TB7-13267

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB7-13267 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision May 14, 2018 Date de la décision Panel Robert S. Garner Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Seyed Hani Azarm Conseil(s) (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX (the principal Appellant), a citizen of a Iraq, appealed a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated March 2, 2017, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. DETERMINATION [2] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Memorandum of Appeal [3] In the contents of his appeal, the Appellant outlined several issues that the RPD misunderstood. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF APPEAL [4] The Appellant described his role as an employee of XXXX XXXX XXXX. Because of his recommendation regarding the placement of a telephone tower, he received unwelcome telephone calls on XXXX XXXX, 2016 from a person who threatened to kill him. The recommended placement of the telephone tower went against the wishes of the elder of a neighbouring town. [5] Around XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, the Appellant received 7 to 10 phone calls where the caller swore at him and threatened to kill him. None of the calls were traceable. As a result of these calls, the Appellant went to the XXXX Police Station on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, and the authorities said they would investigate. In spite of visiting the police station almost daily, the officers were unable to help them. Other police stations either redirected them back to the original police station or said they could not help them. [6] The threats continued nonstop and, as a result, the Appellant, on the advice of his father, began to look for a way out of Iraq. The Appellant, after receiving an American visa, applied for a conference in the USA and left Iraq on XXXX XXXX, 2016. Because of Donald Trump's negative comments about Muslims and refugees in general, he did not file a refugee claim in the USA. [7] The Appellant came across the Canadian border on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, was arrested on the Canadian side and remained in custody for one night. While in custody, he completed his application for refugee status without the assistance of an interpreter. [8] On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, his father received a call, and the caller stated that they would find the Appellant and kill him. On XXXX XXXX, 2016, a driver in another car fired bullets in the direction of his father's car. Admissibility of New Evidence [9] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected1 in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. [10] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.2 Application of Subsection 110(4) [11] Subsection 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.3 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of subsection 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If the Appellant could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [12] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in subsection 110(4). The RAD does not have the discretion to admit such evidence.4 [13] As the RAD understands it, subsection 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD. [14] Subsection 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.5 [15] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Subsection 110(4) [16] Where a document meets the test in subsection 110(4) as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While subsection 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such a document, even if it meets the test in subsection 110(4). [17] In Singh,7 the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) held that there is no valid reason that the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza8 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of the IRPA's subsection 110(4), it is based on the nearly identical wording of paragraph 113(a). In that case, the FCA held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.9 In Singh, the FCA found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of subsection 110(4).10 [18] Where evidence meets the test in subsection 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply to it. Subparagraph 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in subsection 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of the proposed new evidence. [19] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.11 The RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to subsection 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires that all divisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [20] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into subsection 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The FCA has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.12 Pictures [21] The Appellant submitted pictures13 as new evidence. These pictures were intended to show that threats have become severe and hostile with multiple shootings to his family home. [22] The RAD observes that the pictures submitted show a building that has appeared to be damaged. There is no dating of any of the pictures, nor is there any evidence submitted that this is his family's home. In addition, the damage shown is not probative in determining that it was done by gunfire, nor is there any indication of the alleged perpetrators of this damage. No probative documentation was submitted to substantiate that the police inspected the house on XXXX XXXX, 2017, as alleged. A copy of a letter allegedly submitted by the investigative officer and supportive of the Appellant's allegations will be addressed below. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the pictures are not probative in establishing the Appellant's claim and will not admit them as new evidence. Police Reports [23] The Appellant submitted a letter written by a major investigative officer, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017.14 The letter goes on to state that the house had bullet scars as reported by a group of police officers who visited the incident location. The letter makes reference to previous police reports of threats received by the household. [24] The RAD in observing the copy of the letter allegedly written by the major investigative officer notes that it is a copy and that the copy has two blue coloured stamps evident. There are no other indications of a coloured printer in the report submitted. The name of the person who allegedly made this report was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, allegedly the father of the Appellant. In the letter, it makes reference to previous complaints made on XXXX XXXX, 2016 and XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. [25] The RAD references the letters of complaint submitted and finds that the dates of the complaint are XXXX XXXX, 2016 and XXXX XXXX, 2016 - dates that are inconsistent with the document submitted as new evidence. In addition, the person who made the complaints on XXXX XXXX XXXX 201615 was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, not the complainant. The letter makes reference to a complaint filed to the police by the Appellant on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, but no evidence was submitted to substantiate that such a complaint had been made to the police. [26] The second letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2016, named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, born XXXX XXXX, 1990, as the complainant. In observing the Basis of Claim (BOC) documentation, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) interviews, and the passport for the Appellant, his complete full name appears as XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds it not credible that a document, allegedly from the police, would not have the correct spelling and correct name for the Appellant if he had in fact made the claim. The RAD notes that, in the BOC documentation,16 the father's family name appears as XXXX. [27] The RAD finds, given the previous documentation submitted, and on a balance of probabilities, that the police document submitted as new evidence is fraudulent and therefore not probative. The police documents submitted to the RPD are also not found to be probative in establishing the Appellant's claim. Supporting Letters [28] A letter submitted by the Appellant's uncle17 states that his brother's family had difficulty because of the Appellant's troubles resulting from the location of a cellular network power installation. Nothing in the letter indicates that the author of the letter had any personal first-hand information or observation of any of the allegations of the Appellant. The letter indicates that he was aware that they had difficulties, but give no information as to how he came by this knowledge. As a result, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the letter is not probative in supporting the Appellant's allegations. [29] Another uncle submits a letter18 stating that he is aware that the family has been threatened on several occasions because of a cellular network tower installation. The letter provides no first-hand or probative documentation that the author has observed or been party to any of the allegations that were made by the Appellant. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the letter is not probative in supporting the Appellant's allegations. [30] A copy of a note was submitted, unsigned, allegedly from the perpetrators of the alleged threats against the family. The note submitted is a copy, unsigned, and there is no indication in the memoranda submitted that the police have become involved because of this threatening letter. The RAD does not accept this letter as probative in regard to the Appellant's allegations. This is supported by the RAD's previous findings above regarding the lack of genuine documentation being given to support the Appellant's allegations. [31] As a result of the above, the RAD will not be holding a hearing given that no new probative evidence has been entered. Role of the RAD [32] The Appellant supports the provisions outlined in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in the case of Huruglica. The decision of the FCA in Huruglica19 provides guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal, such as the RAD, to decisions of the first-level administrative tribunal. [33] The Court stated that, with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions by applying the correctness standard. Pursuant to paragraph 111(2)(b) of the IRPA, the RAD may refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination if it is "of the opinion" that it cannot make a decision confirming or setting aside the RPD's decision without hearing the evidence presented before the RPD. This recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because those cases require an assessment of credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that, although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. [34] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its assessment of the RPD's decision on the basis of the principles outlined above. ANALYSIS Credibility The Hearing [35] The RPD commented on the Appellant's good understanding of English, having completed his BOC in English without the assistance of an interpreter. In spite of this fluency in English, the RPD member used an IRB interpreter because of the difficulty in understanding the Appellant's accent. In spite of this use of an interpreter and the Appellant's fluency in English, many questions had to be asked five or six times before an answer was given. When asked to explain this difficulty, the Appellant had no real response. The RPD found he did this because he had no real response to the questions challenging his alleged story and, as a result, gave answers that were not related to the questions asked. Eventually, the RPD member, at one point, asked the Appellant to repeat the question that he thought was being asked. As a result, the RPD found that the explanations provided to the material contradictions and omissions were wanting, insufficient, and inadequate. [36] The RPD member referenced the Appellant's educational training as an engineer and commented that he had a well-groomed analytical mind. In spite of this, the Appellant could not comfortably answer questions without several repetitions. In addition, the RPD member asked the Appellant to focus on him rather than the telephone speaker. As a result, the RPD member found that the Appellant's avoidance of looking at the RPD member when answering questions indicated that he was not telling the truth. [37] The Appellant made no submissions regarding the RPD's findings about his inability to answer the questions asked or respond appropriately without making several attempts. [38] The Appellant made reference to his inability/unwillingness to make eye contact because of cultural differences. He submitted a document20 to support this submission. [39] With respect to the Appellant's behavior in responding to questions, the RAD gives deference to the RPD. The RAD listened to portions of the hearing in order to support that the Appellant did not respond immediately to questions asked and on several occasions did not answer the question asked. In reviewing the BOC documentation regarding his facility in English and education, the RAD finds it unreasonable that the Appellant would have not understood the questions asked in English. Also, in order to avoid any confusion, the RPD had a Kurdish interpreter translate his questions. The RAD supports the RPD's findings on this issue. [40] In regard to the lack of eye contact, the RAD cannot support the RPD's findings. Culturally, there are many nationalities that do not make eye contact when speaking to persons. Avoidance [41] In testimony, the Appellant stated that he moved to a different location, his uncle's home, within his hometown. The RPD pointed out to the Appellant that this information was not contained in either form of his BOC. The Appellant stated that he did not know it would be useful in this case. The RPD put it to him that he mentioned his other avoidance technique; that of going to work at different times to avoid detection, and wondered why such an important piece of information as changing locations would not have been included. The Appellant's response was that he did not know if it was a requirement for his case. He also stated, "if I was not asked, I would not have mentioned it." The RPD rejected the Appellant's answers for this material omission. The RPD reasoned that moving some 40 minutes away from his home for a period of some five months would be a major life change and this was not listed in his BOC forms, but he mentioned a minor change of altering the times he went to work. [42] The Appellant made no submissions on this issue. [43] The RAD finds, in listening to the recording of the RPD hearing, that the Appellant talked about moving 40 minutes away to his uncle's house to avoid detection by his alleged persecutors. No mention is made of this in either of his BOC narratives. Given that the Appellant described how he avoided confrontation by varying his times of going to work, the RAD would reasonably expect that such a large avoidance technique, moving 40 minutes away to an uncle's house, would have been mentioned. While not the only determinative issue in this case, this issue clearly undermines the Appellant's overall credibility. Threats [44] When the Appellant was asked to tell the RPD about the threats he received, he testified that, in all of the messages received, they would kill him. The RPD noted that this question was asked multiple times. When asked by the RPD if they ever demanded anything besides the threat to his life, he testified, "No". The RPD referred to the CBSA interview, an interview that was conducted with a Kurdish interpreter. The Appellant stated in that interview that they asked for money as well. The Appellant responded that they never asked him for money. The RPD found the Appellant not credible on this issue, given the differences between his testimony at the RPD hearing and the testimony given to the CBSA Officer. [45] The Appellant made no specific submissions on this issue. He submitted that there was a misunderstanding and that the underlying issues that caused the threats was the loss of a developmental opportunity by not having the tower on their land. [46] In reviewing the CBSA interviews21 held with the Appellant, the RAD finds that the Appellant, during the interview,22 stated, in summary, that he was threatened, and they asked for the money that they would have received had the tower been placed on their land. The RAD finds that this is a major inconsistency. When specifically asked at the RPD hearing if there were any other threats, it is not credible that the demand for money would not have been mentioned. This inconsistency further undermines the Appellant's overall credibility about his allegations. Additional Threats [47] The RPD put it to the Appellant that he had stated to the CBSA Officer that he was threatened to put the tower in their location or they would kill him. The RPD wondered why this was not included in his testimony at the RPD hearing. The Appellant denied saying this, testifying that they never asked him to move the tower. The RPD took a negative credibility inference about the Appellant's credibility because the response was made to a very direct question by the officer. [48] In response to the Appellant's counsel's submissions that the interviews are not read back and therefore not reliable, the RPD stated that the lack of being read back does not mean that they are not reliable. The RPD reasoned that the officer and interpreter would not have made mistakes because they did not know the Appellant's story. The RPD also reasoned that the officer asked open-ended questions and reported what was said about towers and money. The RPD also reasoned that the statement should have been in his BOC form or in his testimony, but they were not. [49] The Appellant submitted that, once the towers are installed, it would be impossible to move them and that his comments were referring to the threats due to the loss of such opportunity. [50] The RAD is aware of federal jurisprudence that cautions decision-makers against using CBSA interviews as the determinative factor in deciding a claim. However, in reviewing the interviews by the CBSA officer, the RAD finds that the Appellant did state that they would kill him if he did not move the towers to their land. The Appellant seems to be inconsistent with respect to the specific allegations made against him by the alleged persecutors. Although not a main determinative issue, this lack of consistency in his allegations undermines his overall credibility. Phone Calls [51] The RPD made a negative inference about the Appellant's credibility because of inconsistent testimony and documentation in regard to who received the threatening phone calls. The Appellant testified that only he had received the threatening phone calls from XXXX 2016 until XXXX 2016. When the RPD informed the Appellant that, during his CBSA interview, he stated that the alleged persecutors, "randomly called me and my father",23 he explained that he did not state this. He also testified that he was in detention and unable to focus clearly. The RPD noted that he voluntarily stated that his father had received calls. [52] The RPD stated that the Appellant's story at the hearing and in his BOC was that his father was not contacted until the agents of harm could no longer find him after he left the country in XXXX 2016. [53] The Appellant's submissions on this issue stated that, because he was feeling threatened and scared and anxious, he could not remember the full conversations with people on the line or the approximate number of calls. No submissions were made regarding the inconsistencies described above in the RPD's decision [54] In reviewing the BOC narrative and testimony at the hearing, the RAD finds that the Appellant was inconsistent regarding the persons who received the threatening phone calls. He stated at the beginning of the hearing that only he had received the phone calls, information consistent with his BOC narrative,24 but contrary to the CBSA interview and information given after this inconsistency was pointed out. Again, the issue is not, in its own right, a determinative issue of the claim, but this inconsistency contributes to the undermining of the credibility of his allegations. Grenades and Police Report [55] The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony and the police report, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, stated that the agent of harm had threatened several times to throw grenades at the family's home. In the Appellant's amended narrative, filed February 20, 2017,25 this issue was not mentioned. On repeated questioning about this issue, the Appellant finally responded that he did not think it was necessary, as he already had the evidence. The RPD reasoned that the alleged police report from his father was dated at least 21/2 months prior to the amended BOC narrative being submitted and would reasonably have been included. The Appellant stated that his father was shot at many times but did not include this alleged threat. [56] The RPD further reasoned that the Appellant testified that he is in constant contact with his parents, and it is unreasonable not to have included this threat in his BOC narrative. As a result, the RPD found the father's police report not credible. [57] The Appellant submits, quoting Federal jurisprudence,26 that because the police report was self-reported, does not mean that it is unreliable. He submits that the dangers were outlined, and that, although he did not include the throwing of grenades in his BOC narrative, it was clearly stated in the police report provided to the RPD. [58] The RAD notes that the police report indicates that the alleged assailants threatened to throw grenades at the Appellant's home. This allegation was substantiated in testimony. However, this allegation is not written in the Appellant's BOC narrative. The RAD does not accept the Appellant's explanation that he did not believe that it was necessary to include this information. According to testimony, the Appellant is in constant contact with his parents, and it would be reasonable to expect that, in his amended BOC narrative, referenced above, such an important piece of information would be included. The RAD draws a negative inference from this omission in his BOC narrative. Again, although not in its own right the determinative issue in this claim, it further undermines the allegations of the Appellant's story and his overall credibility. Supporting Letters [59] Because of inconsistencies between testimony and documentation with regard to the support letter submitted, the RPD drew a negative inference about the Appellant's credibility [60] In his CBSA interviews, the Appellant stated that he did not want to tell his employer because he did not want to be fired. In a letter submitted in documentation,27 dated XXXX XXXX, 2017, XXXX XXXX, a friend and manager of the Appellant, states that he was informed of the difficulties, and the issue was discussed verbally with a higher manager. When this issue was pointed out to the Appellant, he stated that he did not tell him and did not tell him that he was not to speak to anyone. [61] The Appellant submits that neither of his answers regarding the letter was incorrect. He states that XXXX is a long-term friend as well as a team manager. Because he trusted his judgment, the Appellant left it up to him as to whether he brought up the threats to a higher manager. [62] The RAD does not agree with the Appellant's submissions on this issue. Telling his friend who is also his manager at the company is inconsistent with his statements to the CBSA officer. Also stating that he left it up to his judgment as to whether to inform more senior managers is inconsistent with his statements that he did not want anyone in the company to know for fear of being fired. The Appellant continues to be inconsistent about his allegations and the story surrounding them. The RAD draws a negative inference in regard to the Appellant's credibility. CONCLUSION [63] The RAD finds that the number of inconsistencies and omissions have undermined the credibility of the Appellant. While individually they may not be determinative, collectively they amount to a total lack of credibility regarding the allegations made in support of the refugee claim. DISPOSITION [64] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). (signed) "Robert S. Garner" Robert S. Garner May 14, 2018 Date 1 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected"; see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014, 2014 FC 1022, at para 51. 2 Paragraph 3(3)(g)(iii), Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 3 Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, July 22, 2015, 2015 FC 895, at para 19. 4 Deri v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, at para 55; M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96., at para 63. 5 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at para 54. 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para 16. 7 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para 64. 8 Raza, 2007 FCA 385. 9 Ibid., Raza, 2007 FCA 385, at paras 13-15. 10 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 11 Ibid., Raza, 2007 FCA 385, at para 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2004, at 17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministry of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33, at para 64. 12 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para 48. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, at Exhibit 5, at pp. 000002-000009. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, at Exhibit 6, at pp. 000002-000003. 15 Exhibit, RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 81-83. 16 Ibid., at p. 18. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, Exhibit 6, at pp. 000004-000005. 18 Ibid., at pp. 000006-000007 19 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, at pp. 000022-000023. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 54-63. 22 Ibid., at p. 57. 23 Ibid., at p. 61. 24 Ibid., at pp. 22-25. 25 Ibid. 26 Kaburia, Colin Wagombe v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-230-01), Dawson, May 7, 2002, 2002 FCT 516. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's record, at p. 126. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB7-13267 18 RAD.25.02 (April 24, 2018) Disponible en français