TB6-07843

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-07843 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 12, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Luis F. Agostinho Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Kingsley I. Jesuorobo Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who claims to be a citizen of Zimbabwe, appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the RPD's decision and replace it with a determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection or in the alternative that the matter be referred back to a different member of the RPD for re-determination. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to section 111(1) (b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant became involved in the Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai (MDC-T) political party in 2011 by putting up posters and distributing MDC-T bits and pieces. The Appellant alleges that he became a full member of the MDC-T in 2013 and continued to support the party by distributing posters and apparel which advertised the party. On XXXX XXXX, 2013, the Appellant further alleges he was approached by three men who identified themselves as police officers, they asked him to identification, however the Appellant refused to produce his identification and the men began to threaten him. A physical altercation ensued, but as onlookers approached, the three men fled. [4] Sometime in 2014, the Appellant applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) in order to study in Canada, and said visa was granted. The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015 to begin his studies. In January 2016 he was contacted by his sister who advised him that while she was in Zimbabwe on holidays from her studies in China, she had been assaulted by members of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriot Front (ZANU-PF) after she refused their invitation to join the party. It was at this time following the advice of his sister that the Appellant sought refugee protection at an inland office in Canada. Analysis The Role of the RAD [5] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [6] The Appellant's counsel makes submissions on the appropriate standard of review which is to be used by the RAD.1 [7] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.2 [8] The RAD is a statute of a different kind as is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.3 Such an appeal: "(i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD."4 [9] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states, that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.5 [10] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.6 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to choose whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, then RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.7 [11] However, there are cases where the RPD enjoys an expressive advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, as such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.8 The Federal Court of Appeal, in deliberating the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: "The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case."9 [12] It is obvious from the reading of the Federal Court of Appeal decision that some level of deference is warranted, it is less evident how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: "[T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed."10 [13] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. Therefore, credibility findings which arise from that oral testimony are appropriate of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, so are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [14] The RAD notes that not every finding relating to credibility however, warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.11 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - here the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.12 [15] The question becomes how much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can "recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'."13 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Federal Court. [16] It is unfortunate that the Federal Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.14 This leads the RAD to believe, this proposes that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [17] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 15 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [18] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [19] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason, that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [20] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [21] But the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [22] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. Application for an Oral Hearing [23] The Appellant does not request an oral hearing pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA. [24] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present "only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [25] According to Section 110(6), upon which the Appellant relies, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. In this appeal, where there is no evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) must be understood in relation to Section 110(4). [26] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [27] The RAD has not accepted any of the Appellant's new proposed evidence, as such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing in his appeal. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [28] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected16 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [29] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.17 Application of Section 110(4) [30] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.18 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of his claim. If he could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [31] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.19 [32] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [33] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit one piece of new evidence: (a) Article: The Elephant in the Room/Human Rights Watch20 [34] The Appellant did not provide an Affidavit with his record of appeal, thus there is no explanation for the evidence submitted. [35] Section 110(4) does not, however, refer to the Appellant's hearing; rather, new evidence is that which arose after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. This document was available and was used in the RPD hearing of the Appellant. It can now be found in the RPD record21, and as such forms part of the RPD record. [36] The Appellant's proposed new evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4) and is therefore not admissible in this appeal. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE Did the Board err in its credibility findings? The Appellant's political profile [37] The RPD member found that the Appellant's testimony about his political involvement added to the Panel's concerns about the credibility of the Appellant's political association with the MDC. In the decision rendered by the RPD, the member referred to the Appellant's profile within the MDC to be very low and that the Appellant has only the most surface-level interest.22 [38] The Appellant submits in his appeal that the Board erred in concluding he had submitted insufficient evidence of his political profile and that he had not establish an objective basis for his personal fear. [39] The RAD has listened to the recording of the hearing and, consequently agrees with the Appellant. When the RPD member asked the Appellant why he decided to join the MDC he did, indeed, respond that it was the right thing to do. However, he continued with a forthright and detailed explanation as to why this was the case. The Appellant testified that the country was going from bad to worse. He testified further that with the government in power the citizens did not have basic necessities such as food, electricity, and petrol; he testified that hospitals and schools were shut down. The Appellant then testified that he wanted to join the MDC because the party promised at that time to make changes in the country and he wished to be part of the change. [40] The RAD notes that there is no indication that the RPD member questioned the Appellant about the MDC policies or objectives. The Appellant testified that he had joined the youth wing of the MDC and participated in some activities. [41] The recording of the hearing indicates that when the RPD member asked the Appellant what he did upon joining the MDC, the Appellant provided testimony in a straightforward manner. The Appellant testified that he was introduced to the MDC in his district where he participated in the party activities; he further testified that he began to attend rallies. [42] The RAD found no probative evidence in the record to establish that the Appellant was a member or supporter of the MDC. There are no letters from the MDC party to corroborate the Appellant's position in the MDC party, and the RPD did not pursue this avenue in the hearing. [43] The RAD has previously found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant may have been active in the MDC when he resided in Zimbabwe and may came to the attention of authorities on one occasions. The RAD notes that as part of the UK Border Agency's fact-find mission to Zimbabwe, a representative of a major NGO stated that there were no express legal restrictions on those returnees, but the intelligence systems of the main political parties are sophisticated and it would not be possible for those who have come to the adverse attention of a party to avoid that risk by relocating within Zimbabwe. The NGO representative stated further that this applies equally to rural and urban areas.23 [44] According to independent documentary evidence, the MDC supporters, human rights defenders and other opponents of ZANU-PF, or those perceived to be such, who are able to establish that their political opinions or perceived political activities in Zimbabwe and/or the UK mean that they are at real risk of coming to the attention of ZANU-PF or its supporters and who cannot avoid that risk by internally relocating will have a well-founded fear of persecution and should be granted asylum.24 [45] Independent documentary evidence indicates that records are kept by various groups and authorities including the CIO, local police and ZANU-PF party organizations and the war veterans but the existence of these records do not materially add to the assessment of the risk of persecution in an individual case which depends on the applicant's profile and background. It seems unlikely that someone who has been caught up in random and intimidating violence would without more be regarded as of continuing interest to the authorities. The Appellant's Profile [46] The RPD member found that the Appellant: During his testimony, I found the claimant to be forthright, answered questions directly, and did not exaggerate. The claimant stated that he had been attacked on XXXX XXXX 2013, that his mother had been approached a number of times by ZANU-PF members asking about the whereabouts of her children, and gave details about the attack on her sister. The claimant stated that it was this final attack on his sister that convinced him to make his refugee application in Canada. The claimant also provided a colour copy of the medical report regarding his sister, and the injuries she sustained in XXXX 201625. I find on a balance of probabilities that the encounter the claimant had in the parking lot with the three unidentified men did happen as claimed. I also find on a balance of probabilities that the claimant does believe that his sister was attacked in XXXX 2016, and that his sister advised him to claim refugee status as a result of the attack on her. From this, I do conclude that the claimant does have a personal fear of ZANU-PF. However, I also find from the claimant's evidence that he does not have a sufficiently high political profile to bring him to the attention of the Zimbabwean authorities or ZANU-PF to provide the objective basis of that personal fear. 26 [47] The member also stated that she considered the documentary evidence when finding that the Appellant would not be at risk as a returnee from abroad. In this finding, the RPD member depended upon information provided from a nine day fact-finding mission by the UK Border Agency during August 2010.27 In particular, the fact- finding mission "has not come across any cases of returnees from the UK being mistreated and would expect to know of any such cases because its member organization are represented across the country."28 [48] The Appellant submits that the independent documentary evidence justifies his fears based on the fact that the incidents involving him and his sister and the authorities still visit his home and ask his mother for his whereabouts. The Appellant argues further that the Board engaged in a selective reading of the evidence in this regard. [49] The RAD disagrees with the Appellant. The RAD considered the independent documentary evidence regarding a failed refugee claimant with the Appellant's profile returning to Zimbabwe. [50] The UK Operational Guidance Note advises that the decision maker in a refugee claim make an assessment of the risk on return to Harare airport.29 [51] The Operational Guidance Note states that the process of screening returning passengers is an intelligence-led process and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) will generally have identified from the passenger manifest in advance, based upon such intelligence, those passengers in whom there is any possible interest. The fact of having made an asylum claim abroad is not something that in itself will give rise to adverse interest on return. A deportee from the United Kingdom who, having been subjected to the first stage interview at the airport, is allowed to pass through the airport is likely to be the subject of some monitoring in his home area by the local police or the CIO but the evidence does not indicate a real risk of persecutory ill-treatment for those who are being monitored solely because of their return from the United Kingdom. [52] However, the fact-finding mission referred to earlier in this decision states that they are unable to say that there have been no cases of risk for returnees but if there have been they have been isolated examples. They do, however, have concerns that those who are known to have claimed asylum in the UK would be considered necessarily to have been disloyal to Zimbabwe and may therefore face additional problems reintegrating because the fact that they had claimed asylum would become known. This would not apply to returning economic migrants unless their families were known to be political activists.30 [53] The RAD, thus, concludes that if the Appellant returns to Zimbabwe there is more than a mere possibility that he will be screened by the CIO as a person of interest because of his previous political activities in Zimbabwe. If he does pass through the first screening, his activities will be monitored. The Appellant would, more than likely, be discovered by the authorities to be not only a failed asylum seeker but a former activist with the MDC. [54] The RAD wishes to note the following advice provided in the Operational Guidance Note: The current atmosphere of hostility to the return of failed asylum seekers does not of itself put at risk those who would otherwise not be at real risk but does serve to reinforce the fact that asylum claims must be considered with care and where there is any uncertainty, any doubts must be resolved in the applicant's favour. Objective Evidence [55] Given that the RAD finds that the Appellant was, on a balance of probabilities, low level active member of the MDC in Zimbabwe and, the RAD has considered the independent documentary evidence with regards to people with such a profile. [56] The CIO from the UK Home Office provides the following information.31 The most important human rights problems in the country remained the government's targeting for harassment, arrest, abuse, and torture of members of non-ZANU-PF parties and civil society activists, widespread disregard for the rule of law among security forces and the judiciary, and restrictions on civil liberties. [57] There are continuing reports of politically motivated abductions during the year. The NDP also lists MDC supporters and human rights defenders and other perceived opponents of the ZANU-PF as a specific profile of persons who are at risk of persecution in Zimbabwe by the ZANU-PF ruling party.32 [58] The Freedom in the World report corroborates the brutal campaign of violence against the MDC members and their suspected supporters and civil society and the press. Again it reiterates that Zimbabwe is not an electoral democracy. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have dominated political landscape since 1980 overseeing amendments to continually expand the constitution to continue to attempt to legitimize his stay in power.33 [59] The DOS report indicates that ZANU-PF supporters, often with tacit support from police, continued to assault and torture scores of persons, including suspected and known MDC members, their families, civil society activists, and student leaders. Many incidents are reported in the report. For example, from January through September, according to one NGO, 334 persons sought treatment for injuries and trauma sustained from security force abuse, compared with 289 persons in 2012. Observers attributed the increase to the constitutional referendum in March and the July 31 elections. Nearly 50 percent of the cases took place in Harare, and the vast majority of the victims were affiliated with MDC.34 [60] The latest report from Human Rights Watch, January 2014 states that the security forces have a long history of partisanship on behalf of President Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party. The partisanship of the security forces' leadership has translated into abuses by these forces against MDC members and supporters, and civil society organizations.35 [61] Amnesty International provides the following information: Human rights defenders and political activists - other than ZANU-PF members - continued to operate under heavy restrictions. In urban areas, police were the main perpetrators, using the Public Order and Security Act to arbitrarily limit the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, including by blocking legitimate meetings and activities of human rights defenders and other political parties. In semi-urban and rural areas, local ZANU-PF activists continued to disrupt legitimate activities of their opponents with impunity. Some traditional leaders were also used by ZANUPF to restrict access to rural areas. Incidents of uniformed soldiers assaulting people attending meetings organized by the two MDC parties were recorded. The UK Operational Guidance Note concludes that: MDC supporters, human rights defenders and other opponents of ZANU-PF, or those perceived to be such, who are able to establish that their political opinions or perceived political activities in Zimbabwe and/or the UK mean that they are at real risk of coming to the attention of ZANU-PF or its supporters and who cannot avoid that risk by internally relocating will have a well-founded fear of persecution and should be granted asylum. [62] The RAD finds that the objective evidence supports the Appellant's subjective fears. The RAD, therefore, finds that there is more than a mere possibility that the Appellant would be persecuted if he were to return to Zimbabwe. DISPOSITION [63] The Appellant is entitled to the presumption of truthfulness. The RPD has found the Appellant to be credible in his testimony regarding details of physical threats to him and members of his family. The RAD finds that the Appellant has established, with credible evidence, a well-founded fear of persecution in Zimbabwe. As the state is the agent of persecution, he cannot expect adequate state protection in his particular circumstances. The RAD has also found that the Appellant cannot avail himself of a viable internal flight alternative. CONCLUSION [64] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee, as he has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his political opinion. [65] This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Luis F. Agostinho" Luis F. Agostinho September 12, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 51-66. 2 See, for example, Akuffo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 3 Dhillon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 321, para. 14; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 4 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 5 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 6 Ibid. 7 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 8 Huruglica, FCA, para. 70. 9 Huruglica, FCA, para. 74. 10 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233 at para. 11. 11 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also Huruglica, FCA, para. 72. 12 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.) 13 Huruglica, Federal Court, para. 55. 14 See Yin, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Akuffo, Allalou, and Sajad; also Bui. 15 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 16 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 17 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 18 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 19 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 21-48, Article; The Elephant in the Room/Human Rights Watch 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 161-188. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 5, Reasons for Decision, para. 6. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package for Zimbabwe (June 30, 2015), at item 2.2. 24 Ibid., at item 1.4. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 139-145. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 4, para 6. 27 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Zimbabwe (27 June 2014), item 2.2. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., at item 1.4. 30 Ibid., at item 2.2. 31 Ibid., at item 2.2. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Zimbabwe (June 30, 2015), item 1.4. 33 Ibid., at item 2.4. 34 Ibid., at item 2.1. 35 Ibid., at item 2.3. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-07843