MB5-04104

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-04104 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision - Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered/heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision May 24, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Me Alain Bissonnette Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Jacques Despatis Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION I. INTRODUCTION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX, who is a citizen of Djibouti, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD). He is submitting that the RPD erred in the analysis of a refugee sur place claim and in the assessment of his credibility. II. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Under subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) allows the appeal, sets aside the RPD's determination and substitutes the determination that should have been made, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is a refugee under section 96 of the IRPA. III. BACKGROUND A. Summary of alleged facts [3] In his memorandum, the appellant summarizes the facts as follows: - In XXXX 2010, he joined the Union pour la Démocratie et la Justice (UDJ) [union for democracy and justice], a political party that, in 2012, rallied the other opposition parties to form the coalition Union pour le salut national (USN) [union for national salvation], of which he is also a member; - He was detained for three days after he participated in a demonstration held on XXXX XXXX, 2011; - On XXXX XXXX, 2013, his party appointed him as a XXXX XXXX XXXX during the legislative elections; - On that day, he XXXX XXXX XXXX and he informed those in charge of what he had seen; - On XXXX XXXX, 2013, he was summoned by the authorities and was detained for 24 hours; - Later, he went to study in France, where he met other USN activists and where, among other things, he participated in a demonstration held in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, 2014; - In 2014, he participated in an internship with a company named XXXX XXXX, which manages XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; - During his internship, he learned that people were being sought to testify regarding the XXXX XXXX in 2013 and he volunteered; - On XXXX XXXX, 2014, he was summoned by the authorities. He went to the police station where he was verbally and physically attacked and was then detained for 48 hours; - On June 27, 2014, he took part in preparations for activities organized by the USN for the country's independence festivities; - On XXXX XXXX, 2014, he received another summons to appear at the police station, but he did not go and instead left his country on XXXX XXXX, 2015, to go to France; - In XXXX 2015, he came to Canada to finish his master's degree; - He filed his refugee protection claim after he completed his studies, that is, in June 2015; - During his stay in Canada, he participated in two demonstrations; photographs and videos were taken at these events and these items are available on social sites accessible online.1 [4] In addition to his Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form),2 the appellant, referred to as the claimant at the time, submitted some documents as evidence.3 B. RPD decision [5] The hearing was held before the RPD on August 26, 2015, and the decision to reject the refugee protection claim was rendered on September 1, 2015.4 [6] In its reasons for decision, the RPD indicates that, at the hearing, the claimant's testimony was hesitant, vague and sometimes contradictory, even when simple and clear questions were asked.5 It also considers that the claimant's behaviour was not that of a person who fears being returned to his country and that he did not establish a subjective fear of persecution if he returned to Djibouti.6 [7] The RPD was also of the opinion that it is inconsistent for the claimant to allege that the authorities of his country would persecute him because of his political opinion but that his studies abroad were paid for by these same authorities.7 [8] With regard to the claimant's return to his country to participate in an internship there in 2014, the RPD was of the opinion that, if he feared persecution in his country, he would not have returned.8 [9] More generally, the RPD was of the opinion that the claimant's testimony did not align with the alleged facts. Here is what it writes on this topic: [translation] [36] The claimant's testimony does not align with the facts alleged on the record and the evidence. The claimant alleged that he was arrested because of his participation as XXXX XXXXfor the opposition and member of the USN during the elections in February-March 2013. He left his country in XXXX 2013 to study in France and he returned to his country to do his internship. He did not claim asylum in France.... [40] In our opinion, the claimant entered France to pursue his studies and not because of a fear of political persecution. If such were the case, there is reason for the panel to believe that this claimant would have claimed asylum during his stay in France from XXXX XXXX, 2014, to XXXX XXXX, 2015. The claimant did not establish a subjective fear of persecution if he returned to his country during this second period. [41] The claimant's behaviour undermines his credibility with regard to his account of torture and political persecution in his country. The panel did not believe that the claimant did not know until XXXX 2015 that he was wanted by the authorities of his country. This assertion contradicts the evidence and previous statements, as the claimant stated that he received a summons to appear in XXXX 2014. [42] Faced with these inconsistencies and contradictions, the panel finds that the claimant is not credible. Given that the panel does not find him credible, it does not attribute any probative value to the summons submitted by the claimant, especially since these documents are disparate and unreliable. The three summons have different formats and one of them has deletions. Moreover, the originals for two of them were not submitted.9 [10] The RPD was also of the opinion that the delay in claiming refugee protection in Canada does not correspond with the behaviour of a person who fears being persecuted in their country.10 [11] With regard to the argument that the claimant is a refugee sur place, the RPD was of the opinion that he did not establish that he was targeted by the authorities of his country after meeting opposition members and participating in demonstrations in Canada.11 C. Grounds of appeal and decision sought [12] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the RPD erred in the analysis of a refugee sur place claim and in the assessment of his credibility.12 [13] With regard to the principle of refugee sur place, the appellant identifies the applicable test and submits that there is a significant risk that he would be persecuted as a result of his political activism in France and in Canada, especially since documents were published in which he can be seen at demonstrations against the Djiboutian regime.13 He also submits that he is indeed an active activist within the USN, that there is more than a reasonable chance of believing that the authorities of his country are aware of the demonstrations in which he participated and that, because of his actions within the USN, he would be persecuted if he had to return to Djibouti.14 [14] With regard to the assessment of his credibility, the appellant submits that the RPD made a number of errors. [15] First, with regard to the delay in claiming refugee protection, the appellant submits that the RPD acknowledged that he is a member of the USN and that he participated in political activities in Djibouti and abroad. In this context, he submits that the fear of being persecuted does not have to involve the past, but that a person can be recognized as a refugee in relation to their fears of future persecution. He adds that if he had claimed refugee protection when he arrived in Canada, this could have had a negative impact on the carrying out of his studies, which he was in the process of completing.15 [16] Then, with regard to his internship in XXXX, the appellant submits that it is not the government or the authorities of his country who manage XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, but rather, XXXX XXXX company and that, therefore, he did his internship with an independent company.16 [17] In conclusion, the appellant is asking the RAD to allow his appeal and recognize him as a refugee or a person in need of protection, or to refer the matter before a different RPD member for a hearing de novo.17 IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL A. The appellant presented documents on appeal [18] In his affidavit, the appellant states that he produced before the RAD some evidence to be considered in the assessment of his record.18 [19] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the new documents on the political situation in Djibouti were published after the RPD's decision was received and that, therefore, he could not have obtained them before his hearing. He adds that he is submitting these documents to show that the political situation in Djibouti has not improved at all and that he risks being persecuted because of his political activities.19 [20] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the documents regarding XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX should be admitted on appeal because he did not consider that his job with this company would cause him problems when his claim was being assessed before the RPD.20 B. Test for admissibility [21] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present to the RAD only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It should be noted that the time limit referred to in subsection 110(4) is the rejection of the appellant's refugee protection claim, not the hearing before the RPD. A party who wants to provide a document as evidence after a hearing but before a decision takes effect may make an application to the Division.21 [22] In a recent, highly anticipated decision, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the explicit conditions in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are inescapable, have to be met and leave no room for discretion on the part of the RAD.22 It also found that the criteria established by the case law in terms of the credibility and the relevance of evidence come implicitly from the wording of the subsection in question.23 In short, there is a clear legislative intention not to authorize any new evidence on appeal before the RAD other than in very specific and carefully defined circumstances. This is because the RAD's role is not to provide the opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted before the RPD, but to allow for errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law to be corrected.24 [23] Furthermore, the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules) provide that the appeal record must contain, among other documents, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, and a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding how that evidence meets the requirements of that subsection and how it relates to the appellant.25 C. RAD decision regarding the admissibility of the documents in question [24] The new documents on the political situation in Djibouti were published a few days or weeks after the RPD's decision.26 In his memorandum, the appellant submits that these documents show that the political situation in Djibouti has not improved at all and that he risks being persecuted because of his political activities. [25] Having carefully read these documents, I am of the opinion that they include analyses regarding the political situation in Djibouti as it was analyzed a few days or weeks after the RPD's decision. As the appellant himself stated, these documents simply establish that the situation has not improved. If the situation has not improved, it has therefore logically remained the same as it was a few days or weeks beforehand. That said, no information in these documents pertains directly to the appellant's personal situation. Consequently, in light of the wording of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the relevant case law, my conclusion is that these documents do not constitute new evidence and are not admissible on appeal. [26] With regard to the documents on the XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX,27 having carefully read them, I am of the opinion that they do not include any evidence that arose after the rejection of the appellant's refugee protection claim. I am also of the opinion that the appellant did not establish that these documents were not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented them to the RPD, before the rejection of his refugee protection claim. Moreover, a summons regarding his internship in Djibouti was submitted as evidence before the RPD.28 Consequently, in light of the wording of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the case law, my conclusion is that these documents are not new evidence and are not admissible on appeal. V. HEARING BEFORE THE RAD A. The appellant requested that a hearing be held before the RAD [27] In his affidavit29 and his memorandum,30 the appellant requests that a hearing be held before the RAD. B. Test under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA [28] The RAD Rules state that the record of the person who is the subject of the appeal must contain, among other things, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, as well as a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding why the RAD should hold a hearing, if the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held.31 [29] Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, when evidence presented on appeal is found to be admissible, it should be determined whether that evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, whether it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and whether it would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. If the answer is yes, the RAD may then hold a hearing. C. RAD decision on whether to hold a hearing [30] The RAD bears the burden of determining whether or not the requirements set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA have been met.32 One of the determinative factors is that evidence presented on appeal must have been found admissible.33 Yet, in this case, I found that the evidence presented by the appellant as part of his appeal was not admissible according to the criteria set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the case law. Consequently, I conclude that there is no reason to hold a hearing before the RAD. VI. APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL A. Appellant's position [31] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the RAD must conduct its own assessment of all the evidence, analyze the RPD's determination without showing it any deference, and come to its own conclusion as to whether the appellant is a "refugee" or a "person in need of protection."34 B. A brief summary of the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Huruglica [32] Following an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history and various arguments used to date, in a recent, long-awaited decision, the Federal Court of Appeal states that the role of the RAD is to intervene when the RPD is wrong in law, in fact or in fact and law.35 It also states that an appeal before the RAD is not a true de novo proceeding.36 It also clearly specifies the approach to be taken by the RAD: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable.37 [33] As for the degree of restraint or deference owed by the RAD to the RPD's conclusions or findings as to the credibility of any testimony, Justice Gauthier makes a number of clarifications that I find very useful: [70] This also recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In each case, the RAD ought to determine whether the RPD truly benefited from an advantageous position, and if so, whether the RAD can nevertheless make a final decision in respect of the refugee claim. [71] One can imagine many possible scenarios. For example, when the RPD finds a witness straightforward and credible, there is no issue of credibility per se. This will also be the case when the RAD is able to reach a conclusion on the claim, relying on the RPD's findings of fact regarding the relative weight of testimonies and their credibility or lack thereof. [72] Problems will occur when the credibility findings themselves are disputed on appeal, and the RAD has no way to reach a conclusion without endorsing or rejecting those findings. If the RAD can identify an error in situations where, for example, a claimant was not found credible because his story was not plausible based on common sense, the RPD may have no real advantage over the RAD. [73] Similarly, there may also be cases where a finding that a witness is not credible was based on discrepancies that could not justify such a conclusion or that simply did not exist. If the assessment of the oral evidence contains an error which the RAD can easily identify, but the weight to be given to this testimony is essential to determine whether the RPD decision should be confirmed or set aside, the RAD may conclude that it is a proper case to refer back to the RPD with specific directions in respect of the error identified in the credibility findings. [74] That said, it is not appropriate to say more about the various scenarios that may arise, for they are not before us. The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.38 C. Independent assessment to correct any error [34] Drawing on the Federal Court of Appeal decision, it is clear that I must fully exercise the role of the RAD in correcting any errors that the RPD may have made and rendering the determination that should have been made or must be made in light of the most recent evidence on the record.39 VII. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [35] Following an independent assessment of the record, I am of the opinion that the RPD erred in its analysis of the principles relating to refugees sur place. Here is why. [36] Here is how the UNHCR presents the principles relating to refugees sur place: 94. The requirement that a person must be outside his country to be a refugee does not mean that he must necessarily have left that country illegally, or even that he must have left it on account of well-founded fear. He may have decided to ask for recognition of his refugee status after having already been abroad for some time. A person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee "sur place". 95. A person becomes a refugee "sur place" due to circumstances arising in his country of origin during his absence. Diplomats and other officials serving abroad, prisoners of war, students, migrant workers and others have applied for refugee status during their residence abroad and have been recognized as refugees. 96. A person may become a refugee "sur place" as a result of his own actions, such as associating with refugees already recognized, or expressing his political views in his country of residence. Whether such actions are sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be determined by a careful examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person's country of origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.40 [37] In this case, it must be determined whether the political opinion expressed by the appellant in Canada has come to the notice of the authorities of his country of origin and, if so, how it is likely to be viewed by those authorities. Before ruling on these issues, the decision-maker must consider credible evidence of the appellant's activities likely to substantiate any potential harm upon return.41 [38] In this case, the RPD recognized that the evidence establishes that the appellant is a member of the USN party, acted as XXXX XXXX for this party during the February 2013 elections and participated in a public party meeting during the country's independence festivities in June 2014. The RPD did not doubt that the appellant participated in a demonstration in France and supported opposition politicians in Ottawa, and it indicated that he had submitted as evidence photographs in which he can be seen holding signs with four other individuals. However, it also considered that this evidence was insufficient to draw a conclusion of a serious possibility of persecution. It was also of the opinion that the claimant did not establish that he is targeted by the authorities of his country because of his political activities. In its opinion, if he were a refugee sur place, the regime would have stopped paying for his school bursary before XXXX 2015. The RPD also considered that the evidence does not establish that the claimant is so involved with the political opposition outside his country that there is a serious possibility that he would be persecuted if he returned to the country.42 [39] In his memorandum, citing the Federal Court decision in Kammoun, the appellant submits that, with regard to refugees sur place, the only relevant question is whether activities abroad might give rise to a negative reaction on the part of the authorities and thus a reasonable chance of persecution in the event of return.43 He also cites excerpts from a highly regarded work of doctrine in international refugee law: In addition to sur place claims based on either new circumstances or the intensification of pre-existing conditions in the country of origin, it is also recognized that sur place refugee status may be grounded in an individual's actions while abroad. Such claims are commonly based on risk if returned to an authoritarian state of origin after having engaged in political activism in a foreign country.... In evaluating sur place claims based on the applicant's activities abroad the focus of attention should therefore be simply on whether the activities abroad may plausibly come to the attention of the authorities in the claimant's country of origin, and, if so, whether the risk thereby engendered is both sufficiently serious to amount to a risk of being persecuted and based on an actual or imputed Convention ground. Circumstantial evidence showing a real chance of awareness is sufficient since "[i]t is not necessary, and indeed would usually be impossible, for the claimant to provide direct evidence that the authorities have such knowledge.44 [40] I add that, in all refugee protection claims, the important thing is to understand what the alleged fear is in terms of the future. In other words, the test for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution is forward-looking.45 However, in this case, the appellant's fear, which, in my opinion was clearly expressed before the RPD, is being identified as a person who criticizes the authorities of his country because of his political activities after arriving in Canada. [41] The RPD did not doubt that the appellant is a member of the USN party, acted as XXXX XXXX for this party during the elections in February 2013 and participated in a public party meeting during the country's independence festivities in June 2014. Furthermore, it did not doubt that the appellant supported opposition politicians and participated in demonstrations in Canada. [42] However, as the appellant indicates in his memorandum,46 according to the documentary evidence, in Djibouti the authorities monitor communications and social networks where critical views of them may manifest. According to the report from the Department of State of the United States of America, the most serious human rights problem in 2014 involves the right of citizens to change or significantly influence their government: The most serious human rights problem was the government's abridgement of the right of citizens to change or significantly influence their government. The government did so by suppressing the opposition and refusing to allow several opposition groups to form legally recognized political parties; harassing, abusing, and detaining government critics; denying the population access to independent sources of information; and restricting freedom of speech and assembly.47 [43] Still according to the documentary evidence, in Djibouti the authorities condemn, imprison and harass political opponents in alarming proportions and severely repress opposition demonstrations.48 [44] I am of the opinion that the documentary evidence allows for the conclusion that not only might the Djiboutian authorities be informed of the appellant's activities in Canada and the fact that he is a member of the USN, but also that this knowledge may give rise to a negative reaction on their part, which compromises his fundamental rights. [45] One can understand that the RPD was troubled by the fact that the appellant continued to receive support from the authorities of his country while he was pursuing his studies in France and in Canada. But such a situation is familiar among authoritarian countries, as these regimes use the fact that they helped their foreign nationals study abroad to then pressure them to support them in turn. All in all, I am of the opinion that the RPD member raised the bar too high when he asked whether the claimant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he had to return to live in his country. In my opinion, the documentary evidence establishes that mere USN members who express their political opinion in good faith, particularly at demonstrations, are at risk of suffering serious consequences from Djiboutian authorities. [46] Although refugee protection claimants must establish their case on a balance of probabilities, they do not, however, have to prove that persecution would be more likely than not. In other words, the evidence must not necessarily show that a refugee protection claimant has suffered or will suffer persecution. Indeed, as I understand the case law in that regard, what the evidence must establish is that the refugee protection claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the grounds set out in the IRPA.49 Moreover, in order to conclude that there is a reasonable fear of persecution or, in other words, a reasonable chance or serious possibility of persecution, there need not be more than a 50% chance (i.e., a probability), but there must be more than a minimal possibility,50 given that there is no intermediate ground between the two limits.51 [47] Persecution is generally defined as the serious interference with a basic human right,52 and the word "persecute" means to harass or afflict with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance; to afflict persistently.53 While it is true that the dividing line between persecution and discrimination or harassment is difficult to establish, the case law indicates that discrimination will only amount to persecution when it is serious or systematic enough to be characterized as persecution.54 In drawing on two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Bédard states that before finding that persecution exists, there is a need to consider whether a basic right was violated and then verify whether the violation was repetitive or systematic.55 [48] In this case, I am of the opinion that the documentary evidence establishes that opposition members who dare express their political opinion in Djibouti risk having their fundamental rights severely and repeatedly violated. I am also of the opinion that, given the activities that he has participated in in Canada, the appellant established that he risks being identified as an opponent if he has to return to live in Djibouti, hence his well-founded fear of being persecuted, similar to opponents who live there. [49] With regard to the issue of whether the authorities of his country could protect him in a similar situation, the documentary evidence indicates that the judiciary lacks independence and is inefficient, not to mention reports of judicial corruption and that authorities do not respect constitutional provisions for a fair trial.56 VIII. CONCLUSION [50] For these reasons, I set aside the RPD's determination and substitute the determination that should have been made, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is a "refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA. [51] The appeal is allowed. Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette May 24, 2016 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Appellant's memorandum, October 7, 2015, paragraphs 9 to 16, pages 173, 174 and 175 of the appeal record. 2 Appellant's BOC Form, pages 13 to 29 of the RPD record. 3 The list of these documents is reproduced at pages 103, 104 and 105 and at pages 155, 156 and 157 of the RPD record. The documents themselves are reproduced at pages 106 to 153 and 158 to 198 of the RPD record. 4 RPD's reasons and decision, pages 3 to 12 of the RPD record. 5 Idem, paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, page 6 of the RPD record. 6 Idem, paragraphs 15 and 16, pages 5 and 6 of the RPD record. 7 Idem, paragraphs 20 and 24, pages 6 and 7 of the RPD record. 8 Idem, paragraphs 20 and 24, pages 6 and 7 of the RPD record. 9 Idem, paragraphs 40, 41 and 42, pages 9 and 10 of the RPD record. 10 Idem, paragraphs 44 to 48, page 10 of the RPD record. 11 Idem, paragraphs 50 to 56, pages 11 and 12 of the RPD record. 12 Appellant's memorandum, at paragraphs 38 and 39, pages 181 and 182 of the appeal record. 13 Idem, paragraphs 40 to 44, pages 182 to 185 of the appeal record. 14 Idem, paragraphs 45 to 74, pages 185 to 196 of the appeal record. 15 Idem, paragraphs 78 to 83, pages 196, 197 and 198 of the appeal record. 16 Idem, paragraphs 84 to 88, pages 198 and 199 of the appeal record. 17 Idem, paragraphs 93 and 94, page 200 of the appeal record. 18 Appellant's affidavit, October 7, 2015, paragraphs 17 and 20, pages 17 and 18 of the appeal record. 19 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 30, 31 and 32, page 180 of the appeal record. The documents in question are reproduced at pages 19 to 27 of the appeal record. 20 Appellant's memorandum, paragraph 33, pages 180 and 181 of the appeal record. The documents in question are reproduced at pages 28 to 35 of the appeal record. 21 Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, rule 43. 22 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Parminder Singh, No. A-512-14, de Montigny, Gauthier and Nadon, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 96, paragraphs 38 to 51. 23 Idem, paragraphs 34 and 35. 24 Idem, paragraph 54. 25 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 26 The documents in question are reproduced at pages 19 to 27 of the appeal record. 27 The documents in question are reproduced at pages 28 to 35 of the appeal record. 28 C-12: The internship abroad agreement is reproduced at pages 132 and 133 of the RPD record. 29 Appellant's affidavit, paragraph 20, page 18 of the appeal record. 30 Appellant's memorandum, paragraph 35, page 181 of the appeal record. 31 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 32 Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2693-14, O'Reilly, July 27, 2015; 2015 FC 911, at paragraph 11. 33 Parminder Singh, supra, footnote 21, at paragraph 51: "...the basic rule is that the RAD 'must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division...' (s. 110(3)). The new evidence must meet the admissibility criteria set out in subsection 110(4), and a new hearing can be held only if the new evidence fulfils the conditions set out in subsection 110(6)." 34 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 17 to 27, pages 175 to 178 of the appeal record. 35 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Huruglica, No. A-470-14, Gauthier, Webb and Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93, paragraphs 36 to 103. 36 Idem, paragraph 79. 37 Idem, paragraph 103. 38 Idem, at paragraphs 70 to 74. 39 Idem, at paragraphs 96, 97 and 98. 40 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, reissued, Geneva, December 2011, 209 pages, paragraphs 94, 95 and 96, pages 20 and 21. The UNHCR Handbook is an international instrument that defines the term "refugee" and sets out the principles that must guide the determination of refugee status. Canadian jurisprudence recognizes the persuasive authority of the Handbook: Hernandez Utrera v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2254-07, Shore, November 20, 2007; 2007 FC 1212, paragraph 18; Soto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3734-01, Tremblay-Lamer, July 10, 2002; 2002 FCT 768, paragraph 15; Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, La Forest, pages 713 and 714. 41 Hannoon v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3079-11, O'Keefe, April 18, 2012; 2012 FC 448, at paragraph 49. 42 RPD's reasons and decision, paragraphs 50 to 56, pages 11 and 12 of the RPD record. 43 Appellant's memorandum, paragraph 42, pages 182, 183 and 184 of the appeal record. 44 James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status. Second Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 693 pages, pages 76 and 77 and 79 and 80, citations omitted. 45 Idem, pages 161 to 169. Emezieke v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4453-13, Locke, September 29, 2014; 2014 FC 922, paragraph 30. 46 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 61 to 65, pages 189 and 190 of the appeal record. 47 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), National Documentation Package on Djibouti, June 30, 2015 (the Index of which is reproduced at pages 56 to 67 of the RPD record), Document 2.1: United States of America, Department of State, Djibouti. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, June 25, 2015, 28 pages, which is reproduced at pages 122 to 146 of the appeal record, particularly pages 122 and 126 to 129. 48 Idem, Document 4.2: Research Directorate, IRB, The Union for National Salvation (Union pour le salut national, USN) coalition, including the parties in the union, its objectives and its activities; the treatment of USN members and supporters by the state (2011-February 2014), which is reproduced at pages 152 to 161 of the appeal record. 49 Parampsothy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-421-12, Mandamin, August 16, 2012; 2012 FC 1000, at paragraph 24. See also: Mugadza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1324-07, Mandamin, January 30, 2008; 2008 FC 122, at paragraphs 20 to 22. 50 Idem. 51 Florea v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5443-04, Lemieux, November 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1472, paragraphs 21 to 24. Arrinaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-224-04, O'Keefe, May 31, 2005; 2005 FC 773, paragraph 43. 52 Sadeghi-Pari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Mosley, [2004] F.C.J. No. 316, 2004 FC 282, at paragraph 29, as cited by the Honourable Justice Zinn in Warner v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), March 23, 2011, No. IMM-4283-10; 2011 FC 363, at paragraph 7. 53 Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1984), 55 NRF 129 (FCA), as cited by the Honourable Justice Zinn in Warner v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), March 23, 2011, No. IMM-4283-10; 2011 FC 363, at paragraph 7. 54 Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1888, 88 F.T.R. 208, at paragraph 8, as cited by the Honourable Justice Zinn in Warner v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), March 23, 2011, No. IMM-4283-10; 2011 FC 363, at paragraph 7. See also the analysis by the Honourable Justice Near on the same subject in Mallampally v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), February 27, 2012, No. IMM-5626-11; 2012 FC 267, at paragraphs 22 to 24. 55 Portuondo Vasallo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Bédard, May 31, 2012, No. IMM-8526-11; 2012 FC 673, at paragraph 15. 56 IRB, National Documentation Package on Djibouti, Document 2.1, supra, footnote 47, page 124. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-04104 18