TB5-01947

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01947 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 27, 2015 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Howard Gilbert Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Albania, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the negative determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection as he is excluded from refugee protection under Article 1E of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant was a permanent resident of Italy as he was in possession of a Permesso Di Soggiorno which was equivalent to a European Commission (EC) Long-Term Residence Permit.1 The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Albania or Italy, he will be harmed by members of the XXXX family because of a blood feud they declared against his family. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on October 27, 2014 and December 16, 2014. By a decision of January 29, 2015, the RPD rejected the claim. The RPD found that the Appellant is a person referred to in section 98 of the IRPA and is excluded from refugee protection pursuant to Article 1E of the Convention. Specific findings included the following: * A negative inference was drawn with respect to the Appellant's credibility from the omission in his initial claim forms of his status in Italy as a permanent resident. [5] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, the Appellant has status substantially similar to that of its nationals, in the third country of Italy. [6] Even if the Appellant did not have such status at the time of the hearing, he is still excluded for refugee protection under Article 1E as he previously had status and lost it. [7] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant could return to Italy. [8] A negative inference was drawn with respect to the Appellant's credibility from the omission in his amended Basis of Claim Form (BoC) narrative that members of the XXXX family were residing in Italy. [9] The RPD found that members of the XXXX family were not residing in Italy. [10] The RPD found that the Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Italy with clear and convincing evidence. It found, on a balance of probabilities, that there is adequate state protection for the Appellant in Italy. [11] The Appellant submits that the RPD made several errors including the following: The RPD failed to consider the 'best evidence available' concerning the continued validity of his permanent residence status in Italy. The RPD's finding, that his assertion that his permanent resident status in Italy had been revoked is speculative, is unreasonable and constitutes an error of fact and law. The RPD erred in law when it excluded him from claiming Convention refugee status pursuant to Article 1E because he had previously obtained permanent resident status, but had since lost it. The RPD erred in fact when it found that it was only speculative that he would be targeted by the XXXX clan (blood feud) if his presence in Italy was discovered. The RPD did not reject his claim due to credibility concerns; while paragraph five of the RPD reasons for its decision identifies credibility as a determinative issue and negative credibility inferences were drawn, paragraph 58 makes it abundantly clear that the only finding the RPD makes is that he is excluded from protection under the Convention by Article 1E. [12] The Appellant has not submitted new evidence and does not request an oral hearing. He asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to quash the decision of the RPD and replace it with a positive determination that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant asks that the matter be referred back to the RPD for re-determination on its merits by a differently constituted panel. Role of the RAD [13] What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? While the Appellant makes no argument with respect to this issue, the RAD notes in Huruglica the Court considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.2 It found that the RAD had erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.3 [14] Justice Phelan stated the following in Huruglica: Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.4 In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error."5 [15] Considering the Court's decision in Huruglica, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, recognizing and respecting the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own determination. ANALYSIS [16] Based on a review of all of the evidence and pleadings in the appeal, the RAD focused on two issues in assessing this appeal: a) Did the RPD err in finding that the Appellant is excluded from refugee protection based on Article 1E of the Convention? b) Did the RPD err in finding that there is adequate state protection for the Appellant in Italy? Application of Article 1E [17] Article 1E of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees6 states that: This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. [18] The Federal Court of Appeal, in Zeng,7 set out the test that must be taken into account when considering the application of Article 1E. Zeng provides the RPD and the RAD with a reformulated test to be applied to the Article 1E determinations as follows: Considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, does the claimant have status, substantially similar to that of its nationals, in the third country? If the answer is yes, the claimant is excluded. If the answer is no, the next question is whether the claimant previously had such status and lost it, or had access to such status and failed to acquire it. If the answer is no, the claimant is not excluded under Article 1E. If the answer is yes, the RPD must consider and balance various factors. These include, but are not limited to, the reason for the loss of status (voluntary or involuntary), whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in the home country, Canada's international obligations, and any other relevant facts. [19] The RPD found that the Appellant had status in Italy at the time of the hearing and his rights in Italy met the test in Shamlou.8 It preferred the evidence contained in the Response to Information Request (RIR)9 regarding the revocation of residency permits in Italy over the evidence provided by the Appellant, including a letter from a lawyer in Italy and an excerpt from Italian legislation.10 [20] The Appellant submits that the RIR the RPD relied on contained internal inconsistencies. He argues that the RIR creates two concurrent, but different, forms of permanent resident status - Carta di Soggiorno and Permesso di Soggiorno per Soggiornanti di Lungo Periodo - each having different rights and obligations. The Appellant submits that the RPD's reliance on the casual statement made in the RIR regarding the revocation of residency permits in Italy to the exclusion of credible contradictory evidence before it is unfounded. He argues that the best evidence before the RPD was the actual Italian legislation that was interpreted consistently by two independent sources and was supported by a legal opinion from a certified and licensed Italian lawyer. The Appellant submits that the RPD was fettering its discretion when it refused to consider the actual legislation, supported by an Italian lawyer's opinion, in favour of an RIR. [21] The RAD considered the evidence on the issues noted above. Status in Italy [22] The RPD noted that there was no information before it to indicate that the Appellant's EC residence permit for long-term residents had in fact been revoked. It found that the Appellant's assertion that his permit was no longer valid was not supported by the evidence. The RPD noted that the Appellant had not contacted the Italian authorities or the Italian embassy in Canada since his arrival in Canada; therefore, there was no information before it from the Italian authorities confirming his assertion that his permit had been revoked. It found the Appellant's assertions that his permit was no longer valid to be speculative. [23] The RAD notes that the Appellant was asked at his hearing before the RPD if he knew if there was a simple procedure by which he could get his residence status issued once it is revoked. The Appellant indicated that he did not know. When asked if he believed that he would be able to get his residency status if he returned to Italy, the Appellant said he did not know. The RAD also notes, as the RPD did, that the Appellant had not contacted the Italian authorities to determine his status in Italy and therefore was unable to establish that his residency status in Italy was anything but valid. [24] The RAD also notes that the Appellant possessed a valid Italian Permesso Di Soggiorno with an "unlimited" expiry when he entered Canada.11 The RAD also notes that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 the Rome visa post notified the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada that Italian officials indicated the Appellant is a permanent resident of Italy and his residence permit was still valid and was issued for self-employment activities on XXXX XXXX, 2010.12 It was also noted that the Appellant's permanent resident permit had no expiry date. [25] The above is evidence of the Appellant's permanent residence in Italy. The jurisprudence13 is clear that, once there is prima facie evidence of permanent residence, the onus shifts to the refugee claimant to demonstrate why the residency status cannot be renewed. In this appeal, the issue has become demonstrating why the Appellant's absence from Italy equates to his losing his permanent residence status in that country. [26] The RAD examined the documentary evidence on the file. A Response to Information Request (RIR)14 differentiates between temporary residence permits and permanent residence permit (Carta di Soggiorno). The RIR indicates that a person, who is absent from Italy for 12 months or more, "can" lose his or her permanent resident status regardless of the validity indicated on the Carta di Soggiorno. The RIR sets out the requirements for obtaining an EC Long-Term Residence Permit, which includes: copy of the income tax statement, evidence of appropriate accommodation, and pay slips for the current year. The RIR sets out the grounds for revocation of the permit which include the following: the applicant no longer meets the requirements of the permit; the applicant has been absent from EU territory for 12 consecutive months; the applicant has acquired long-term resident status in another European Union Member State; and the applicant has been absent from Italy for more than six years. [27] The RPD noted from the RIR that a person who is absent from Italy for 12 months or more "can" lose his or her permanent resident status. The RPD also noted that information on the Polizia di Stato website, referenced in the same RIR, states that the EC residence permit for long-term residents "may be" revoked if the permit holder has been absent from the territory of the European Union for a period of 12 consecutive months. The Appellant submits that the RPD is only referencing one authority as the only source referenced in the RIR is the Italian State police website. [28] The RPD had before it evidence at the hearing which indicated that Italian officials considered the Appellant to be in possession of a long-term residence permit. The Appellant did not provide evidence to the RPD regarding how Italian officials would know that he was in violation of the residency requirements. The Appellant did not provide evidence of a requirement of regular compliance checks by Italian officials to maintain his Carta di Soggiorno. The Appellant did not provide evidence of any individuals who have had their long-term residence status revoked by Italian authorities. [29] The RAD notes that there was no evidence before it which referred to the fact that a renewal of the EC Long-Term Residence Permit required providing evidence of compliance. In fact, the Staying in Italy Legally document15 indicates that the EC Long-Term Residence Permit is valid for an indefinite period. The card provided is valid as a personal identification document for five years, and the applicant may ask for its renewal by submitting new photos. This document does not indicate that there are any other requirements for renewing the permit other than submitting new photos. The document also does not indicate that the renewal of the permit involves nothing more than an application and the submission of photos, or that any form of discretion is involved in issuing another card. [30] The RAD considered the letter, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, and attachments from a lawyer with the law firm, XXXX XXXX.16 The letter indicates that the Appellant had a long permit-to-stay issued by the Department of Public Security of Varese on the XXXX XXXXf XXXX 2010 for an unlimited period. Also indicated in the letter is that the permit is expired and not valid anymore due to the fact that the Appellant moved to Canada more than one year prior. The author of the letter indicates that an Italian legislative decree states that the permit-to-stay will be revoked in case the person entitled will be out of the European Union for more than 12 months. A copy of the legislative decree was attached to the letter. [31] The RAD notes that the letter does not establish the expertise of the lawyer to comment on issues of permanent residence or status in Italy. Furthermore, the lawyer refers to one line in the three page legislative decree to base his opinion on. Only five lines of the three page legislative decree were translated from the Italian to the English language. One of the referenced lines translated states, "The resident permit referred to in paragraph 1 is revoked..." however, paragraph one (1) is not translated. As such, the excerpt lacks context and details. It is not known what resident permit is being referred to in paragraph 1 of the decree. Without reading the entire legislative decree, it is impossible to interpret the provisions governing immigration and the status of foreigners in Italy, the intent of the legislation. Without reading the entire legislative decree, it is impossible to determine if the translated excerpt applies to the Appellant. Furthermore, the letter from the lawyer has little probative value given that it is little more than personal opinion presumably based on one excerpt of legislation. In addition, the RPD had before it information from the Italian government which clearly confirmed that the Appellant continued to be viewed as a permanent resident by Italian authorities. While the RAD agrees with the Appellant that the actual legislation would be the best evidence to base a determination, this evidence was not before it, as the decree was not fully translated. [32] The Appellant notes that the RPD was making inquiries with the Italian authorities, through an Acquisition of Information Form (AIF), to determine the continued validity of his status and then was told that it was no longer needed. He argues that there is no basis to suggest that he should have made identical inquiries or that his failure to do so supports the finding that his assertion that his Italian status was revoked is speculative. [33] The Appellant's argument cannot succeed. As noted above, the jurisprudence17 is clear that, once there is prima facie evidence of permanent residence, the onus shifts to the refugee claimant to demonstrate why the residency status cannot be renewed. Although the RPD initiated a process to obtain information from the Italian authorities regarding the Appellant's status in Italy, the onus was on the Appellant to obtain it. The Appellant had been in Canada for approximately one year and three months when his hearing concluded. He had ample opportunity to approach the Italian authorities to inquire about his status, or lack thereof, and failed to do so. [34] At the time of the hearing, the RPD had before it evidence that the Appellant continued to be seen as a permanent resident of Italy. Neither the RPD nor the RAD has been provided with any additional evidence to indicate that the Appellant has lost his right to re-enter Italy or his permanent residence status, or would be considered by Italian officials as having forfeited his right as a permanent resident. Given the particular facts and evidence before it, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that the Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to support his argument that there was a serious possibility that he would be deemed in violation of his permanent resident status requirements by Italian authorities. The Appellant's fear is based on an excerpt in the Italian legislation and an interpretation of the excerpt indicating that a permit-to-stay will be revoked in case the person entitled will be out of the European Union for more than 12 months. This evidence was found to be lacking in its ability to prove this. The subjective belief on the part of the Appellant that he had lost his permanent resident status in Italy was not supported by credible objective evidence. As such, the RAD concurs with the RPD finding that the Appellant had permanent resident status in Italy at the time of the hearing. Rights of Nationals [35] The RPD noted that possession of an EC residence permit for long-term residents (Permesso di Soggiorno per Soggiornanti di Lungo Periodo) entitled the Appellant to rights that are set out in Shamlou18 including: the right to return, the right to work, the right to study and to have full access to social services. An RIR in evidence indicates that holders of residence permits are entitled to the same benefits as nationals, including access to schooling, medical and social assistance for as long as the permit is valid. It also indicates that residence permits allow individuals, unless specific limitations are imposed, to travel to several European countries without restraint for a period not to exceed 90 days in any six-month period.19 The RAD finds that the rights afforded the Appellant are similar to those set out in Shamlou. Summary of IE [36] After a review of all the evidence in the record, the RAD finds that the Appellant had permanent residence status in Italy at the time of his hearing and that he enjoyed rights similar to nationals of Italy. Adequacy of State Protection [37] Once the Appellant's status as a person who has the rights and obligations similar to Italian citizens has been established, the RAD finds the only remaining issue is whether the Appellant faces a risk of persecution, or a risk of harm should he return to Italy. [38] In addition to the direction in Zeng (cited above), the RAD finds that the preponderance of the case law suggests that risk in the Article 1E country should be assessed. For example, in Kroon,20 Justice MacKay suggested that, if a claimant faced a threat of persecution in the putative Article 1E country, then that country would not be an Article 1E country. In Olschewski,21 the Federal Court considered the findings related to the claimant's fear in the Article 1E country, which amounted to an implicit agreement with the CRDD that could assess a claim against the Article 1E country. The Federal Court upheld a negative decision which focused on the adequacy of state protection in the Article 1E country in Feimi.22 [39] The Ward decision indicates that all states are presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens, except in situations where the state is in a state of complete breakdown.23 To rebut the presumption of state protection, a claimant must provide clear and convincing evidence of the state's inability to protect its citizens.24 A claimant who alleges that state protection is inadequate must persuade the Board that the evidence establishes that the state protection is inadequate on a balance of probabilities.25 [40] The RPD considered the risk that the Appellant would face in Italy in its reasons and at the hearing. The RPD found that members of the XXXX family were not residing in Italy and that the Appellant did not provide credible and trustworthy evidence to support his allegations that the blood feud would follow him to Italy. It concluded that the Appellant would not face any risk in Italy due to the blood feud. [41] Nonetheless, the RAD notes that the RPD considered the issue of state protection in Italy for the Appellant. It found that the Appellant had not rebutted the presumption of state protection in Italy with clear and convincing evidence, as is required by the well-established principles of the Ward decision noted above. It also found that the evidence established, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would be able to obtain adequate state protection in Italy. [42] The RAD notes that, in the absence of a compelling explanation, where the state is a functioning democracy with willingness and the apparatus necessary to provide a measure of protection to its citizens, a failure to pursue state protection opportunities within the home state will usually be fatal to a refugee claim.26 The Appellant testified that as a foreigner in Italy he is unable to obtain adequate state protection against the threats made by the XXXX family. He indicated that there is widespread prejudice, in and out of the police force, towards foreigners. The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider the availability of state protection for him on an operational level and therefore erred in law in its characterization of his decision to remain out of Italy as voluntary. He further submits that he remained out of Italy due to a credible fear and the absence of adequate state protection. The Appellant submits that there are documented occurrences where a blood feud emanating from Albania is settled beyond its borders (i.e. the United Kingdom). [43] The RAD notes that the Appellant did not provide evidence that Albanians have harmed or killed other Albanians in Italy as a result of a blood feud. The Appellant provided evidence that an Albanian man was murdered in Britain in 2002. The BBC article When a blood feud came to Britain27 reports that two men were sentenced for murdering an Albanian man in London. It also indicates that the case involved a blood feud with its roots in Albania. The Appellant did not provide sufficient credible evidence to support his subjective fear of being harmed in Italy. In fact, the Appellant was unable to provide evidence regarding the location of the XXXX family members in Italy. The Appellant's subjective fear of harm based on unsubstantiated allegations and on the proximity between Albania and Italy do not constitute a compelling explanation as to why the Appellant believed adequate state protection would not be forthcoming. [44] The Appellant argues that, as a foreigner in Italy, he is unable to obtain adequate state protection against the threats and there is widespread prejudice in and out of the police force towards foreigners. He refers to documentary evidence noted by the RPD dealing with incidents of prejudice and intolerance towards immigrants in Italy. He refers to documentary evidence noted by the RPD regarding the Italian government's commitments to prevent discrimination and xenophobia, indicating that there was no attempt by the RPD to determine if the commitments were honoured or implemented. [45] The RAD notes that the Appellant presented no credible evidence to indicate that he suffered prejudice and intolerance while he resided in Italy. The Appellant was granted permanent residence status in Italy and he indicated that he enjoyed similar benefits and services as Italians. The RAD finds that there was no persuasive evidence before it to persuade it that the Appellant, as a permanent resident, would be treated any differently than Italians by police or authorities. The Appellant did not indicate that he had been discriminated against or that he was treated with violence by Italians. The Appellant was able to live and work in Italy since 1996. Furthermore, the Appellant's history of living in Italy for approximately 17 years, visiting Albania on occasion and then returning to Italy, undermines the argument that he would be unable to obtain adequate state protection in Italy and there is widespread prejudice towards foreigners in Italy. In fact, the only reason that the Appellant cites for not returning to Italy was the threats associated with the blood feud. [46] The RAD further notes that the preponderance of documentary evidence suggests that adequate state protection exists for individuals such as the Appellant in Italy. The United States Department of State (DOS) report indicates that Italy is a multi-party parliamentary democracy. The law requires the government maintain civilian control over all security forces. The government prosecuted and punished officials who committed crimes and abuses. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence.28 A 2013 Freedom House report indicates that the country continued to make gains against organized crime.29 A 2013 United States DOS report indicates that the government continued to vigorously investigate, prosecute and convict human traffickers.30 [47] For the reasons noted above, the RAD concurs with the RPD's finding that the Appellant had not rebutted the presumption of state protection in Italy with clear and convincing evidence. The RAD also concurs with the RPD's finding that the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would be able to obtain adequate state protection in Italy. DETERMINATION [48] Based on the totality of the evidence before it, the RAD concurs with the RPD finding that the Appellant is excluded under Article 1E of the Convention. [49] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. The RAD finds that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is he a person in need of protection. [50] The appeal is therefore dismissed. (signed) "M. Pettinella" M. Pettinella May 27, 2015 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 533-534, 544-548. 2 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 3 Huruglica, para. 45. 4 Huruglica, para 54. 5 Huruglica, para 55. 6 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27), Schedule (Subsection 2 (1)), Sections E and F of Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1E. 7 Zeng, Guanqiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-275-09), Noël, Layden-Stevenson, Stratas, May 10, 2010; 2010 FCA 118. 8 Shamlou, Pasha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4967-94), Teitelbaum, November 15, 1995, (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 135 (F.C.T.D.). 9 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 544-548. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 529-543. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 533-534. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 122. 13 Shahpari, Khadijeh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2327-97), Rothstein, April 3, 1998, (1998), 44 Imm. L.R. (2d) 139 (F.C.T.D.). 14 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 544-548.Appeal Pleadings, pp. 37 - 40, Response to Information Request (RIR) ITA104045.E, 23 April 2012. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 502-527. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 535-543. 17 Shahpari, Khadijeh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2327-97), Rothstein, April 3, 1998, (1998), 44 Imm. L.R. (2d) 139 (F.C.T.D.). 18 Shamlou, Pasha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4967-94), Teitelbaum, November 15, 1995, (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 135 (F.C.T.D.). 19 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 544-548. 20 Kroon, Victor v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3161-93), MacKay, January 6, 1995; (1995), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 164 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraphs 167-168. 21 Olschewski, Alexander Nadirovich v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1424-92), McGillis, October 20, 1993, at paragraph 11. 22 Feimi, Jani Ardian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2934-98), Teitelbaum, June 11, 1999. 23 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at 725. 24 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at 709. 25 Flores Carrillo, Maria del Rosario v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-225-07), Létourneau, Nadon, Sharlow, March 12, 2008; 2008 FCA 94, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636 (F.C.A.). 26 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 282-285. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 550, item 2.1. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 550, item 2.3. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 554, item 7.5. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01947