPD misconstrued the evidence, placed too much weight on irrelevant omissions in the BOC and based its decision almost entirely on plausibility findings which cannot be supported by the evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW: [29] I have considered the Appellant's submissions with respect to "Standard of Review," however, the RAD disagrees for the following reasons:- [30] The Federal Court in Iyamuremye2 addressed the question of the proper standard of review to be applied by the RAD in reviewing RPD findings and confirmed that the appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and mixed fact and law is reasonableness, and the appropriate standard of review for questions of law is correctness. The reasonableness standard is concerned with the "existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility in the decision-making process" and with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law as per Dunsmuir.3 The correctness standard is applicable to questions of law and issues of general legal importance, e.g. principles of natural justice and procedural fairness which fall outside the specialized area of expertise of the RAD.4 I have applied the reasonableness standard in the case at hand, as the alleged errors involve fact and mixed fact and law. DETERMINATIVE ISSUES: [31] The determinative issue is credibility and the well-foundedness of the Appellant's fears. MINISTER'S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS AT THE RPD HEARING: [32] The Minister submitted that the fact the Appellant was promoted up the ranks of the Turkish Air Force on the one hand, and, on the other hand, suffered allegations of persecution, was an attempt on the part of the Appellant to embellish the merits of his claim. The Minister also submitted that the medical evidence is merely a recitation of facts provided to the physician by the Appellant and this medical information was not contained in the BOC, thereby casting doubt on the veracity of this evidence. The Minister further submitted that there is no indication that an assessment or tests were carried out to reach the diagnosis of PTSD. Moreover, the Minister argued that the author of the report has not been designated as to her medical credentials. The Minister further submitted that failure to claim in the U.S. is indicative of a lack of subjective fear. COUNSEL'S SUBMISSIONS: [33] The RPD finds that, although the Appellant did not like serving in the army, in 2009, he was promoted to the rank of XXXX, and in 2013 he resigned and it would be reasonable to expect that he would receive a dishonourable discharge. The RPD finds that he was discharged at the same rank and presumably with pension and benefits. The Appellant submits that promotions in the military, which were explained in the Appellant's oral testimony, are given for years of service and not based on merit. Moreover, the Appellant submits that his last promotion was XXXX 2009. In the absence of a court case being brought against him, the Appellant submits that this would not occur. Moreover, the Appellant submits that the discharge document provided to the RPD clearly states that the Appellant's last promotion was XXXX 2009. The Appellant further argues that the RPD ignored evidence that, despite performing well, he was not advancing due to the persecution he had faced, and the RPD also ignored the explanation provided by the Appellant. Moreover, the Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider the dissenting vote on this decision in which the Judge found in his favour. ANALYSIS: [34] The RAD finds that the RPD ignored the evidence that promotions were made on the basis of years of service as opposed to merit. More importantly, the RAD finds that the RPD ignored the fact that the Appellant had not, in fact, received a promotion since 2009 and he remained in the military until 2013. Lastly, the RAD finds that the RPD's finding that it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to receive a "dishonourable" discharge is merely speculative and no explanation is provided for the basis of this finding by the RPD. Given the RAD's conclusions, I find that the RPD's findings on the foregoing are unreasonable. [35] The Appellant provided detailed testimony of abuse at the hands of his superiors that spanned a period of more than 10 years. He was beaten and placed in solitary confinement based on his perceived religion as a Christian, Jew and atheist. However, the RPD examined the decision of the Appellant's appeal to the supreme Military Administrative Court, wherein it indicated that he had 28 commendations and no penalties (punishments). This was in contrast to the Appellant's testimony that his personal file would not indicate such punishments. The Appellant submits that the punishments he received occurred extra-legally, and therefore there would be no reason that such disciplinary actions would be included on the Appellant's record. Counsel submits that it is just as plausible, and, in fact, probable, that the Appellant would be unable to obtain a written record of this. The Appellant, in his oral testimony, explained that he cannot obtain a record of the disciplinary action taken against him as these measures are not legal and that the military itself could have proceedings brought against it. The RAD finds that the RPD provided no evidentiary foundation for its finding. Moreover, the RAD finds that it may be just as reasonable that the Appellant's record would not include such disciplinary actions. The RPD's findings are, therefore, speculative and, as such, are not reasonable. [36] The Appellant alleges that he may be arrested upon return due to the fact that he claimed refugee status in Canada, and he may also be perceived as a traitor who released military secrets to Canada. He also fears that he may be arrested under false pretense and imprisoned because of his past problems in the army. The Appellant provided evidence of continuing pursuit as a result of his move to live with his sister in Istanbul, whereby he acquired a new phone in his sister's name. The Appellant submits that the RPD drew a negative inference from the fact that the Appellant's phone number on his visa application and his military discharge form were the same, despite the fact that the Appellant had stated that he had changed his number. Counsel for the Appellant submits that this contradiction was not brought to the attention to the Appellant to allow him to provide an explanation for the contradiction. The RAD has reviewed the transcript of the proceedings and, indeed, the RPD relied on the record as opposed to confronting the Appellant. The RAD finds, therefore, that this constitutes an error in law. [37] The RPD found that the information provided by the Appellant, with respect to some colleagues from the Air Force Academy, who had similar issues of being accused of releasing secret military documents to civilians in XXXX, were events which were not on point with those of the Appellant. Counsel submits that the RPD drew an adverse inference from the fact that the Appellant had not mentioned in his BOC that several of his colleagues from the Air Force had been falsely accused by the authorities of releasing secret military documents after they left service. It is submitted that this information could not have been reasonably expected to be included in the Appellant's BOC. The RPD stated that this additional information was "not insignificant, however noted that the circumstances were different. The RAD does not find that the Appellant's credibility was impugned due to this lack of information in the BOC. [38] The RPD found that the Appellant's fear of being arrested because he claimed refugee status or may be perceived as a traitor is mere speculation, as there was no evidence that the Turkish authorities arrest their citizens who have claimed refugee status, upon their return. The RPD found that the claimant's fear is based on speculation because, if the Turkish authorities intended to arrest him, they had ample opportunities to do so., eg. 2013, after the demonstration. Moreover, the RPD noted that the Appellant was not charged, but released after his phone and camera were confiscated. Counsel for the Appellant submits that the documentary evidence before the RPD states that the police routinely detain demonstrators and release them without charge.5 Counsel submits that the Appellant need not have been held and charged in order to be considered wanted by the police or in order for what he experienced to constitute persecution. [39] The RAD finds the conclusion reached by the RPD, with respect to the Appellant having made a Canadian refugee claim is reasonable as there was no evidentiary foundation for a finding to the contrary. It is reasonable, in the RAD's opinion, that the RPD found that there were opportunities to arrest the claimant and they failed to do so. [40] The Appellant also submits that the RPD drew a negative inference due to the fact that there was a delay between the end of the Appellant's mandatory military service and his resignation. The RPD, according to the Appellant, did not consider the explanations that he attempted to resign in XXXX, however the application was refused. Moreover, the Appellant was pursuing his performance ranking and was attempting to seek justice. [41] The RAD finds that the RPD's decision does not make a finding in this regard, although this testimony is contained in the transcript of the proceedings. Accordingly, the RAD finds that, while no clear finding was made, a negative inference was drawn. [42] Similarly, the Appellant submits that the RPD drew a negative inference from failure to claim in the U.S. The RAD concludes that, although the Minister made this submission, the RPD, however, made no finding in this regard. [43] The RPD found that, as a holder of a special green passport, which is issued to government figures, the Appellant has a privileged passport based on his rank in the army, but this also allowed him to leave the country. The RPD further found, according to the NDP package, that an individual will be stopped from departing if he or she is wanted for anything.6 The Appellant submits that the "implausibility" findings by the RPD are unreasonable. The RAD finds, however, given the information in the NDP package, the RPD's negative inference, in this regard, is reasonable, given the fact that the Appellant was able to leave the country without difficulty. [44] The RPD considered the documentary evidence on file on religious freedom and inter-religious tolerance in Turkey; specifically the treatment of members of the Christian and Jewish religious communities. Although counsel makes no submissions in this regard, the RAD finds that the RPD's findings are reasonable. [45] The RPD considered the forward-looking definition of Convention refugee and whether or not there was evidence of continued pursuit. The RPD found that the evidence from the Appellant's sister and his friend provides no such evidence. The Appellant argues that the letter from his sister describes the harassment and pressure, and that he did not return to her apartment the night he was detained by police at the XXXX XXXX protests, and then arrived at her apartment the next day with injuries, all consistent with the Appellant's narrative and oral testimony. The RAD finds that this evidence should have been accorded more probative value because it corroborates his detainment as well as the injuries. Accordingly, the RAD finds that there was, in fact, evidence of continued pursuit and therefore the RPD's finding in this regard was unreasonable. [46] The RPD further found that the Appellant was never dismissed from the Army; he resigned in 2013. The RPD states that, following his resignation, the Military had an opportunity of harming the Appellant. The Appellant submits that, at the time of his resignation, he was threatened and later received a threatening phone call. He was then arrested at protests and his identification and personal information were recorded upon his arrest. The Turkish police indicated to the Appellant that the Military was now aware of his arrest at the protests. The RAD finds that: * The Appellant was threatened, and therefore it is, in fact, indicative of potential harm. [47] The medical evidence was found by the RPD to be self-reported and therefore was given little weight. The RAD concludes that this is a reasonable finding as there was no information with respect to the author of the report, any specific assessment or tests carried out, and therefore, the RPD quite properly gives it little weight. The RAD finds that the RPD did not properly explain why it placed little weight on this document, however the record demonstrates that this finding was reasonable. CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO CREDIBILITY FINDINGS: [48] The following findings by the RPD were found by the RAD to be unreasonable: * The RPD finding that it would be reasonable that the alleged disciplinary incidents incurred by the Appellant would be indicated on his personal file. * The RPD ignoring the Appellant's evidence that promotions were not made on the basis of merit, but on the basis of years of service, which included the RPD not taking into account the fact that the Appellant had not been promoted since 2009. * The RPD found contradictory statements with respect to the Appellant having changed his telephone number, but failed to confront the Appellant with the contradiction. The RPD drew a negative credibility inference, thereby constituting an error in law. * The RPD's finding that it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to receive at least a dishonourable discharge, which was merely speculative and not based on any evidentiary finding. Remedy [49] Section 110(6) gives the RAD discretion to hold a hearing if there is new documentary evidence which meets certain requirements, including that it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim. (110(6) [50] The Appellant has submitted new evidence which might indeed meet such requirements. However, it would be difficult to restrict an oral hearing to such evidence, when there are other credibility concerns that play into the issue which is included in the "new" evidence. In effect, an oral hearing would become a de novo proceeding. As the RAD cannot rely upon some of the material evidence from the RPD hearing, it would be necessary for the RAD to rehear most of the refugee claim, not just the portion relating to the new evidence. [51] In the RAD's view, the IRPA does not support the de novo hearing of a refugee claim by the RAD. The legislation requires the RAD to proceed without a hearing (IRPA, SECTION 110(3) citation), allows an exception where there is new evidence (IRPA SECTION 110(6), and prohibits the RPD from rehearing evidence that was presented to the RPD. (IRPA section 111(2)(b). [52] The RAD cannot substitute its own determination for that of the RPD and, therefore, refers this matter back to the Refugee Protection Division with the following directions. (IRPA, Section 111(1)(c)). While it was not necessary for the RAD to admit the Appellant's new evidence relating to his refugee claim, the Appellant may submit these documents, pursuant to the RPD Rules, and call this witness for the de novo hearing of his claim. The RPD is not to consider or admit the transcript of the first RPD hearing, but may question the Appellant on any aspect of his refugee claim, including the discrepancies described above. [53] Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the matter referred back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. (signed) 'Roslyn Ahara' Roslyn Ahara July 16, 2014 Date 1 Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 2 Iyamuremye c. Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2014 CF 494 - 2014-05-26 [ French ] 3 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 47 4 Ibid. 5 U.S. Dept. of State Report, Turkey 6 U.S. Dept. of State Report, Turkey, item 14.6, Response to Information Request TUR102800.E --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-02518