TB4-05776

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-05776 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 20, 2014 Date de la décision Panel S.S. Kular Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Pablo Irribarra Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, (the Appellant), a citizen of Jamaica,1 appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. [2] The Appellant submits that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD, and either find the Appellant to be a Convention refugee, or in the alternative refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. [3] The Appellant has submitted new evidence as per Section 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).2 The Appellant is not requesting a hearing at the RAD pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA. The Minister is not intervening in the RAD Appeal. DETERMINATION [4] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [5] The Appellant alleges a fear of persecution in Jamaica due to his sexual orientation as a bisexual male. [6] In XXXX of 2007, the Appellant came to Canada on a valid work permit for the XXXX which was extended to the XXXX. In XXXX 2008, the Appellant returned to Jamaica to reapply for a work permit to return to Canada. The Appellant was granted work permit, and returned to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2008. [7] During his brief return to Jamaica, the Appellant was "outed" and his family and community became aware of his sexual orientation as a bisexual male. The Appellant was beaten and chased from the community. The Appellant fled to his father's house and then returned to Canada. [8] The Appellant has remained in Canada continuously since his return to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2008. The Appellant's legal status in Canada expired in XXXX 2009. The Appellant filed his claim for refugee protection in Canada on January 20, 2014. The Appellant alleges that he fears persecution and possibly death if returned to Jamaica due to his sexual orientation as a bisexual male. [9] Counsel for the Minister filed a Notice of Intent to Intervene3 in the Appellant's claim for refugee protection at the RPD on the grounds that there were serious concerns regarding the Appellant's credibility. The counsel for the Minister participated by filing documents with no attendance at the RPD hearing. [10] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on May 27, 2014. In the decision of June 12, 2014, the RPD rejected his refugee claim. [11] The RPD found that the Appellant did not provide sufficient trustworthy and credible evidence to establish his claim. The RPD had credibility concerns with the Appellant's evidence, including the Appellant's inconsistent evidence regarding his sexual orientation of whether he is bisexual or gay. Therefore, the RPD found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant did not establish his allegations, particularly his sexual orientation and the alleged incidents having had taken place in Jamaica. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [12] The Appellant provided the following documents as new evidence:4 1. Letter from his mother in Jamaica, XXXX XXXX 2. Letter from his sister in Jamaica, XXXX XXXX 3. Letter from XXXX XXXX in Jamaica 4. Letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, regarding the Appellant volunteering in the XXXX XXXX XXXX since XXXX 2014 5. Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX, a member of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and a friend of the Appellant 6. Photographs (15 in total) of the Appellant with members of the LGBT community: most of the photos (10) taken at the Pride Parade in Toronto, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; 2 photos dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; and two dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; and one XXXX XXXX, 2014. [13] As provided for in Section 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and person subject to the appeal. Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. The RAD assesses the Appellant's proposed new evidence, as per Section 110(4) of the IRPA and in the context of the totality of the Appellant's evidence adduced at the RPD, including the recording of the RPD proceedings. [14] The Appellant submits that the above evidence did not exist until after the RPD hearing; therefore, it satisfies the criteria set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA.5 The Appellant provided reasons why he could not provide these documents before the rejection of the claim, and references to case law why his evidence be admitted at the RAD.6 In view of the criteria set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD finds the evidence submitted under tabs E, F, G, H, and I of item 2 of the Appellant's Record, items 1 thru 5 listed above, are not new as the evidence therein did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's claim as alleged. The RAD acknowledges that the RPD in finding the affidavit from the Appellant's mother not being persuasive in terms of establishing the Appellant's allegations, including of receiving any death threats mentioned that the affidavit from the Appellant's mother was not sworn or witnessed.7 The affidavit from the Appellant's mother included as new evidence is witnessed. Despite the above, the RAD finds the evidence contained therein is not new. The evidence contained therein was reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of the claim. The Appellant was represented by competent counsel at the RPD. Further, the RAD finds the above-mentioned documents address issues central to the claim. Therefore, as per Section 110(4) of the IRPA, it was reasonable in the circumstances to expect the Appellant to have presented this evidence, including witnessed document from his mother, to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. Based on these reasons, the RAD finds the evidence in items 1 thru 5 submitted to the RAD does not meet the requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA. The RAD, therefore, does not accept items 1 thru 5 as new evidence. [15] The photos submitted under tab J of item 2 of the Appellant's Record, item 6 above, is new as these photos were taken after the rejection of the claim, and especially photos relating to the Pride Parade 2014 could not possibly be taken prior to the rejection of the claim. Thus, it was not reasonable in the circumstances to expect the Appellant to have presented this evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. Therefore, the RAD finds these photos meet the test in Section 110(4) of the IRPA. Although the Appellant's this proposed new evidence, the photos, meets the test set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA, this does not require the RAD to admit these photos into evidence without any further consideration. [16] Section 110(4) of the IRPA is worded in a similar manner to Section 113 of the IRPA that deals with pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). Section 113(a) provides that an applicant whose claim for refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. The PRRA is not an appeal of the RPD decision as is the situation for the RAD; however, guidance can be obtained from the jurisprudence interpreting Section 113 of the IRPA. [17] The leading case on "new" evidence for PRRA, Raza,8 was decided by the Federal Court of Appeal. While Raza predates the introduction of the IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the very similar wording of Section 113(a). [18] In Raza, the Court outlined factors to be considered in determining what constitutes new evidence. These factors were: 1. Credibility: Is the evidence credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 2. Relevance: Is the evidence relevant to the PRRA application, in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 3. Newness: Is the evidence new in the sense that it is capable of: (a) proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD, or; (b) proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or; (c) contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD (including a credibility finding)? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 4. Materiality: Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 5. Express statutory conditions: (a) If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the RPD hearing, then has the applicant established either that the evidence was not reasonably available to him or her for presentation at the RPD hearing, or that he or she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the RPD hearing? If not, the evidence need not be considered. (b) If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered (unless it is rejected because it is not credible, not relevant, not new or not material). [19] In consideration of the Raza factors, a document's "newness" is not to be tested solely by its date of creation but by the date of the events or circumstances it seeks to prove.9 The Appellant had submitted some photos with his friends from the LGBT community to the RPD. There are also photos showing that the Appellant participated in Toronto Pride Parade 2014. Although the Toronto Pride Parade 2014 photos are different in context than the other photos submitted, the RAD finds all photos submitted do not add new information to the Appellant's evidence that was already before the RPD. Further, using the Raza factors, this evidence fails the Raza test on relevance and materiality. The photos in and of themselves are not sufficient to establish the Appellant`s identity as a bisexual male or gay. Based on these reasons, the RAD determines that even though the photos submitted to the RAD by the Appellant meet the requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD would not accept these as new evidence based on the Raza factors, relevance and materiality. Therefore, the RAD does not accept these photos as new evidence. [20] All of the Appellant's alleged new evidence is not admitted at the RAD. ANALYSIS [21] The Appellant makes submissions on the standard of review, referring to the recent Federal Court cases.10 The RAD has considered the appellant's submissions both in his Memorandum11 including the case law,12 and the Appellant`s submissions relating to standard of review. [22] In considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD, while the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [23] Although the RAD is a relatively new body, it now has the benefit of some Federal Court jurisprudence which speaks to the appellate tribunal's role in relation to that of the RPD. [24] In Iyamuremye, the Court found itself: [E]ntirely in agreement with the RAD that the standard of review to be applied to findings of fact made by the RPD is reasonableness. It is well established that an appellate body must review the findings of a trial court by applying a correctness standard to findings that involve questions of law and by applying a reasonableness standard to those involving questions of mixed fact and law....13 The Court went on to hold that the RAD must review the evidence that was before the RPD and conduct its own, independent assessment of that evidence to determine whether the lower tribunal had properly considered the evidence and "reasonably justified its conclusion".14 [25] In the subsequent case of Alvarez, the Court clarified the role of the RAD in relation to the RPD.15 It held that the RAD is not to undertake a process of judicial review, but rather must perform its own assessments of the facts in order to determine whether the RPD made an error of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a "palpable and overriding error."16 In the Court's view, the lower tribunal's ability to hear evidence viva voce makes it better situated than the RAD to make findings of fact, and therefore the appeal tribunal should show deference to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law. In contrast to its ruling in Iyamuremye, here the Court found that the RAD erred by assessing the decision of the RPD against a standard of reasonableness, but then required the use of a higher standard. The Eng case released on the same day as Alvarez, contained the same analysis of the issue of standard of review. [26] In Malhotra,17 issued after Alvarez and Eng, the Federal Court considered another decision of the RAD, in which the tribunal applied a standard of reasonableness to the RPD's decision under appeal. Although the Court did not specifically address the RAD's selection of the standard of review, it observed that the RAD had applied a standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD's decision did not contain any error which justified the intervention of the Court. [27] More recently, the Court, in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.18 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.19 [28] While the Court had endorsed the standard of reasonableness in Iyamuremye, and accepted it in Malhotra, it found in Huruglica that the application of such standard was in error. In contrast to Alvarez and Eng, the Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error. In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal." As instructed by the Court, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. [29] In this appeal, the RAD adopts and will follow guidance from the case law in Huruglica. Merits of the Appeal The Appellant's Pleadings20and the case law submitted21 [30] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its credibility assessment of the Appellant. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred, in finding that the Appellant established neither his sexual orientation nor the incidents he experienced in Jamaica, by having ignored relevant evidence that directly contradicted the conclusion that the RPD reached. The Appellant submits that the RPD based its conclusions on unreasonable credibility findings.22 The RPD's Findings23 [31] The RPD had credibility concerns with the Appellant's evidence, including the Appellant's inconsistent evidence regarding his sexual orientation of whether he is bisexual or gay. The RPD, therefore, found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant did not establish his allegations, particularly his sexual orientation and the alleged incidents having had taken place in Jamaica.24 RAD Analysis The Discrepancy Relating to the Name of the Appellant's same-sex Partner in Jamaica [32] The RAD reviews the totality of the evidence, including the recording of the proceedings. The RPD found that the Appellant was unclear about the name of his same-sex partner in Jamaica, XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXX. The Appellant testified at the hearing that he "got his name wrong", and added that everyone in Jamaica has two names. The RPD found the Appellant's explanation unreasonable. The Appellant alleged that he came to know of his same-sex partner's real name, XXXX XXXX, after he came across an old pamphlet from his Church, and that this happened after he had already filed his Basis of Claim (BoC) form with the RPD. The RAD finds the Appellant had submitted an amendment to his narrative to the RPD, which the RPD did not mention in its Reasons for decision.25 The Appellant had also submitted a document from the XXXX XXXX in Jamaica26 to the RPD. The Appellant's alleged same-sex partner was the Pastor at the XXXX XXXX in Jamaica. The document that the Appellant had submitted to the RPD has a caption of the Pastor and just below it on the same page a caption of the Appellant, demonstrating the Appellant's link to the Church activities. Relating to the issues of the discrepancy identified here, the RAD finds it would have been preferable for the RPD to mention the BoC amendment. Nonetheless, in consideration of the totality of the evidence in this case including the Church document, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, the Pastor's correct name, XXXX XXXX, was known among the patrons of the church, including the Appellant. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, the BoC amendment and the Appellant`s explanation that he came to know of his same-sex partner's real name, XXXX XXXX, after he came across an old pamphlet from his Church cannot cure the credibility problem raised by this discrepancy. Therefore, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding the Appellant not credible in his allegations that he came to know of his same-sex partner's real name, XXXX XXXX, after he filed his BoC with the RPD. Omission of the Appellant's Past Relationship with a Woman in his BoC [33] The Appellant testified that he was in a long-term relationship with a girl named XXXX for several years. This relationship was not included in his BoC. The Appellant's explanation for the omission was that he did not see the need. Due to this omission, the RPD drew a negative inference about the Appellant's credibility. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its finding because '...while his past relationship with XXXX was relevant because it was relationship with a man, and is therefore an indicator of his attraction for men, his relationship with XXXX or other women he has casually dated were not relevant because he is not facing persecution in Jamaica because of his attraction for women.'27 The RPD found that his long-term relationship with XXXX is a very important and relevant fact in the claim28 because the basis of the Appellant's claim is that he a bisexual male. Based on the totality of the evidence, the RAD finds the Appellant's long-term relationship with XXXX is a significant fact just as is his alleged relationship with his same-sex partner, as these facts define the Appellant's profile as a bisexual male. In consideration of the above, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding the Appellant not credible regarding the reasons for the omission of his long-term relationship with XXXX from his BoC. The Appellant's Sexual Orientation and the Alleged Incidents in Jamaica [34] The RPD found the Appellant not credible regarding his sexual orientation as a bisexual or a gay person. The Appellant had consistently narrated himself to be a bisexual male in all of his documentation provided to the RPD and during most of his testimony at the RPD. At the hearing, however, when the Appellant was asked by the RPD to state his sexual orientation, the Appellant identified himself as gay. The Appellant testified in the latter part of the proceedings at the RPD, and submits in his pleadings that he is more attracted to men than women. The Appellant wrote in his appeal pleadings that his statement about him being gay at the RPD was made in the context of explanations he had provided concerning his attraction for both men and women, and the fact that within this framework, he was more attracted to men than women.29 The RAD finds the Appellant's pleadings go beyond the scope of the totality of the evidence provided to the RPD. The RAD finds the Appellant's pleadings attempt to interpret what the Appellant meant to say at the RPD. In this respect, the RAD finds the Appellant's explanations as to what he had meant to say at the RPD would not have been conceivably considered by the RPD in arriving at its findings in this case. Considering the totality of the evidence provided at the RPD, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding that the Appellant has not established with clear and convincing evidence that he is a bisexual man or gay. [35] The Appellant wrote in his original BoC that his neighbour discovered him with his same-sex partner XXXX at his mother's house. In his updated narrative, the Appellant stated that his brother's girlfriend discovered him with his same-sex partner XXXX at his mother's house. The RPD asked the Appellant to explain this discrepancy in his evidence. The Appellant explained that the neighbour was his brother's girlfriend, and that she lived with his brother next door. The RPD did not find the Appellant's explanation satisfactory. The Appellant submits that he had clearly established in his amended narrative that he was discovered with his same-sex partner by his brother's girlfriend and that she lived next door with his brother. The RAD acknowledges the information in the updated BoC; however, it is clear from the information in the Appellant's original BoC that he is not talking about being confronted by one person, or someone related to his family member. The Appellant is referring to some neighbours confronting him.30 Regardless, the RAD finds the evidence is not clear for the RAD to make a determination regarding who confronted the Appellant that day. The RAD finds the fact whether the Appellant was confronted by his brother's girlfriend who lived with his brother next door, or he was confronted by a neighbour is not significant in determining the Appellant's allegations of abuse by the community due to his sexual orientation; what is important is whether the alleged incident occurred. The RAD finds the RPD found the Appellant to be generally not a credible witness, and therefore, did not find that the alleged incidents actually happened. Based on the evidence adduced at the RPD, on a balance of probabilities, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding the Appellant to be generally not a credible witness, and therefore to making a further finding that the alleged incident did not happen. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in its credibility findings. [36] The RPD also found the Appellant not credible relating to his testimony that his mother was threatened with death. The RPD found that the Appellant failed to enter these details in his BoC; and moreover, the letter from the Appellant's mother submitted to the RPD made no mention of any death threats issued against her.31 Due to cumulative credibility concerns, and because the Appellant's mother's letter was not sworn or witnessed, the RPD did not find the Appellant's mother's letter persuasive in establishing the Appellant's allegations, including those of receiving death threats. In respect to this, the RAD finds the RPD erred in fact stating that the Appellant`s mother`s letter made no mention of any death threats. The RAD reviewed the Appellant`s mother`s letter; the letter does mention threats to her.32 The RAD acknowledges that the RPD erred in fact with respect to the Appellant`s mother`s letter. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding, due to cumulative credibility concerns, and because the Appellant's mother's letter was not sworn or witnessed, the Appellant's mother's letter not persuasive in establishing the Appellant's allegations, including those of receiving death threats. [37] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred, in finding that the Appellant established neither his sexual orientation nor the incidents he experienced in Jamaica, by having ignored relevant evidence that directly contradicted the conclusion that the RPD reached. The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to mention letters from XXXX XXXX (the Appellant`s sister)33 and XXXX XXXX (a witness to the alleged incident in Jamaica in 2008).34 [38] While the RPD does not have to refer to each and every document and/or piece of evidence; the RAD finds it would have been preferable if the RPD had referred to all of the letters submitted in its Reasons for decision. The RAD finds the letters that the RPD failed to mention are not in or of themselves sufficient to overcome the Appellant`s credibility problems. The Appellant was found to be generally lacking in credibility by the RPD. The RAD reviewed both letters submitted. The letters are from the Appellant`s sister and an acquaintance of the family, both residing in Jamaica. The RPD could not question them. The letter regurgitate the Appellant`s allegations. The letters are submitted by the Appellant who himself is generally lacking in credibility. Therefore, the RAD gives these letters little evidentiary weight. Delay in Claiming and Re-availment [39] The RPD asked the Appellant why he failed to make his refugee claim in Canada in 2008 or earlier, and/or to make enquiries to stay legally in Canada. The Appellant replied that he could have; he should have. The Appellant added that his circle of friends from Jamaica and the Caribbean all hold the same values.35 The RPD did not find the Appellant's explanation for delay for claim satisfactory. The RAD is aware that a delay in making a refugee claim is not a determinative factor in and of itself, but is a relevant consideration for the decision maker in assessing the Appellant's fear of returning to his own country of nationality. Moreover, the delay in this case is lengthy, more than five years. It is reasonable to assume that a person with well-founded fear of persecution will attempt to apply for refugee protection without unreasonable delay. In the absence of a reasonable explanation, as in this case, the delay in claiming further detracts from the Appellant's credibility. The Appellant's Involvement in LGBT Groups in Canada [40] The evidence in this case shows that the Appellant started to attend LGBT groups in Toronto after filing his claim for refugee protection. The documents that he provided from these organizations simply indicated that the Appellant had recently joined those groups. The Appellant also submitted letters from two gay friends XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX; the Appellant submitted that the RPD failed to consider these letters.36 The RAD repeats here while the RPD does not have to refer to each and every document and/or piece of evidence in its Reasons for decision; the RAD, however, finds it would have been preferable if the RPD had referred to all of the letters submitted. In this context, the RPD found that the Appellant's recent and limited involvement in the LGBT organizations, indicated through the various letters submitted, was not persuasive to establish the Appellant's allegations, including his sexual orientation as a bisexual male or a gay.37 Therefore, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in its failure to mention two letters from the Appellant`s gay friends. Thus, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in finding that the Appellant's recent and limited involvement in the LGBT organizations, indicated through the various letters submitted, was not persuasive to establish the Appellant's allegations, including his sexual orientation as a bisexual male or a gay. The Appellant's Psychological Assessment [41] The Appellant provided psychological assessment conducted by Dr. XXXX.38 The RAD concurs with the RPD and finds the report to be very general in nature, regurgitating the self-reported allegations provided by the Appellant at the RPD. The RPD found that the report did not reflect on the potential credibility-related shortcomings in the Appellant's evidence. The RPD, therefore, gave the report little weight in determining the veracity of the Appellant's allegations.39 The RAD finds the RPD did not err in its consideration of the Appellant psychological assessment in making its findings. [42] The RPD found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant did not establish his allegations, particularly his sexual orientation and the alleged incidents having had taken place in Jamaica. Considering the totality of the evidence in this case, including the recording of the proceedings, the RAD concurs with the RPD that when considered cumulatively, the RPD's credibility findings are sufficient to support the RPD's conclusion that the Appellant was generally lacking in credibility. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD concurs with the RPD as the RAD would have come to the same conclusions. [43] Therefore, the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, nor a person in need of Canada's protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. DISPOSITION [44] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [45] This appeal is dismissed. (signed) 'S.S. Kular' S.S. Kular October 20, 2014 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Exhibit 1. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Exhibit 5. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume I, item 2, Exhibits, E, F, G, H, I, and J; pp. 385-418. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume I, item 2, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014, and in compliance with RAD Rule 3(3)(d), paras. 13-19. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, paras. 73-92. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume I, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para. 16. 8 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385 9 Raza, para. 16. 10 Submissions received at the Board on September 11, 2014. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, pp. 558-593. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 3, Appellant`s Book of Authorities, pp. 418-457. 13 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 2 14 Iyamuremye, para. 3. 15 Alvarez, Ismael Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7218-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702; the same reasons are given in Eng, Sengloem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7281-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711. 16 Alvarez, para. 33. 17 Malhotra, Sunil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6899-13), Bédard, August 1, 2014, 2014 FC 768 18 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799 19 Huruglica, para. 45. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, pp. 558-593. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 3, Appellant`s Book of Authorities, pp. 418-457. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume I, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, pp. 1-9. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, pp. 1-9. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para.22. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 2, Exhibit A, p. 47. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 2, Exhibit D, pp. 127-128. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 28. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para. 13. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 44. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Exhibit 2. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para. 16. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Letter from XXXX XXXX (the Appellant`s mother), p. 384, para 2. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, paras. 60.and 71. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 71. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para. 18. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume II, item 4, Appellant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 71. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, paras. 19-20. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Exhibit 7. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Volume 1, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons for the Decision, para. 21. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-05776