MB8-08049

RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB8-08049 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 9, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Me Alain Bissonnette Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Kayle Amber Sykes Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), submitted evidence before the Refugee Protection Division1 (RPD), and initially stated that she feared returning to live in the DRC because her father had been assaulted and subjected to death threats by reason of his membership in a political party, and because, as an unmarried mother, she had lost the respect of her father and of the community.2 She later added that she is bisexual and had had romantic relationships with women in both the DRC and Canada.3 [2] The RPD found that the appellant, then referred to as the claimant, lacked overall credibility. It concluded that the appellant did not satisfactorily explain her failure to include in the first version of her Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) the fact that she is bisexual, as well as the lack of any testimony or documents that could have corroborated this allegation. It also concluded that the appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation for the lack of evidence that could have corroborated her father's membership in a political party. Lastly, it found that the delay in claiming refugee protection undermined her credibility and that her behaviour was inconsistent with that of a person who feared persecution.4 [3] The appellant presented evidence, requested that an oral hearing be held, and submitted that the RPD erred by failing to draw a conclusion on her fear of persecution because of her status as an unmarried mother. She also submitted that the RPD had unreasonably undermined her credibility, as it failed to conduct the assessment while taking into account her reasonable explanations, failed to give value to the psychological report and failed to identify her as a vulnerable person.5 The Refugee Appeal Division dismisses the appeal. [4] In my opinion, the evidence presented on appeal is not admissible (I), there is no cause to hold an oral hearing (II), and the RPD did not err in rejecting the claim for refugee protection, as criticized by the appellant (III). EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [5] In Singh, the Federal Court of Appeal rules that the explicit conditions set out in subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) are inescapable, have to be met, and leave no room for discretion on the part of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD).6 It also rules that the criteria set out in case law regarding credibility and relevance of the evidence arise from the wording of the subsection in question.7 In short, Parliament expressed clear intent to authorize the introduction of new evidence before the RAD only in specific and carefully defined circumstances, as its role is not to provide the opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted before the RPD, but to allow for errors of fact, errors in law or mixed errors of fact and law to be corrected.8 These criteria exist to help preserve the integrity of the process by promoting finality with respect to the factual record at the first level of decision-making (with rare exceptions) and by encouraging the narrowing of issues as matters move up the appellate ladder.9 [6] The appellant submitted documents to the RAD.10 In my opinion, this evidence is not admissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. My reasons are as follows. [7] To begin, in her memorandum, the appellant does not make full and detailed submissions regarding how this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how it relates to the appellant, as provided in the Refugee Appeal Division Rules11 (RAD Rules). What is certain is that this evidence does not concern events that occurred after the RPD decision. At first glance, it seems that it is simply an attempt to remedy problems with the evidence submitted before the RPD. [8] Second, I find the appellant's explanation that this evidence was unavailable to her at the time of the RPD hearing to be unacceptable.12 [9] How can it be explained that she was unable to obtain these documents at the time of her claim before the RPD, yet was eventually able to obtain them after the RPD decision was rendered? Moreover, in her email to her uncle, she writes that her refugee protection claim was rejected and that she has been given a second chance, and she asks him to provide any kind of evidence.13 The email makes no reference to the fact that she had made a previous, unsuccessful request for him to send her evidence in support of her claim before the RPD. [10] As for electronic communications with the person she refers to as her ex-girlfriend, XXXX, the appellant attempts to blame her former legal counsel. Yet, she did not inform her former legal counsel of the criticism against her, as required under item 6 in the practice notice concerning allegations against former counsel.14 In any event, at the RPD hearing, when asked to explain why she did not provide these electronic communications as evidence, the appellant stated that she had reactivated her account on the dating site in order to access the messages, which were on her telephone, and that she wanted to provide them as evidence, but did not know how to print them. Her legal counsel specified that she had not received these messages. When asked whether she had requested help from someone else, the appellant responded that she had not.15 In my opinion, at the time of the RPD hearing and in the weeks that followed, namely up to the RPD's decision, the electronic communications with the person the appellant presented as her former partner were accessible, and there is no basis to conclude that, in the circumstances, she could not normally have provided them to the RPD. [11] Lastly, I find that the documents in question are neither credible nor trustworthy.16 [12] As for the request that was reportedly made to the appellant's father to appear before the Département de la Sécurité intérieure de l'Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR) [department of homeland security of the national department of intelligence agency],17 the appellant's BOC Form makes no reference to any such fact, although she stated that her uncle, who lives in Kinshasa, had informed her of her father's situation.18 [13] As for the electronic exchanges with the individual referred to as XXXX,19 I am of the opinion that there is no way to identify who this person actually is, or to whom this individual's messages are addressed. As they are not supported by any statutory declaration, these messages carry no presumption of truthfulness. The same is true XXXX XXXX XXXX electronic exchanges.20 [14] With respect to the letter from Ms. XXXX, since it does not include a statutory declaration, it carries no presumption of truthfulness. It refers to the appellant's relationship with someone named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, but it does not specify what type of relationship it consisted of, or who this XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX actually is.21 In her addendum to her BOC Form, the appellant refers to someone known as XXXX, but never indicates her surname.22 The same was true during her testimony before the RPD.23 II. HOLDING AN ORAL HEARING BEFORE THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [15] The appellant requested that an oral hearing be held before the RAD,24 but did not provide full and detailed submissions as to why the RAD should hold the hearing, as provided in the RAD Rules.25 [16] In any event, it is up to the RAD to determine whether or not the tests under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA have been met.26 One of the tests under this subsection is that evidence presented on appeal must be found to be admissible. However, I find that the evidence presented on appeal is not admissible. Therefore, it is not possible to hold an oral hearing.27 III. ANALYSIS OF THE APPEAL [17] The RAD reviews RPD decisions by applying the correctness standard of review after conducting its own analysis of the record. The exception to this rule is in cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in assessing credibility.28 That said, the RAD's role is not to conduct a de novo review of refugee protection claims, but rather to determine whether, as stated by the appellant, the RPD committed errors.29 [18] After conducting my own assessment of the record, I am of the opinion that the RPD enjoys no meaningful advantage and that the correctness standard of review must be applied. After listening to the recording of the hearing,30 analyzing the evidence, including the psychological report,31 and applying Chairperson's Guideline 8,32 Chairperson's Guideline 9,33 and UNHCR Guidelines No. 9,34 I find that the RPD did not commit the errors for which it was criticized. My reasons are as follows. A. Issue of the appellant's vulnerability [19] In her memorandum, the appellant submits that a psychological report is expert evidence that the RPD must consider, and that since Ms. XXXX report noted limited psychological maturity, the RPD erred in not identifying her, on its own initiative, as a vulnerable person.35 [20] According to the Chairperson's Guideline 8,36 the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) has a broad discretion to tailor procedures to meet the particular needs of individuals with severe cases of vulnerability. Various means can be used, for example: creating a more informal setting for a hearing, varying the order of questioning; and explaining IRB processes to the vulnerable person.37 Like all persons appearing before the IRB, vulnerable persons need to be treated with sensitivity and respect. Their vulnerability must also be considered when processing their cases, notably to avoid re-traumatizing them.38 [21] At the time of the appellant's hearing before the RPD, there were no proposals or discussions to identify the types of adaptation measures that could have been adopted. During the hearing, the appellant answered the questions put to her by the RPD in a manner that I find to be respectful and sensitive. On several occasions, the RPD explained to the appellant that it sought to understand why she had not submitted into evidence any documents that could have corroborated any of her allegations or why she had not made any effort to obtain such documents.39 It even gave her the opportunity to do so, even if, in principle, such documents should have been provided as evidence ten days prior to the hearing.40 In my opinion, even if no procedural adaptations were formally adopted at the RPD hearing, the hearing was conducted in a manner that treated the appellant with respect and sensitivity and did not traumatize her. [22] As for the argument that the appellant's lack of maturity explains the fact that she did not provide as evidence any documents that could have corroborated her allegations, and that the RPD erred in finding that her explanation was not reasonable, I find that it is not acceptable. I will return to this question following my analysis. B. Regarding the appellant's sexual orientation or gender identity [23] Gender identity or sexual orientation is a fundamental component of human identity, and this question must be considered with sensitivity and rigour. The RPD may come to the conclusion that a person who claims to be a homosexual is not credible, but it cannot come to such a conclusion without considering all of the evidence, including the person's statements indicating their sexual orientation. During a hearing, the perpetuation of stereotypes must be avoided; it is important to carefully ask relevant questions and have an understanding attitude not only toward the sexual practices themselves, but also toward society's disapproval of appearances, attitudes and behaviours deemed non-conforming to its norms and cultural values.41 Based on my independent analysis of the record, during the hearing, the RPD did not rely on stereotypes and it asked questions in a manner that was not only respectful, but also empathetic and sensitive. In its decision, the RPD stated that it had taken into account Chairperson's Guideline 9.42 [24] It should be noted that the appellant did not include in the first version of her BOC Form any information on her sexual orientation or gender identity as one of the reasons why she feared returning to live in the DRC.43 She did so only one year later, a few days prior to the RPD hearing.44 [25] When asked by the RPD to explain why she did not include this information in her initial BOC Form, the appellant responded that what concerned her the most was her father's situation, as he was under threat, and that she did not speak about her sex life with everyone, and only did so with her legal counsel once she felt ready.45 By signing the first version of her BOC Form, the appellant declared that the information provided was true, complete and correct.46 That being said, Chairperson's Guideline 9 indicates that it may be difficult for an individual who has concealed their sexual orientation or gender identity to disclose and discuss it with government authorities at a port of entry, which may give rise to an inconsistency between information from the port-of-entry interview and testimony at a hearing.47 However, this is not about the appellant's failure to declare her sexual orientation or gender identity to Canadian government authorities at the port of entry, but rather a failure to include this information when she completed and signed her BOC Form despite the fact that she already had legal counsel helping her with her refugee protection claim and she had been living in Canada for a number of years. [26] In any event, in such a context I find that there were grounds to expect the appellant to produce documents or evidence to establish that she is indeed a bisexual person.48 At the time of the RPD hearing, the appellant stated that she was fully open about her sexual orientation and that most of her friends in Quebec knew she was bisexual. She also stated that she had had partners in both the DRC and in Canada. When asked to clarify whether she had evidence to this effect, she answered that all she had were the messages they had exchanged, and that she had no photos or the like. When asked to clarify why these messages had not been provided as evidence on the record, the appellant stated that she had not been asked to do so.49 When asked to clarify whether she had made efforts with one of her partners to obtain a statutory declaration from her or have her testify on her behalf at the hearing, the appellant answered that she had sent a message two weeks earlier, but had not received an answer. When asked to specify whether she had female friends who could have written a document or testified on her behalf, the appellant answered that she has friends in Quebec who are aware of her sexual orientation, but that it hadn't crossed her mind to ask them to testify about such a thing.50 [27] The onus is on the refugee protection claimant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the facts on which they base their claim, including sexual orientation.51 In my opinion, the appellant's psychological difficulties cannot excuse the fact that she did not produce evidence, either documents or testimonies, which could have corroborated that her sexual orientation or gender identity is, in fact, that of a bisexual individual. [28] In its decision, the RPD explained the various reasons that led it to determine that the appellant's credibility had been seriously undermined with regard to the allegation that she was a bisexual individual.52 According to my own analysis of the record, the RPD did not commit any errors. C. There are other reasons to doubt the appellant's credibility [29] When refugee protection claimants swear that certain allegations are true, they are presumed to be telling the truth. However, this presumption can be refuted when the evidence is inconsistent with the testimony or when the RPD is not satisfied with the explanation provided with regard to inconsistencies.53 The RPD can draw negative inferences based on implausibilities, inconsistencies or omissions. All of the evidence must be evaluated as a whole, and RPD members are entitled to use their common sense and human experience.54 - Delay in filing a refugee protection claim [30] In its decision, the RPD explained why it found that the appellant's credibility had been undermined by her delay in claiming refugee protection in Canada.55 In her memorandum, the appellant does not contest this RPD conclusion. [31] It has been clearly established that the failure to seek international protection at the first opportunity is conduct that can demonstrate a lack of subjective fear,56 or behaviour that is inconsistent with that of someone who genuinely fears for his or her life.57 In short, negative credibility findings made under section 96 may affect the validity of a claim under section 97 of the IRPA, even though subjective fear is not part of the assessment for the latter section.58 [32] Based on my independent analysis of the record, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not commit any error in finding that the appellant's credibility was undermined by her delay in claiming refugee protection. - Absence of evidence corroborating her father's political affiliations [33] In its decision, the RPD explained its reason for finding that the appellant's credibility was undermined by her failure to produce evidence that could have corroborated her allegations concerning her father's political affiliations.59 [34] In her memorandum, the appellant submits that her lack of maturity, as detailed in the psychological report, explains why she did not understand that she could provide other evidence if she was unable to obtain her father's membership card for his political party.60 [35] With all due respect, this argument is unfounded. At the RPD hearing, when asked to explain whether she had tried to obtain evidence of her father's political affiliation, the appellant responded that she had no evidence on this matter, and that her uncle had merely explained to her what had happened.61 Yet the email submitted as evidence makes no reference to the fact that her father is allegedly a member of a political party.62 The RPD also noted that there was no evidence to establish who had actually sent this email. At the hearing, the appellant stated that she had family members in various parts of the world. She did not, however, file documents from any of them to establish that her father was in fact involved, in any capacity, with a political party in the DRC. - Lack of grounds for the appellant's fear as an unmarried mother [36] Lastly, in her memorandum, the appellant submits that the RPD erred in failing to assess the fact that she is allegedly a single young mother in her country of origin, with no family or protection. She makes reference to the initial version of her BOC Form, in which she indicates that she fears her father, as well as the soldiers, police officers and other males in her country of origin, and she specifies that she fears torture and physical and sexual violence because she is a young mother who had her child out of wedlock and who cannot rely on anyone for protection. She adds that she testified only briefly about this fear at the hearing because, prior to coming to Canada, she had always had her father's protection. Finally, she submits that, at the hearing, her legal counsel explained in detail the documentary evidence regarding the fear of persecution.63 [37] With all due respect, I find that the appellant did not establish the existence of a fear of persecution in her country of origin based on the fact that she is a mother whose child was born out of wedlock. During her testimony before the RPD on this matter, she initially stated that she was alone, without protection, and did not have any family there, and that she could not count on the protection of police officers when they themselves are criminals who take advantage of single women. She then stated that she had an aunt in the DRC, namely her father's sister, but that she had never been to her village.64 In my opinion, her testimony regarding her family in the DRC contains contradictions. On the one hand, in her BOC Form,65 she states that she was informed by her Tonton Thierry, who is her father's best friend and whom she identified at the hearing as her uncle,66 that her father had been threatened in her country. On the other hand, she stated that she does not have any family in the DRC, and then she declared that her father's sister still lives there, but that she has never been to her village, yet she made no reference to her uncle XXXX who allegedly informed her about the problems her father was facing in the DRC. [38] It is my opinion that I am justified in finding that a credibility issue exists without giving the appellant the opportunity to give an explanation, since credibility is not a new issue in this appeal.67 [39] That being said, it is true that women face a difficult situation in the DRC. During her submissions before the RPD, the appellant's former legal counsel made reference to the documentary evidence, notably concerning the situation of women who live alone in Kinshasa.68 The document, which specifically addresses the situation of women who live alone in Kinshasa, notes that these women are particularly vulnerable if they do not have a family or social network, or if they remain deprived of resources.69 After listening to her testimony before the RPD, I conclude that the appellant did not establish that, were she required to go live in Kinshasa, she would be without family or a social network, deprived of resources and that she would have a well-founded fear of persecution because she is a woman who lives alone. In fact, according to her own testimony, not only does the appellant have at least one aunt living in the DRC, and possibly an uncle, but she also has a father who is a doctor, as well as other family members living abroad. [40] It would have been preferable for the RPD to assess this allegation of fear of prosecution. However, I am of the opinion that if it had assessed it, the final determination would have been the same, namely to reject the refugee protection claim. CONCLUSION [41] For these reasons, I confirm the RPD determination, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of protection within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [42] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette September 9, 2019 Date IRB Translation Original language: French 1 These documents are reproduced on pages 116 to 191 of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record. 2 Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), February 13, 2017, pages 12 to 24 of the RPD record. 3 D-25: Updated story and amended and signed D-25, February 15, 2018, pages 119 to 129 of the RPD record. 4 RPD reasons and decision, March 12, 2018, pages 3 to 11 of the RPD record. 5 Appellant's memorandum, April 26, 2018, pages 49 to 62 of the appeal record. 6 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, No. A-512-14, de Montigny, Gauthier and Nadon, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 96, paragraphs 38 to 51. 7 Ibid., paragraphs 34 and 35. 8 Ibid., paragraph 54. 9 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Davoodabadi, No. IMM-1047-18, Norris, March 21, 2019; 2019 FC 350, paragraph 21. 10 These documents are reproduced on pages 16 to 45 of the appeal record. 11 Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules), SOR/2012-257, rule 3, subrule 3, paragraph g(iii). 12 Sworn statement concerning new evidence, paragraphs 3 to 9, pages 13 and 14 of the appeal record. 13 This email is reproduced on page 17 of the appeal record. 14 Practice Notice - Allegations Against Former Counsel, which came into force on August 27, 2018. This practice notice can be accessed on the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) website. 15 Recording of the hearing held on February 19, 2018, before the RPD, 49:30 to 54:30. 16 Singh, supra endnote 6, paragraphs 38, 43 and 44. Belek v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3459-16, Diner, February 16, 2017; 2017 FC 196, paragraphs 11 to 19. Tuncdemir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-808-16, Gagné, August 31, 2016; 2016 FC 993, paragraphs 35 and 36. Issa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-72-16, Annis, July 14, 2016; 2016 FC 807, paragraphs 18, 19 and 20. 17 This document is reproduced on page 20 of the appeal record. 18 BOC Form, pages 20, 21 and 22 of the RPD record. 19 These exchanges are reproduced on pages 21 to 41 of the appeal record. 20 These exchanges are reproduced on pages 44 and 45 of the appeal record. 21 This letter is reproduced on page 42 of the appeal record. 22 D-25: Updated story and amended and signed D-25, pages 119 to 129 of the RPD record. 23 Recording of the hearing, 40:00 to 50:30. 24 Sworn statement regarding holding a RAD hearing, pages 46, 47 and 48 of the appeal record. 25 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 3, subrule 3, paragraph (g)(v). 26 Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3425-17, Mosley, February 8, 2018; 2018 FC 147, paragraph 18. 27 Borubaev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3026-17, Diner, February 5, 2018; 2018 FC 125, paragraph 21. 28 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, No. A-470-14, Gauthier, Webb and Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93. Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2645-17, Diner, November 14, 2018; 2018 FC 1145. 29 Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Gebrewold, No. IMM-4058-17, LeBlanc, April 6, 2018; 2018 FC 374, paragraph 25. 30 Recording of the hearing held before RPD on February 19, 2018, 00:01 to 01:30:50. 31 The psychological report is reproduced on pages 146 to 151 of the RPD record. 32 Chairperson's Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB, which came into force on December 15, 2006, and amended on December 15, 2012. 33 On May 1, 2017, the coming into force of Chairperson's Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression. 34 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/12/09, October 23, 2012, unpaginated. This document can be accessed on the UNHCR website. Although these Guidelines are not imperative in nature, I find that they are invaluable to the RPD and RAD, and worth consulting. 35 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 40 to 48, pages 58, 59 and 60 of the appeal record. 36 Chairperson's Guideline 8, supra endnote 32. 37 Ibid., sections 2, 3 and 4. 38 Ibid., sections 1.5 and 10.1. 39 Recording of the hearing, 29:30 to 32:00; 38:30 to 41:00; 49:30 to 54:30; and 55:30 to 59:30. 40 RPD Rules, SOR/2012-256, rules 34 and 35. 41 Guidelines on International Protection No. 9, supra endnote 34, paragraphs 5 to 9, 15 and 23. 42 RPD reasons and decision, paragraph 2, page 4 of the RPD record. 43 BOC Form, February 13, 2017, pages 20, 21 and 22 of the RPD record. 44 Amended and signed D-25, February 15, 2018, pages 123 and 124 of the RPD record. 45 Recording of the hearing, 47:15 to 48:00. 46 BOC Form, February 13, 2017, page 24 of the RPD record. 47 Chairperson's Guideline 9, supra endnote 33, section 7.4.1. 48 On the matter of when a refugee protection claimant can be asked to produce documents corroborating their allegations, see the detailed analysis in Luo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5059-18, Strickland, June 17, 2019; 2019 FC 823, paragraphs 18 to 22. 49 Recording of the hearing, 35:20 to 41:00. 50 Ibid., 55:30 to 59:30. 51 Osikoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5059-17, Norris, July 11, 2018; 2018 FC 720, paragraphs 60 and 61. Arreaga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-996-13, Noël, September 25, 2013; 2013 FC 977, paragraph 45. 52 RPD reasons and decision, paragraphs 10 to 20, pages 5 to 8 of the RPD record. 53 Lawani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-21-18, Gascon, September 17, 2018; 2018 FC 924, paragraph 21. 54 Edmond v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-112-17, Roy, July 4, 2017; 2017 FC 644, paragraphs 22 and 27. 55 RPD reasons and decision, paragraphs 24 to 29, pages 9 and 10 of the RPD record. 56 Rivera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No IMM-5826-02, Beaudry, November 5, 2003; 2003 FC 1292, paragraphs 29 and 30. 57 El-Khatib v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3724-15, LeBlanc, April 27, 2016; 2016 FC 471, paragraph 12. 58 Dowansingh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6581-14, Diner, July 30, 2015; 2015 FC 933, paragraph 18. 59 RPD reasons and decision, paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, pages 8 and 9 of the RPD record. 60 Appellant's memorandum, paragraph 44, page 59 of the appeal record. 61 Recording of the hearing, 28:40 to 30:30. 62 This email is reproduced on page 140 of the RPD record. 63 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 23 to 36, pages 53 to 57 of the appeal record. 64 Recording of the hearing, 01:06:00 to 01:07:30. 65 BOC Form, February 13, 2017, page 21 of the RPD record. 66 Recording of the hearing, 28:40 to 30:30. 67 Corvil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4055-18, LeBlanc, March 12, 2019; 2019 FC 300, paragraphs 13, 14 and 15. Marin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3821-17, Mosley, March 2, 2018; 2018 FC 243, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38. Adoye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3058-17, Favel, March 5, 2018; 2018 FC 243, paragraphs 11 to 15. 68 Recording of the hearing, 01:16:50 to 01:28:50. 69 IRB, National Documentation Package on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, July 31, 2017, Tab 5.16, Swiss Confederation. State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), Focus RD Congo. Situation des femmes seules à Kinshasa [report on the situation of single women in Kinshasa], January 15, 2016, 26 pages. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB8-08049 RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français