MB4-02937

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-02937 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered/heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision February 26, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Me Alain Bissonnette Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Chantal Ianniciello Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION I. INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, the appellant, who is a Malian citizen, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), alleging that the RPD rendered a decision based on errors in its assessment of her credibility and that it did not take into consideration the Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Guideline 4).1 II. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) allows the appeal, sets aside the determination, and substitutes the determination that, in its opinion, should have been made in light of all the evidence, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is a "Convention refugee" within the meaning of section 96 of the IRPA. III. BACKGROUND A. Basis of the claim [3] In the form entitled Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), which she signed on May 7, 2014, the appellant states that she is a Malian citizen who was born on XXXX XXXX, 1987, and who is a Muslim. She speaks French and XXXX. Her mother, father, brother, sister and son were living in Mali at that moment.2 [4] In her BOC Form, the appellant states that her parents divorced when she was five years old and that she was entrusted to her uncle, XXXX XXXX, her father's half-brother, who abused her for several years. She also states that, at the age of XXXX, he impregnated her and that she gave birth to a child from whom she was separated, so that nobody would suspect what was going on between her and her uncle.3 [5] In her BOC Form, the appellant declares that, in addition to having defiled her, her uncle suggested giving her in marriage to a childhood friend, an old man living in XXXX, who had two wives and several children.4 [6] In her BOC Form, the appellant states that, after all she suffered, she devoted herself to her studies and that her father helped her to come and study in Canada provided that she agree to never see her child again. She also states that she accepted this offer and that her father sold all his belongings and incurred debts so that she could continue her studies in Canada.5 [7] Aside her BOC Form, the appellant submitted several other documents to the RPD.6 B. RPD decision [8] The RPD hearing was held on July 14, 2014, and the decision to reject her refugee protection claim was rendered two days later, that is, July 16, 2014.7 [9] In the reasons for its decision, the RPD explained that it took Guideline 4 into consideration, but concluded that the credibility of the claimant8 was undermined by numerous contradictions, omissions, and inconsistencies between her written account, her testimony and the exhibits on the record.9 [10] First, because of a contradiction between the information in her visa application and the documents provided with this application, what she states in her BOC Form, as well as her testimony regarding her place of residence after 2005 and the place where she studied, the RPD concluded that the claimant had lived and studied in Bamako since 2005 and did not accept her explanation that it was her father who took care of her visa application.10 [11] Then, given the responses that she gave during the hearing regarding whom she lived with in XXXX, the RPD was of the opinion that the claimant was not credible when she declared having lived in XXXXunder the authority of her uncle, whereas the evidence showed that she lived in Bamako and that she lived with a friend.11 [12] Lastly, the RPD did not believe the appellant when, during the hearing, she stated that her father no longer wanted to pay for her studies in Canada and wanted her to return to Mali so that she could be married and circumcised. It wrote the following in this regard: [translation] [29] The panel does not believe that the claimant fears her father in Mali because the latter wants her to return there in order to be circumcised and to be married by force. The claimant mentioned the fear of her father for the first time at the hearing, as well as her fear of being circumcised. If the claimant feared her father and the female circumcision, these fundamental aspects of her claim would have been mentioned in her account. The panel does not find that such fears are founded. In the absence of a reasonable explanation about these omissions, the panel does not believe the claimant. [30]The evidence also reveals that it is the claimant's father who paid her tuition fees in Canada.... It appears to be contradictory that, following such expenses, her father would have wanted his daughter to return to Mali in order to force her to marry and to be circumcised. The claimant is a university student, and she was able to clearly indicate in her account whom she feared.12 [13] The RPD also indicated that the fears alleged by the claimant are not corroborated by the documentary evidence. [translation] [35] .... According to this evidence, forced marriages and female circumcision occur in certain rural communities and at an early age. However, the claimant is 26 years old, is a university student and lives in the city, which places her outside groups that are vulnerable to such practices in Mali.13 C. Grounds of appeal and decision sought [14] In her memorandum, the appellant submits that the RPD made errors in its assessment of her credibility and did not take Guideline 4 into consideration. [15] First, she criticizes the RPD for not really having taken this Guideline into consideration and for being above all concerned about a possible dubious action aimed at establishing herself in Canada instead of analyzing her fear of persecution.14 She also criticizes the RPD for having used inappropriate language when speaking of [translation] "her story of incest."15 [16] She then criticizes the RPD for, on the one hand, having been ambivalent in its analysis of the documentary evidence and for, on the other hand, not having taken into consideration the fact that the documentary evidence indicates that adult females are also subjected to female circumcision in Mali. Consequently, she considers that the RPD dismissed several pieces of evidence out of hand and did not study clearly the issue of whether she was indeed at risk of being married by force or of being circumcised should she return to live in Mali.16 [17] Lastly, the appellant criticizes the RPD for having focused on secondary issues, and she submits that the RPD really did not have any valid reason to doubt the veracity of her allegations.17 [18] The appellant is asking the RAD to allow the appeal, to set aside the determination of the RPD, and to render a positive determination or, if necessary, to refer the matter to a differently constituted RPD panel.18 [19] In her written statement, the appellant indicates that she was not presenting new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and that she was not requesting a hearing before the RAD.19 IV. APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL [20] In the appellant's memorandum, which refers to a Federal Court decision rendered on July 17, 2014, her counsel indicates that the RAD has the power to conduct its own assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or whether it misassessed the facts to the point of committing a palpable and overriding error.20 [21] In Alyafi, after reviewing the reasoning that was adopted by his Federal Court colleagues in previous decisions, Justice Martineau notes that they seemed to have interpreted the IRPA differently and contradictorily with respect to the nature of the appeal before the RAD.21 He thus identifies three approaches: the standard of judicial review, or "reasonableness"; the standard of appellate review or of "palpable and overriding error"; and a composite and variable standard of review resulting from the nature of the claim before the RAD-characterized as a "hybrid appeal"-and the particular nature of questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, raised by an appellant.22 [22] After dismissing the first approach, Justice Martineau states that the second and third approaches prevail today, but that they create a real dilemma, given the differences that exist between them.23 Rather than choosing between one of these last two approaches, applying the principle of judicial comity, Justice Martineau states that he chose the path of wisdom: allowing the RAD to apply either approach as long as the question of the scope of the appellate review of the RPD's decisions has not been settled by a final judgment by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada.24 [23] In Djossou, Justice Martineau demonstrates that the approach used at that time by the RAD to determine its role in relation to that of the RPD was an unacceptable outcome in law.25 He is unequivocal: an appeal before the RAD is not a judicial review, as the RAD has much broader powers on appeal than those of a court of law sitting in judicial review.26 He invites the RAD to consider the three options before it (true appeal, appeal de novo, and hybrid appeal) with an open mind.27 In the conclusion of this decision, Justice Martineau states that it does not appear appropriate to him to judicially impose any standard of deference on the RAD, until such time as the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada has decided the issue definitively. He states that, in the interim, the onus will be on the RAD to review the IRPA and to adopt a new test based on an analysis that will take all the relevant factors into account. He adds that, in his opinion, the two alternative approaches (the so-called "palpable and overriding error" appellate standard of review, and a composite and variable standard of review) discussed in Alyafi are not the only options to consider-the absence of deference in the case of any error of law, fact, or law and fact being also a possible option.28 [24] In Aloulou, Justice LeBlanc states that respect for legislative intent weighs against treating appeals before the RAD as a form of judicial review, and also weighs against developing a policy of deference, the effect of which would be to turn appeals before the RAD into pseudo-judicial reviews of RPD decisions. He goes on to state that the RAD has a different purpose, that of rectifying any error of law in the RPD's decision or any palpable and overriding error in the determination of the facts or in the application of the law to the facts, assuming that it was correctly identified.29 [25] In Akuffo, Justice Gagné states that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings, although opinions diverge within the Federal Court on the level of deference that is owed.30 In Sajad and Bui, Justice Shore ruled that the RAD owes a certain level of deference to the RPD's findings when they primarily concern the credibility of the person claiming refugee protection.31 [26] Drawing as much as possible on the decisions rendered to date by the Federal Court, I am of the opinion that, in this case, while conducting my own assessment of the evidence, I must show a certain level of deference to the RPD's findings concerning the appellant's credibility. V. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [27] I have read and analyzed all the reasons for the RPD decision, the evidence submitted to the RPD, as well as the arguments outlined in the memorandum of appeal. I have also listened to the recording of the hearing before the RPD. For my part, even taking into consideration the problems of credibility identified by the RPD with respect to certain of the appellant's allegations, analyzing the documentary evidence regarding female circumcision as it is practised today in Mali, and taking into account the abuse committed by one of her uncles that the appellant alleges she experienced in the past, I conclude that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution should she return to her country to live. A. Consideration of Guideline 4 [28] Case law has established that Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution must be considered by RPD members in appropriate cases. RPD members must exhibit the knowledge required and apply it in a comprehensive and sensitive manner when deciding issues of violence against women.32 [29] Guideline 4 specifies the framework of analysis that must be used when a woman alleges persecution by reason of her sex or gender. According to this framework of analysis clearly identified in the Guideline, it is necessary to assess the harm feared by the claimant and ascertain whether the harm feared constitutes persecution. It must be determined whether the claimant's fear of persecution is based on one or more of the grounds listed in the Convention refugee definition. The Guideline specifically refers to female genital mutilation as a situation or circumstances that could give rise to a fear of persecution. The Guideline indicates that it must be determined whether the claimant's fear of persecution is well founded, and this includes an assessment of the evidence related to the ability or willingness of the state to protect the claimant and, more generally, the objective basis of the claim. If required, it must be determined whether there is an internal flight alternative (IFA).33 [30] By reading the reasons for the decision of the RPD, I note that the RPD mentioned having taken the Guideline into consideration.34 That said, after having listened to the recording and having carefully read the reasons for the decision of the RPD, it seems to me, and I state this with all due respect, that it did not take it into consideration. In my opinion, if it had indeed taken this Guideline into consideration, the RPD would have certainly addressed the issue of the claimant's fear in relation to her allegations regarding her uncle's abuse, of which she reportedly was the victim, and in relation to her fear of being eventually circumcised in a more understanding manner, even if it is true that she omitted to mention this latter fear in her BOC Form. During the hearing, the claimant acknowledged that she omitted to mention this fear, but she also added that, at home, marriage does not take place as long as the woman is not circumcised. The RPD then simply asked whether this was the case for all women. The claimant replied that this was not the case for all women and that it depended on the culture, but that, in her family, this was the case. The RPD then decided to return to the omissions in the claimant's account without questioning the links between marriage and female circumcision in the claimant's family and ethnic group.35 [31] Consequently, I conclude that, in this case, the RPD did not demonstrate that it applied its knowledge of violence against women in a comprehensive and sensitive, which resulted in unduly limiting it in its assessment of the appellant's credibility. B. Consideration of evidence on the record [32] The documentary evidence indicates that, in Mali, the rate of female genital mutilation is particularly high throughout the country.36 It also indicates that various factors, including religion, perpetuate the practice and that various resistance groups oppose abandoning the practice. The indecisiveness of the Malian government in this regard constitutes the final obstacle.37 According to the documentary evidence, opposing female circumcision is a perilous political exercise in Mali, and very few elected officials dare to take this risk. [33] That said, there is a network fighting against female genital mutilation in Mali, and several associations advocate the respect of human rights in this regard, stressing that, since the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, female genital mutilation is considered a violation of the rights of women and girls.38 Legally, there is still no effective law that prohibits the practice of female circumcision in Mali. According to the documentary evidence, the existence of a legislative text would mitigate the individual responsibility of persons who oppose this practice. Today, while female circumcision has become a topic of public debate in Mali, the individuals who oppose this practice must not only be committed and courageous in their own home and with respect to those around them,39 but it also cannot be ruled out that they will be subject to various consequences: [translation] Some of the activists encountered mentioned their powerlessness to protect the little girls within their own family, illustrating the difficulty in opposing female circumcision in Mali. In fact, the dynamics identified are not always sufficient to deal with the social pressure and to stop family members from taking the child, without the knowledge of the parents.40 ... ...while all the activists involved in the fight are honouring their commitment without being the victims of abuse, the examples cited below show, however, that sporadic and targeted persecution, described in a personalized and detailed manner, remains plausible in the current Malian context and that the fears of activists fighting against female circumcision cannot be overlooked systematically.41 ... ...the parents who voice their opposition to female circumcision can face significant rejection within their family and provoke "hesitation and a violent response." The father may face pressure and the mother may be ostracized within her home by her in-laws.42 ... Family rejection is...a serious act in Mali.... Family rejection takes the shape of exclusion from the group during important societal events (e.g. funerals) and during group decisions.43 [34] In this case, the RPD found that, according to the documentary evidence, female circumcision is practised in certain rural communities and at an early age. Consequently, it concluded that the claimant, who is 26 years old, who lives in the city and who attended university, does not belong to groups who might become victims of this practice in Mali.44 [35] However, taking into account this same documentary evidence, I arrive at a different conclusion. Although it is true that female circumcision is primarily practised on little girls and at an earlier age in urban centres,45 it is nevertheless a fact that, even if it is rarely practised on adult women, it is a practice that is still going on in Mali. According to the documentary evidence, even if she is married and lives in Bamako, a young adult woman can undergo female circumcision.46 And so far, the appellant has clearly not been circumcised.47 [36] In this case, in my opinion, the fact that the appellant is a Muslim must be taken into consideration. According to the documentary evidence, among certain Muslims living in Mali, female circumcision is an act of purifying ablution and is indispensable to prayer. Moreover, the Muslim movement that defends this practice dominates in Mali and is a real obstacle to ending this practice. Finally, this shift to the religious meaning of the practice of female circumcision is reportedly stronger in urban areas.48 [37] I consider that one must take into account the fact that, in Mali, a woman who opposes her own female circumcision or the female circumcision of her child will not receive the protection of the state. During the hearing, the claimant clearly stated in response to a question from the RPD that the authorities can do nothing against female circumcision and that it is a question of religion.49 Regarding the protection that women who fear being persecuted by reason of their gender can expect in Mali, the documentary evidence seems very clear to me: The Malian State report (UN Doc. CCPR/C/MLI/2003/2) fails to address gender specific violence in any way. The report notes that women are accorded formal legal equality and recognizes that discrimination against women persists in some areas. However, the report neglects to examine violence against women, including but not limited to, domestic violence, marital rape, rape, and female genital mutilation.... Although the Constitution of Mali proclaims in its preamble to defend the rights of women, there are many laws in Mali that are facially discriminatory. For instance, it has been reported to OMCT that Malian women who marry foreigners are not able to pass on their Malian nationality to their children from such a marriage. On the other hand, Malian men suffer from no such restriction in passing on their Malian nationality to their children. Such discrimination in citizenship extends beyond the blatant differential treatment of men and women in Mali. Under such a law, the children of women who marry non-Malian nationals are not eligible for the rights and privileges of Malian citizenship. Other discriminatory provisions in Malian legislation limit a woman's power over the decisions affecting her own life. For example, with regard to type of marriage, the choice between a monogamous marriage and a polygamous marriage is the decision of the husband, not the wife. A woman's rights are limited in marriage by law in other ways, including her husband's power over her right to work and the choice of residence. Malian law also discriminates against women in marriage by providing that wives are obligated to obey their husbands. ... The prevailing image of women in Malian society is in their roles as wife and mother. As such, women remain in the private sphere and do not have much access to the public sphere, which is traditionally reserved for men. In accordance with these roles, women are blamed if their husbands are dirty or badly dressed, as well as if their child misbehaves. These attitudes towards women encourage the stereotype that women are inferior to men. Women who try to rebel against these images and participate in the public sphere are viewed badly by society, including by some women, and are accused of "attempting to wear pants", meaning trying to become a man. Thus, women do not participate in politics or other civic affairs with fewer than 10% of all elected officials being women. In essence, such views reflect an attitude that social and political power is a masculine sphere that women should avoid. The marriage laws in Mali contribute to these stereotypical images of women by declaring that men are the head of the household and that women must obey their husbands. These laws reflect the reality that husbands make 90% of all decisions in the house.50 [38] In the particular context of this case, in light of the documentary evidence, I find that, currently, in Mali, there is no internal flight alternative for a person who refuses or opposes female circumcision, whether it be for herself or for someone else. The rates of female circumcision vary from about 75 percent to 98 percent, depending on the regions where Malians of Bambara origin live.51 In the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, where the rates of female circumcision are very low, there are very few people belonging to the XXXX ethnic group, of which the appellant is a member. I consider that it would be unreasonable, given the political situation in these regions, to expect the appellant to go live there. C. Consideration of the appellant's fear, should she return to live in Mali [39] During the hearing, the RPD asked the claimant whether female circumcision and forced marriages applied to everyone, to all women and girls in Mali.52 In my opinion, and I state this with all due respect, this is not the question that must be asked. Although a person who is claiming refugee protection has to substantiate his or her allegations on a balance of probabilities, she does not have to establish that persecution would be more likely than not. In other words, it is not necessary for her to show that she was persecuted in the past or would be in the future. In fact, according to my understanding of the case law in this regard, what the evidence must show is that the person who is claiming refugee protection has good grounds for fearing persecution for one of the reasons specified in the Act.53 Moreover, to conclude that there is a reasonable fear of persecution or, in other words, a reasonable chance or serious possibility, there need not be a more than a 50 percent chance (i.e. a probability), but there must be a more than a minimal possibility,54 since there is no intermediate ground between these two limits.55 [40] Consequently, by relying on what is required as a burden of proof in terms of fear of persecution for the future,56 and by taking into consideration the specific reality in Mali, not only in terms of female circumcision but also with respect to the situation of women in general, I find that the appellant has indeed established that, for the future, she has a well-founded fear of persecution because she would be at risk of undergoing female circumcision, even if she opposes it. [41] Furthermore, in her BOC Form, the appellant clearly indicates that, for several years, she had been abused by her uncle XXXX XXXX.57 The appellant submitted to the RPD two documents that I consider particularly relevant. The first is a certified document signed by a psycho-social worker indicating that the appellant has started treatment to work on the emotional repercussions of the sexual assault that she allegedly experienced in her country of origin.58 The other is a copy of a birth certificate excerpt from the Bamako district that indicates that, on XXXX XXXX, 2010, the appellant gave birth to a boy whose father is XXXXknown as XXXX XXXX.59 [42] During the hearing, very few questions dealt with these two documents or this aspect of the claimant's account. For a few minutes, there was an exchange regarding the birth of the claimant's son, but the question of the father was never really clarified.60 A little later during the hearing, the RPD referred to the fact that, in the account, the claimant spoke about her uncle, but that, during the hearing, she primarily talked about her fear of her father. The claimant then replied that this was because the questions concerned her studies in Canada. The RPD did not pursue its questions on this subject any further.61 Also, in response to a question from her counsel, the claimant declared that, in XXXX, she lived with her uncle and not with a friend named XXXX XXXX.62 At the very end of the hearing, the RPD again asked the claimant how long she lived with the unkind gentleman, referring to her uncle. The claimant replied that she lived with him from the age of five until she arrived in Canada.63 [43] In the reasons for its decision, the RPD did not specifically analyze this question that I nevertheless consider relevant. The fear that the appellant may have of being circumcised or of being subjected to other forms of persecution should she return to Mali is certainly influenced by the abuse that she alleges she experienced in the past and that was reportedly committed by her uncle. For my part, even taking into account the credibility problems, which were, moreover, identified and analyzed by the RPD, I find that the appellant's credibility is not undermined with respect to her allegations of abuse committed by one of her uncles in the past. I must add that this is a delicate subject and that it is understandable that it is difficult for her to speak of it openly. VI. CONCLUSION [44] For these reasons, I set aside the RPD's determination, and I substitute the determination that, in my opinion, should have been made, in light of all the evidence, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is a "Convention refugee" within the meaning of section 96 of the IRPA. [45] The appeal is allowed. Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette February 26, 2015 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, effective November 13, 1996. This Guideline is available on the IRB's website: http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx. 2 Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), pages 15, 20, 23, 24 and 25 of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record. 3 Idem, page 24 of the RPD record. 4 Idem, pages 24 and 25 of the RPD record. 5 Idem, page 25 of the RPD record. 6 The list of these documents is reproduced at page 132 of the RPD record. The documents themselves are reproduced at pages 133 to 180 of the RPD record. 7 Reasons and decision of the RPD, pages 3 to 10 of the RPD record. 8 The use of the French word demandeure in a claim for refugee protection is not universally accepted. Based on the evolutionary character of the French language and using the increasingly prevalent example of the word professeure to represent the female gender of professeur, the panel is of the opinion that the word demandeure in a claim for refugee protection presented to an administrative tribunal is more apt than the use of the word demanderesse, which is generally used for an adversarial trial procedure. 9 Reasons and decision of the RPD, paragraphs 8 and 13, pages 5 and 6 of the RPD record. 10 Idem, paragraphs 14 to 19, pages 6 and 7 of the RPD record. 11 Idem, paragraphs 20 to 23, pages 7 and 8 of the RPD record. 12 Idem, paragraphs 29 and 30, page 9 of the RPD record. 13 Idem, paragraph 35, page 10 of the RPD record. 14 Memorandum of the appellant, August 6, 2014, paragraphs 32 to 35 and 67 to 72, pages 25, 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the appeal record. 15 Idem, paragraphs 36 to 39, pages 25 and 26 of the appeal record. 16 Idem, paragraphs 40 to 53, pages 26, 27 and 28 of the appeal record. 17 Idem, paragraphs 54 to 62, pages 29, 30 and 31 of the appeal record. 18 Idem, page 34 of the appeal record. 19 Affidavit, August 21, 2014, pages 10 and 11 of the appeal record. 20 Memorandum of the appellant, August 6, 2014, paragraphs 28 to 30, pages 24 and 25 of the appeal record. 21 Alyafi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1091-14, Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 952, at paragraph 46. 22 Idem, at paragraph 16, citations omitted. 23 Idem, at paragraph 43. 24 Idem, at paragraphs 42 to 46. 25 Djossou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7980-13, Martineau, November 14, 2014; 2014 FC 1080, at paragraph 37. 26 Idem, at paragraph 41. 27 Idem, at paragraph 55. 28 Idem, at paragraph 91. 29 Aloulou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7949-13, LeBlanc, December 19, 2014; 2014 FC 1236, at paragraphs 54 and 57. 30 Akuffo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6640-13, Gagné, November 12, 2014; 2014 FC 1063, at paragraphs 34 to 39. 31 Sajad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-926-14, Shore, November 21, 2014; 2014 FC 1107, at paragraph 22. Van Son Bui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1654-14, Shore, November 28, 2014; 2014 FC 1145, at paragraph 25. 32 Aziza Mahamat Nour v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-8278-11, Scott, June 25, 2012; 2012 FC 805, at paragraph 37; Higbogun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2921-09, Russell, April 23, 2010; 2010 FC 445, at paragraphs 55 to 58. 33 Chairperson's Guideline 4, cited in footnote 1. 34 Reasons and decision of the RPD, paragraph 8, page 5 of the RPD record. 35 Recording of the hearing on July 14, 2014, 55:10 to 01:02:30. 36 National Documentation Package on Mali, March 14, 2014, Tab 5.4: Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA) [French office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons], Les mutilations génitales féminines au Mali [female genital mutilation in Mali], January 1, 2009, 102 pages, at pages 17 to 24. 37 Idem, at pages 30 to 37. 38 Idem, at pages 39 to 43. 39 Idem, at pages 44 to 58. 40 Idem, at page 74. 41 Idem, at page 82. 42 Idem, at page 83. 43 Idem. 44 Reasons and decision of the RPD, paragraph 35, page 10 of the RPD record. 45 Document 5.4, previously cited in footnote 36, at pages 22 and 23. 46 Idem, at pages 23 and 24. 47 In the document filed under P-6, Dr. XXXX attested to the fact that he examined the claimant and that she is not circumcised, page 139 of the RPD record. 48 Document 5.4, previously cited in footnote 36, at pages 29 and 30. 49 Recording of the hearing on July 14, 2014, 01:05:00 to 01:05:45. 50 The document Violence against Women in Mali. A Report to the Human Rights Committee was submitted as evidence to the RPD at pages 142 to 160 of the RPD record under P-9. The excerpts are taken from pages 144, 148 and 149 of the RPD record (citations omitted). Read also paragraphs 11 to 13 of the Human Rights Committee report, at pages 161 to 168 of the RPD record. 51 Document 5.4, previously cited in footnote 36, at pages 18 to 21. 52 Recording of the hearing on July 14, 2014, 31:15 to 31:20. To this question, the claimant replied in the negative, while asserting that, in her family, in her culture, it is part [of their tradition]. 53 Parampsothy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-421-12, Mandamin, August 16, 2012; 2012 FC 1000, at paragraph 24. Read also Mugadza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1324-07, Mandamin, January 30, 2008; 2008 FC 122, at paragraphs 20 to 22. 54 Idem. 55 Florea v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5443-04, Lemieux, November 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1472, at paragraphs 21 to 24; Ceballo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-773-04, Beaudry, January 21, 2005; 2005 FC 71, at paragraph 7; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Balogh, No. IMM-982-01, Heneghan, November 6, 2001; 2001 FCT 1210, at paragraph 21; Mariko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7190-03, Harrington, August 16, 2004; 2004 FC 1136, at paragraph; Arrinaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-224-04, O'Keefe, May 31, 2005; 2005 FC 773, at paragraph 43. 56 Parampsothy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-421-12, Mandamin, August 16, 2012; 2012 FC 1000, at paragraph 24. Read also Mugadza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1324-07, Mandamin, January 30, 2008; 2008 FC 122, at paragraphs 20 to 22. 57 BOC Form, page 24 of the RPD record. 58 The document is reproduced on page 141 of the RPD record under P-8. 59 The document is reproduced on page 180 of the RPD record under P-14. 60 Recording of the hearing on July 14, 2014, 46:50 to 49:10. 61 Idem, 01:03:20 to 01:03:58. 62 Idem, 01:16:23 to 01:17:00. 63 Idem, 01:23:30 to 01:24:20. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-02937 17