MB9-27900

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-27900 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Ottawa, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 15 2020 Date de la décision Panel Pamela Arnott Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Arthur Ayers Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss this appeal. XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant) is a citizen of Colombia. Her father was threatened and then murdered by a member of the criminal group Los Norte de Valle. The mother and brother were subsequently extorted by the gang. The Appellant was in Canada on a student visa when her father was murdered: she returned to Columbia for his funeral and learned there of the reason for his death. She returned to Canada in XXXX 2014 and applied for refugee protection in January 2015. The RPD found that she had a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Tunja, Columbia. I agree that the determinative issue is the IFA. DECISION [2] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant's father was an XXXX XXXX and took on, unwittingly, a member of the criminal group Los Norte de Valle as a client. He went to the police when the client threatened him: as a result, the client threatened to kill his family. The Appellant's father was subsequently murdered and the family feared for their lives. Prior to her father's death, the Appellant had been studying in Canada: she returned home for her father's funeral. After the father's death, the Appellant's mother and brother received threats and extortion attempts for a number of months in 2015 and 2016. For a short period, both the Appellant's mother and brother would make changes to limit their risk from the gang, such as changes to their regular travel to work and home, or occasional stays in different apartments in the city, seeking jobs in different places. The mother and brother kept their home and jobs throughout this period. No threats have been received by the Appellant or her family since 2016. [4] The Appellant's claim was heard in 2016 and was rejected by the RPD on the basis of a viable IFA. The RAD returned the claim to the RPD for redetermination based on errors in law and fact in the IFA analysis. The Appellant appealed the RAD decision to the Federal Court who also returned the file to the RPD for redetermination. A second RPD hearing was held in 2019 where the RPD found that the Appellant had a viable IFA in Tunja. This is an appeal of the 2019 RPD decision. NEW EVIDENCE The evidence presented by the Appellant is partially accepted [5] According to subsection 110(4) of the Act,1 I can only accept evidence that: a. arose after the RPD decision; or b. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or c. that you could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [6] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.2 [7] The Appellant has provided a precedent decision of the RPD and a supporting affidavit from the Appellant. This decision was dated after the RPD decision in the Appellant's claim. However, as part of the jurisprudence of the Refugee Protection Division, I find that I do not need to consider it within the gambit of section 110(4). I am also relying on Rule 52 of the RAD Rules3 in making this finding: I find that it is necessary to consider this case of the RPD in deciding the matter of the Appellant's appeal. [8] The Appellant's affidavit relates procedural details about the submission of the precedent decision to the RPD. While this affidavit arose after the RPD decision, was not reasonably available and could not reasonably have been expected before the decision, I find that the affidavit does not meet the requirements of new, credible or relevant. While the affidavit benefits from a presumption of credibility as a sworn document, it contains no new evidence about the Appellant's claim. As I have found that the precedent decision is admissible, I also find that the procedural history of its submission to the RPD is not relevant. The affidavit is not admitted. [9] The Appellant is not seeking an oral hearing. ANALYSIS [10] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made a correct decision based on an independent assessment of the evidence.4 The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in a. Failing to consider the Appellant's claim under section 96 of the Act, b. failing to consider the residual profile of the Appellant as a single woman in Columbia; c. Ignoring evidence of criminal activity throughout Columbia, which has increased since the Peace Accord of 2016; d. Failing to conduct a specific analysis of the risk to the Appellant from the gang which killed her father; e. Ignoring another decision of the RPD which rejected Tunja as a viable IFA. [11] In assessing this claim, I have been mindful of the Appellant's age, education and background. In addition, I am cognizant of the many difficulties faced by a claimant in establishing a claim including cultural factors, the milieu of the hearing room, and the stress inherent in responding to oral questions. In addition, I have considered the Chairperson's Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Guideline #4)5 as I will discuss. The RPD did not err in analysing the Appellant's claim under sections 96 and 97 of the Act [12] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in not conducting an analysis of the Appellant's claim under sections 966 and 97 of the Act based on the Appellant's profile as a single woman in Columbia. The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred in considering this residual profile under the IFA analysis without first considering her claim based on her residual profile as a single woman. [13] I am guided by the Federal Court jurisprudence that a viable IFA is determinative of a claim under section 96 or 977. I find that the RPD did not err in finding that an IFA was a determinative analysis and was determinative in this specific claim. I also note, however, that the RPD must consider the pleaded grounds in doing its IFA analysis as these grounds dictate the risks to which the claimant may be subject in the proposed IFA. The Appellant has a viable IFA in Tunja [14] The viability of an IFA is determined through a two-prong test. Firstly, I must be satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, the claimant would not face a serious possibility of persecution or risk to their life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA. This is referred to as "beign safe" in the IFA and applies to claims under section 96 and 97. Secondly, I must be satisfied that conditions in the proposed IFA are not such that it would be objectively unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for them to relocate and reside there. Once the possibility of an IFA is raised the burden shifts to the claimant.8 I find that the Appellant has not met this burden. The Appellant has a safe IFA in Tunja [15] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in concluding that the lack of evidence of the presence of any criminal gangs in Tunja was positive evidence of the absence of those gangs. While I agree that the specific identities of the agents of persecution need not be established by the Appellant (whether Los Urabenos, Clan del Golfe or Los Rastrojos), the onus remains on the Appellant to establish, on balance of probabilities, that those she fears have the motivation and ability to locate her in Tunja. Essentially, she is arguing that the RPD should base its conclusions on positive evidence of an absence: in my opinion, this evidence is unlikely to be found, on a balance of probabilities, in a dynamic environment such as Columbia as well as a misapprehension of the burden of proof. I have also reviewed the maps available in the NDP about the territories controlled by the most powerful gangs in Columbia, in particular the information about Clan del Golfo. This information indicates that this powerful organization does not have a presence in Tunja.9 I note that the objective evidence cited by the Appellants10 refers to the need to consider the ability of the armed groups to find people as part of an analysis: these sources do not contain factual conclusions that people can be found. Finally, I am guided by the Federal Court who have indicated that the standard for proof of adverse conditions in the IFA is very high and requires the Appellant to produce actual and concrete evidence of adverse conditions.11 I find that the RPD made no error in reviewing the evidence in the NPD about the areas where these criminal groups are active and concluding, based on the lack of evidence of their activity in Tunja, that those groups she fears do not have the ability to find her in Tunja. [16] The Appellant also argues that the evidence of rampant criminal gang activity across Columbia shows that the Appellant would be at risk in all locations in Columbia.12 According to Pineda13, "the risk faced by an applicant ought not to be a random and generalized risk indiscriminately faced by all persons living in the country". I have reviewed the articles from the NDP cited by the Appellant as well as the articles submitted in their materials. 14 In my view, based on the claimant's profile, I find that the Appellant faces a risk shared by all other people in Colombia. The objective evidence shows that several criminal organizations claim territory across Columbia and that crime and internal displacements continue to plague Columbia due to criminality and paramilitary actions15. Unfortunately, these conditions are shared by many people in Columbia. I find that the Appellant has not shown that she would be unsafe in the proposed IFA of Tunja. [17] The Appellant also argues that all proposed IFAs in Columbia would be unsafe as she would be at risk, as a single woman, for gender-based violence. She has provided references to the objective evidence that there continue to be sexual assaults against women by illegal armed groups.16 Based on my review of the totality of the evidence, including the Appellant's testimony17 I find that the violence feared by the Appellant is a result of widespread generalized criminality in Columbia. The government of Columbia has reported significant efforts to assist women who have been victims of past crime related to Columbia's gang violence.18 These measures include health services, political advocacy, and legal rights. The UNHCR provides that women with a particular profile of human rights defenders, social leaders or indigenous or Afro-Columbians are at risk19: the Appellant does not have this profile. Having reviewed the totality of the evidence, I find that the Appellant has proved insufficient evidence that her risk for gender-based violence is any different from any other single woman in Columbia. I also find, based on the objective evidence, that the situation of women in Columbia does not make the proposed IFA unreasonable. [18] In a Convention refugee claim, the Appellant must show that she faces more than a mere possibility of persecution based on her gender. Membership in the particular social group is not sufficient to establish persecution.20 The law also provides that the persecution must be "by reason of" one of the Convention grounds: in other words, the Appellant must show that she is persecuted for her gender. After my review of the evidence, I find that the Appellant is not persecuted by reason of her gender. Her evidence, and that of her family, was that she feared the criminal gang and her father's assassin due to the murder of her father. The descriptions of the fears described by the Appellant and her mother do not point to gender-based violence: they describe the fears common to all victims of crime and the emotional hardship of being separated from family during difficult times.21 She alleges that she is at risk for kidnapping and sexual violence due to her gender. In my view, this is the situation addressed in the Gender Guideline: "women who fear persecution on the same Convention grounds and in similar circumstances as men. That is the risk factor is not their sexual status per se but rather their particular identity ...The nature of the harm feared... may vary as a function of the claimant's gender."22 [19] Her risk is due to her familial relationship to victims of crime23 : the specific harm will be a form of gender-based violence. The underlying risk, in my opinion, remains that she is a victim of crime or a family member of victims of crime. As the RPD has noted, the Federal Court has held that victims of crime generally fail to establish their fear of persecution under one of the Convention grounds.24 I find that the Appellant has failed to establish her claim under section 96. [20] I have also considered whether the Appellant is at risk for gender-based persecution outside of sexual violence. The objective evidence indicates that gender-related discrimination is common in Columbia although Columbia has multiple statutes guaranteeing women's protection and participation in legal and economic rights.25 The OECD also indicates that Columbia struggles to implement some of these protections for women's economic and social rights and notes that women are more likely to be the victims of domestic violence.26 The Appellant has provided no evidence that she or her family have been victims of any gender-based persecution in Columbia: she speculates that she is at risk. On the basis of the evidence before me, I cannot conclude that the Appellant suffered from, or could suffer from, a sustained or systematic violation of her fundamental rights, notably in the areas of education, employment, housing or medical care, that would amount to persecution. The finding that there is discrimination against women and the fact the Appellant is female are not sufficient to establish that there exists a serious possibility that she could be persecuted for this reason in her country.27 [21] In a section 97 claim, the Appellant must show that her risk is, on a balance of probabilities, of a different nature or degree than a significant subgroup of the population living in her country of nationality. In this case, the Appellant must show that her risk is of a different nature or degree than other single women in Columbia or other potential victims of gender-based violence. Based on my review of the totality of the evidence, including the Appellant's testimony28 I find that the violence feared by the Appellant is a result of widespread generalized criminality in Columbia and not targeting of her as a single woman in particular. The Appellant has provided references to the objective evidence that there continue to be sexual assaults against women by illegal armed groups.29 I am also guided by the Federal Court who indicates that "the risk faced by an appellant ought not to be a random and generalized risk indiscriminately faced by all person living in the country".30 Having reviewed the totality of the evidence, I find that the Appellant has, however, not proved any evidence that her risk for gender-based violence is any different from any other single woman in Columbia. I find that the Appellant has not made out her claim. [22] The Appellant argues that XXXX XXXX, the man convicted of the murder of her father, will be motivated to find her. The Appellant speculates that this man will be looking for revenge.31 She also speculates that he will be associated with the Clan del Golfo gang and have the means of that gang to find her. The onus is on the Appellant to show that she does not have a viable IFA and she has provided very little detail about any mechanisms through which the agents of persecution could be able to search for her in Colombia. The fact that the Appellant believes she could be found or located does not make it so, and does not discharge her burden to show with credible and trustworthy evidence that she would face more than a mere possibility of persecution, or on a balance of probabilities, a risk to her life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA. I find that the Appellant has not offered sufficient persuasive evidence to establish that her agent of persecution has the means to locate her in the IFA location. [23] Finally, the evidence indicates that it was her uncle who assisted with the investigation to find Mr. XXXX.32 I note that there is no evidence that this assassin has made any actions against the uncle or other members of the family. I find that this lack of action is notable given the many inquiries and investigations by the Appellant's uncle which led the prosecution against Mr. XXXX. I also find that the evidence shows that the last actions against the family were more than 4 years ago.33 I find that the Appellant has not shown that the criminal gang or XXXX XXXX have the motivation to find the Appellant in the proposed IFA. The Appellant has a reasonable IFA in Tunja. [24] The Appellant has framed her arguments largely in terms of the first prong of the IFA analysis but also argues that the RPD failed to consider that gender-based violence makes all locations in Columbia unreasonable for the Appellant. Similar to my findings on this argument in relation to section 97 in the first prong of the IFA34, I find this argument unconvincing. To be clear, I find that there is insufficient evidence that the level of gender-based violence in Columbia against single women makes all locations unreasonable as proposed IFAs and makes Tunja unreasonable as a proposed IFA. [25] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in not considering her personal circumstances in the IFA analysis. There is a very high threshold to the objectivity of an IFA. Reasonability or objectivity refers to the second prong of the analysis of an IFA. The Federal Court has indicated that: "the unreasonableness test... requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized."35 [26] The transcript shows that the RPD considered the Appellant's personal circumstances, being her age, work history and professional qualifications36. The RPD also correctly observed the case law which states that, to meet their burden, the Appellant must present actual and concrete evidence of conditions that would jeopardize her life and safety in relocating to a safe area. Unfortunately, the fact that the Appellant has no friends or relatives in the proposed IFA does not make the proposed IFA unreasonable and that the fact that the Appellant may not be able to find suitable employment in his or her field of expertise may not make the IFA unreasonable.37 [27] In this case, the RPD panel proposed Tunja as an IFA. Tunja is a large urban area which is the capital of the department of Boyacá. It offers employment and educational opportunities for the Appellant although it has unemployment and crime as do all major cities in Colombia and in Canada. However, there is no evidence that a single woman could not establish herself in the proposed IFA and receive any required supports from the community and public authorities. [28] The Appellant speaks both Spanish and English and is familiar with the culture in Columbia. She is a skilled young adult who could pursue educational or employment opportunities in the IFA locations. She has both a postsecondary education and recent work experience. As the RPD noted, she has shown herself to be an adaptable person who has been able to relocate and integrate successfully into new environments in two counties.38 While I am sympathetic to the Appellant's concern of living without the presence of any close friends or relatives, she also testified that she has successfully adapted to other new environments without the presence of close friends or relatives. Having reviewed the totality of the evidence, I find that the Appellant's personal circumstances do not make the IFA unreasonable. [29] It is important to note that the burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate that the proposed IFA is unreasonable or unduly harsh in her particular case. The Appellant has not provided submissions that the proposed IFA would be unreasonable in terms of language, religion, transportation and travel, health or social services, medical care, accommodation, or other factors. The Federal Court of Appeal has been clear that "undue hardship resulting from loss of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and expectations"39 does not meet the threshold required under the second prong of the test. While I am sympathetic to the potential difficulties faced by the claimant in relocating to Tunja, I find that relocation does not render this location unreasonable in her personal circumstances. I have reviewed the totality of the evidence and find that the Appellant has not discharged the onus of showing that it would be objectively unreasonable for her to relocate to Tunja. The RPD case TB8-07027 can be distinguished [30] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in not following the finding of a similar case.40 In this precedent case, the RPD found that Tunja was not a viable IFA based on the persecutors' ability to track the claimants from Bogota (a large urban centre) to Tunja (a smaller and more remote town). The Appellant contends that the case shows that a smaller town may not make a safer IFA due to remoteness and smaller presence of the criminal gang in question while, conversely a larger town may be equally safe due to the larger presence and infrastructure of the criminal gang.41 This case is also relevant, according to the Appellant, as it concerns Tunja as a proposed IFA. Finally, the Appellant argues that the agents of persecution are the same which reflects their ability to find her in a similarly situated town. [31] The Appellant acknowledges that decisions of the RPD are non-binding but persuasive on other panels of the RPD42. In my view, it is equally clear that that RPD decisions are non-binding and not persuasive on the RAD, as the appeal tribunal for the RPD.43 [32] I find that the precedent case can be distinguished from the present case. The Appellants in the precedent case were a family of 5 where the adults worked in retail sales jobs accessible to the public. Their interaction with the agents of persecution occurred over a period of six months. In the Appellant's case, she was in Columbia for 1 month when the problems with the former client first arose, moved to Canada and subsequently returned for her father's funeral.44 I find that her past interaction with the agent of persecution is less direct and more distant than in the precedent case. The agents of persecution in the two cases45 are from two different paramilitary or criminal organizations with different networks and resources. The Appellant argues that the Clan del Golfo (the agent of persecution of the precedent case) is a "reincarnation of the Norte del Valle cartel"46 which is belied by the objective evidence.47 As noted by the RPD, the objective evidence indicates that Norte del Valle members may have become part of Los Rastrojos, Los Urabenos or Clan del Golfo. The RPD in the Appellant's claim did a comprehensive analysis48 of the objective evidence of these three gangs on the seminal question of their ability to find the Appellant which I adopt in its entirety. I also am not persuaded by the RPD's analysis in the precedent case which is limited to 2 paragraphs in a 13 page decision.49 It is settled law that a geographic size does not guarantee the safety of an IFA. In most cases, this argument is applied against a large centre. I find that the same argument can be applied against a smaller centre. The Appellant points to several factors which may affect the safety of a given location: I find that the factors of transportation links to other centres, population size, demographic diversity of the population, transient nature of the population, police protection in addition to geographic remoteness may also affect the safety and reasonableness of a proposed IFA. I am also guided by the Federal Court who indicated that the analysis of an IFA must be specific to the Appellant, her risks and the proposed locations50. I find that the Appellant has not established that the precedent case is determinative of her own. [33] The Appellant also argues that I should be persuaded by the factual findings in the 2016 RPD and RAD decisions which were challenged at the Federal Court by the Appellant. As the Court ordered a de novo hearing51, I am unable to agree with that argument. [34] Finally, the Appellant argues that I should be persuaded by the Federal Court when they cited an RPD finding that "Los Urabenos have a national reach"52. I find that the law requires that I complete an analysis of the specific risk against this specific Appellant at the time of this appeal53. As the reach of a criminal organization is a question of fact, I find that the RPD, who examined the Appellant's case in light of the most recent objective evidence and the totality of the Appellant's evidence, have a better perspective than the Federal Court in 2018 on the basis of different objective evidence and different facts. I have found no errors in the factual analysis of the RPD and have conducted my own analysis of the reach and ability of the gangs in relation to the Appellant's claim.54 Finally, I find, as noted above, that the objective evidence does not show that Clan del Golfo is also known as or is the single successor55 to Los Urbanos. CONCLUSION [35] The Appellant has not established a serious possibility that she would be persecuted in Columbia, nor that, on a balance of probabilities, that she would face a risk to her life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture because she has a viable IFA option in Tunja Columbia. Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Act, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Pamela Arnott Pamela Arnott September 15 2020 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001. (the Act). 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza 2007 FC 385. 3 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257. 4Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 5 Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution. Issued November 13, 1996, pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 6 In reviewing the RPD decision, particularly paragraphs 11-14, I believe that the RPD made a typographical error in the subtitle of these paragraphs. The analysis in paragraphs 11-14 refers to the criteria for a claim under section 96 and the conclusion in paragraph 14 concludes that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee under section 96 of the Act. 7 Singh, (Gurmeet) v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995) 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 226 (FCTD); Tharmaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No 92; Hernandez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 703. 8 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (MEI), 1993 CanLII 3011, at para. 9. 9 NDP for Columiba (31 May 2019) item 7.4 "Colombia's most important post-FARC drug trafficking groups" at p 2. This item was unchanged in the most recent NDP avaialble at the time of this hearing, 12 June 2020. 10 RPD-1, Appellant's Post-Hearing Submissions at para 9 citing NDP for Columbia (31 May 2019) item 1.7 "UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing ...." (26 October 2015). This article was unchanged in the most recent NDP avaialble at the time of this hearing, 12 June 2020. 11 Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2013 FC 988, Ranganthan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2000 CanLII 16789. 12 RPD-1, Appellant's Supplementary Submissions at p 6-9. 13 Martinez Pineda v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 365 14 RPD-1, Appellant's Supplementary Submissions citing NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 7.2 "Paramilitary successor groups and ...." Immigration and Refugee Board (COL105773.E) 24 April 2017 and item 14.1 "Stuck in the Middle". These items were unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. However, item 14.4 "Displacement Rising as Columbia's Conflict......" (13 June 2016) from the NDP for Columbia (31 May 2019) was was removed from the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. See also the submissions of 8 September 2016 and 5 March 2015 about the historic violence in Cali and the evolution of several Columbian criminal organizations. 15 NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 14.1 "Stuck in the Middle" (March 2019). This item was unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 16 P-1, Appellant's Memoranda at para 60 citing the NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 2.1 "Columbia 2018 Human Rights Report" at p. 1 and 25, item 5.1 "Social Institutions and Gender Index 2019" at p 6. 17 RAD-2, Transcript, (September 25 2019) "Appellant's closing submissions" at p 52-58. 18NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 5.3 "Access to justice for women victims of sexual violence" March 2016. This item is unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 19 NDP for Nigeria (31 May 2019), item 1.7 "UNHR Eligibility Guildeines....." at p 46. This item is unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 20 Ocean v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2001 FC 796 at para 15-16. Paul-Laforest v. MCI 2012 FC 815. 21 See RPD-1, Affidavit of the Appellant (January 20, 2019), Letter of XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX 2015) evidence about who she fears (gang) due to father's murder. 22 Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution. Issued November 13, 1996, pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act at section A.I.1. 23 Her evidence, provided in the 2019 hearing, is that her brother and mother were extorted in 2015-16 and her father was murdered. 24 RPD-1, Reasons for Decision at para 11 citing Hamaisa, Basem v. MCI 2009 FC 997. See also Somin v. M.C.I. 2009 FC 218. See also Rizkallah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 156 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.); Lozandier v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2009 FC 770 (CanLII); Jean, Léonie Laurore v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2010 FC 674 (CanLII). 25 NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 5.1 "Social Insitutions and Gender Index 2019" OECD (December 2018). This item is unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 26 Ibid. This item is unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 27 Debel v. M.C.I. 2020 FC 156; Riboul, Erva v. M.C.I. 2020 FC 263; Morissaint, Jean Eddy v. M.C.I. 2020 FC 413. 28 RAD-2, Transcript, (September 25 2019) "Appellant's closing submissions" at p 52-58. 29 P-1, Appellant's Memoranda at para 60 citing the NDP for Columbia (19 May 2019) item 2.1 "Columbia 2018 Human Rights Report" at p. 1 and 25, item 5.1 "Social Institutions and Gender Index 2019" at p 6. 30 Pindea v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 365. 31 RPD-2, Transcript of Hearing (September 15 2019) at pg 33-34 32 RPD-1, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX 219) and Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX 219). 33 RPD-1, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX XXXX 2019). 34 See paras 12, 13, 16, 17, 18. 35 Ranganathan, Rohini v. M.C.I (F.C.A., no . A-348-99), December 21, 2000. 36 RAD-2, Transcript of Hearing (15 September 2019) at p.34, 36 and Reasons for Decision at para 46-50. 37 Mchedlishvili v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2010 FC 630 (CanLII) at para 16 38 RPD-1, Reasons for Decision at para 35. 39 Ranganathan v. Canada (MCI), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA) at para. 15; Okechukwu v. Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1142 at para. 37; Obineze v. Canada (MCI), 2018 FC 1150. 40 The Appellant cites TB8-07027, a decision of the RPD made on 27 October 2019 ("the precedent decision"). The Appellant provided submissions in October 2019 to the RPD on this decision. I have considered both the decision and the Appellant's submissions on it in my analysis. 41 P-1, Appellant's Post-Hearing Submissions of October 27 2019 at pg 3 and Appellant's Memoranda at para 92. 42 P-1, Appellant's Post-Hearing Submissions of October 27 2019. 43 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, section 110(1). 44 RPD-1, Narrative attached to Basis of Claim at lines 1-8 and lines 32-58. 45 Being the Appellant's case and the precedant case 46 P-1, Appellant's submissions of October 27 2019. 47 See NDP for Columbia, (May 2019) item 7.2 "Columbia Elites and Organized Crime" at p 12-14, 19; item 7.4 "Columbia's most important post-FARC drug trafficking..." at p 4; item 7.9" Recycled Violence: Abuses by FARC dissident groups..." at p 27; item 7.24 "The presence and activities of Los Rastrojos...." at p 1. These items were unchanged in the most recent NDP available at the time of this decision, 12 June 2020. 48 RPD-1, Reasons for Decision, para 22-34. 49 In fact, the RPD does not make a direct statement about Tunja as an IFA but concludes it is no more remote than Florian (the proposed IFA) and probably less so". It is on the basis of the remoteness of Florian (where the Appellants in the precedent case were tracked) that the RPD concluded that there was no viable IFA. 50 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.) ; Thirunavukkarasu. v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1993 CanLII 3011, Cruz Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 81 51 P-1 Appellant's Record, Notice of Decision at p 33. 52 Appellant's Memoranda at para 92 citing Sanchez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2018 FC 665 53 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.) ; Thirunavukkarasu. v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1993 CanLII 3011, Cruz Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 81 54 RPD-1, Reasons for Decision at para 22-39. 55 P-1, Appellant's Memoranda of October 27 2019 at pg 8. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-27900 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français