MC3-15774

RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC3-15774 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision [Translation of the original version] Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Date of decision October 3, 2023 Date de la décision Panel Toni Jedid Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Carolina Roa Sanchez Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the appellant) is a Mexican citizen. She is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) determining that she is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under section 96 and paragraph 97(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [2] The appellant alleges that she operated a XXXX in Mexico. She alleges that she was a victim of extortion in the course of her business activities. She alleges that a woman named XXXX was murdered by the Sinaloa cartel for filing a complaint against them and also for refusing to give up her business. She alleges that she fears she will be killed by members of the Sinaloa cartel. [3] The RPD made negative findings as to the appellant's credibility. It noted the lack of evidence related to the murder of the woman named XXXX. It found that there was an omission in the Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) related to the identification of the Sinaloa cartel as an agent of harm. It also found that there was an omission related to the appellant's stay at the home of her sister-in-law between XXXX and XXXX 2019. It considered the internal flight alternative (IFA) issue and it was of the opinion that the appellant has an IFA in the state of Tlaxcala. [4] The appellant submits that the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness. She states that exchanges between the member and her former lawyer were not interpreted. She states that the RPD did not give her the opportunity to respond to some of its concerns. She states that the RPD did not accurately report some of her statements at the hearing. She states that the RPD allowed some of her responses to not be translated. With respect to the IFA, she submits that the RPD's conclusion is unreasonable. [5] The determinative issues for the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) are whether the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness and whether it erred in its analysis of the IFA. [6] My response to the determinative issues is no, and I am of the opinion that the appellant has an IFA in the state of Tlaxcala. DETERMINATION [7] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in determining that the appellant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [8] In support of her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submitted the following evidence: * Exhibit A-1: News article published on XXXX XXXX, 2019, concerning the murder of XXXX XXXX XXXX. The appellant submits that: [translation] "This evidence corroborates what the appellant states at paragraph 9 of her statement, that she first found an article about this woman's death but that it referred solely to a problem with her ex-partner. This evidence helps establish the appellant's credibility." * Exhibit A-2: News article published on XXXX XXXX, 2019, concerning the murder of XXXX XXXX XXXX. The appellant submits that: [translation] "This evidence corroborates what the appellant states at paragraph 9 of her statement, that after speaking to her current lawyer and learning the importance of this evidence, she continued to search for and found this article concerning the woman's death, which indicates the real problem, the dispute over the land. This evidence helps establish the appellant's credibility." * Exhibit A-3: Screenshot of a post from XXXX XXXX, 2019, on XXXX XXXX XXXX son's Facebook page. The appellant submits the following: [translation] "This screenshot shows that XXXX murder was announced on social media on XXXX XXXX, 2019. This is the evidence the appellant spoke about in her testimony at the hearing, which corroborates paragraph 9 of her statement." * Exhibit A-4: List of medications prescribed to the appellant in XXXX 2021. The appellant submits the following: [translation] "The evidence corroborates what the appellant states at paragraph 8 of her statement, that she had a nervous breakdown and was prescribed medications in 2021. In her opinion, this corroborates that her experience is real and that she was distraught about leaving everything she had built." * Exhibit A-5: News articles concerning the presence of the Sinaloa cartel in Cancún. The appellant submits the following: [translation] "Newspaper articles show that the Sinaloa cartel is very present in Cancún-Quintana Roo, where the appellant had her business and was a victim of extortion and threats. The newspaper articles corroborate what the appellant was talking about, that when she talked about the 'Cartel' she was referring to Sinaloa, because it is very present in the area. This serves to corroborate the appellant's credibility." [9] Regarding all of this evidence, the appellant submits the following: [translation] "In our humble opinion, it meets the statutory requirements in terms of its admissibility, particularly because it is evidence that was simply not considered necessary prior to the decision and other documents did not exist before the claim was rejected." She acknowledges that the interpretation of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA is restrictive. However, she relies on Singh1 to argue that the RAD is still free to apply the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA with more or less flexibility depending on the circumstances specific to each case. She argues that this new evidence is credible, relevant and material and that it contradicts the RPD's negative finding as to her credibility. Not all of the evidence submitted by the appellant is admissible. [10] Pursuant to the IRPA,2 I can admit only evidence i) that arose after the RPD rendered its decision, ii) that was not reasonably available at the time of the decision, or iii) that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented before the RPD, before the decision was rendered. iv) If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide whether the evidence is new, credible and relevant before admitting it.3 [11] I cannot accept the appellant's submissions for the following reasons: Exhibits A-1 and A-2 (news articles - death of the woman named XXXX) [12] The publication dates of this evidence are prior to the RPD's decision, and the appellant's submissions are insufficient for it to be admitted under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Not thinking it was necessary to present evidence before the RPD rendered its decision in no way satisfies any of the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [13] If I had admitted this evidence, I would have rejected it on grounds of credibility because it contains information that is not consistent with either the allegations in the written account accompanying the BOC Form or the appellant's testimony about the date the woman named XXXX died. The news articles indicate that the XXXX woman's death took place on the afternoon of XXXX XXXX, 2019, while in her written account the appellant alleges that the death took place on a date prior to XXXX XXXX, 2019. The appellant's written account states the following: [Translation] ...On the same beach there was another woman (coincidentally her name was XXXX XXXX XXXX) who rented a place like me. She went to the police to file a complaint. She thought the police would protect her and she went to the beach as though nothing had happened. This is what my colleagues at the beach told me. The day she went, the cartel people were there. She spoke to them and told them she was not prepared to leave her place. They did not do anything and they even let her work. She finished her day and left as usual. That day, she went with her daughter and another teenager. They followed her, and when she was near her house, they started shooting at her until she died. I learned of this news the next day and I was never more afraid in my life. That day, as usual, I spoke to my daughter who lives in Montréal and just told her that I had problems at work. I just told her that I could no longer pay the extortion fees, so my daughter told me to come and spend the holidays with her and her daughters, that she would pay for my ticket. So, I did not hesitate. She bought my ticket for XXXX XXXX, 2019, but she told me to file a complaint with the police to protect myself. On XXXX XXXX, I decided to go to the police and talk about what was happening, about the woman they had killed, and I went home. [Emphasis added] [14] In her written account, the appellant alleges that she filed a report on XXXX XXXX, 2019, in which she reported the death of the woman named XXXX. At the hearing, when she was asked about the date on which the incident occurred, the appellant replied [translation] "XXXX XXXX, 2019."4 The appellant's testimony and the allegations in her written account about the XXXX woman's date of death are inconsistent with the information in these news articles. It is illogical that the XXXX woman's death, which occurred on XXXX XXXX, 2019, was reported in the complaint filed by the appellant on XXXX XXXX, 2019, as is stated in the aforementioned allegations in the written account. [15] With regard to Exhibit A-2, which alludes to the motive for the crime, which is reportedly a [translation] "dispute over a parcel of land," there is nothing to indicate, on a balance of probabilities, that it was a dispute related to the operation of the XXXX woman's business. Regardless, the inconsistencies raised in the evidence about the XXXX woman's date of death are sufficient to render this evidence inadmissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Exhibit A-3 (screenshot from the Facebook account) [16] It appears that this evidence was posted on XXXX XXXX, 2019, that is, well before the appellant left Mexico and before the RPD rendered its decision. At the risk of repeating myself, the appellant's submissions are insufficient to admit this evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. It is a post on a Facebook page inviting people to attend the funeral and the family's period of mourning. I have no reason to raise doubts about the XXXX woman's death. However, even if I admitted this evidence, I am of the opinion that it would be insufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the woman named XXXX was murdered by the cartel because of the complaint filed against them or because she refused to give up her business, as the appellant submits. That said, I am of the opinion that this evidence is inadmissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Exhibit A-4 (medication prescription) [17] This is a prescription issued on XXXX XXXX, 2021, that is, well before the RPD's decision. The appellant does not satisfactorily explain how this new evidence meets one of the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Moreover, the appellant does not explain why this evidence was not presented before the RPD or why it was not reasonably available. Even if I admitted this new evidence, I am of the opinion that the content makes no connection between the medical symptoms or prescriptions described and the allegations in the appellant's written account. It does not connect the appellant's medical symptoms to what she experienced in Mexico due to the cartel. Therefore, this evidence is not admissible. Exhibit A-5 (news articles - presence of the Sinaloa cartel in Cancún) [18] The news articles are dated February 13, 2023, March 13, 2023, and April 5, 2023, respectively. The RPD rejected the appellant's refugee protection claim on March 21, 2023. The news articles dated February 13 and March 13, 2023, are not admissible because their publication dates precede the rejection of the claim. There is nothing to indicate that this evidence was not reasonably available at the time of the decision or that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented it before the RPD, before the decision was rendered. As for the news article published on April 5, 2023, I am of the opinion that it meets the first requirement of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. With respect to the case law criteria, I am of the opinion that this evidence contains new facts. It is relevant because it contains information about the presence of the Sinaloa cartel in Cancún. I have no reason to doubt the credibility of this source. That said, I am of the opinion that this news article is admissible. Request for an oral hearing [19] In support of her memorandum of appeal, the appellant requested an oral hearing under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. The RAD's decision on whether or not to hold an oral hearing is based on whether the criteria in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA have been established and, if so, whether the RAD should exercise its discretionary power to hold an oral hearing. Although the news article dated April 5, 2023, is admitted, I am able to decide on the determinative issues without holding an oral hearing. ANALYSIS [20] My role is to examine all of the evidence and decide whether the RPD's decision is correct.5 I reviewed all of the evidence independently, I listened to the audio recording of the hearing and I applied the correctness standard. [21] First, I will consider the issue of procedural fairness, and then I will look at the RPD's findings with regard to the appellant's credibility and the IFA. I- Breach of the duty of procedural fairness [22] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD breached the duty of procedural fairness it owed to her. She submits the following: [Translation] * First, the most serious breach is the one related to there being no interpretation, at the beginning of the hearing, of an exchange between her former lawyer and the member, and its impact on the analysis of her credibility throughout the case. * Second, another procedural fairness error is the fact that conclusions were drawn based on concerns that were not shared with the appellant at the hearing. See paragraphs 26 and 34 of the decision. * Third, it is important to note another breach of procedural fairness, namely, the interpretation was inaccurate-even false-for multiple facts or for the appellant's testimony at the hearing. See paragraphs 14, 28 and 30 of the decision. [23] I will examine the appellant's three aforementioned submissions to decide whether the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness. [Translation] "First, the most serious breach is the one related to there being no interpretation, at the beginning of the hearing, of an exchange between her former lawyer and the member and its impact on the analysis of her credibility throughout the case." [24] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD spoke with her former lawyer and that their exchanges were not translated. She states that she felt helpless because she did not understand the exchanges that were not translated. She submits that her credibility was undermined due to an error in the interpretation. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, she alleges the following: [Translation] 4) At the hearing, I must say that I felt helpless, because on two occasions there were direct exchanges between the member and my lawyer before the RPD, which were not interpreted into Spanish for me at the hearing. So, from the very beginning of the hearing, I thought I should not speak much and that perhaps my lawyer was supposed to speak for me. My current lawyer explained that this was not the case, that I had the right to a full interpretation of the exchanges that took place in front of me, and that it was me who had to say everything to support my claim; ... 6) So, when the member asked me if everything was complete, or if I wanted to add anything "aside from what was done by my counsel," I did not fully understand and the member had to ask the question again. In the end, I replied that everything was complete, but I did not know what the member was referring to when she said, "what was done by my counsel."6 [25] I agree in part with the appellant in terms of the untranslated exchanges between her former lawyer and the RPD member. It is clear from listening to the audio recording that the introduction to the hearing began at 00:00:39. From that point, the member's statements were translated up to 00:06:53. From then, the member spoke with the former lawyer about the late submission of Exhibit P-11 and exhibits P-8 to P-10. That exchange was not interpreted. At 00:07:38, the member stated that she wanted to take a few minutes to read the documents that had been submitted late, and this was translated by the interpreter. Therefore, the hearing was recessed, and upon return from the break, at 00:12:24, the member stated that she had read the documents that were submitted late and was admitting them. That part of the exchange was not interpreted. At 00:12:40, the former lawyer intervened to make a change to the appellant's written account, specifically to change the date that appears in it (February 2013 instead of February 2009).7 When asked whether there was [translation] "anything else," the former lawyer replied no. That part of the exchange was not interpreted. At 00:15:53, the member asked the appellant if she recognized her BOC Form, and she directly replied yes, in French. She stated again that she recognized her BOC Form, but that time through the interpreter. In this regard, I note that during the hearing, the appellant replied directly in Spanish a few times without waiting for the interpretation, which suggests that she had some linguistic understanding. I quote, by way of example, the exchanges that took place between the member and the appellant at 01:29:26: [Translation] Member: But you had another XXXX in XXXX XXXX, no? The appellant replied directly in Spanish. Member: Is that another XXXX? The appellant replied directly in Spanish. [26] As of 01:29:55, the member requested the interpreter's intervention. In Agudelo, the following was decided: [35] There are some preliminary points. First, the applicant alleged in his written memorandum that he does not speak English and was not in a position to realize that the interpreter's translations were incorrect. The applicant stated that he did not know he could stop the hearing to correct perceived translation errors. I accept that the applicant's first language is not English and that (as he submitted at our hearing) he had "problems" with English at the time. However, it is not entirely accurate to say that he spoke no English and could not know that there were translation issues at the hearing. Even amongst the short excerpts of the hearing in the Application Record, there are examples when the applicant himself immediately intervened to address the translation. He intervened once to correct the translator (who said "2013" in English instead of "2018") and on another occasion to clarify an answer he gave that appears to have been ambiguous in the original Spanish.8 [27] Although this is not a determinative factor in my analysis, I am of the opinion that the untranslated exchanges between the member and the former lawyer focus on, among other things, the late submission of some evidence and the change made to the written account. The exchanges between the member and the former lawyer did not address the basis of the refugee protection claim. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, the appellant alleges the following: [Translation] ...About the date that the lawyer changed in my written account, she was right, it was 2013 rather than 2009; however, I would have liked the interpretation of that first exchange because that way maybe I would have understood that I could make changes or additions at that time, that I could do so myself and not just my lawyer. [Emphasis added] [28] The appellant is not challenging the change made by her former lawyer at the start of the hearing. The late submission of evidence did not interfere with the course of the hearing or the appellant's right to a fair hearing. On the contrary, the member admitted the evidence that was submitted late. [29] With regard to the RPD's question as to whether the appellant wanted to make any changes to her written account, there is nothing in listening to the hearing to suggest that she did not understand the question, as she submits. The RPD asked the appellant the following question: [translation] "Is there any other information or changes you have received since you signed this document that you would like to make to your written account today or to your form, aside from what was done by your counsel at the start of the hearing?"9 [30] The RPD's question was translated. Given the appellant's silence, the RPD reformulated the question and clearly asked the appellant if she had understood the question. At that time, and before the translation began, the appellant replied directly in Spanish: "no es correcto"10 or [translation] "no it's fine,"11 through the interpreter. The RPD asked the appellant if her BOC Form was complete, true and correct, including the change made by her lawyer, and she replied yes.12 If the appellant did not understand the question, she just had to inform the member of her concerns, which was not done, in which case it would have made sense to reformulate the question for her or to provide further explanations. That said, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not err in this regard. [31] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that other RPD conclusions were influenced by her statement at the beginning of the hearing indicating that the content of her BOC Form was complete, true and correct. She refers to paragraph 28 of the RPD's reasons, which states the following: [Translation] [28] The claimant submitted in evidence a statement from her sister-in-law that states that she stayed at her home in Mexico City for six months, from XXXX to XXXX 2019. According to the statement, the claimant also received calls from people who told her they knew where to find her. When the panel asked her why she did not indicate that six-month stay in Mexico City in her written account, the claimant replied that she did not know, that it was probably because she was nervous. The panel rejects that explanation, which it considers unreasonable. The claimant signed her BOC Form nearly 10 months after she arrived in Canada, she was assisted by her lawyer, she made a change to her written account at the beginning of the hearing, she had ample time to amend her written account to add that information. She did not do so. Moreover, the claimant testified that including the changes made at the beginning of the hearing, her BOC Form, including her written account, was complete, true and correct. Furthermore, the panel also notes that the claimant indicated on her immigration form that she lived in Cancun from XXXX 2008 to XXXX 2019. The panel draws a negative inference from this omission and concludes that the claimant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that she lived in Mexico City for six months, from XXXX to XXXX 2019, or that she received telephone threats during that time. [Emphasis added in the memorandum of appeal] [32] I cannot accept the appellant's submissions. The RPD's conclusion is not based solely on the appellant's failure to amend her written account at the beginning of the hearing. The RPD added that the appellant was represented by counsel and that she made a change to her BOC Form in XXXX 2020. I will come back to this in my analysis concerning motivation. [33] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant states the following: [Translation] The second exchange that was not interpreted was from 00:36:48, and it is even more serious, because it pertained to the identity of the agent of persecution, which the panel called into question. The panel asked the appellant why she had not indicated that she feared the Sinaloa cartel and she replied that she remembers having stated that. ...Had she had access to interpretation from the time the member and the lawyer were discussing and looking for the name Sinaloa in the written account, she would have had a better understanding of its importance, and she could therefore have explained that her written account of the BOC Form had been written in French by her daughter, and that it was a simple oversight on her part. [34] She submits that the exchange between the member and her former lawyer, about whether the Sinaloa cartel was mentioned in the written account was not translated. She states that if the exchanges between her former lawyer and the member had been translated for her, she could have stated that her written account had been written in French by her daughter and that it was a simple oversight on her part. She argues that the statement submitted in support of her claim (Exhibit P3) contains information about the Sinaloa cartel. [35] Although I recognize that the exchange between the member and the former lawyer was not translated, the fact remains that the appellant was asked about the missing allegation in her BOC Form related to the identification of the Sinaloa cartel. When asked about the omission noted by the RPD, the appellant stated the following: [translation] "maybe I was nervous, I remember writing it, I came to get away from them."13 The appellant in no way alluded in her testimony to the fact that her written account had been translated by her daughter or that there may be oversights on her part, as she submits. I will come back to this. [36] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant states the following: [Translation] Also, on three occasions in the recording it can be noted that the member may have been rushed, because she did not wait for the interpretation into French, and she cut off the appellant's answer. That might explain why the exchanges were not interpreted to the appellant. In doing so, the RPD clearly violated the appellant's right to be heard, which warrants the intervention of the RAD. [37] She submits that even if case law does not require there be actual prejudice associated with the erroneous interpretation, her credibility has been undermined due to an interpretation error. [38] I agree with the appellant with regard to the member's conduct. At the hearing, the member, on two occasions, did not give the interpreter the opportunity to translate the appellant's answers. The RPD asked one question after the other before the appellant's answer was translated. Listening to the hearing reveals the following: [Translation] Member:14 "Is there anything else, Madam, other factors that might make relocating to either of these places difficult?" The appellant replied in Spanish mentioning the cartel, and the member carried on with another question before the answer was interpreted. Member: "Aside from the cartel." Member:15 "I understand that your only daughter is in Canada, Madam. Do you have other family members who still live in Mexico today?' The appellant replied in Spanish, and before her answer was interpreted, the RPD asked the next question: "What city do your family members live in?" [39] Although no objection was made during the hearing by either the appellant or her former lawyer, the onus is still on the RPD to ensure that all of the appellant's answers are translated. The member should have given the interpreter the opportunity to translate the appellant's answers before moving on to other questions. Although the RPD did not give the interpreter the opportunity to translate the appellant's answers, I am of the opinion that this error by the RPD is not serious enough to conclude that the appellant's right to be heard has been violated. [40] Overall, I do not see how the uninterpreted exchanges between the member and the former lawyer or the RPD's conduct were a breach of the duty of procedural fairness. [Translation] "Second, another procedural fairness error is the fact that conclusions were drawn based on concerns that were not shared with the appellant at the hearing. See paragraphs 26 and 34 of the decision." [41] The RPD noted that the appellant submitted in evidence two complaints.16 It was of the opinion that nothing in the appellant's testimony or in the evidence on the record indicates that the authorities acted on her complaints. It noted that the appellant's testimony that when she was a victim of extortion the first time, she did not file a complaint [translation] "because the police never do anything because the police are on their side." [42] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant states that the RPD did not ask her if she followed up on the complaints filed with the authorities. Relying on the evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP), she submits that the Sinaloa cartel is powerful and has ties to the authorities. She states the following: [translation] "So, it is completely logical that she did not follow up on her complaint, out of fear, but the member did not hear her on this because the question was not asked." She submits that the RPD reached a negative conclusion without informing her that it was a source of concern. [43] I agree in part with the appellant regarding the power of the Sinaloa cartel. However, I am of the opinion that the RPD took into consideration the reports filed by the appellant, but concluded, and rightly so, that there is nothing in the evidence, including the appellant's testimony, to indicate that the authorities acted on the reports. If, for example, the evidence on the record contained information that the police had arrested members of the Sinaloa cartel as a result of the reports filed by the appellant, this could be a sign that the cartel would be motivated to track her down. That is not the case. I will come back to this in my analysis regarding the cartel's motivation to track down the appellant. [44] The RPD did not find the appellant's testimony that her house is abandoned to be credible. It was of the opinion that if that were the case, she would have indicated as much in her written account. It noted that the house is not in Tlaxcala but was of the opinion that it is nonetheless a property that could help her to relocate and find a place to live in the proposed IFA. It was of the opinion that the appellant could reasonably earn a living and find housing in Tlaxcala and concluded that she did not discharge her burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the proposed IFA is unreasonable. It concluded that the appellant has an IFA in Tlaxcala. [45] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD drew conclusions, without informing her at the hearing of its concerns in that regard. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, she states the following: [Translation] Also, another concern that the panel did not share with me was the fact that, because I own a house in Mexico, that would allow me to relocate and find a place to live in the proposed IFA. The panel only asked me if I owned a house, and I said yes, that it was abandoned, and it did not ask me any further questions. This conclusion took me by surprise. How could I go back to live in a country where I am threatened by the Sinaloa cartel, which I reported to the authorities, and which will find me no matter where I hide. I cannot get my house back because, like I stated in the hearing, it is abandoned, even if I did not write that in the written account, it is true. I did not write it because I wrote the facts directly related to the threats and extortion I experienced; if the member had asked me why I did not write that, I would have had the opportunity to respond to that concern and would have provided more details, but she did not ask me. [46] I cannot accept the appellant's submissions. In its analysis of the second prong of the IFA, the RPD asked the appellant if she could find housing in the location proposed as an IFA, and she stated that it would be difficult for her to find a place to live. When asked about her written account indicating that she owns a house, which she is still paying for,17 the appellant stated that the house is abandoned.18 The RPD correctly pointed out the contradiction between the appellant's testimony and the allegations in her written account. The RPD did not have to confront the appellant about this apparent contradiction, and I do not see an error on its part. I will come back to this in my analysis of the second prong of the IFA. [Translation] "Third, it is important to note another breach of procedural fairness, namely, the interpretation was inaccurate-even false-for multiple facts or for the appellant's testimony at the hearing. See paragraphs 14, 28 and 30 of the decision." The death of the woman named XXXX and the lack of evidence [47] The appellant was asked how she knew why the woman named XXXX had been killed, and she stated that her co-workers gave her the information. When asked if the murder had been reported in the newspapers, she replied yes and added: [translation] "her husband was involved with a municipal councillor, we think that her husband was involved in the murder."19 When asked why she did not submit excerpts of these articles, the RPD reported in its decision that the appellant stated, [translation] "I don't know." [48] The RPD was of the opinion that the appellant did not establish that the death of the woman named XXXX was at the hands of the Sinaloa cartel or any other cartel. It was of the opinion that the excerpts of the newspaper articles about the murder of the XXXX woman could have clarified this. In its view, this is evidence that was reasonably available to the appellant and could have reinforced the merit of her allegations. It concluded that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the woman named XXXX was killed by a cartel because she had filed a complaint, or that she might suffer the same fate. [49] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD did not accurately report her testimony concerning the lack of evidence related to the XXXX woman's death. She states that the RPD seemed to have a preconceived notion about her claim. [50] I agree with the appellant about the incorrectly reported testimony in the RPD's decision. When questioned about the lack of evidence concerning the death of the woman named XXXX, the appellant did not state [translation] "I don't know," as the RPD reports in its decision, but rather, [translation] "because I could not obtain it, at that time I did not think it would be necessary, just a witness account by her son, in which he says that his mother was dead."20 Contrary to what is reported by the RPD, the appellant provided a detailed explanation. Although I recognize that the RPD erred in this respect, the fact remains that the explanation provided by the appellant at the hearing to justify the lack of evidence is unsatisfactory. In any case, I am of the opinion that the appellant's testimony that she did not think it was necessary to submit evidence concerning the death of the woman named XXXX, even though it was available to her, is not satisfactory to rebut the RPD's negative conclusion that she failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the death of the XXXX woman was at the hands of the cartel because she had filed a complaint or because she refused to give up the business. That said, I cannot accept the appellant's submission that the RPD had a preconceived notion about her claim. Written statement from her sister-in-law [51] In support of her refugee protection claim, the appellant submitted in evidence a statement from her sister-in-law indicating that she stayed at her home in Mexico City for six months, from XXXX to XXXX 2019.21 According to that statement, the appellant also received calls from people who told her they knew where to find her. When asked why she did not indicate that six-month stay in Mexico City in her written account, the appellant stated that she did not know, that it was probably because she was nervous.22 [52] The RPD rejected the appellant's explanations. It pointed out that the appellant signed her BOC Form nearly 10 months after she arrived in Canada, that she was assisted by her lawyer, that she made a change to her written account at the beginning of the hearing, and that she had ample time to amend her written account to add that information. She did not do so. It noted that the appellant testified at the beginning of the hearing that her BOC Form was complete, true and correct. It noted that the appellant wrote in her immigration form that she lived in Cancún from XXXX 2007 to XXXX 2019. It drew a negative inference from that omission and was of the opinion that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that she lived in Mexico City for six months from XXXX to XXXX 2019 or that she had received threats by telephone over that time. [53] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits the following: [translation] "It is important to note another breach of procedural fairness, namely, the was inaccurate-even false-for multiple facts or for the appellant's testimony at the hearing." [54] She states that she left Mexico on XXXX XXXX, 2018, her immigration forms were signed on January 16, 2020, and her BOC Form bears a stamp dated March 13, 2020. She argues that the RPD used a false premise to discredit her, when she testified, at "00:35:12," that she quickly claimed refugee protection after she arrived in Canada. [55] I agree in part with the appellant. The evidence on the record shows that the appellant's BOC Form was signed on January 16, 2020,23 a XXXX XXXX after she arrived in Canada. At the hearing, when asked when she claimed refugee protection, she stated, [translation] "I don't recall, but let's say XXXX days after my arrival here in Canada."24 With regard to the appellant's date of arrival in Canada, her BOC Form indicates [translation] "XXXX XXXX, 2019,"25 which therefore lines up with her testimony. [56] However, I note that in October 2020, the appellant submitted the same BOC Form, this time signed before an interpreter and containing her former lawyer's contact information.26 The RPD was referring to the BOC Form signed in October 2020. When she was asked about the allegations omitted in her written account about staying at her sister-in-law's home for a few months in 2019 and the threats made against her, the appellant stated she was nervous. At the risk of repeating myself, the appellant in no way alluded in her testimony to the fact that her written account had been translated by her daughter. Like the RPD, I am of the opinion that the appellant's explanations were unsatisfactory because in October 2020 she was represented by her former lawyer and she could therefore have received advice and made a change to her BOC Form to include in her written account the allegations mentioned in her sister-in-law's written statement. These allegations are important because they are at the heart of the appellant's fear. Overall, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not err in its conclusion and that there was no breach of procedural fairness as she submits. Communication with her family members [57] The appellant was asked if she still communicates with her family members in Mexico, to which she replied [translation] "very little." She stated that she spoke to her sister-in-law about 15 days before the hearing. When asked if her family members have been threatened or visited by the cartel, the RPD reported the following in its decision: [translation] "no, they did not tell me anything. They have not received any threats or calls." [58] The RPD relied on the evidence in the NDP27 stating that criminal groups are prepared to do anything to find someone when they have a true interest in doing so. They will go as far as torturing relatives in order to find information about a targeted individual's whereabouts. It concluded that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the cartel has the motivation to track her down in the proposed IFA and that the state of Tlaxcala is a safe IFA for her. [59] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant relies on the audio recording of the hearing, which indicates the following: [Translation] Member: So, during your conversation (inaudible)...that person told you that from the time you left Mexico in XXXX 2019, up until 15 days ago, did they receive any visits or threats from the cartel? Appellant: I don't know. Member: Did they tell you whether they had received threats or visits from the cartel? Appellant: No, only when I was there, and they were telephone calls.28 [60] She submits the following: [Translation] It is one thing for the appellant to testify that her family members told her they have not received any threats, that is, they are confirming the information, as the panel seems to report, and it is something very different to state that she does not know, because that indicates that her family may have received threats, but she does not know because she has not spoken to all of her family members in Mexico. According to the appellant's statement, the panel seems to arrange the wording in its conclusions in order to be right and to discredit her. [61] I agree with the appellant. When she was asked by the RPD whether her family members had been threatened or visited by the cartel, the appellant replied [translation] "I don't know."29 When asked again, the appellant stated, [translation] "no, only when I was there, they were telephone calls."30 The RPD incorrectly reported the appellant's testimony in that respect. The appellant did not state that her family members have not received threats or calls, as reported by the RPD in its decision, but instead stated that she did not know. I will come back to this in my analysis concerning motivation. [62] Overall, after reviewing all of the evidence, I am of the opinion that the RPD's errors are not significant enough to vitiate its entire decision, and I conclude that there was no breach of procedural fairness. II- Credibility - Failure to identify the agent of harm (Sinaloa cartel) [63] At the hearing, the appellant stated the following about her fear in Mexico: [translation] "I fear the mafia and the cartel. I know them and they know me." 31 When asked which cartel she was referring to, she replied [translation] "the Sinaloa cartel." When asked why she had not indicated in her BOC Form or in her written account that she fears the Sinaloa cartel, she stated that she had written it. When asked again, she stated, [translation] "maybe I was nervous, I remember writing it, I came to get away from them."32 [64] The RPD rejected the appellant's explanations and considered this a major omission. It noted that the appellant made a change to her written account at the beginning of the hearing and that she could have amended it at the same time to identify her agents of harm. It drew a negative inference from that omission and concluded that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that she was a victim of threats and extortion by the Sinaloa cartel. [65] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the omission identified by the RPD is unfounded because the evidence submitted in support of her claim, the report,33 contains information about the Sinaloa cartel. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, the appellant alleges the following: [Translation] I feel hurt when the panel says it does not believe that I was a victim of extortion by the Sinaloa cartel, as if I could have made up the complaint to the authorities, as well as the other evidence, and as if I made up the entire story for refugee protection. If I had made it all up, then why can I not go back to live in Cancún? I answered truthfully during the hearing, and I thought that I had clearly indicated the name of the cartel in my written account attached to the BOC Form, because I was certain that I had indicated it. For me, in my mind, when I refer to the "mafia" or to the "Cartel," I am talking about the Sinaloa cartel, because it is the cartel operates in Cancún. Furthermore, I would like you to know that the story attached to my written account was written by my daughter as I told her what happened. Errors may have occurred, like forgetting to write the name "Sinaloa." However, that name is in the complaint filed on XXXX XXXX, 2019. After my arrival I was still very nervous, and XXXX, because I had to leave everything that I had built to become an independent woman, which corroborates that my story is true. In 2021, I could no longer tolerate my XXXX, because I was not sleeping and my body was shaking, and I had to consult a doctor who prescribed medication for me (I attached the list in my evidence) to sleep and control my nerves. However, now, my XXXX is starting again, because my claim was rejected and I feel as though I did not say everything I had to say during the hearing. [66] I agree in part with the appellant's submission. The written account that accompanies the BOC Form in no way alludes to the Sinaloa cartel. While I recognize that the complaint filed by the appellant contains information about the Sinaloa cartel, the allegation must still appear in the written account. The instructions in the BOC Form state that everything important must be included in the written account. The lack of information in the written account about the agent of harm is a key element that is central to the claim. Moreover, the BOC Form34 submitted in October 2020 indicates that it was translated by an interpreter named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Even if I accepted that the written account was initially translated by the appellant's daughter, the fact remains that she signed a new BOC Form in the presence of an interpreter in October 2020. The appellant could have ensured, with the help of an interpreter and her former lawyer, that the contents of her written account were complete. At the hearing, when she was asked if the BOC Form and the written account had been translated or interpreted for her from French to Spanish and vice versa, the appellant replied yes35 and again did not allude to the fact that her written account had been translated by her daughter. [67] However, in light of the evidence in the NDP36 and the new evidence admitted, it is clearly indicated that the Sinaloa cartel is present in Cancún. Despite the significance of the omission identified by the RPD, I am of the opinion that the appellant's allegations about the "mafia" can be tied to the Sinaloa cartel. I do not draw a negative inference about the appellant's credibility due to the omission identified. I note that both the current version of the NDP (September 29, 2023) and the archived version (September 29, 2022) contain the same information about the presence of the Sinaloa cartel in Cancún, in the state of Quintana Roo. [68] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD's decision focused largely on findings of credibility, even though it stated that the IFA was a determinative issue. She submits that the credibility findings are flawed and that they impacted all of the RPD's other conclusions. She submits that the RPD did not consider the complaint submitted in support of her claim, namely Exhibit P-3. [69] I do not accept the appellant's submission, and I am of the opinion that the RPD was right to decide on both her credibility and the IFA. Although the hearing focused largely on issues of credibility, the RPD still questioned the appellant sufficiently about the IFA and made separate findings about her credibility and the IFA. In Singh, the Federal Court held as follows: [15] It was open to the RAD to conclude that credibility was the determinative issue and that it would only decide that issue. It was also open to the RAD to review both the credibility issues and the IFA issue, and render a decision on both of them, as the RPD did.37 [70] With regard to the complaint filed (Exhibit P-3), I am of the opinion that that evidence is not sufficient to overcome the multiple credibility problems identified in the evidence. III- Internal flight alternative (two-prong test) [71] The RAD's analysis focuses on the IFA in Tlaxcala. The Federal Court of Appeal established a two-prong test for an IFA in Rasaratnam.38 According to this test, the RAD must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that (1) there is no serious possibility of the appellant being persecuted in the part of the country to which to it finds an IFA exists; and (2) that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the appellant, for her to seek refugee there. The onus is on the appellant to demonstrate that the proposed IFA is unreasonable. In Sadiq,39 it was held that: Under the first part of the test, what a claimant must establish to demonstrate that a particular place is not a viable IFA depends on the nature of the claim for protection. If the claimant is seeking protection as a Convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA, they must establish that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in the proposed IFA. This includes establishing on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA. If the claimant is seeking protection under section 97 of the IRPA, they must establish on a balance of probabilities that they would be personally subject to a risk to life, to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or that there is a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the proposed IFA. The cartel's ability to find the appellant [72] The RPD was of the opinion that the cartel has the ability to find the appellant in the IFA. This conclusion is not being challenged, and I do not see any errors on the part of the RPD in this regard. The cartel's motivation to find the appellant [73] The appellant was asked why the cartel would want to find her; she replied because she had filed a complaint and the woman named XXXX was killed because she had filed a complaint. She could suffer the same fate. [74] With regard to the XXXX woman's death, the RPD indicated that it had concluded that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that her death occurred because of the complaint filed against the cartel. [75] The RPD indicated that the appellant submitted as evidence two complaints.40 It was of the opinion that nothing in the appellant's testimony or in the evidence on the record indicates that the authorities acted on her complaints. It noted the appellant's testimony that when she was a victim of extortion for the first time, she did not file a complaint [translation] "because the police never do anything because the police are on their side." [76] The RPD reviewed the evidence in the NDP concerning the motivation of criminal groups to find their targets. The evidence indicates that criminal groups may wish to find their targets because they "steal or lose money; due to personal rivalries; for political incentives/reasons... or due to 'personal vengeance; perceived betrayal; public exposition of relationships with public officials, politicians or investments; or cooperation with authorities as informants or collaborative witnesses'".41 The RPD concluded that the appellant does not match any of these types of individuals or groups and that none of the aforementioned reasons apply to the appellant's personal situation. It noted that the appellant paid the extortion amounts demanded. [77] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits the following: [Translation] The panel also erred because its decision is confusing and based on an incorrect assessment of the evidence and the facts. On the one hand, the member is of the view that the cartel, even though the appellant did not establish its identity on a balance of probabilities, has the ability to track her down, and on the other hand, that it does not have the motivation to persecute her because her profile does not match the type of person that might be persecuted by a criminal group. This conclusion is incorrect because it was drawn without taking into account, once again, either the appellant's testimony at the hearing or Exhibit P-3. The appellant reported the Sinaloa cartel. Her name and the name of the cartel are connected in the same document. If they have contacts in the prosecutor's office, which is corroborated by the objective evidence, they already know that she has reported them; therefore, her life is in danger. Consequently, she falls under the reasons indicated by the member at paragraph 27 of her decision: for reasons of personal vengeance (for reporting them) or for cooperating with the authorities as an informant or a witness. When she filed the complaint, she informed the authorities about the Sinaloa cartel's criminal activities. The member did not analyze that correctly. [78] I do not agree with the appellant's submissions, and I can only refer to the RPD's conclusion below, which reads: [Translation] [22] The panel reviewed the objective evidence, even though the panel concluded that the claimant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that her agent of harm is the Sinaloa cartel, the panel nonetheless analyzed the ability of cartels to find their targets... [Emphasis added] [79] Aside from the credibility problems raised in the evidence, the RPD rightly considered the issue of whether the appellant has an IFA in the state of Tlaxcala. Even if the RPD had found the appellant credible, there is an IFA in Tlaxcala. [80] I independently reviewed the factors listed by the RPD regarding the cartel's motivation to track down a person of interest, including the complaint filed by the appellant, and I am of the opinion that it was not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant's profile matches those likely to be of interest to the cartel. There is nothing to indicate that the authorities arrested members of the Sinaloa cartel because of the complaint filed by the appellant for it to constitute a reason for vengeance. There is also nothing to indicate that the appellant is being targeted by the cartel because she filed a report and is therefore considered to have cooperated with the authorities, as the appellant submits. I am of the opinion that the appellant's submissions in this regard are speculative. [81] At the hearing, when she was asked whether her family members had received any threats from the cartel, the appellant replied that she did not know. While the absence of threats against the appellant's family members is not determinative in the analysis of motivation, it is still incumbent on the appellant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the merits of her allegations, including those concerning the cartel's motivation to track her down. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the cartel is looking for the appellant. [82] I cannot ignore the RPD's next conclusion with respect to its analysis of the first prong of the IFA. The RPD writes the following: [Translation] Considering the claimant's testimony, the evidence on the record and the objective evidence, the panel concludes that the claimant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the cartel has the motivation to track her down in the proposed IFA and concludes that the state of Tlaxcala is a safe IFA for the claimant.42 [Emphasis added] [83] The RPD concluded that the appellant has an IFA in the state of Tlaxcala before even looking at the second prong of the IFA. It is well established that the IFA analysis is a two-prong test. Together, both of these prongs must satisfy certain criteria before a conclusion can be made that there is an IFA for the claimant in a proposed location. The RPD considered the second prong of the IFA, but the way in which its conclusion is written nonetheless leads to confusion. [84] Overall, I am of the opinion that the appellant failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the Sinaloa cartel would be motivated to track her down in the proposed IFA. Second prong [85] The appellant was asked if she would be able to find work in Tlaxcala. She replied that she would not. She stated that in Mexico, [translation] "once you are 40 years old, you find hardly any work, and at 50 years old, none at all."43 [86] In the RPD's view, the objective evidence did not corroborate the appellant's testimony regarding employment. It noted her years of experience as a XXXX and was of the opinion that this could only help her job search in the future. With regard to housing, the appellant stated that it would be difficult for her to find a place to live. When confronted with her written account indicating that she owns a house she is still paying for, the appellant stated that the house is abandoned. [87] The RPD did not find the appellant's testimony that the house is abandoned to be credible. It was of the opinion that if that were the case, she would have stated as much in her written account. It noted that the house is not in Tlaxcala but was of the opinion that it is nonetheless an asset that could help her to relocate and find a place to live in the proposed IFA. It was of the opinion that the appellant could reasonably earn a living and find housing in Tlaxcala and concluded that she did not discharge her burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the proposed IFA is unreasonable. It concluded that the appellant has an IFA in Tlaxcala. [88] In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant submits that the RPD's conclusion regarding the possibility of finding a job is based on speculation. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, the appellant alleges the following: [Translation] Also, another concern that the panel did not share with me was the fact that, because I own a house in Mexico, that would allow me to relocate and find a place to live in the proposed IFA. The panel only asked me if I owned a house, and I said yes, that it was abandoned, and it did not ask me any further questions. This conclusion took me by surprise. How could I go back to live in a country where I am threatened by the Sinaloa cartel, which I reported to the authorities, and which will find me no matter where I hide. I cannot get my house back because, like I stated in the hearing, it is abandoned, even if I did not write that in the written account, it is true. I did not write it because I wrote the facts directly related to the threats and extortion I experienced; if the member had asked me why I did not write that, I would have had the opportunity to respond to that concern and would have provided more details, but she did not ask me. [89] I do not accept the appellant's submissions. She simply disagrees with the RPD's conclusion. She does not explain how the RPD erred. I have already addressed the possibility of finding a place to live in the location proposed as an IFA. Even though the appellant's house is located in another state, the fact remains that she has a property that could facilitate her relocation to the IFA. In my analysis, I considered the appellant's age, her level of education, her employment history, the language spoken in the IFA, the presence of family members in Mexico and her religion, and I am of the view that these factors, examined as a whole, support the conclusion that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to her, for her to seek refuge there. [90] In my analysis, I considered the allegations in the affidavit attached to the appellant's memorandum of appeal stating that she fears gender-based violence in Mexico (single woman). At the hearing, the appellant was asked what city she lived in before coming to Canada and she replied as follows: [translation] "Cancun, Quintana Roo. I went there when I was young, I was 17 years old, I was born in Mexico City." When asked who she lived with, she replied [translation] "I lived alone."44 The appellant previously lived alone for years before coming to Canada. In my analysis, I considered the high crime rate in Mexico and the violence against women, which continues to be a serious problem. However, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not discharge her burden of establishing that, if she had to live in the IFA, there would be a serious possibility of persecution because she is a single woman. [91] Overall, I am of the opinion that the appellant has an IFA in Tlaxcala. She did not establish that there is a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA or that she would be personally subjected, on a balance of probabilities, to a risk to her life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if she had to relocate there. CONCLUSION [92] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the RPD's determination that the appellant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. (signed) Toni Jedid Toni Jedid October 3, 2023 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 2 Subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 3 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 4 Recording of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) hearing on February 21, 2023, at 00:26:54. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 6 Appellant's record, Memorandum of appeal, Appellant's affidavit, at p. 16. 7 RPD record, Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), written account, first page of the written account, second paragraph, third line, at p. 16. 8 Agudelo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 355 - 2022-03-16, para. 35. 9 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:17:14. 10 Ibid., at 00:18:14. 11 Ibid., at 00:18:16. 12 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:19:06. 13 Supra, footnote 4, at 00.38.31. 14 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:53:12. 15 Ibid., at 01:54:13. 16 Supra, footnote 7, exhibits P-3 and P-4, at pp. 137 and 140. 17 Supra, footnote 7, written account, at p. 16. 18 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:52:23. 19 Ibid., at 01:47:02. 20 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:48:16. 21 Supra, footnote 7, Exhibit P-5, sister-in-law's statement, at p. 143. 22 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:42:38. 23 Supra, footnote 7, BOC Form, at p. 25. 24 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:35:29. 25 Supra, footnote 7, BOC Form, Q. 2(e), at p. 20. 26 Supra, footnote 7, BOC Form, at pp. 36 and 37. 27 Ibid., National Documentation Package (NDP) on Mexico, September 29, 2022, Tab 7.8: The crime situation in Mérida, Mexico City, Campeche, and Cabo San Lucas; organized crime and cartel groups active in these cities (as well as Yucatán state, State of Campeche, and Baja California Sur); the ability and motivation of organized.... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. September 8, 2021. MEX200732.E. 28 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:58:22. 29 Ibid., at 01:59:17. 30 Ibid., at 01:59:39. 31 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:21:05. 32 Ibid., at 00:38:31. 33 Supra, footnote 7, Exhibit P-4, at p. 140. 34 Supra, footnote 7, BOC Form, Q. 12, at p. 48. 35 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:16:38. 36 NDP on Mexico, September 29, 2023, Tab7.4: OSAC Country Security Report. Mexico. United States. Overseas Security Advisory Council. June 15, 2022, at p. 6; NDP on Mexico, September 29, 2023, Tab 7.43: The Horrors of Zacatecas Could Happen Anywhere in Mexico. InSight Crime. Chris Dalby. January 10, 2022, at p. 2. 37 Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1583 - 2022-11-18, para. 15. 38 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 (CA), at paras. 8-10. 39 Sadiq v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 430 - 2021-05-12, para. 43. 40 Supra, footnote 16 (exhibits P-3 and P-4). 41 Supra, footnote 27, (Tab 7.8), at p. 13. 42 Supra, footnote 7, RPD reasons, para. 31, at p. 11. 43 Supra, footnote 4, at 01:51:12. 44 Supra, footnote 4, at 00:39:51. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC3-15774 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français