TB6-07833

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-07833 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision August 3, 2016 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal D. Jean Munn Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Colombia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that the Appellant is a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the matter be returned to the RPD for a new hearing under a differently constituted panel. Background [2] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he fears paramilitary groups, specifically Los Rastrojos, who threatened and extorted him in 2014. He also fears the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) because he had raised his public profile in an effort to prevent Los Rastrojos from bothering him, and the FARC therefore saw the Appellant as target. Greater details may be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form1 and in the audio recording of the hearing. [3] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on November 3, 2015. A negative decision was rendered in writing on November 23, 2015. The RPD found that the Appellant was unable to establish his claim on the basis of credible and trustworthy evidence, had a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) and failed to meet the requirements for a section 97 claim. The Appellant was unrepresented by counsel at his hearing. [4] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Appellant's Issues [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred; a) by making erroneous findings of fact in a perverse or capricious manner without regard for the evidence; and b) by making an unreasonable analysis under section 97 of the IRPA. ANALYSIS The Role of the RAD [6] The RAD is an Appellate body governed by specific legislation2 and guided by the jurisprudence3 of the Federal Courts. The RAD's role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.4 Such an appeal "(i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD." [7] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states, that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.5 [8] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness,6 with no deference accorded to the RPD.7 [9] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings on credibility where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. [10] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [11] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [12] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [13] However; the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from an intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD may determine the findings to be in error. [14] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. [15] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [16] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected8 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [17] It is for the Appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.9 Application of Section 110(4) [18] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.10 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of Section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellants could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claims. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [19] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claims, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in Section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.11 [20] As the RAD understands it, Section 110(4) provides the Appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [21] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for Appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.12 [22] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.13 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [23] Where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [24] In Singh,14 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason why the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza15 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of Section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly-identical wording of Section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.16 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of Section 110(4).17 [25] Where evidence meets the test in Section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [26] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.18 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [27] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into Section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in Section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.19 [28] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in Section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. The Appellant's Proposed New Evidence Submitted Pursuant to Section 110(4) of the IRPA [29] A document dated March 30 and 31, 2015 which shows when the Appellant first retained counsel to assist him in his refugee claim. [30] The RAD has assessed the Appellants' affidavit as to how the proposed evidence meets the criteria of Section 110(4). The RAD notes that the Appellant provides weak explanation why some of these documents were not available prior to the hearing, or what steps he had taken to obtain these documents prior to the hearing. The Appellant has vaguely complied with RAD Rule 3: Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii) (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, (iii) how any documentary evidence referred to in paragraph (e) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the appellant, (emphasis added) [31] The Appellant has failed to explain why this evidence was not available for disclosure prior to the decision of the RPD panel. The Appellant clearly indicates that he is submitting these documents to refute the RPD findings. He further indicates that he was unaware that delay in claiming would be an issue to be concerned with at that hearing. He does not, however, explain why, after finding out at the hearing that delay in claiming was an issue, he did not immediately disclose this document to the panel as post hearing evidence. The RAD finds the Appellant had had sufficient time before the RPD hearing to submit the document that he is now asking the RAD to accept as new evidence. As Federal Court noted in one of its recent decisions, "An appeal to the RAD should not be tantamount to another full-blown hearing."20 [32] In this case, the RAD looked at the literal provisions of Section 110(4) of the Act in assessing the new evidence, asking itself two questions with respect to the new evidence; namely, (1) did the evidence arise after the rejection of the claim and was it not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and (2) was the evidence such that the Appellants could not reasonably have expected in the circumstances to have presented it at the time of rejection? [33] In regards to the only document submitted as new evidence, a receipt for the retainer paid to an immigration consultant, dated March 30 and 31, 2015, this is a document which was available to the Appellant prior to the hearing before the RPD and is provided only as evidence to refute the RPD finding in regards to the Appellant's delay in claiming. Counsel for the Appellant speaks to the lateness of the previous counsel in filing the paperwork after being hired in March of 2015, using that as a reason for the delay in claiming and as an explanation as to why the delay was not the fault of the Appellant, but of counsel. However, that does not explain why it took five months for the Appellant to hire the counsel he now blames for the tardiness of filing. The Appellant claims that it took him the five months delay to learn that he could apply for refugee protection and then to find counsel he could afford. None of that is sufficient reason for him not to have applied immediately upon entry into Canada and as such I can find no sufficient reason to admit this document. It does not explain the lengthy delay in finding counsel (five months). The document is not new and does not meet the requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA. RAD finds this document to be inadmissible under 110(4). [34] The RAD after assessing the evidence in regards to the above questions, finds that the evidence does not meet the requirements of Section 110(4). In answer to question (1), the Appellant has had this receipt since March 31, 2015. There is no explanation as to why he did not submit this document or attempt to get the document prior to his hearing. However, as soon as he received a negative decision, he was able to submit this document which he now attempts to have the RAD accept as evidence. [35] In regards to question (2), the Appellant was represented by counsel before his hearing at the RPD, although for whatever reason, had no counsel at his hearing. Counsel who prepared and assisted the Appellant in preparing for his hearing should have been conversant with claims and what requirements are necessary before the RPD. The Appellant could reasonably have been expected to know that. Contrary to current counsel's submission21 that the Board no longer discloses a screening form identifying the issues, the Appellant had retained an Immigration Consultant as counsel who should have known or could have obtained such information from the Board. It is not the position of this Board to say that a particular counsel is or is not competent or did or did not perform his or her duties properly. If the Appellant believes that he was not represented properly, there are avenues for him to take to rectify such grievances, however, the RAD will not consider the excuse that counsel was tardy or incompetent in any way without proof that the counsel is on notice of the complaint and that the proper authority has been notified. I therefore find that the Appellant should reasonably have expected delay in claiming to be an issue and therefore should have produced any evidence he believed would have supported his allegations and testimony. [36] Further and lastly, the Basis of Claim (BoC) form advises that the refugee claimant is "responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."22 [37] This evidence is dismissed. The Arguments [38] Counsel argues that the panel erred by making erroneous findings of fact in a perverse or capricious manner without regard for the evidence. Counsel lists the evidence which was disclosed at the RPD hearing as documents which establish that the Appellant was a) a well-established businessman, b) very involved with his community, c) politically involved, d) worked closely with police and politicians, e) had been a victim of extortion, etc. f) had narrowly escaped an attempted kidnapping and g) had filed numerous denunciations and requests for assistance to no avail.23 [39] I have read the Reasons and Decision24 and find that the panel did not adequately analyze the evidence disclosed prior to or at the hearing. The panel, at paragraph 25, summarily dismisses "the remaining claimant-specific documentary evidence on file" as being unable to overcome credibility concerns. This documentary evidence includes police reports, requests for assistance with poor police response to the Ombudsman, requests for protection and more very material and credible evidence of the issues alleged by the Appellant. [40] The RAD must show deference to the RPD in regards to credibility findings in many instances as the RPD panel has the opportunity to assess the testimony of the claimant in front of it, whereas in most cases, the RAD does not have that opportunity. However, even when a claimant or Appellant may display credibility issues through inconsistent or contradictory testimony, strong documentary evidence may tip the scales in his or her favour. It is for that reason that the RPD must properly analyze all of the evidence and speak to the evidence in its Reasons and Decision. It is not necessary for the RPD to refer to every piece of evidence, however, a failure to address the evidence which strongly supports a claim can be an error and can be fatal to the decision. [41] In this particular case, the panel had credibility issues with the lack of direct answers from the claimant/Appellant to direct questions to him. The panel did not vigorously pursue the questions to which non direct answers were given, as is often needed when in a hearing room situation with an unrepresented individual who neither speaks nor understands the language of the hearing. There were questions to which direct answers were given and the panel used these direct answers to impugn the credibility of the claimant by comparing the direct answers to those questions not answered directly. I find that this is an issue on which more understanding of the situation by the panel may have assisted in making a determination more in line with the evidence presented. [42] I concur with counsel that the evidence disclosed certainly supports the fact of risk to the Appellant while he was in Colombia. I find that the RPD did err by failing to fully consider the evidence on its own merit and for dismissing that evidence due only to the credibility concerns of the panel in regards to testimony and the lengthy delay in claiming. [43] Counsel further argues that the RPD erred by making an unreasonable analysis under section 97 of the IRPA. I will deal with this issue by breaking down the risks claimed. [44] In the first place, counsel argues that the risk to the Appellant began in the early 2000's when he was extorted by criminal gangs.25 Criminality is a generalized risk, one faced by most business people in Colombia and not personalized. Due to the general nature of business people being the targets of extortion and insufficient evidence being adduced to show that the Appellant was targeted for reasons other than his perceived ability to pay the extortion, I find that the criminal acts perpetrated against the Appellant fail to meet the requirements of Section 97 of the IRPA in particular Section 97(1)(b)(ii), which clearly says: 97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally (a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if (i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. [45] The second risk factor is alleged threats from the FARC, ordering the Appellant to get out of town "or else". The Appellant has adduced supporting documentation26 which shows that he did in fact report the threats to the Judicial Police in Colombia, on or about the XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014. [46] I am confused by the panel's writing regards the Section 97 claim. In paragraph 28 of the Reasons and Decision, the panel finds that the personalized risk to the claimant/Appellant exists on a balance of probabilities, but then in the following paragraph the panel writes that the panel does not find that the "personalized risk" is not "generalized". Either the Appellant faces a personalized risk or he faces a generalized risk but not a personalized risk that is generalized. This makes no sense to me. Regardless of this issue, the fact that the FARC is now targeting the Appellant brings the issue back into the realm of Section 96 because there is a nexus which is "perceived political opinion". I will therefore deal with the issue of the FARC in the analyses below, first. ANALYSIS [47] The FARC representatives approached the Appellant and issued him an order to get out of town, threatening destruction of his property, possible death to the Appellant and even harm to the Appellant's mother and her place of business. The reasonable presumption is that the Appellant's profile within his community (ie: his connections to politicians and police and military) resulted in him being threatened by FARC as a perceived political opponent/target. The Appellant has provided credible supportive evidence by way of denunciations and requests for protection27 against the threats of the FARC. The Appellant disclosed a document detailing his forced displacement by the FARC. This document is a Criminal Notice to the Judicial Police28 and is a credible and material document. This document supports the Appellant's allegations of expected persecution by the FARC. However, the document also indicates that the Appellant only needs to follow the direction of the FARC to vacate the town (move elsewhere) to satisfy the FARC's demands. The Appellant writes in his Memorandum that he did flee to another city, then to Venezuela, returning to Colombia, then to Mexico where he vacationed for twelve days before returning to Colombia and then to the USA. The panel asked the Appellant why he did not claim protection in any of these countries as the Appellant was claiming that he had been persecuted since the year 2000 and he had made these trips after that time. The Appellant testified that he did not claim in Panama as he was only there "in transit". He did not claim in Mexico because he could not find suitable employment there and he did not claim in the USA because he did not speak the language, even though he was in Florida which has an extremely large Spanish speaking population, far greater in percentage than the Spanish speaking population in Canada where, after eleven months in the country, he did make a claim. The reasons given by the Appellant for failing to claim in the other countries that he visited is insufficient reason for a person who truly fears for his life. If, instead of traveling to foreign countries as he did, he had simply relocated to Bogota or Medellin, he would have complied with the FARC's demands and, on a balance of probabilities, would have been safe to pursue his life. [48] As the panel has not spoken on the issue of internal flight alternatives (IFA) and the Appellant has not officially raised the issue in his Memorandum, it would be an error for me to analyze IFA at this time without providing the Appellant due notice of the issue and sufficient time to respond by submissions on the issue. With this in mind, I am sending official notice of the issue to counsel and the Appellant and will await submissions before proceeding as IFA is a determinative factor in both a Section 96 and a Section 97 claim. [49] However, in regards to the agents of harm identified by the Appellant (the FARC and the Los Rastrojos gangsters) it is necessary for me to take a forward look on behalf of the Appellant. [50] FARC has signed a peace accord with the Colombian government at the negotiator's level. The accord will see the FARC surrendering all of its weapons, disbanding its guerilla fighters and transitioning into a normal political party within the Colombian political system. The total ceasefire is now in effect. This is common knowledge being reported on in the daily news reports, worldwide. As FARC is demobilizing, it is very unlikely that the FARC would be a problem for this Appellant should he return home and go back to doing business. So, although he may have been perceived to hold different political views from what the FARC espouses, there is less than a mere chance that the FARC would jeopardize the long negotiated peace agreement to exact some kind of perceived revenge on this Appellant. The FARC will, on a balance of probabilities, be a little preoccupied with getting the best deal available in the peace agreement to be bothered with this Appellant. Circumstances in Colombia have changed significantly since the Appellant departed there. This source of persecution is no longer a threat to the Appellant. [51] The Appellant also feared the criminal gang, Los Rastrojos, because the gang was extorting him and threatening his life. According to documents29 at the Board, the criminal gang, Los Rastrojos, as a national criminal organization is finished (as of 29 August 2013 report). The capture and/or surrender of the top leadership has caused the gang to virtually implode. It is now relegated to a few rural areas around places such as Narino and Norte de Santander, however, not in the major urban areas such as Medellin. Even if the gang was still powerful enough to find and attack the Appellant, such criminal activity is not grounds for protection under Section 96 of the IRPA as criminality is not and does not provide a nexus to the Convention. To be considered under a Section 97 risk, the risk must be personalized and not a risk shared by a substantial portion of the population, as extortion is. As previously shown above, this risk is generalized and as such failed the test of Section 97. [52] Counsel argued in his requested submissions that IFA had been dealt with at various points during the hearing. Specific references will be found in the new submissions from counsel but counsel only regurgitates the old testimony that FARC will find the Appellant anywhere in Colombia. That no longer is the case as discussed above. [53] Counsel also speaks to the criminal events happening in Colombia including in the IFA proposed by me (Medellin), however criminality is an issue everywhere which is why it is not a nexus to the Convention. Unless the Appellant could show that he was being personally targeted for reasons other than the generalized reasons that most Colombian business people face, his claim that Medellin is not a suitable IFA because of the crime rate there is not sufficient reason for dismissing Medellin as an IFA. [54] When considering an IFA, the Federal Court of Appeal, in Rasaratnam, has given the RAD guidelines for a two-prong test through which the RAD will determine whether an IFA is suitable in any particular case. [55] The first consideration is whether or not there is a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA, that is, there must be no serious possibility of persecution in the IFA. As mentioned above, the FARC is no longer a major concern in any urban area and as it has negotiated a peace accord with Colombia, and I find that it is less than a mere possibility that the FARC would try to locate the Appellant and upon doing so, persecute him in Medellin. The second agent of harm was the criminal gang, Los Rastrojos, which I have shown earlier is no longer operating in urban areas and is all but finished in Colombia. I find that the Los Rastrojos would present less than a mere possibility of persecuting the Appellant should he re-locate to Medellin. [56] The second consideration is that the IFA is reasonable in all circumstances. In other words, conditions in the IFA are such that it would not be objectively unreasonable (or unduly harsh), in all the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellant, for the Appellant to relocate. [57] There is a very high threshold to the objectivity of an IFA. The Appellant should not have to undergo great physical danger or undue hardship in traveling or staying in the proposed IFA. An IFA is unreasonable if conditions would jeopardize an Appellant's life or safety. [58] Once an IFA is proposed, the onus is on the Appellant to show that he does not have an IFA. [59] In this case, I proposed an IFA of Medellin. Medellin is a city of more than two million people. Medellin is one of Colombia's economic centers with a contribution to Colombia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 11%. Medellin offers universities, colleges, hospitals, industry and culture. It has unemployment and crime as do all cities, everywhere. Medellin can offer anyone with the entrepreneurial gift of this Appellant many opportunities in work and society. No place is perfect, however, aside from the crime rate, the Appellant has given no sufficient reasons why he could not re-locate to Medellin. I find that a suitable IFA does exist for this Appellant. Disposition [60] The issue of IFA is determinative and as I have found that an IFA does exist for this Appellant, I find that the RPD decision will stand. CONCLUSION [61] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe August 3, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 2. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 3 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para 14; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 4 Dhillon , supra, footnote 3, paras. 14-18. 5 Huruglica, supra, footnote 3, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 6 Ibid. 7 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 8 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 9 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 10 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 11 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 12 Singh, supra, footnote 11, para. 54. 13 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 14 Singh, supra, footnote 11, para. 64. 15 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., 16 Ibid, Raza, paras. 13-15. 17 Singh, supra, footnote 11, para. 64. 18 Singh, supra, footnote 11, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 19 Singh, supra, footnote 11, para. 48. 20 Zhong, Zhihui et al v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3438-15), Boswell, March 23, 2016; 2016 FC 346. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Basis of Claim Form, page 1 of 12. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, p. 320, para. 20. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 1 to 10 inclusive. 25 Appellant's Memorandum at para 26 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibit A1, pp. 120-122. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibit A1. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 120-122. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Colombia (July 17, 2015), item 7.7. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-07833