TB5-09903

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-09903 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 8, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Luis F. Agostinho Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal N/A Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who claims to be a citizen of the Netherlands, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either substitute a positive determination or return the matter to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This Appeal is therefore, dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she is a victim of domestic abuse in the Netherlands at the hands of her husband and father. The Appellant was born in Eritrea but travelled to the Netherlands with her family when she was very young. The family applied and was granted refugee protection by the Netherlands. The Appellant was granted Dutch citizenship in 1988. [4] The Appellant further alleged before the RPD that she was forced to marry an Eritrean man and they had three children. The Appellant testified that her husband became very abusive and as a result she ran away. [5] The Appellant left the Netherlands and travelled to Canada in XXXX 2013 and made an inland refugee claim in March 2015. [6] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on June 24, 2015. By a written decision of September 10, 2015, the RPD rejected her claim. The RPD's reasons were detailed, and addressed that she had not rebutted the presumption of adequate state protection. The Appellant submits on appeal that the RPD erred in its treatment of an IFA ( Internal Flight Alternative). ANALYSIS What is the Role of the RAD? [7] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [8] The Appellant's counsel has made submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,1 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states, in paragraphs 54 and 55, of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error." [9] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD will recognize and respect the credibility findings of the RPD or other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. [10] In a decision issued by RAD Member Edward Bosveld which I adopt and accept his reasoning, Member Bosveld considered at some length the legislation and jurisprudence concerning the role of the RAD.2 It assessed the nature of a RAD appeal and addressed the scope and degree of deference to be shown to findings of the RPD. The panel reached the following conclusions, which it finds to also be applicable here, about the approach to be taken in a RAD appeal. The RAD's Approach [11] The RAD will take the following approach in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD. It will assess all of the evidence, both that in the RPD's record and any admissible new evidence. It will consider questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact raised by the Appellant and, where applicable, the Respondent. [12] Where the proceeding is a true appeal-that is, where there is no admissible new evidence, as is the case here-the RAD will consider the decision of the RPD, the submissions in respect of that decision, and determine whether the RPD's determination is wrong. As a true appeal is founded on the record, the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence in that record in order to determine the appeal. [13] Where an appeal includes admissible new evidence that speaks to an error in the RPD's decision, it is a hybrid appeal, where the RAD must consider the RPD's reasons in light of the new evidence, which may establish that the decision of the RPD is wrong.3 [14] Where an appeal presents admissible new evidence which establishes a new, changed, or heightened risk, or otherwise changes the overall nature of the claim, this will result in a limited de novo appeal. In some such cases, the decision of the RPD may be less relevant in light of the new evidence-that is, the new evidence establishes a risk or degree of risk, or other potentially determinative matter not considered by the RPD. Unlike a true de novo proceeding, however, the RAD will not ignore the RPD's record or the findings of the lower tribunal, as these may remain relevant to the appeal. [15] The RAD will recognize and respect findings which the RPD was in an advantageous position to make, which will normally include credibility findings and other findings of fact. Where such deference is to be shown, the RAD will not intervene unless the RPD's reasoning process is not comprehensible or the outcome of that process is not based on and supported by the evidence. [16] Where the RPD's determination is entirely based on findings which warrant deference-such as an overall lack of credibility, based on oral testimony-the RAD will, having conducted its own assessment of the evidence, consider whether the RPD's reasoning process is comprehensible and whether the determination is based on and supported by the evidence. [17] On matters where the RPD has no advantage, the RAD will show no deference and will apply a standard of correctness, engaging in its own analysis of the evidence and reaching its own conclusion to determine if the RPD was wrong. Where the RAD finds that its conclusion does not agree with that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own finding and determination or, if it is unable to substitute, will refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [18] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that an Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected4 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [19] It is for an Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.5 [20] While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such a document, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [21] The RAD has, in almost all appeals to date, applied the factors set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza.6 While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of Section 113(a). The Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.7 [22] In Iyamuremye8, the Federal Court accepted the RAD's application of the factors in Raza to new evidence submitted on an appeal under IRPA. Subsequently, in Ghannadi,9 the Court held that the RAD should consider the factors in Raza, but noted that these are merely considerations to be taken into account and not necessarily determinative of admissibility. Most recently, the Court, in Singh,10 found that the factors in Raza are based specifically in the language of Section 113(a) and are not transferable in the context of an appeal before the RAD. The Court found that it was unreasonable for the RAD to strictly apply the Raza factors without distinguishing its own role from that of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) Officer who is bound by Section 113(a). [23] In Singh, the Court wrote that ...in order for there to be a "full fact-based appeal" before the RAD, the criteria for the admissibility of evidence must be sufficiently flexible to ensure it can occur. Often, the evidence at stake will be essential for proving the factual basis of the errors the claimant alleges were made by the RPD. This consideration becomes all the more pertinent in light of the strict timelines a claimant now faces for initially submitting evidence before the RPD. A claimant now has 50 days to present all documents from the date he or she made the claim; the previous legislative scheme required the documents 20 days prior to a hearing, which, on average, took much longer to take place. When the RPD confronts a claimant on the weakness of his evidentiary record, the RAD should, in subsequent review of the decision, have some leeway in order to allow the claimant to respond to the deficiencies raised.11 [24] The Court also held that the "main issue is whether the evidence 'was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably (or normally according to the French version) have been expected in the circumstances to have presented.'"12 [25] The Court did not discuss Iyamuremye or Ghannadi in its analysis of Sections 110(4) and 113(a). It did, however, certify the following question: In considering the role of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment officer and that of the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, sitting in appeal of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division, does the test set out in Raza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 for the interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 apply to its subsection 110(4)? [26] While the certified question has not yet been answered, the RAD must nevertheless continue to consider new evidence, such as that which has been submitted in support of this appeal. While it may be inappropriate to strictly apply the factors in Raza, given that they are not specific to Section 110(4) and were not crafted for use in an appellate process, the RAD's consideration of new evidence cannot end with the application of the test in Section 110(4). To limit its analysis to that provision would be to ignore other provisions of IRPA-such as Sections 162(2) and 171(a.3)-as well as established jurisprudence based on statutory provisions almost identical to Section 110(4). Such a restricted analysis would also require the RAD to accept "new" evidence even if it is irrelevant, immaterial, or lacking in credibility. [27] The RAD presumes that Parliament, in creating Section 110(4), was well aware that this provision is almost identical in wording to Section 113(a)-which provides a strong indication that Parliament intended the test from Raza to be used by the RAD.13 [28] The RAD will therefore undertake an analysis of any proposed new evidence, not only for its timeliness, which is largely the focus of Section 110(4), but also for its evidentiary value. In doing so, the RAD will look to the factors in Raza but will not be strictly bound by them, and in applying any Raza factors, must distinguish its own role from that of a PRRA officer. [29] Section 171(a.3) of IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility and trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [30] While IRPA makes specific reference to the credibility of evidence received by the RAD, there is no corresponding provision which addresses relevance. However, in the RAD's view, it is obvious that evidence must be assessed for its relevance.14 Apart from the support from the case law, it would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [31] It is therefore appropriate for the RAD to consider whether new evidence is relevant, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [32] The RAD will also consider whether the proposed new evidence is material. In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal described this factor: "Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered." This factor may, in the RAD's view, set an inappropriately high standard in the context of a RAD appeal. [33] An officer determining a PRRA application must not engage in a review of the applicant's negative RPD decision. The PRRA process exists to determine whether a risk to the applicant has arisen between the date of issue of the RPD's decision and the date of the applicant's pending removal from Canada,15 and the officer has no power to reconsider or set aside the RPD's decision. A PRRA will in most cases take place a year or more after the RPD's decision.16 In this context, the definition of materiality set out in Raza makes sense: the new evidence must be so significant that it would have led to a different outcome before the RPD. [34] However, as the Court noted in Singh, the RAD context is considerably different. The RAD is not restricted to making a new assessment of the risk faced by the Appellant, though this could occur as a result of new evidence presented upon appeal. The RAD appeal is meant to be decided within four or five months of the RPD's decision. The Appellant may challenge the decision of the RPD, and the RAD has broad powers to review that decision for errors of fact or law, or mixed fact and law, to confirm the decision, to confirm on other grounds, to set aside the decision and substitute another, or to set aside the determination and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. It is of paramount importance that the RAD may look only to admissible new evidence when considering whether to hold a hearing under Section 110(6).17 [35] The Court's definition of materiality, which is appropriate for evidence presented in support of a PRRA application, seems overly restrictive when applied to evidence submitted in an appeal to the RAD. If the RAD would apply the materiality factor as set out in Raza, it could lead to the rejection of evidence that is capable of showing that the RPD's decision was in error, only because that evidence is not so strong that it would have resulted in the acceptance of the refugee claim had the evidence been before the RPD. Further, the RAD is not asking-as the PRRA officer is under Raza-whether the RPD decision would have been different. The RAD is considering whether the RAD thinks the determination should have been different or whether the RPD decision was in error. [36] For example, it is not uncommon for the RPD to reject a refugee claim on the basis that the claimant has not established his or her identity, and in such situations, the RPD is not required to go further to consider the evidence of persecution.18 A claimant rejected by the RPD on the basis of identity-perhaps because identity documents were still in transit from the country of origin at the time of the refugee hearing-might appeal to the RAD and presents as new evidence such recently-received documents. However, those documents might be rejected by the RAD if it considers their materiality as defined in Raza: whether the refugee claim would probably have succeeded if the documents were made available to the RPD. In many cases, the establishment of identity does not in and of itself warrants the acceptance of a refugee claim, and therefore the Appellant's newly-obtained identity documents could be rejected by the RAD as lacking materiality. [37] In the RAD's view, this restrictive approach to materiality is not consistent with the broad powers given to the RAD. While the PRRA officer is required to focus on a single issue-risk to the applicant-the RAD is required to consider both whether the RPD decision is in error and, after having reviewed all of the evidence, whether the Appellant is a protected person. An approach that focuses on whether the evidence is material enough to affect the outcome of the RAD appeal rather than the RPD's decision is therefore preferred. [38] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4). (a) The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible and trustworthy. (b) The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence-whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence) of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal.19 (c) The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it would be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of IRPA. [39] If the proposed new evidence does not meet each of the factors above, the RAD may choose not to admit it. These factors, however, are not exhaustive, as the RAD may consider other factors as appropriate in the circumstances. The Appellant's proposed new evidence a) E-mail from XXXX XXXX;20 and b) Letter from XXXX XXXX:21 and c) Articles;22 [40] Document (a) is an e-mail from XXXX XXXX who is the sister of the Appellant.23 The Appellant provides no explanation for the submission of this letter, further the RAD upon reviewing this letter finds that it adds nothing new to the proceedings. The Appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to why this document was not available previously. There is no explanation as to how she got possession of it, what steps if any had she taken to obtain it for his RPD hearing. Accordingly, since this document provides nothing new, the RAD finds it does not meet the requirements under section 110 (4) and as such, the RAD does not find this document to be admissible. [41] Document (b) is a letter from XXXX XXXX. The Appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to why this document was not previously available. There is no explanation as to how she got possession of it, what steps if any had she had taken to obtain it for her RPD hearing. [42] The RAD has considered this context in assessing this document; the Appellant has failed to show to the RAD how this letter is relevant, material, and credible. The RAD finds that this proposed new evidence does not meet the requirements of section 110 (4). The Appellant's lack of explanation falls short of how this would be relevant and material and credible to her claim. [43] Document (c) are Articles from unknown sources. The Appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to why these documents were not available previously. There is no explanation how she got possession of it, what steps if any had she had taken to obtain it for her RPD hearing. [44] The RAD has considered this context in assessing this document; the Appellant has failed to show to the RAD how these articles are relevant, material, and credible. The RAD finds that this proposed new evidence does not meet the requirements of section 110 (4). The Appellant's lack of explanation falls short of how this would be relevant and material and credible to her claim. [45] For these reasons, the RAD does not admit the Appellant's proposed new evidence. Application for an Oral Hearing The Appellant requests an oral hearing pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA. [46] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present "only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [47] According to Section 110(6), upon which the Appellant relies, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in section 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. In this appeal, where there is no evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) must be understood in relation to Section 110(4). [48] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [49] The Appellant has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal, and since the RAD has not admitted any of the new evidence, as such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing in her appeal, and her application for an oral hearing is denied. Issues Raised on Appeal [50] IRPA provides that the Appellants may appeal, "in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection."24 These appeals must therefore be understood as being filed against the RPD's decision, and must comply with the RAD's rules. [51] The RAD Rules require the Appellants to provide, in their Memorandum, "full and detailed submissions regarding the errors that are the grounds of the appeal," and where those errors are located in the RPD's decision.25 [52] The Appellant have challenged non-existent findings in respect to the IFA. The Appellant's Memorandum does not, however, make any submissions with respect to the RPD findings on state protection which was the determinative issue. The RPD did not make any findings in respect to an IFA. [53] The RAD has carefully reviewed the RPD's decision as well as the evidence in the RPD record. It is clear that the State Protection determination stands on its own-that is; it is not influenced by or dependent on other findings. [54] The RPD proceeded to consider the Appellant's viability of state protection. The RPD did not import any credibility findings into its analysis: rather, it found that there were no valid reasons for objecting to state protection, and found that other objections were speculative. The RAD is satisfied that the State Protection finding, which the Appellant do not challenge here, was made independent of the other findings contested by the Appellant on appeal. [55] The State Protection finding is determinative of the Appellant's refugee claim under both Sections 96 and 97 of IRPA and is also dispositive of this appeal. Even if the RPD had erred in its analysis of credibility, nexus, and generalized risk, the Appellant's refugee claim would nevertheless fail on the basis of State Protection. [56] If the Appellant objects to the RPD's conclusion on State Protection, she has not stated this in her Memorandum, or explained to the RAD why she believes that finding to be wrong. [57] The Federal Court has described the statutory configuration of an appeal to the RAD: "In sum, the appeal before the RAD (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made."26 In seeking judicial review of the RAD's decision, the Applicants in that matter argued that the RAD erred by failing to consider a certain risk factor associated with a proposed IFA, even though they had not raised that issue on appeal. The Court, in dismissing the application for judicial review, concluded that "it is not the RAD's function to supplement the weaknesses of an appeal before it, or, for that matter, of the refugee protection claim presented in the first place."27 [58] In Siliya, the Federal Court considered a matter where the Appellants did not challenge the RPD's IFA finding in their appeal to the RAD. The Court concluded, "The RAD's decision should not be disturbed because the Applicants never challenged the dispositive finding of the RPD as to an IFA and, thus, there was no basis for any appellate intervention by the RAD."28 [59] The Appellant here has not challenged the RPD's determinative finding that she can seek state protection in her own country. As such, there is no basis for the RAD's intervention, and this appeal must fail. CONCLUSION [60] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [61] This Appeal is therefore, dismissed. (signed) "Luis F. Agostinho" Luis F. Agostinho March 8, 2016 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 X (Re), 2015 CanLII 19235 (CA IRB). 3 Reference to this type of evidence is made in Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para. 55. 4 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 5 Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7269-05), Mosley, November 16, 2006, 2006 FC 1385; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385 7 Ibid, paras. 13-15. 8 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 45. 9 Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, paras 17-18. 10 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 56. 11 Singh, para. 55. 12 Singh, para. 58. 13 The presumption of consistent expression holds that "it is presumed that the legislature uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings." Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008) at pp 214-15: 14 There is a great deal of support for this view. "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 15 Cupid, Keturah Laverne v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1737-06), Snider, February 16, 2007, 2007 FC 176, paras. 4, 25, 26. 16 s. 112(b.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27 17 Singh, para. 53. 18 Liu, Lanfen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4384-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007, 2007 FC 831, para. 18. 19 See Raza at para. 13.4; also David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 3d ed. (Irwin Law, 2002) at 24: "Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence." 20Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p25, E-mail from XXXX XXXX, dated 14 Nov, 2015 unsigned 21Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 27-28, Letter from XXXX XXXX and translation 22Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 30-39, unknown sourced articles one dated 28 August, 2015, another October 20, 2014, other articles were undated. 23 Exhibit 4, RPD's Record, at pp. 11-15, letters from XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated December 23, 2009 to January 08, 2010 24 IRPA, Section 110(1). 25 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g). 26 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015; 2015 FC 321, para. 18, emphasis added. 27 Dhillon, para. 20. 28 Siliya, Mohamed Yusuf U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5679-13), Boswell, January 23, 2015; 2015 FC 120, para. 25. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR :