TB7-12720

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-12720 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 22, 2018 Date de la décision Panel Cynthia Pay Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Johnson Babalola Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] This decision involves XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria. She is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant alleges that she has been targeted by the XXXX XXXX XXXX in Nigeria, and as a result, she fears for her safety if she has to return there. I find that the determinative issue in her appeal is credibility. I agree with the RPD that the Appellant failed to establish her allegations on a balance of probabilities, and find that it did not err in its determination regarding a non-genuine police report submitted by the Appellant, and the negative impact this finding had on her credibility. I also agree that her other evidence did not overcome this very significant credibility issue. DECISION [2] After considering her arguments and all of the evidence, I dismiss the Appellant's appeal. Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), I confirm the determination of the RPD. The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant worked as a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Nigeria. She claims that she fears reprisals from members of the XXXX XXXX XXXX for speaking to students against becoming involved with this cult. She alleges that she was threatened by members of the cult in XXXX 2016, and claims that she reported this to the police, but they took no action. The Appellant travelled to Canada to attend a conference on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 2017. While here, she received a call from her family informing her that members of the cult had visited her home again on XXXX XXXX, 2017 to look for her, mistaking her sister for her and threatening her. As a result the Appellant says that she decided not to return to Nigeria and made a refugee claim in February 2017. [4] The Appellant's refugee claim was heard by the RPD on April 12 and May 29, 2017. In its reasons dated June 12, 2017, the RPD rejected the Appellant's claim on the basis of credibility. Some of its findings included the following: a) she recorded an inaccurate number of students that were killed by the cult in her Basis of Claim (BOC), which was a central event in her narrative; b) she failed to provided corroboration for the link to the XXXX XXXX XXXX for the triggering event that caused her to talk to students about the cult, or for an attack and arson incident on her campus; and c) she provided a false police report to corroborate her claim that she reported the threats by the cult to the police. [5] Further, the RPD also placed little weight on documentary evidence, including an affidavit by her sister and a report by a psychotherapist, and on the testimony of a witness, and found that this evidence did not overcome its other credibility concerns. ISSUES [6] The Appellant has provided new evidence, which I will discuss below. She also argues that the RPD erred as follows: a) in impugning her credibility on the basis of discrepancies in the police report, which were based on third-party information; b) in placing significance on the originally inaccurate number of students killed listed in her BOC, which was a minor and peripheral issue; c) in its findings regarding lack of corroboration; d) in dismissing her psychotherapist report and failing to consider her psychological state; e) in ignoring her witness's testimony and dismissing her documentary evidence; and f) in failing to carry out a section 97 analysis. ANALYSIS [7] After conducting my own analysis of the record, I dismiss the appeal. I turn now to explain my reasons for reaching this conclusion. NEW EVIDENCE [8] The Appellant has submitted new evidence consisting of: a) Letter requesting late witness dated May 11, 2017 and accompanying fax transmission report b) List of website addresses c) Correspondence between Appellant and law office in Nigeria dated June 23, 2017 and July 21, 2017, accompanying police reports, and DHL courier envelope d) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX dated July 5, 2017 [9] She requests that the RAD accept her new evidence, and requests an oral hearing. Test for new evidence [10] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim, that was not reasonably available, or that could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have been presented at the time of the rejection of the claim. If the new evidence meets one of the criteria set out in subsection 110(4), then the RAD may assess its admissibility further based on its credibility, relevance and newness.1 Letter requesting late witness [11] In its reasons, the RPD refers to a second late request for a witness received by the Board on June 1, 2017, two days after the final sitting of the Appellant's hearing. The RPD denied the request, as the request provided no explanation of why this witness was unavailable to testify at the previous two sittings, or why the request was being made after all the evidence was heard and the hearing concluded. In her submissions, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its finding that the second request for a late witness was received by the Board on June 1, 2017, because the witness request letter was sent May 11, 2017, and because this witness actually testified at the second sitting of hearing on May 29, 2017. [12] The Appellant presents as new evidence a letter from her counsel dated May 11, 2017 requesting that XXXX XXXX XXXX attend her hearing as a witness with an accompanying fax confirmation report. She requests that the RAD accept this letter because it was unavailable at the time of the hearing because errors by the RPD had not occurred until their decision was rendered. [13] I do not accept the letter, as its content is not new. Based on my review of the RPD record, I find that an identical letter save for the date was sent to the Board requesting that XXXX XXXX XXXX be permitted to attend the hearing as a witness. This letter was dated April 6, 2017, and stamped as received by the IRB on April 7, 2017.2 Further, as noted by the Appellant, this witness did testify at her hearing. [14] In addition, I find that the new evidence does not appear to be the same letter that the RPD is referring to in its reasons regarding the second late request for a witness. In the RPD record, I found a second letter from the Appellant's counsel, XXXX XXXX, dated May 31, 2017 and stamped as received by the IRB on June 1, 2017.3 This letter refers to the Appellant's name and file number, and requests that a person named XXXX XXXX XXXX, identified as a Canadian citizen and the Appellant's brother, be permitted to attend her hearing as a witness. Based on my review of the Appellant's Schedule "A" form, no one with that name is listed as her brother, nor are any of her family members listed as holding Canadian citizenship.4 Further, based on my review of the transcript of the hearing, which was helpfully provided by the Appellant, the request for the appearance of the witness who testified, XXXX XXXX XXXX, was actually late because of administrative oversight by the Appellant's legal counsel, but the request for a late witness was granted by the panel. [15] As a result, I find that the RPD did not err in its finding that it received a late request for a witness after the end of the hearing. It appears that this second request for a late witness may have been sent in error by the Appellant's legal counsel regarding another claimant's hearing, despite the fact that the letter refers to the Appellant and her RPD file number. I surmise that the previous request for a late witness was likely used as a precedent by the Appellant's legal representative's office, but the "re:" line was not amended to include the correct claimant's name and file number before submitting this request to the Board. The RPD properly addressed the request received from the Appellant citing her name and file number. The error appears to have been made by her legal representative, not the panel. [16] As a result, I do not accept the submitted letter and accompanying fax confirmation report. List of website addresses [17] During the first sitting of the Appellant's hearing, the RPD noted that there were discrepancies regarding the appearance of Appellant's alleged police report and samples of police reports included in the National Documentation Package for Nigeria (NDP), including the appearance of the Nigerian Police logo. During the second sitting of the hearing, the Appellant provided a number of sample police logos that more closely resembled the one in her alleged police report. The RPD asked for the sources of the submitted sample logos, but the Appellant was unable to provide them. [18] Now the Appellant has submitted as new evidence a list of website addresses as the sources of these sample police logos that she presented at the RPD. She argues that they were unavailable at the time of her hearing, as this was only a concern that arose at the second and last sitting of her claim. [19] I disagree. These materials are not new, and must have been available to the Appellant before the rejection of her claim, as she claims to have found the logos from various websites and presented the sample logos at her hearing. Further, she is incorrect in asserting that this concern came up only at the second sitting of her hearing. She was asked about the discrepancy in the police logo on her police report at the first sitting of the hearing.5 It appears that she presented the logos at the second sitting of her hearing as an attempt to address the concerns about the logo and the genuineness of the police report, which will be discussed further below.6 Although the Appellant's counsel raised the possibility of post-hearing disclosure of the website addresses in her closing submissions,7 this appears not to have been done, despite the fact that the RPD decision was not finalized for almost two weeks after the second sitting of the hearing. [20] I find that this material was available at the time of the rejection of the Appellant's claim and therefore does not meet the criteria for new evidence under the IRPA. The Appellant is now attempting to bolster the logo evidence that she presented without sources at her hearing, but the RAD was established to allow for errors to be corrected, not to provide an opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted before the RPD.8 Correspondence between Appellant and law office in Nigeria dated June 23, 2017 and July 21, 2017, accompanying police reports, and DHL courier envelope [21] As noted above, the RPD had concerns about the genuineness of the police report presented by the Appellant to corroborate her claims of being threatened by the XXXX XXXX XXXX and that she sought state protection. The RPD determined that the police report was not genuine because it found that the Nigeria Police Force logo was inconsistent with the sample standard police force logo in the NDP, and because according to the objective evidence in the NDP, the letterhead should provide the issuing unit's telegraphic address, not its telegram address as provided in the report submitted by the Appellant. As a result, the RPD found that the Appellant had presented a fraudulent police report to substantiate her claim, and drew a negative credibility inference on the basis of this finding. [22] The Appellant now provides new evidence to address the RPD's finding that the police report was fraudulent. She has presented correspondence to and from a law office in Nigeria which purports to request that the law firm investigate the inconsistent letterhead and logo. A letter dated July 21, 2017 from the law office of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. in Nigeria states that they investigated the genuineness of the police report, and confirms that the police report is genuine and authentic, but that the logo on this report was one "for internal use only within the Police Division itself." The letter further explains that the Appellant was given this internal version of the logo because she did not explain to the police that she had been requesting a report "for use outside the shores of Nigeria". An original copy of a new police report "for external use" dated July 17, 2017 was also submitted for consideration as new evidence by the RAD. [23] I reject all of this evidence. First, its content is not new, and therefore does not meet the criteria for new evidence under the IRPA. While this evidence was requested after the rejection of her claim, its content existed before this date, and I find that it was reasonably available to the Appellant before then. She was represented by counsel who should be familiar with the NDP for Nigeria, and should have addressed any concerns about the genuineness of her documentary evidence during her RPD hearing. As noted above, the provision of the IRPA regarding new evidence is not designed to provide an opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted before the RPD, or to provide evidence tailored to address the RPD's negative findings. [24] Even if the evidence was considered "new" under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, I further reject this evidence on the grounds of credibility. I note that the logo on the new police report also does not match up with the sample logos in the NDP. The logo contains an elephant, and in the version submitted by the Appellant, its face and trunk are shaped differently from the elephant in the NDP samples. Its face is rounder, and its trunk fatter and straighter than in the NDP samples. The NDP states that "the police logo displayed on police reports is the same across the country and does not vary."9 What appears to be crossed poles in the logo also differ from the logo on the Appellant's new report. In her report, the tops of the poles are drawn as an outline lacking in detail, whereas in the samples the tops of the poles are made up of a series of circles joined in a line. Further, the logo on the Appellant's new police report includes two back legs, whereas the sample authentic logo provides the image of the closest back leg only. Based on my inspection of the Appellant's original new police report, which was provided to the RAD, I also note that the bird at the top of the logo is just a coloured bird silhouette completely lacking in detail, whereas the sample logos provide details of feathers drawn on the bird's body. Further, the NDP does not indicate that there are different police report logos provided for domestic use and use "outside the shores of Nigeria;" on the contrary, the objective evidence states that the police logo should be consistent for all police reports. As a result, I further find that the new evidence is not genuine, and reject it on this basis as well. Affidavit of XXXX XXXX [25] The Appellant has also provided an affidavit of XXXX XXXX, who was the Appellant's PhD supervisor. This affidavit states that the Appellant asked him on XXXX XXXX, 2017 to look for news articles linking an incident involving the death of two students on campus to the XXXX XXXX XXXX. It claims that he was unable to search because he was travelling until XXXX XXXX, 2017, and when he did look, he learned that all copies had been burned in a university library fire in XXXX 2016 set by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [26] This evidence appears to be aimed at addressing another negative finding by the RPD. The RPD found that the Appellant failed to provide to make reasonable efforts to provide corroborating evidence of this incident and linking it to the XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant was asked if she had asked her colleagues at the university to help her find some of the reports, but she had not done so. The Appellant argues that the RAD should accept this affidavit because it was not available at the time of the hearing, since "the Appellant had not even thought of requesting an affidavit from her colleague in order to demonstrate that the said articles had been unavailable to her." [27] I reject this affidavit because it does not meet the criteria set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The Appellant testified in the first sitting of her hearing that she had not asked Professor XXXX to help her to find any articles to corroborate the incident and link to the XXXX XXXX XXXX.10 His affidavit states that the Appellant requested that he look for the articles on XXXX XXXX, 2017, two weeks after the first sitting of her hearing. Although according to the affidavit the Appellant contacted Professor XXXX before the second sitting of her hearing on May 29, 2017, based on my review of the transcript of the hearing, this was not mentioned by the Appellant or her legal representative in her closing submissions when she addressed this issue,11 nor did she request the opportunity to provide the articles after her hearing. As a result, I find that the Appellant has not established that this affidavit was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection of her claim, as she testified that she did not attempt to obtain any corroborating articles during the first sitting of her hearing, and did not mention any efforts being made at the second sitting. Oral Hearing [28] The Appellant has requested an oral hearing under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. Because I have not accepted her new documentary evidence, there is no documentary evidence that meets the criteria for an oral hearing, and I deny her request. ISSUES ON APPEAL a) Did the RPD err in impugning the Appellant's credibility on the basis of discrepancies in the police report, which were based on third-party information? [29] The Appellant provided a police report dated February 2, 2017 that states that she reported that she had been threatened by two young men at gun point on XXXX XXXX, 2016. It states that the men threatened to kill her if she continued to dissuade students from joining the XXXX XXXX XXXX or if she failed any of her students in her courses. [30] The RPD found that the report was not genuine. As discussed above, it found that the logo on the report did not match the sample logos provided in the Nigeria NDP, as it included a garland, but the samples did not. Further, the letterhead on the Appellant's report provides a telegram address rather than a telegraphic address as provided in the official samples in the NDP. When asked about these discrepancies, the Appellant stated that she did not know why there was a discrepancy. The RPD rejected this explanation on the basis that, based on the objective country condition evidence, it expected a genuine police report to carry the same logo as all police reports across the country. In the second sitting of her hearing, the Appellant presented a number of copies of samples of Nigerian police force logos that did include a garland, which the RPD gave little weight and found to be insufficient to overcome the credibility concerns with the report, as she did not establish their source. She failed to produce originals of the samples, or website pages where she claimed to have found the samples. [31] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in impugning her credibility for matters within third-party information, such as the discrepancies in the police report. She argues that it was not logical to expect her to know the answers to the RPD's questions about the discrepancies, as she was not the author of the report. [32] I disagree. The RPD was not making an unfair demand on the Appellant to explain why a third-party's information was inconsistent, or making a credibility finding on the basis of speculative answers to questions about matters of which she had no knowledge, as in the case law cited by the Appellant.12 Rather, it found that the police report she provided was not genuine on the basis of the fact that its letterhead did not match up with samples of police reports and information about Nigerian Police Force logos and letterhead provided in the NDP, and made a negative credibility finding based on the fact that she had provided a non-genuine police report. As a result, because this was the only first-hand corroborating evidence of the October 24, 2016 incident, it further found that on a balance of probabilities that this incident did not take place. I agree with the RPD's finding that the police report is not genuine. [33] The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred in ignoring evidence when it dismissed the sample police force logos that she provided. She argues that the RPD erred in noting that she had the benefit of an adjournment for six weeks to provide the sources of the logos. I agree that the RPD erred in this finding, as the Appellant only provided the logos during the second sitting of the hearing, but I do not find that this error is significant. I agree with the RPD's assessment of the logos provided by the Appellant, and I too place little weight on them. These logos were provided without source information, and do not outweigh the objective country condition evidence regarding Nigeria Police Force logos provided in the NDP. [34] The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred in impugning the Appellant's credibility for failing to produce the sources of the website without giving her an opportunity to be questioned about why she did not produce the website addresses. I disagree. The RPD did not use this finding to impugn the Appellant's credibility. It merely gave the sample logos she provided little weight, and found that they were insufficient to overcome the significant issues in the police report she provided, and I agree with this finding. [35] Based on my own review of a copy of the police report dated February 8, 2017, I agree with the RPD findings regarding the discrepancies regarding the police report logo and letterhead. I also note that the text of the letter overlaps with a border on the left side of the letterhead, which I find to further diminish its credibility. I agree with the RPD's finding that this police report is not genuine. Further, I find that she has provided no explanation for the fact that she has provided a fraudulent police report. Because the Appellant has provided a non-genuine police report that purports to corroborate the XXXX XXXX, 2016 incident where she was threatened by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and forms the genesis of her refugee claim, I find that this is very damaging to her credibility; and further that on a balance of probabilities, she has not established that she was threatened by the XXXX XXXX XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 2016, or that she reported this incident to the police. b) Did the RPD err in placing significance on the originally inaccurate number of students killed in her BOC? [36] The Appellant claims that students were killed by the XXXX XXXX XXXX at her university in 2009, which led her to begin speaking to students against cultism. In her BOC she originally stated that "a student was murdered," but she later amended the BOC to "students;" and also changed a passage that originally read "the XXXX XXXX XXXX left their logo on his body" to "their bodies".13 The RPD rejected the Appellant's explanation that the original version was a mistake, as it was such a significant incident that they would have expected it to be accurate in her original BOC. [37] The Appellant argues that she provided a reasonable explanation that it was a mistake; that her psychological state contributed to the mistake (which I will address below); that this mistake was minor and peripheral; and also that the panel failed to provide reasons for its finding that she had failed to establish that she had reason to speak to students about the XXXX XXXX XXXX. [38] I find that the RPD did provide reasons for its findings, but erred in placing such heavy emphasis on the number of students originally named in the BOC. I agree with the RPD that this is an unusual error to make in the BOC, as it was a central and very striking event in the Appellant's narrative, and there was not just one place where there was a numerical inaccuracy, but three. I therefore find that this was not a typographic error. I do not find that the RPD erred in rejecting the Appellant's explanation that this was a mistake or oversight, as there were three numerical errors in her BOC ("student," "his" and "body"). The Appellant testified that she wrote the narrative herself, and discovered her mistake only later after re-reading her BOC,14 which I find to be implausible, especially given the fact that she is a highly educated university lecturer working on her PhD. Since there were three numerical errors, not just one, I find it implausible that she would make so many errors in writing the narrative and not notice any of them before signing it. Regarding the impact on her psychological state, as discussed below, I do not find that she has established that it impacted her ability to put together an accurate narrative. [39] I do find, however, that the RPD placed too much significance on this finding, essentially using it as the basis to reject her entire claim. The RPD used the finding regarding the inaccurate number of students killed to further find that she had never had a reason to talk to students about cultism, never spoke to them about the XXXX XXXX XXXX, and therefore did not trigger the threats from the cult. Although the numerical errors do impact the Appellant's credibility, as seeing the dead and defaced bodies of the students forms a central part of her narrative, this takes the finding too far. However, this error is not fatal to the RPD's decision, because of the very significant credibility issues raised by the police report submitted by the Appellant, as discussed above. c) Did the RPD err in its findings regarding lack of corroboration? [40] The RPD found that the Appellant failed to make reasonable efforts to provide corroboration such as media articles of the 2009 incident at XXXX XXXX when students were allegedly killed by members of the XXXX XXXX XXXX, and that this further undermined her credibility regarding her fear of persecution. The RPD further found that the Appellant failed to provide corroboration that the XXXX XXXX XXXX was responsible for an attack on the vice-chancellor and the burning of the library at XXXX XXXX. This contributed to their finding that the Appellant had not established that the cult was responsible for the attack on the vice-chancellor and arson incident. [41] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in impugning her credibility for failing to provide corroboration of the alleged attacks by the XXXX XXXX XXXX at her university, as she had explained that she looked but could not find any articles online to provide the link to the cult. Further, she argues that the presumption of truth should apply; that there was no evidence to the contrary or grounds to doubt her explanation; and she provided other documentation to corroborate her claim, such as affidavits. [42] I disagree with the Appellant. In general, negative inferences cannot be drawn solely from the failure to produce corroborating evidence, but the failure to provide corroboration can be considered when there are valid reasons to doubt the claimant's credibility,15 or where the explanation for failing to provide this evidence when it would reasonably be expected is not accepted.16 In this case, I find it is reasonable to expect corroboration of these attacks, as the Appellant testified that they were reported in the media, including the link to the XXXX XXXX XXXX, and I do not agree that the RPD erred in its rejection of the Appellant's explanation that she could not find any such articles online, or in considering the fact that she had not made any further efforts such as asking any colleagues in Nigeria to help her find them. I do not agree that the RPD erred in making a negative inference from the lack of corroboration. They did not use the lack of corroboration to "impugn" the Appellant's credibility as she argues, but rather correctly considered the lack of corroboration in determining whether she had established these events on a balance of probabilities. I agree that the lack of corroboration of these events should be considered in assessing the Appellant's allegations, especially given the credibility issues raised by the non-genuine police report that she presented. d) Did the RPD err in dismissing her psychotherapist report and failing to consider her psychological state? [43] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in failing to consider her psychological state in assessing her credibility and in rejecting her psychotherapist assessment. [44] I disagree. The Appellant provided a report by XXXX XXXX, psychotherapist dated March 31, 2017. This report states that the Appellant is exhibiting symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. The RPD found that the report went beyond the scope of a psychotherapist report into advocacy, and that it was not helpful in determining the Appellant's credibility. Further it found that mental health did not impact her ability to testify or produce an accurate narrative. I agree with the RPD and also give Ms. XXXX report little weight. I do not agree with the Appellant that the RPD rejected the report "on the basis of its own erroneous opinion that [she] was not credible to begin with." The report was based only on a 60-minute, one-time interview without any objective, in-depth testing. Ms. XXXX, a psychotherapist, is not the Appellant's treating counsellor, nor authorized to provide a diagnosis under the Regulated Health Professions Act.17 The Appellant provided no other evidence regarding her mental health, nor did she indicate that she is receiving treatment for any mental health condition. I find that the Appellant has not established on a balance of probabilities that her mental health impacted her ability to write her narrative or to provide testimony. e) Did the RPD err in ignoring the witness's testimony and dismissing her documentary evidence? Witness's testimony [45] The Appellant called a friend with whom she is staying as a witness to provide corroboration regarding the alleged incidents of persecution. The RPD gave the testimony little weight because he did not witness the alleged incidents first-hand; and although he testified that he saw the Appellant crying after a phone call, there could be many explanations for why she was upset or distraught. [46] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred because it "completely ignored" his testimony and gave it little weight on the basis of an "erroneous pre-determined global credibility finding". I disagree. The RPD considered the witness's testimony, but accorded it little weight for the reasons outlined above. The RPD did not err in doing so, and I agree with their finding. Documentary evidence -- affidavits [47] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in rejecting her documentary evidence and failed to consider the totality of the evidence based on a predetermined global credibility finding. This evidence included a number of affidavits, news articles regarding the XXXX XXXX XXXX and supportive photographs. [48] The Appellant provided affidavits by her sister XXXX, husband, and colleague XXXX XXXX to corroborate an alleged incident involving threats against XXXX, who was mistaken for the Appellant by members of the cult. The RPD stated that the Appellant provided two affidavits in support of the attack against her sister and gave them little weight, as they corroborated an incident that the Appellant had already failed to establish on a balance of probabilities. [49] I agree with the Appellant that the RPD was somewhat backwards in its analysis, and should have considered these affidavits in determining whether the Appellant had established this incident on a balance of probabilities. I find, however, that this is not fatal to the RPD decision. I find that the affidavits do not outweigh the serious credibility concerns raised by the non-genuine police report with respect to the Appellant's allegations. [50] I also assign them limited weight in comparison to oral testimony that can be tested under oath. Further, I note some irregularities in the three Nigerian affidavits that diminish their credibility. I note on the basis of a stamp on the documents that the affidavits were allegedly sworn at a High Court Registry. As stated in the country condition information about Nigeria, "Commissioners for Oaths" are among the officials permitted to swear affidavits.18 The documents provided by the Appellant misspell the title of this official as "Commissioner for Oath". In a context where affidavits are "rampantly forged,"19 I find this irregularity to be of serious concern. Court-issued affidavits in Nigeria are provided with a numbered receipt,20 but no such documentation accompanied this document. Further, the name of the commissioner who allegedly swore the affidavits is not provided on the document, and their signature is illegible. [51] Regarding the affidavit by XXXX, this affidavit covers the same ground as his oral testimony, which I have found that the RPD has correctly considered. I do not find that the RPD erred in not addressing this specifically, as they have discussed and considered his oral evidence. [52] The Appellant also provided articles about the XXXX XXXX XXXX and photographs of her family. I do not find that the RPD erred in ignoring these pieces of evidence, as they do not relate to the central issues in the Appellant's claim or her specific allegations. e) Did the RPD err in failing to carry out a section 97 analysis? [53] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in failing to undertake a separate section 97 analysis. [54] I disagree, and find that the RPD did not err. I have upheld the RPD's finding that the Appellant has not established on a balance of probabilities that she is under threat by the XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD found as a result that the Appellant failed to meet the test for a person in need of protection, namely a risk to her life, torture or cruel or unusual treatment should she be returned, and I agree. CONCLUSION [55] On the basis of the findings outlined above, I dismiss the appeal. I agree with the RPD that there were significant credibility concerns regarding the Appellant's claim, and that she did not establish her allegations on a balance of probabilities. [56] As a result, I confirm the determination of the RPD pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Cynthia Pay" Cynthia Pay May 22, 2018 Date 1 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, cited in Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para 64. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 267. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 380. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 49. 5 Exhibit P-1, Appellant Record, hearing transcript, p. 85. 6 Ibid. at pp. 95, 97-99. 7 Ibid. at pp. 119-120. 8 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 54. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 30, 2016), item 10.3, RIR NGA103988.E, p. 3, 6 and 7. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, hearing transcript, p.76. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, hearing transcript, p. 122. 12 Kong, Win Kee v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-471-93), Reed, January 27, 1994. Reported: Kong v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 179 (F.C.T.D.), at p.6. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 32. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant Record, Transcript April 12, 2017, p. 74. 15 Radics, Sandor Andras v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4020-13), Noël, February 4, 2014; 2014 FC 110, at para. 30. 16 Rojas, Yoany Alexander v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6992-10), Rennie, July 8, 2011, 2011 FC 849, at para 6, as cited in Radics, Sandor Andras v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4020-13), Noël, February 4, 2014; 2014 FC 110, at para. 31. 17 Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 27. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 3, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2016), item 9.2, at section 3. 19 Ibid., at section 8.3. 20 Ibid., at section 7.1. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-12720