TB5-01900
The RAD confirmed the RPD because material inconsistencies in the Appellant's testimony and documentary record undermined her credibility regarding a same-sex relationship; the newly admitted medical/psychological evidence did not raise a serious credibility issue central to the decision or justify an oral hearing;...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- TB5-01900
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Canada)
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 10 June 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Protection Appeal (rad Review of RPD Determination) / Appeal Heard on the Record Under S.110 Irpa; RAD Decision to Confirm RPD Issued June 10, 2015
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed pursuant to s.111(1)(a) IRPA
- Legal Topics
- Admissibility of Fresh Evidence, Credibility Assessment, Internal Flight Alternative (ifa), Natural Justice, Standard of Review / Appellate Scope
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
XXXX XXXX XXXX
Appellant
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Canada)
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Protection Appeal (rad Review of RPD Determination) / Appeal Heard on the Record Under S.110 Irpa; RAD Decision to Confirm RPD Issued June 10, 2015
Legal Issues
- 1 Admissibility of new evidence under s.110(4) IRPA
- 2 Whether new evidence raises a serious credibility issue warranting an oral hearing under s.110(6) IRPA
- 3 Whether RPD erred in credibility findings regarding alleged same-sex relationship and related documents
Ratio Decidendi
The RAD confirmed the RPD because material inconsistencies in the Appellant's testimony and documentary record undermined her credibility regarding a same-sex relationship; the newly admitted medical/psychological evidence did not raise a serious credibility issue central to the decision or justify an oral hearing; and, on the balance of probabilities, a reasonable and accessible internal flight alternative exists in Abuja, thus negating refugee or protection status.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed pursuant to s.111(1)(a) IRPA
Orders
- Appeal dismissed and RPD determination confirmed pursuant to s.111(1)(a) of the IRPA.
- RAD admitted as fresh evidence the medical documents and counsel's letter (items a to d) and excluded the other proffered documentary items (items e to h) under s.110(4).
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01900 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 10, 2015 Date de la décision Panel C. Forbes Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Bola Adetunji Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, has appealed a negative determination of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated February 9, 2015. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant is requesting a hearing be held under section 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Appellant requests that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD determining that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee and an order be made for an oral hearing of the claim before the RAD. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the RAD set aside the decision of the RPD and an order be made for a de novo hearing before the RPD. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Background [3] The Appellant alleges that she fears her family and the community in general in Nigeria because of her sexual orientation as a bisexual woman. Her first same-sex relationship was when she attended university with a woman named XXXX XXXX XXXX. Despite this, she met and married a man on XXXX XXXX, 2013; yet she continued her relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX. She became pregnant in XXXX 2013, and shortly thereafter, her husband was informed of her relationship with another woman by "the gateman" who had caught the Appellant and XXXX XXXX XXXX having sex. She returned to her parents' home where her father discovered that her husband had filed for divorce. Her father threatened her with cleansing rituals and with circumcision. When she stood up to him, he beat her with a stick. The elders saved her, and she sought medical attention for a leg and arm injury. She alleges that, should she return to Nigeria, her sexual orientation would be known, and she fears being attacked, raped and perhaps killed by people in the community. She alleges she cannot reside in any part of Nigeria and cannot go to the police because of her sexual orientation and because the government is against gays and lesbians. She also fears her father will find her, and she will be forced to be circumcised, as this is a tradition in her country. She states that she cannot seek protection because the police do not get involved in family matters. The Appellant had a visa to Canada from a previous visit and left Canada to claim for refugee protection. [4] The Appellant's refugee determination hearing was first scheduled for January 6, 2015; however, it did not proceed, as it was administratively cancelled. [5] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on February 2, 2015, and written Reasons were issued on February 9, 2015. [6] The Appellant was represented by the same counsel for the hearing and for this appeal. [7] The Minister did not participate in the hearing or the appeal but did submit a letter (received on January 3, 2015) stating they would not be attending the hearing and respectfully requesting that the RPD not accept any evidence from the Appellant that does not comply with Rule 34 because, as of December 9, 2014, the Minister had yet to receive any disclosure from counsel for the Appellant.1 [8] The Appellant submits that the issues on this application are: a) Whether the RPD erred in not assessing at all the well foundedness of the fear that the applicant asserted against the community in Nigeria. b) Whether the RPD erred in not assessing at all the well foundedness of the claim on the basis of a perceived bisexual orientation in a homophobic community like Nigeria, given the Board's own finding of a credible close relationship between the Appellant and XXXX XXXX XXXX. c) Whether the negative findings that the RPD made against the Appellant are such valid credibility concerns that precluded a decision being made on her being persecuted for her sexual orientation in a homophobic society like Nigeria and whether such credibility concerns are impacted by the existing evidence of her mental state and the new evidence of her forgetfulness, memory loss and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX through the letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX, Doctors XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX. d) Whether the RPD breached the principles of natural justice by making significant findings of fact on some documents not having been provided with respect to internal flight alternative when that only arose as an issue during the course of the hearing. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [9] As provided for in s. 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and refugee claimant. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [10] The Appellant submits that the proposed new evidence meets the test of s.110(4) of the IRPA because the evidence is "fresh evidence" and "not available at the time of the hearing". [11] The Appellant provided eight pieces of evidence to the RAD for consideration as new evidence. [12] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit the following documents as new evidence: a) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated March 9, 2015;2 b) Letter from The Doctor's Office, undated;3 c) Psychological assessment by Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated March 10, 2015;4 d) Letter from counsel Bola Adetunji, dated March 6, 2015;5 e) Internet printout of news article, Urhobo Times, "Woman attacked by naval officers cries for justice", dated September 21, 2012;6 f) Internet printout of news article, "Eku community elects new traditional ruler", dated March 19, 2013;7 g) Internet article, untitled, undated; and8 h) Copy of a photograph of an election poster, untitled, undated.9 [13] The affidavit of the Appellant sets out the basis of the Appellant's refugee claim, information which predates the rejection of her claim, which was before the RPD and which is already before the RAD as part of the RPD's record. However, the remainder of the affidavit contains the Appellant's explanation for the provision of the new evidence. The RAD will only accept the portion of the affidavit in order to assess the new evidence. Therefore, the portion of the affidavit addressing the new evidence is admissible, pursuant to s. 110(4). Medical documents, Items a) to c) [14] The RAD has considered the above-noted letters from medical agencies. The Appellant has explained that these documents were not available prior to the rejection of her claim. The RAD notes the Appellant had her hearing on February 2, 2015 with the written Reasons of the negative determination rendered on February 9, 2015. Given the short timeframe between the hearing and the issuance of the decision, the RAD finds the explanation provided by the Appellant for failing to present it to the RPD is reasonable, and, therefore, the RAD admits the medical letters, at a) to c), pursuant to s. 110(4). Letter from Counsel, item d) [15] The RAD has considered the letter from counsel, Bola Adetunji, dated March 6, 2015, at item d) noted above, that provided an explanation why the Appellant is submitting the documents, at a) to c) noted above. Given that the RAD has accepted the letters from the medical agencies, at a) to c), the RAD also admits counsel's letter, pursuant to s. 110(4). Internet Printouts and copy of photograph of poster, items e) to h) [16] The RAD has considered the articles tendered by the Appellant in this appeal as new evidence, at items e) to h), noted above. The RAD notes the articles, at e) and f), predate the rejection of the claim by approximately 11/2 to 2 years. The Appellant submits that the need for these documents only became clear late in the hearing when IFA was raised, and they are submitted to establish the Appellant's father's prominence and influence. The Appellant was given an opportunity to provide information about her father when questioned by both the RPD and her counsel. The Appellant's fear of her father was part of the record and before the RPD. The RAD notes the short period of time between the hearing and the rendering of the decision; however, the Appellant's counsel would know he could request at the hearing to provide post-hearing submissions regarding the Appellant's father's profile, yet failed to do so. The Appellant has not provided an explanation why the news articles could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have been presented, prior to the hearing or filed an application with the RPD to present the documents at the hearing. Therefore, the RAD finds these news articles do not meet the test of s.110(4). [17] The RAD has also considered the articles, at items g) and h) noted above. Given that the articles are undated, it is unclear to the RAD the date of the issuance of the news articles, and, therefore, it cannot determine whether or not the news articles could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have been presented, prior to or at the hearing. Therefore, the RAD finds these news articles do not meet the test of s.110(4). [18] For the reasons identified above, the RAD accepts the documents noted above, at a) to d), presented as new evidence. ORAL HEARING [19] The Appellant has requested an oral hearing. [20] According to Section 110(6), the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing of rejecting the refugee claim. In this appeal, where there is no new evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) must be understood in relation to Section 110(4). [21] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [22] The Appellant submits that the RPD did not have the general information that the Appellant was mentally down and failed to consider this evidence; it gives a valid basis to conducting an oral hearing on this matter. The RAD has addressed this issue below and found that the evidence submitted by the Appellant did not support her allegations that she suffered forgetfulness and other experiences, including her surgery, recent delivery of her baby, and the sequence of events leading up to her hearing that impacted her mental state and on her testimony. Further, the RAD further found this evidence is not sufficient to undermine the negative credibility findings of the RPD. [23] While the RAD has admitted new evidence in this appeal, the RAD finds that the evidence does not raise a serious issue with respect to the Appellant's credibility that would justify accepting or denying the Appellant's refugee protection claim. As such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing. ROLE OF THE RAD [24] Counsel for the Appellant submits that the RAD should follow the Federal Court's decision in Huruglica.10 [25] The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,11 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by the RAD to decisions of the RPD. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.12 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error".13 [26] While there has been some conflict in the case law from the Federal Court regarding the standard of review to be applied by the RAD when reviewing RPD decisions, Justice Martineau, in Alyafi,14 has said that, in the face of this conflict, the Federal Court should allow the RAD to apply either approach as long as the question of the scope of the appellate review of the RPD's decisions has not been settled by a final judgment by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. [27] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Deference will be afforded to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [28] The RAD focused on the following issues in assessing this appeal: a) Did the RPD err in its finding that the Appellant was not in a same-sex relationship in Nigeria with a woman named XXXX XXXX XXXX? b) Did the RPD make an unfair internal flight alternative finding? The Appellant's Mental State [29] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider the Appellant's surgery, recent delivery of her child, the sequence of events leading up to her hearing and the impact thereof on the Appellant, on her mental state and on her testimony. The RAD does not accept the Appellant's argument in this regard. [30] The RAD notes that the RPD, at paragraph 2 of the Reasons, shows the RPD considered the Chairperson's Guideline for Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution15 in coming to its decision in the claim. The reasons show that the RPD clearly identified the Guidelines that were to be considered with regard to weight and credibility in the Appellant's evidence as well as to ensure that any accommodations were made in terms of procedural matters during the course of the hearing. A review of the transcript of the hearing16 shows the RPD explained to the Appellant at the onset of the hearing that, if she did not understand a question, to let the RPD know, and it would be repeated or rephrased for her in another way. The RPD informed the Appellant that, because she had brought her infant with her to the hearing, if she needed a break for any reason, and especially for the child, to let her know, and they would go off the record. The RAD notes that the Appellant was represented by experienced counsel who did not file an application for accommodation for the Appellant at her hearing. The RAD notes, based on a review of the audio recording, that questions were asked of the Appellant in a sensitive and respectful manner. Further, clear direction was given to the Appellant, and the questioning was not unduly harsh or onerous. [31] The Appellant argues that the RPD made negative findings that were impacted by the existing evidence of her mental state and the new evidence of her forgetfulness, memory loss and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX through the letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX and Doctors XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX. [32] The Appellant points to jurisprudence that suggests that minor discrepancies, for which reasonable explanations are available, are sufficient to undermine the entire evidence of an applicant, is indicative of an overly microscopic view of the facts. Credibility assessments based on trivial inconsistencies are unreasonable. It is submitted that the credibility finding of the Refugee Protection Division is unreasonable and internally inconsistent.17 [33] The Appellant further argues that the RPD did not consider the impact of the forgetfulness and other experiences, her surgery, recent delivery, the sequences of events leading up to her hearing and the impact thereof on the Appellant, on her mental state and on her testimony. [34] The RAD does not accept this argument as persuasive for the following reasons. Letter from Counsel [35] The RAD has considered the letter from counsel Bola Adetunji, dated March 6, 2015, at item d) of the new evidence. The RAD finds the letter18 addressed to Dr. XXXX is providing the psychologist his opinion on why he is referring the Appellant for assessment. The counsel states in his letter that he did not have the opportunity to assess her or to refer her to the psychologist prior to her hearing but does not provide an explanation for not doing so. The RAD finds the letter is not based on a diagnosis but written on observation. Therefore, the RAD affords little weight to the letter from counsel with regard to establishing the Appellant's alleged memory loss when providing testimony at the hearing. Psychological Report [36] The RAD has given consideration to the psychologist's report of the Appellant which was tendered as new evidence in this appeal. The Appellant submitted to the RAD, a report from Dr. XXXX, Psychologist,, dated March 10, 2015,19 specifically to corroborate that her memory was impacted by the recent birth of her child. [37] The report states that it is evident that the Appellant's anxiety levels and worrisome thoughts have affected her cognitive faculties. However, Dr. XXXX does not make any findings with regard to the Appellant's cognitive functioning being compromised, prior to or at the Appellant's hearing because of the birth of her child. Dr. XXXX identifies in her report that the Appellant is suffering from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX. It does not state that the Appellant's condition requires an assessment of a specialist. The Appellant has not tendered any evidence that she is seeking or has sought the intervention of a specialist on the issue of her alleged XXXX and XXXX. The RAD notes that the Appellant has had over three months to seek medical treatment by a specialist but has failed to provide any such evidence. [38] Dr. XXXX report indicated the assessment consisted of a clinical impression based upon one interview together with XXXX and XXXX inventories. Dr. XXXX clinical impression is that the Appellant suffers from XXXX and XXXX in the "XXXX range" and states that the results are consistent with her self-report during the clinical interview. The RAD notes the report does not indicate that she was encouraged to seek counselling and does not refer the Appellant for treatment or further care. In addition, there is no evidence in the record which confirms that the Appellant is obtaining ongoing treatment for the condition identified by Dr. XXXX. Dr. XXXX states that the Appellant's condition will deteriorate if returned to Nigeria, "as she appears convinced her life is at risk and that she and her daughter will be circumcised if she has to return to Nigeria." [39] The RAD finds that Dr. XXXX opinions were based upon the unverified self-report of the Appellant. Accordingly, the validity of the conclusions depends heavily upon the truth of the information provided by the Appellant. The RAD therefore affords the report of Dr. XXXX little weight in establishing the credibility of the alleged risk faced by the Appellant in Nigeria. [40] Furthermore, the RAD notes that the Appellant did not identify to the RPD that she was suffering from XXXX and XXXX, or that her memory had been impacted by the recent birth of her child or XXXX. The Appellant was represented by experienced counsel who would have met and prepared the Appellant for her hearing. Counsel had the opportunity to question the Appellant and provide submissions on the issue of the Appellant's mental state following her testimony, but failed to do so, either at the hearing or prior to the rejection of her claim. In addition, the record reflects that the Appellant is not obtaining ongoing treatment for the conditions identified by Dr. XXXX. [41] Furthermore, the RAD notes that Justice Annis, in Czesak,20 has cautioned decision-makers regarding the reliance upon forensic expert evidence obtained for the purpose of litigation, unless it is subject to some form of validation, and without the opportunity of the decision-maker to assess the reliability of expert opinions under cross examination. Justice Annis concludes by stating: "In my view therefore, unless there is some means to corroborate either the neutrality or the lack of self-interest of the expert in relation to the litigation process, they generally should be accorded little weight." Accordingly, based upon the concerns identified, the RAD affords little weight to the report of Dr. XXXX with regard to the Appellant's alleged memory loss when providing testimony at the hearing. Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [42] The RAD has considered the letter submitted by the Appellant from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated March 9, 2015, written by XXXX XXXX, a XXXX XXXX with the XXXX. The letter states: This letter is to inform you that XXXX XXXX stated during her hospital stay at XXXX XXXX XXXX - XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, on dates XXXX XXXX, 2015 - XXXX XXXX, 2015, that she is experiencing forgetfulness and memory loss.21 [43] The RAD notes that there is no indication in the letter that the Appellant had been diagnosed as having this condition at the time of her hospital stay and prior to her hearing. The letter shows that the Appellant had "stated" this occurred during her stay in the hospital. The RAD finds the social worker's statement was based upon the unverified self-report of the Appellant rather than on independent clinical studies. Accordingly, the validity of the conclusions depends heavily upon the truth of the information provided by the Appellant. Therefore, the RAD affords little weight to the report of the social worker with regard to the Appellant's alleged memory loss when providing testimony at the hearing. Letter from The Doctor's Office [44] The RAD has considered the letter claimed to be from XXXX XXXX, MD. The RAD notes that the letter is not dated, and there is no indication on the letterhead regarding the credentials of the author. While the letter states that the Appellant was "in hospital early January", that "she is XXXX XXXX XXXX" and suffers XXXX which contribute to memory lapse, all consistent with post-partum anxiety; there is no indication in the letter when this condition began. Therefore, the RAD finds, based on these factors, the letter can be given little weight with regard to establishing the Appellant's alleged memory loss when providing testimony at the hearing. [45] The RAD has reviewed the transcript provided by the Appellant in the pleadings.22 The RAD has also reviewed the audio recording of the Appellant's hearing. The RAD notes the fluidity of the Appellant's testimony. She did not hesitate or ask for clarity of questions posed to her by the RPD. She did not state at any time throughout the proceedings that she was confused or was suffering XXXX due to the stress inherent in the hearing room. The RAD finds that none of the above-noted evidence from Dr. XXXX, the social worker from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, or XXXX XXXX, MD, supports the Appellant's allegations that she suffered forgetfulness and other experiences, including her surgery, recent delivery and the sequences of events leading up to her hearing that impacted her mental state and on her testimony. Further, the RAD further finds this evidence is not sufficient to undermine the negative credibility findings of the RPD. The Appellant's Sexual Orientation Appellant's Dissolution of her Marriage [46] The Appellant argues that, where the Appellant consistently erred on an issue around the dissolution of her marriage, this should have alerted the Board to psychological issues affecting the testimony. The Board failed to consider whether the Appellant's testimonial failings were attributable to possible psychological state, memory lapses and forgetfulness. [47] The Appellant points to jurisprudence to support the argument that the Board's finding of credibility cannot be sustained when it overlooked the difficulties of the applicant and her being mentally down. Mr. Gordoo's evidence at the hearing suffered from what the Member described as "confusing and contradictory responses." This may have been linked to the medical conditions from which he was suffering...faced a major operation within two days of the last hearing date. It is reasonable to assume that in addition to the stress which claimants normally experience in testifying before the Board, Mr. Gordoo was suffering from the effects of chemotherapy and contemplating the forthcoming operation. His oncologist had reported a complaint of memory loss. This may have served as a least a partial explanation for the confusing and contradictory nature of Mr. Gordoo's testimony. The Member does not appear to have taken that into account in assessing his evidence.23 [48] The RAD notes the RPD put to the Appellant that the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage24 states that the grounds for the dissolution of the marriage are based upon the fact that the Appellant "was caught on the XXXX XXXX XXXX, 2013 and XXXX XXXX, 2013 in the act of adultery". The Appellant was asked by the RPD how she and XXXX XXXX XXXX could have been discovered making love on XXXX XXXX, 2013 when the Appellant had testified that XXXX XXXX XXXX had only come to visit the Appellant in XXXX 2013. The Appellant's explanation was that the people who prepared the Petition had made an error. The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's explanation was not reasonable. The RPD found there was no evidence before them that the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage had been amended for any errors or evidence or that any errors were brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of the High Court of Justice for correction. [49] The RPD further noted that the Affidavit of Verification25 was signed and sworn to the High Court Registry, Sapele, by the Appellant's husband. Given these documents had been prepared by proper officials of the High Court of Justice: Delta State of Nigeria in the Sapele Judicial Division Holden at Sapele, the RAD concurs with the RPD affording more weight to the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and the Appellant's husband's Affidavit of Verification over the Appellant's testimony. [50] The RAD notes the RPD found inconsistencies between the dates provided by the Appellant regarding her divorce proceedings. The Appellant testified that she attended the High Court in Sapele on XXXX XXXX, 2014 and that she was divorced on XXXX XXXX, 2014 with the divorce "finalized" on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The RPD noted that the Notice of Petition26 and the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage27 are dated XXXX XXXX, 2014 and were filed with the High Court of Justice on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The Appellant was asked by the RPD how she could have gone to court for a hearing into her divorce proceedings on XXXX XXXX, 2014 and have been divorced on XXXX XXXX, 2014 when her husband had only filed the Notice of Petition and Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The RAD notes the Appellant's response was that she did not know. The RPD found the Appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for the inconsistencies between her testimony and the other evidence before them and afforded more weight to the Notice of Petition and the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage over the Appellant's testimony. Given that these documents had been prepared by proper officials of the High Court of Justice: Delta State of Nigeria in the Sapele Judicial Division Holden at Sapele, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the discrepancies between the Appellant's testimony and the divorce documents undermine the Appellant's credibility. [51] The RAD notes that the RPD went on to consider the Appellant's testimony that, at her court hearing on XXXX XXXX, 2014, she admitted to committing adultery, and the judge granted the divorce. Her further testimony was that she was "divorced" on XXXX XXXX, 2014, which was "finalized" on XXXX XXXX, 2014. She explained that XXXX XXXX, 2014 was the date on which the divorce "officially came out" and the papers were issued. The RPD noted that the Memorandum of decree nisi having become absolute,28 issued by the High Court of Justice Delta State of Nigeria in the Sapele Judicial Division, states that the decree nisi of dissolution of marriage between the Appellant and her husband became absolute on XXXX XXXX, 2014. Further, the Decree nisi of dissolution29 between the Appellant and her husband is dated XXXX XXXX, 2014. The Appellant repeated that it was on XXXX XXXX, 2014 that the judge said she and her husband were "officially divorced" and further explained that, three months later, the divorce papers were issued. The RPD found the Appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for the inconsistencies. The RPD found there was no evidence to support the Appellant's evidence that the Appellant was "officially" divorced on XXXX XXXX, 2014. Once again, the RAD concurs with the RPD, affording more weight to the Decree nisi of dissolution and the Memorandum of decree nisi having become absolute over the Appellant's testimony as these documents had been prepared by proper officials of the High Court of Justice: Delta State of Nigeria in the Sapele Judicial Division. Further, based on the evidence, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the discrepancies between the Appellant's testimony and the divorce documents before the RPD undermine the Appellant's credibility. [52] The RAD notes the RPD reasons show that the Appellant explained during questioning by her counsel that she had not reviewed the documents pertaining to her divorce and therefore was not aware of the dates contained in those documents. The RPD found and the RAD concurs that the Appellant's explanation that she had not read the divorce papers did not reasonably address the inconsistencies between her testimony and the divorce documents. The RAD finds the divorce document significant in that it was tendered by the Appellant in support of her claim, and it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have reviewed the document prior to her hearing. The RAD once again concurs with the RPD, giving more weight to the information contained in the divorce documents given that they were issued by court officials, as noted above. Therefore, on a balance of probabilities, the RAD finds the RPD's finding that the discrepancies between the Appellant's testimony and the divorce documents before the RPD undermine the Appellant's credibility is supportable. Medical Report [53] The Appellant submits that the RPD "failed to address the medical records and pictures and the implicit finding that a woman will not be subjected to that kind of violence by reason of her committing simple adultery as alleged by the RPD." The RAD does not accept the Appellant's argument as persuasive. [54] The RAD notes that the RPD stated that the Appellant testified that she was physically beaten at her father's home after he discovered the Appellant was bisexual. She was taken to the hospital for medical treatment. The RAD notes the Appellant testified that she only suffered injuries to her hand and had no other injuries. The RPD noted and the RAD concurs that the Appellant stated in her Basis of Claim (BoC) form30 that she had injured her leg and arm. The Appellant's response when this discrepancy was put to the Appellant by the RPD was that she had made a mistake when she was preparing her BoC. The RPD further noted that the medical report from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX states that the Appellant's "chest is not clinically clear", that bruising on both the Appellant's hands were noticed, and also noted a "severe bone dislocation" on the Appellant's left arm.31 Upon notification of the content of the medical report, the Appellant then stated to the RPD that she had in fact injured her arm. A review of the audio recording concurs that the RPD clearly asked the Appellant whether she had suffered any injuries other than to her hands, and the Appellant confirmed this information. Given that the Appellant provided the evidence that she had injured her "arms" only after the inconsistency between her testimony and the medical report was noted by the RPD, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that the Appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for the discrepancies between her testimony, the BoC and the medical report. [55] Further, the RAD finds the RPD drawing a negative inference with respect to the Appellant's credibility in this matter is supportable. Photographs [56] The RPD noted that the Appellant provided several photographs32 of herself posing with various individuals and of herself receiving medical treatment. The RAD notes the RPD found that, given the credibility concerns with respect to the Appellant's allegations of her sexual orientation, her same-sex partner, and her alleged assault by her father, the panel found, on a balance of probabilities, that the photographs of the Appellant receiving medical treatment and the photographs of various individuals, whose identities and their relationship to the Appellant had not been verified in any manner further to the Appellant's testimony, do not offer persuasive evidence to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant is bisexual and therefore do not overcome the credibility concerns as noted previously with respect to the Appellant's sexual orientation. The RPD afforded the photographs little evidentiary weight with respect to establishing the Appellant's sexual identity. [57] The RAD has reviewed the photographs33 submitted by the Appellant to the RPD and concurs with the RPD that the photographs are not persuasive evidence that she received medical treatment from a beating from her father, nor are the unverified photographs persuasive evidence to establish the Appellant's sexual orientation. The RAD finds the RPD was correct in affording the photographs little evidentiary weight with respect to establishing the Appellant's sexual orientation. The RAD has reviewed the totality of the evidence on the record and further concurs with the RPD's finding that, on a balance of probabilities, the credibility concerns noted above do not overcome the credibility concerns with respect to the Appellant's sexual orientation. Letter from Sister [58] The RAD notes the RPD considered the letter submitted by the Appellant that was written by her sister.34 The RPD found that, while the letter mentions that the Appellant has committed an "abomination" and "tarnished the family image", there was no reference in the letter to the Appellant's sexual orientation or to the Appellant's relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD noted that there is no reference in any of the divorce documents that the Appellant was caught in a same-sex relationship or any reference to the Appellant's sexual orientation as a bisexual or as a lesbian. The RPD further noted that the only reason for the dissolution of the Appellant's marriage given in the divorce documents35 and accepted, on a balance of probabilities, was that the Appellant committed adultery which led to the dissolution of the Appellant's marriage. [59] Given the Appellant's significant inconsistencies with respect to the discovery of her relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX and of her subsequent divorce, the RPD found there is insufficient persuasive evidence to determine that the Appellant was ever in a same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX or that she is bisexual or that the "adultery" referred to in the divorce documents is in reference to the Appellant's alleged same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD further found there was no persuasive evidence before the panel to determine that the "abomination" and "tarnishing of the family image" referred to in the Appellant's sister's letter is in reference to the Appellant's sexual orientation and her alleged same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX. Based on the content of the letter, the RAD concurs with the RPD affording the Appellant's sister's letter and divorce documents little evidentiary weight with respect to establishing the sexual identity of the Appellant. [60] The RPD found, given the significant credibility concerns noted with respect to the alleged discovery of the Appellant's same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX and of the Appellant's subsequent divorce, that the Appellant is not a credible witness in regard to her alleged same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX. Based on the totality of the credibility findings, the RAD finds the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant had a close platonic friendship with XXXX XXXX XXXX as opposed to a romantic or sexual same-sex relationship with her, is supportable. Perceived Sexual Orientation [61] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in not assessing "the well foundedness of the claim on the basis of a perceived bi-sexual orientation in a homophobic community like Nigeria", given the RPD's "own finding on a credible close relationship between the Applicant and XXXX XXXX XXXX". [62] The RAD does not accept this argument. The Appellant's own evidence was that she had lived with XXXX XXXX XXXX throughout her years in university without causing any difficulties for her or XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that the Appellant was not a credible witness with regard to her alleged same-sex relationship in Nigeria. Therefore, the RAD finds there is no persuasive evidence before the RAD that the Appellant would be perceived to be bisexual if she chooses to reside with a woman in Nigeria. Reavailment and Delay in Claiming [63] The Appellant submits that, if the RPD did not accept the evidence of the Appellant on her sexuality, there is no basis for the credibility finding made by the RPD against the Appellant for not seeking protection from such risks. [64] The RAD notes that the RPD acknowledged that the Appellant previously came to Canada in XXXX2013 and returned to Nigeria in XXXX2013 and did not make a claim for refugee protection at that time. The Appellant explained to the RPD that she was happy being married, and there was no reason for her to seek protection. The RPD found that, while the Appellant was allegedly happy in her marriage, she was also maintaining a secret same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX and had been doing so since she was a university student. The RPD found the Appellant was well aware of the serious risks she was taking in having a same-sex relationship in Nigeria; yet took no steps to seek protection from such risks when it was readily available and instead chose to reavail to Nigeria. [65] The RAD notes that the RPD supported this finding with evidence from the Appellant's BoC, where she states: "I cannot live the way I want to be in my country. I cannot love the way I want without fearing what the people will do to me. I am scared because of my lack of freedom in my own country." The RPD found it "reasonable to expect that a claimant, facing a risk of harm and who has a desire to "live the way I want" would seek protection at the first available opportunity. The RPD found the Appellant did not do so. [66] The RPD went on to consider that the Appellant speaks English, is well educated, having studied towards a degree in XXXX XXXX at the University of XXXX in Nigeria, and her background and capabilities, including her belief that she cannot live how she wants to in Nigeria. The RPD found that it was reasonable to expect, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would have made inquiries about seeking protection at her first available opportunity. While it is true that the RPD could have articulated its reasons in this regard more fully, it is clear that the RPD is referring to the Appellant seeking protection at her first available opportunity, if she genuinely feared for her life in Nigeria because of her sexual orientation. [67] The RPD acknowledged and the RAD concurs that, while failure to claim and reavailment are not decisive factors themselves, the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the delay in claiming and reavailment undermines the Appellant's credibility as it relates to her allegations of a risk of harm in Nigeria is supportable. Letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX [68] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to give necessary weight to relevant evidence and failed to consider the impact of her pregnancy on her ability to attend further orientation sessions with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. [69] The Appellant provided a newcomer orientation record from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX dated November 6, 2014 in support of her claim, which confirms that she attended an orientation session.36 The RPD accepted that the Appellant attended the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX since XXXX 2014; however, it afforded the training record "little evidentiary weight with respect to establishing the sexual orientation of the claimant as a bisexual, particularly in light of the aforementioned credibility concerns." The RAD notes that anyone can join the programming at the XXXX and that attendance at the XXXX does not confirm or deny the sexual orientation of the Appellant. The RAD further finds the RPD was correct in placing little weight on the Appellant's evidence from the XXXX XXXX XXXX in support of being bisexual. Microscopic Assessment of the Evidence [70] The RAD considered the submission by the Appellant that the RPD conducted a microscopic analysis with regard to the Appellant's claim. [71] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the RPD did not apply an overly vigilant and microscopic examination of the Appellant's other evidence. In addition, the RAD does not find that it was fixed on peripheral or irrelevant issues for the credibility findings in this case. The questions posed by the RPD were intended to assess the credibility of the Appellant's testimony and the credibility of the documents she submitted to support her claim. It was open to the RPD to test the credibility of the Appellant's evidence. Moreover, the Federal Court stated, in Bénéclerc,37 that the panel member can question the applicant energetically in order to, among other things, clarify the shortcomings in the evidence and to assess their credibility. The RPD relied on the totality of evidence before it in determining the Appellant was not credible. As such, the RAD finds that the RPD did not apply an unduly stringent or microscopic analysis. Accordingly, the Appellant's argument in this regard must fail. Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) [72] After a review of the complete record, including a recording of the hearing, the RAD finds that, notwithstanding the findings of the RPD and the allegations of error in those findings by the Appellant, there was evidence before the RPD of the existence of the determinative issue of an accessible and reasonable IFA. [73] For the reasons that follow, in this case, the RAD can confirm the RPD's determination. The RAD notes that the IFA was fully canvassed at the RPD hearing and that the Appellant and her counsel made submissions on the issue before the RPD which the RAD has reviewed. [74] In assessing an IFA, the RPD must apply a two-pronged test, cited in Rasaratnam,38 suitably modified to take account of section 97 of the IRPA. 1) the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and/or the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the IFA. 2) moreover, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for him to see refuge there [75] Both prongs must be satisfied to find that the claimant has an IFA. The burden of proof rests with the Appellant to show that she does not have an IFA. The finding of an IFA must be based on a distinct evaluation of a region for that purpose taking into account the Appellant's identity. An IFA must be a realistic and attainable option. An Appellant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to undergo undue hardship in traveling there or staying there.39 [76] The Appellant argues that she cannot return to Nigeria, which is a homophobic society throughout Nigeria. The RAD does not accept this argument as persuasive. The RPD found and the RAD concurred that the Appellant is not credible with regard to her allegations that she is a bisexual and will be at risk if she returns to Nigeria. [77] With regard to her allegations that her father will have her perform cleansing rituals and force her to be circumcised, the RAD finds there is a reasonable and viable internal flight alternative available to the Appellant in Abuja. [78] The RAD is aware that large urban areas cannot be assumed to be an IFA by virtue of their population size alone.40 The RAD finds that the RPD's finding of an IFA is not dependent on the size of these cities but was made in consideration of the totality of the evidence including the Appellant's ability to access services as well as to seek and obtain employment and housing. [79] The Appellant submits the RPD did not consider the documentary evidence which speaks to the influence and power of the Appellant's father. The RPD stated that the applicant committed adultery and may therefore face rituals. [80] The RAD notes that the RPD found that the Appellant's testimony concerning the centrepiece of her allegations of persecution was not credible. The RPD found the Appellant's testimony was undermined by significant contradictions between the versions of the central events of her allegations that she was bisexual and in a same-sex relationship in Nigeria and, as a result, was beaten by her father. [81] The RPD found and the RAD concurs, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility that she would be persecuted with regard to forced circumcision in Nigeria, if she were to relocate of Abuja, and that it would not be unreasonable for the Appellant to seek refuge there. In addition, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would not be forced by her father to participate in cleansing rituals, if she were to relocate to Abuja. [82] The RAD finds that the Appellant did not adduce persuasive evidence to indicate that she would have to live in hiding in Abuja. [83] In addition, the RAD finds that, despite her father being a lawyer in Nigeria, she has not provided any persuasive evidence how her father would come to know that she was living elsewhere in Nigeria. [84] Therefore, the RAD finds that the Appellant could live in any of the proposed IFA cities without fear or the need to hide. If the Appellant chooses not to inform others of her presence in these cities, there is no reason to believe that her location would be discovered. [85] The RAD considered the reasonableness of the IFA in the proposed IFAs. The test for reasonableness is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to move to another, less hostile part of the country before seeking status abroad, as per Thirunavukkarasu.41 This requires an evaluation of the conditions in the IFA as well as the Appellant or similarly situated persons. Thirunavukkarasu sets a very high threshold for what makes an IFA unreasonable in all the circumstances. The hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not the kind of undue hardship that renders and IFA unreasonable.42 However, it is not enough for the Appellant to say that he or she does not like the weather there, or that he or she has no friends or relatives there, or that he or she may not be able to find suitable work there.43 [86] The Appellant was asked by the RPD why it would not be possible for her to live in Abuja, the proposed IFA city. The Appellant responded that her father was a lawyer who has influence all over Nigeria and is connected to the police. The RPD found the Appellant had provided very little detail of the connections her father may have and the network of contacts he may have to find the Appellant or details of any mechanisms or resources through which he would be able to search for the Appellant. Breach of Natural Justice [87] The Appellant argues that the RPD breached the principles of natural justice by making significant findings of fact on the absence of corroboration with respect to internal flight alternative when that issue only arose during the course of the hearing. The RPD found that the Appellant had not provided enough corroboration of the assertion that her father is a lawyer and that he has a significant influence in Nigeria. The RPD breached the principles of natural justice by making significant findings of fact on documents not having been provided with respect to internal flight alternative when the issue only arose as an issue during the course of the hearing and without giving the applicant the opportunity to submit evidence on the issue. The RAD does not accept the Appellant's argument in this regard. While the Appellant is correct that the issue of IFA was raised at the hearing, the RAD notes, from a review of the evidence, that the Appellant, who was represented by experienced counsel, was given an opportunity to provide information about her father when questioned by both the RPD and her counsel. The RAD notes that the RPD questioned the Appellant and was also provided a further opportunity to clarify when asked if her father "had influence or any sort of networks in Abuja." The Appellant responded, "he goes to...he travels to different places to do cases all over Nigeria." The Appellant's counsel provided submissions on the issue of IFA and submitted that her father "travels around visiting..." Counsel did not provide submissions on the possibility of the Appellant's father locating her in Abuja. The RAD notes the short period of time between the hearing and the rendering of the decision; however, the Appellant's counsel would know he could request at the hearing to provide post-hearing submissions regarding the Appellant's father's profile, yet failed to do so. The RAD finds the RPD did not breach the principles of natural justice by failing to give the Appellant the opportunity to submit evidence on the issue. [88] The RPD considered the documentary evidence on internal relocation in Nigeria that indicates that victims of domestic violence can relocate within Nigeria, find employment, shelter, and support. The RAD finds that the RPD considered the documentary evidence in the context of the Appellant's personal circumstances. [89] The RAD notes that the RPD considered the following documentary evidence from the United Kingdom's Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report on Nigeria that addresses the freedom of movement for women in Nigeria as follows: WACOL [women's NGO] explained that internal relocation is possible for any adult woman irrespective of whether the case is about FGM (female genital mutilation), domestic violence or forced marriage. It is possible for adult women to relocate and look for jobs to sustain themselves; however, FGM and forced marriage cases very often involve underage girls. WRAPA (Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative) advised that internal relocation is legally possible, based on the right to freedom of movement as guaranteed by the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, for adult women seeking to protect their daughters against FGM. WRAPA considered that internal relocation is a realistic option for such women...the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) found that in theory, it is not difficult for a woman to relocate within Nigeria and in this way find physical safety...44 [90] The RAD notes that the RPD also considered the same report that states that internal relocation is an option for adult women who face domestic violence and that the report references the United Nations Development Fund for Women which states that the "sheer size of the country and its large population means that it would be very difficult for a husband, or other family members, to locate a woman who has escaped FGM, a forced marriage, or is a victim of domestic violence." [91] Based on the documentary evidence noted above, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that the evidence on internal relocation in Nigeria indicates that victims of domestic violence can relocate within Nigeria, find employment, shelter, and support. [92] The RPD further noted that the United Kingdom's Home Office, Country of Origin report45 indicates that WACOL was of the opinion that, if a woman needs physical protection in Abuja, she can go to the Federal Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development. The Ministry would offer protection to the women concerned. In September 2007, the Federal Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development opened a shelter in Abuja for women who are victims of domestic violence and their accompanying children. Its location is kept secret for the safety of the women. Women's NGOs throughout Nigeria can refer any woman who needs shelter to the shelter in Abuja. Women can stay in the shelter for up to four or five months. During this time, the women receive counselling from a department in the Ministry, and attempts will be made to mediate between women and the perpetrators. If reconciliation is not possible, the Ministry can offer the women legal assistance in taking their cases to the courts. Based on the documentary evidence, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that there are resources available in Abuja to vulnerable women that can provide assistance to the Appellant should she require such assistance. [93] The RAD notes that the RPD went on to consider the personal circumstances of the Appellant with respect to her ability to relocate to Abuja. The Appellant stated in her BoC that she is Christian and that she speaks English. The documentary evidence states that Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in the Federal Capital Territory.46 For this reason, the RAD is satisfied that the Appellant will have sources of moral and spiritual assistance and support available to her in Nigeria. The RAD notes the Appellant did not contest this finding. [94] The RPD noted that English is the official language of Nigeria. The RPD further noted that regarding ethnic affiliation and job opportunities, the women's NGO, WACOL (Women Aid Collective), considered that this might play a significant role in some rural locations but not in the larger cities and that ethnic affiliation has almost no bearing regarding internal relocation to Abuja.47 [95] Based on the documentary evidence, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would not face social or cultural constraints in Abuja but would in fact be familiar with the language, religion and culture in Abuja and that there would be facilities for religious worship available in Abuja should the Appellant wish to seek them out for spiritual support. [96] The Appellant submits that the RPD impugned the Appellant's credibility on her sexual orientation but did not address the implicit finding arising from the educational records before the Board and the evidence that the Appellant did not complete her education at the University of XXXX. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument has no merit in this regard. The RAD notes that the RPD stated that the Appellant (at the time of rendering the hearing) was 22 years of age, fluent in English and had studied towards a degree in XXXX XXXX at the University of XXXX, Nigeria. The RAD finds that the RPD did not state that the Appellant was a university graduate. [97] The RPD went on to find, given the documentary evidence48 that the availability of job opportunities is not a significant factor in relocating to larger cities, and given the Appellant's level of education and capabilities, she could reasonably be expected to find employment in Abuja and support herself. [98] Finally, the RPD considered the documentary evidence that UNIFEM has indicated that, in considering internal flight alternative, "attractive young, single women, in particular, are very vulnerable to abuse, harassment and trafficking when relocating to another area without economic means or family networks.49 The documentary evidence before the RPD and the RAD also indicates that such young women may also be vulnerable to unscrupulous men that may target these women and that, furthermore, it would be difficult for such women to relocate in Nigeria without relations who can assist her, particularly for a woman of an influential family who may be recognized.50 The RPD acknowledged that the Appellant stated in her BoC that she has family members in Nigeria, namely, her mother and siblings. Given the Appellant's university education, employment potential, and her ability to provide for herself, as evidenced by her ability to establish and provide for herself in Canada, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant could reasonably support herself in Abuja. Further, there was no persuasive evidence of the details of any connections her father may have in Abuja and, on a balance of probabilities, there was no persuasive evidence to establish that she would be recognized or sought out in Abuja. [99] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided any persuasive evidence that it would not be reasonable for her to move to Abuja. [100] The Appellant provided no persuasive evidence that she would be unfamiliar with cultural issues and norms in Abuja. Therefore, the RAD is satisfied that it would be reasonable for the Appellant to adapt to new surroundings in Abuja and be able to obtain employment. [101] Once the issue of an internal flight alternative is raised, the onus is on the refugee claimant to show that the option does not exist, by establishing that either of the two tests cited in Rasaratnam51 criteria is not met. The Federal Court of Appeal, in Thirunavukkarasu,52 stated that an applicant need only show that there is a serious possibility of being persecuted in the new location or that their removal to Nigeria would not subject them personally to a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture. The RAD finds that the Appellant has failed to show that the IFA option is not available to her. [102] Based on the totality of the evidence, the RAD finds that the record contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that an IFA in Abuja, Nigeria is accessible to the Appellant. [103] Given the finding above, that the Appellant has an internal flight alternative in Nigeria, the RAD finds that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA city and that her removal to Nigeria would not subject her personally to a risk to her life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture. Disposition [104] The RAD finds that there is an internal fight alternative for the Appellant, and since IFA is a determinative issue, the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [105] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. (signed) "C. Forbes" C. Forbes June 10, 2015 Date 1 Appellant's record, p. 83. 2 Appellant's record, page 87. 3 Appellant's record, page 89. 4 Appellant's record, pp. 91-96. 5 Appellant's record, pp. 97-98. 6 Appellant's record, pp. 100-101. 7 Appellant's record, p. 102 8 Appellant's record, p. 103 9 Appellant's record, p. 104. 10 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 11 Ibid., Huruglica. 12 Ibid., Huruglica, para 54. 13 Ibid., Huruglica, para 55. 14 Alyafi, Aghiad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1091-14), Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 952. 15 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 16 Appellant's record, at pp. 18 to 60. 17 Kanagarasa, Nisanthan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6783-13), Diner, February 4, 2015; 2015 FC 145. 18 Appellant's record, p. 85. 19 Appellant's record, pp. 91-96. 20 Czesak, Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9539-12), Annis, November 14, 2013; 2013 FC 1149. 21 Appellant's record, p. 87. 22 Appellant's record, pp. 17-60. 23 Gordoo, Davaajav v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3793-10), Mosley, April 27, 2011; 2011 FC 497. 24 RPD's record, Exhibit 7, Personal Documents, item C-14. 25 RPD's record, p. 145, Exhibit 7, p. 22. 26 RPD's record, p. 142, Exhibit 7, p. 19. 27 RPD's record, p. 139, Exhibit 7, p. 16. 28 RPD's record, p. 147, Exhibit 7, p. 24. 29 RPD's record, p. 146, Exhibit 7, p. 23. 30 RPD's Record, Exhibit 2. 31 RPD's Record, p. 133, Exhibit 6, p. 12. 32 RPD's Record, pp. 152-160, Exhibit 8. 33 RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, Ibid. 34 RPD's Record, Exhibit 9. 35 RPD's Record, Exhibits 7 and 8. 36 RPD's Record, p. 129, Exhibit 6, p. 8 37 Bénéclerc v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2538-06), Martineau, March 6, 2007; 2007 FC 266. 38 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 39 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.), at 596-599. 40 Reynoso, Edith Isabel Guardian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2110-94), Muldoon, January 29, 1996. 41 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.), at 596-599. 42 M.C.I. v. Ranganathan, Rohini (F.C.A., no. A-348-99), Létourneau, Sexton, Malone, December 21, 2000. 43 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.), at 596-599. 44 RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 28, 2014), item 2.2, Country of Origin Information (COI) Report: Nigeria, United Kingdom, Home Office, 3 February 2014. 45 RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Nigeria (November 28, 2014). 46 RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Nigeria (November 28, 2014), item 12.1, Nigeria, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, United States, Department of State, 28 July 2014. 47 RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Nigeria (November 28, 2014), item 2.2, Country of Origin Information (COI) Report: Nigeria, United Kingdom, Home Office, 3 February 2014 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 52 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01900