TB6-10490

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-10490 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision November 22, 2016 Date de la décision Panel L. Favreau Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Lani Gozlan Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "Appellant"), a citizen of Turkey, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),1 the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is of Kurdish ethnicity. He claimed that he was active in pro-Kurdish parties including the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the People's Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, HDP). As a result of his political activities and demonstration against the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi , AKP), he was detained, beaten and threatened by the police on several occasions since 2011. He stated that the most severe detention was in XXXX 2015, wherein, among other severe treatment, he was blindfolded, tied to a pole and was punched in his stomach and genitalia, kicked and slapped and shocked with an electrical device multiple times. He stated that he was interrogated about his ties to the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) and the YDG-H (the youth wing of the PKK) both of which are considered to be terrorist groups by Turkish authorities. After 41 hours and a promise to assist the police in infiltrating the HDP and to attend the Istanbul Security Directorate (Police) on a weekly basis, he was released. [4] Upon return to Turkey, he fears that he will be persecuted because of his political opinion. [5] The Appellant's refugee claim was held on May 13, 2016. In a decision of July 21, 2016, the RPD rejected the Appellant's claim. The Appellant has appealed the decision to the RAD alleging that the RPD erred in its credibility findings and in its consideration of the evidence before it. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [6] The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court of Appeal's decision, in Huruglica,2 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal, such as the RAD, to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. In accordance with the decision of the Federal Court, the RAD will conduct an analysis of the evidence to determine if the RPD erred and come to its own determination whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. MERITS OF THE APPEAL [7] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant lacks the subjective fear to ground a claim for refugee protection. This lack of subjective fear is part of his overall impugned credibility. The RPD further found that the cumulative effect of the negative credibility leads to a finding that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant is not a person in need of protection. Delay in Leaving Turkey [8] The RPD drew an adverse credibility finding based on the Appellant's delay in leaving Turkey. The RPD noted that the Appellant stated that his detentions and abuse by the Turkish police began in 2011 and occurred another five times prior to leaving Turkey in 2015. He stated in his narrative and in his testimony that, each time he was detained by the police, he was beaten and threatened. The RPD also noted that the Appellant testified that both the mistreatment and threats he endured became worse over time but also that he "did not think that it was very important". [9] When asked why he did not leave Turkey in the course of the four years between the first detention in 2011 and the last beating in 2015, he initially stated that he did not leave Turkey after the first detention because he did not have a passport and "did not know much about things in life". He later stated that he "was tortured and beaten but was not aware of the seriousness of the situation". [10] When asked to clarify this point, he replied that people are taken into custody all the time, and this is why he began working for the HDP and BDP. Although he was asked several times, the RPD found that the Appellant did not provide a coherent explanation about why it took him so long to leave Turkey when he was being subjected to severe treatment by the authorities. [11] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in drawing a negative inference from his decision not to flee Turkey earlier. He testified that it was his last detention when he was subjected to prolonged torture that he made the decision to leave Turkey. He argues that it is clear from his evidence as well as his Basis of Claim (BoC) narrative that the persecution escalated in the last incident and that the abuse was far more significant than the earlier incidents. He argues that he only perceived his life was truly in immediate danger after the last detention, and the RPD cannot substitute its own understanding of when he ought to have feared for his life. [12] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. While the Appellant has alleged that the abuse he suffered in the last detention was graver than his initial five detentions, when questioned by the RPD at his hearing, he acknowledged that he was repeatedly beaten and threatened and that with every detention, the beatings and threats escalated. The RAD finds it reasonable to expect that he would have made some effort to leave Turkey after having faced increasingly violent encounters with security forces due to his political activism. The RAD notes that he was issued a passport in 2013, which gave the Appellant the ability to exit the country legally. [13] Regardless, even though he alleges that he determined he would need to leave the country as early as XXXX 2015, he delayed his departure until XXXX 2015. The RAD notes that the Appellant was in possession of a valid Canadian visitor's visa as of March 2015. The Appellant has alleged that his delay in departure after XXXX 2015 was because the agent who assisted him in getting the Canadian visa demanded that he create a travel history by traveling to Bulgaria in XXXX 2015. The RAD finds the explanation neither credible nor plausible. [14] The RAD notes that the Appellant had already obtained the Canadian visa. There was no purpose in establishing a previous travel history because the Appellant already had a right of entry to Canada. The RAD further notes that the Appellant's application for a visa indicates that he would be traveling with his father. In light of this, establishing a travel history for himself and not his father makes little sense. [15] The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that the Appellant's delay in departing Turkey when he had the means to do so not only undermines the credibility of his allegations but also undermines his subjective fear. [16] Further to the foregoing and more concerning to the RAD is the fact that the Appellant did leave Turkey in XXXX 2015 and traveled to Bulgaria. Rather than leaving for Canada from Bulgaria, the Appellant returned to Turkey, reavailing to the country in which he alleged persecution. The RAD finds that in traveling out of Turkey and reavailing to Turkey at a time he alleges he was wanted by police undermines both his subjective fear and the credibility of his allegations that he was wanted for his political activism. [17] His travel out and back into the country at that time is particularly concerning given the fact that the Appellant was traveling on his own passport. The RAD notes that the Appellant was questioned at the RPD hearing by the panel member about his ability to travel out of the country. Although the Appellant has implied that his safe passage was facilitated by the agent who assisted him in obtaining his Canadian visa, the RAD notes the passport bears stamps indicating that it was stamped by border officials from Turkey. The Appellant alleges that at the time he left Turkey to travel to Bulgaria and when he later left Turkey and traveled to Canada, he was wanted by the police because he had failed to report as required by the conditions of his release. [18] The RAD notes that the documentation indicates that the passport issued to the Appellant was a passport that uses biometrics to authenticate the identity of the traveller. It uses contactless smart card technology, including a microprocessor chip (computer chip) and antenna (both to power the chip and for communication), which is embedded in the passport enabling security forces to scan the document without direct contact. [19] In correspondence sent to the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara who specializes in border security and mobility noted that Turkey's biometric passports are "second generation MRTD [machine-readable travel document] passports with photographic biometric capabilities". Other sources report that the chip inside the passport contains information about the passport holder's face (such as the distance between the eyes, nose, mouth and ears), as well as the information contained on the personal details page of the passport. [20] According to the Embassy Official, the passenger's name is checked against a centralized computer system. An individual will be stopped if he or she is wanted for anything (e.g., if the individual is a criminal wanted by Interpol or wanted within Turkey). Once the individual has been screened, the police officer may stamp the passport with an exit date; however, the Official noted that this is not always done. The individual may then proceed to a passenger waiting area to wait for his or her flight. Again, the RAD notes that the Appellant's passport was stamped by Turkish border officials.3 [21] In light of the documentary evidence, the RAD finds it is not plausible that the Appellant was able to exit Turkey if he was wanted due to his political activism as he has alleged. The RAD finds that the presence of the stamps indicate that the Appellant's identity was verified by border control officials. Furthermore, even if the agent assisting the Appellant was able to circumvent some of the security measures by bribing the border control official, the RAD finds the covert capabilities of the biometric passport would identity the Appellant when he exited and entered Turkey. Delay in Making Refugee Claim in Canada [22] The RPD drew an adverse credibility and subjective fear finding based on the Appellant's delay of nine months in making a claim for refugee protection after arriving in Canada. The RPD rejected the Appellant's explanation that he was told by the smugglers and the people he was staying with in Canada that he could not make a refugee claim until his visa expired and that it was not until he, by chance, met a Turkish speaking person in XXXX 2016 who told him to apply right away. [23] The RPD found that the Appellant made little effort to inquire about the refugee process, despite alleging that he feared for his life. He did not consult legal counsel. He made no mention of researching official sources for information on seeking protection. He could not account for his activities during those nine months, save for visiting a friend in Edmonton and coming to Toronto. The RPD found that the Appellant's failure to seek refugee protection in Canada in a more timely fashion was inconsistent with the actions reasonably to be expected of individuals facing a risk of harm or death. [24] The Appellant submits that his entry and stay in Canada was authorized by visa, and he did not face removal to Turkey. He argues that, as such, his delay was reasonable. In addition, he submits that he was misguided by the smuggler and the people with whom he was staying in Canada, who told him that he could not file for refugee protection. [25] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD rejects the Appellant's argument that he was in Canada on the strength of a valid visa. The RAD notes that the Appellant's visa application indicated that he traveling with his father and was only going to remain in Canada for four days to visit relatives prior to traveling to Mexico. The RAD finds that, given the Appellant was traveling alone and did not transit out of Canada to Mexico after four days, the purpose of his visit to Canada was inconsistent with his application, and, as such, his purpose in Canada would be called into question which may have put him at risk of removal. [26] In addition, the RAD finds that the Appellant presents himself as a competent, confident and sophisticated individual. He had access to his cousins who immigrated to Canada and, although not refugees, had some familiarity with Canadian immigration laws and undoubtedly to the availability of immigration and refugee information on the Internet or the access of information from immigration consultants. The RAD agrees with the RPD's findings that, given the Appellant's allegations of the cumulative abuse and threats over the course of nearly five years culminating in being subjected to torture, it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to have claimed protection in a timelier manner, particularly given he was in Canada outside his stated purpose. Political Activities in Canada [27] The RPD drew adverse credibility finding based on the Appellant's failure to continue his political activism from the safety of Canada. The RPD noted that the Appellant alleged that he was so involved in the Turkish leftist political sphere when he was living in Turkey that he risked his life on a number of occasions in furtherance of that cause. Despite having been arrested six times and undergoing beatings and threats because of his political views, he nonetheless continued to risk his personal safety for his political beliefs. The RAD notes, however, that he ceased all Kurdish or political activities upon his arrival in Canada. The RPD noted that he failed to approach any Kurdish associations or groups of similarly politically minded Turkish ex-pats, as it is reasonable to expect he ought to do, given he was free to exercise his political views without risk of harm. [28] The RPD noted that the Appellant tendered a letter from the Toronto Kurdish Community & Information Centre, dated XXXX XXXX, 2016, which only speaks to his Kurdish ethnicity and does not provide any corroboration that the Appellant holds any political views. [29] The Appellant submits that he was a newcomer to Canada and was struggling to find his way here. He argues that he moved between different parts of Canada, including Alberta, and that he was unable to find Kurdish organizations in Alberta when he was there. He argues that it was unreasonable for the RPD to expect him to become politically active upon his arrival to Canada. [30] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that the Appellant's perseverance in the face of ongoing and escalating assaults and threats indicates a commitment to the political cause he alleges he supported in Turkey. The RAD finds it is reasonable to expect that, given he was free to exercise his political opinion in Canada, he would make efforts to seek out like-minded individuals and organizations to enable him to do so. The RAD finds his failure to do so undermines his allegation that he was politically active in the face of ongoing persecution in Turkey. Treatment of the Corroborative Documentary Evidence [31] The Appellant tendered a number of documents post-hearing that were considered by the RPD in coming to its determination:4 (a) Copies of envelopes and postage for the documents; (b) Translated BDP membership application for Mr. XXXX; (c) Translated HDP membership application for Mr. XXXX; (d) Translated letter from the HDP; (e) Translated letter from Mr. XXXX brother, XXXX XXXX; and (f) Translated HDP and BDP membership applications for Mr. XXXX colleague, XXXX XXXX. [32] The RPD drew an adverse inference from the late disclosure of the documents. The RPD noted that the Appellant alleged he fled Turkey on the basis that his life was in danger due to his political involvement, but he did not think to bring any proof of his political involvement to Canada. Furthermore, the RPD noted that the Appellant did not request any proof of his political involvement until two months after his claim had been made despite the fact that he was represented by counsel at the time he first made his refugee claim. [33] The Appellant submits that the lateness of his documents was reasonable. He argues that he only became aware of the need to provide supporting documents when he retained a lawyer. [34] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the Appellant had retained a lawyer at least two months in advance of making any effort to obtain corroborating documents. He did not provide any explanation to the RPD regarding why that delay was necessary nor did he express any difficulty in acquiring the documents he did tender. The RAD finds that the Appellant has not explained why he was unable to tender documents which were readily available to him in advance of the RPD hearing. [35] The RPD noted that the HDP letter addresses the Appellant's involvement in the BDP and HDP parties, but it speaks more to the general political climate in Turkey rather than any corroboration that the Appellant was detained or how he was personally treated. [36] The Appellant submits that the letter in question confirms his involvement in both the BDP and the HDP parties. He further argues that, while the letter does not provide specific dates, it does corroborate his activities with the parties and the fact that he was targeted and taken into custody by authorities because of those activities. He argues that it was unreasonable for the RPD to base its decision on what the letter did not state rather than on what it did state. [37] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that, while the letter does provide some corroboration that the Appellant suffered detentions and threats, there is no indication that he suffered beatings and torture at the hands of authorities. The RAD finds this is particularly relevant given the letter speaks about the specific mistreatment and harm that has come to other supporters of the HDP. Given the Appellant's alleged commitment to the political cause of the HDP and his perseverance in the face of repeated detentions and escalating beatings and threats, the RAD finds it reasonable to expect that the letter from the HDP would address the physical beatings and torture he has alleged he suffered, particularly given the fact that the Appellant had requested this letter for the purpose of his refugee hearing. The centrepiece of his allegations of persecution is the ongoing and escalating abuse he suffered culminating in torture. The RAD finds that while the letter may serve to corroborate that he was involved with the HDP, the absence of any allegations that the Appellant suffered physical abuse because of his political activities undermines his allegations in this regard. [38] The RPD found that it could give little weight to the letter from the Appellant's brother.5 The letter states that the Appellant's family was visited by Turkish police on several occasions asking about the Appellant. The letter also states that the entire family was detained and police approached neighbours of the Appellant's family, making inquiries about him. Although the undated letter was apparently requested prior to the Appellant's refugee claim, the RPD noted that the Appellant did not allege either in his BoC narrative or his oral testimony that his family had been detained. The RPD found it reasonable to expect the Appellant to do so, given the letter indicated that his brother was continually keeping him informed of what was occurring in his absence. [39] The Appellant submits that it was unreasonable for the RPD to base its conclusions about the letter from the brother on the basis of what it did not state rather than what it did state. He argues that the letter provided evidence that his family and neighbours were subjected to inquiry due to their association with him. [40] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds the allegation that his entire family had been detained by the police is a significant allegation that is highly relevant to his risk of harm should he return to Turkey, and, as such, it is reasonable to expect that such a significant event ought not to have been omitted from his allegations. The RAD finds that the late disclosure of this letter and the omission of this significant allegation from the Appellant's evidence undermines the credibility of the letter. [41] The RPD further noted that, given the manner in which the evidence was presented, there was no way to test the veracity of the allegations in the letter, nor the identity or credibility of the letter's author. [42] The Appellant submits that there was nothing to suggest that the letter was not credible in the allegation that it details, and it was unreasonable for the RPD to discount the letter because the author was not available for examination. [43] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in his regard. The RAD finds there is reason to question the credibility of the allegations contained in the letter. As previously noted in these Reasons, the late disclosure and the omission of this significant allegation from the Appellant's evidence undermines the credibility of the letter. The RAD also notes that all of the documents tendered were provided through the same source, the Appellant's brother. Although many of the documents were purportedly provided by the HDP, none of them were sent directly to the Appellant from the HDP. The RAD notes that the provenance of the letter from the HDP is called into question by the fact that the documents were apparently sent prior to the date indicated on the HDP letter. [44] The RPD also questioned the provenance of the letter from the HDP. The RPD noted that the envelope in which all of the documents arrived from Turkey was dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. However, the letter from the HDP was dated as written on XXXX XXXX, 2016. [45] The Appellant submits that the RPD was mistaken in this regard because the envelope bears a stamp which is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, two days after the letter in question is dated. [46] The RAD has reviewed the envelope and the accompanying postage receipts and finds that there is reason to question the provenance of the letter. While it is true that the envelope does bear a stamp which appears to indicate a date of XXXX XXXX, 2016, the RAD notes that the accompanying postage receipt and bill of lading bears the dates XXXX XXXX XXXX 20166 and XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016.7 The RAD also notes that the "pick-up date" for the package is dated XXXX XXXX, 20168. The RAD notes that the documents were sent from Bingol, Turkey. The RAD also notes that the stamp on the face of the envelope dated XXXX XXXX, 2016 indicates Istanbul. The RAD finds, based on a balance of probabilities, that this indicates that the envelope was received in Istanbul on that date. The RAD finds the documents accompanying the envelope indicate that the envelope was originally sent from Bingol on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, prior to the date indicated on the HDP letter. The RAD finds that this undermines the credibility of the HDP letter. Although the RPD was satisfied that applications for membership to the HDP and BDP were genuine documents, the RAD cannot agree. The RAD notes that these documents came from the same source and that the provenance of these documents is called into question by the inconsistency in the dates of the HDP letter. [47] The RAD finds, after its own review and analysis of the evidence, that no weight can be given to the Appellant's personal documentary evidence in establishing that he was persecuted by authorities in Turkey due to his political activism. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [48] As provided for in s. 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and refugee claimant. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [49] The Appellant has submitted an updated letter from the HDP as new evidence in this appeal, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. [50] The RAD's analysis of the admissibility of the proposed new evidence must begin first with the test set out in s. 110(4). While the RAD agrees with the Appellants that further analysis of the evidence is required before the RAD can accept the proposed new evidence, the analysis as set out in Raza9 is not entirely appropriate for the purpose of assessing evidence submitted to the RAD. In this regard, the RAD is guided by the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Singh.10 [51] Accordingly, the RAD has adapted the analysis in Raza11 to the assessment of evidence submitted to the RAD. [52] In assessing whether the proposed new evidence meets the statutory provisions of s. 110(4), the RAD considered the following: (a) First, did the evidence arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim? Here, the RAD may consider whether the evidence is capable of proving the current state of affairs in the country of feared persecution, or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the rejection of the refugee claim.12 (b) The RAD will consider not only the date on which the document came into existence but the timing of the event or circumstance which the document seeks to prove.13 For example, an affidavit or newspaper article may have been created after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, but the information in the document may be several years old, and the RAD may therefore find that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, despite the date of the document. (c) It is important to note here that s. 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing, but rather after the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Where a document arose after the hearing but before the rejection of the refugee claim, it is necessary for the RAD to consider whether the Appellant could have presented the document to the RPD by way of a post-hearing submission. (d) If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered, and the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document.14 (e) Second, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, it must consider the next factor in s. 110(4). If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the rejection, has the Appellant established that the evidence was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before it rejected the claim,15 or that it proves a fact that was unknown to him at the time of the hearing?16 If so, the RAD will proceed to assess the newness, credibility and relevance of the evidence. (f) Third, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, and that it was reasonably available at the time of the rejection, it must consider the final part of the s. 110(4) test: could the Appellant reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence prior to the rejection of the refugee claim? If so, the evidence need not be considered.17 If the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to present the evidence to the RPD, the RAD will proceed to assess the newness, credibility, and relevance of the evidence. (g) If the proposed new evidence meets the tests set out in the statutory requirements and in Raza,18 the evidence will be admitted as evidence in the appeal. The materiality of the evidence will be considered in the context of the assessment made under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. [53] The Appellant submits that the new HDP letter is relevant in proving his political identity and profile and in corroborating his credibility. It also provides new information regarding the fact that his colleagues were forced to sign written statements incriminating him and falsely stating that he was involved in illegal activities. [54] The RAD finds that this document does not meet the test in subsection 110(4). The RAD notes that the information contained in the letter was largely provided in the previous HDP letter. Where the new letter departs from the letter previously tendered, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not explained why this information could not have been included in the first letter. The allegations that members were forced to sign statements against the Appellant is undated in the letter, and, as such, it is unclear whether it occurred prior to or after the rejection of his claim. [55] The RAD finds that the Appellant bears the burden of establishing how his proposed new evidence meets the statutory requirements to be admitted as new evidence. The Court has held that, if an applicant believes that the evidence meets the requirements of paragraph 113(a), it is up to the applicant to provide explanations as to why it conforms to the statutory requirement.19 For example, if the evidence pre-dates the RPD's decision, it is the duty of the person submitting the new evidence to provide why it had not been placed in front of the RPD under the express statutory requirements under paragraph 113(a).20 [56] Similarly, the allegation that the authorities attended the office of the HDP looking for the Appellant and others around mid-XXXX lacks the specificity required to determine whether it occurred prior to the rejection of his claim. The RAD finds that by virtue of the reference to the visit by authorities being included in the same paragraph that begins with "Since XXXX 2015", it remains unclear whether the author is referring to XXXX 2015 or not when referring to the visit by authorities. Again, the RAD notes that the Appellant bears the burden of establishing how his proposed evidence meets the statutory requirement to be admitted as new evidence. [57] Under a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), the Federal Court has held that it is the applicant's obligation to provide an explanation as to why the evidence could not have been presented to the RPD. Evidence can be rejected for this reason, and this is in conformity with the requirements set out in the IRPA and found in Raza.21 [58] Similarly, the Refugee Appeal Division Rules22 (RAD Rules) provide that the Appellant's Record must contain: (i) a written statement indicating whether the Appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, and (ii) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding how any documentary evidence that the Appellant wants to rely on in the appeal meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and how that evidence relates to the Appellant. [59] The RAD has considered the recent Federal Court decision in Singh23 and finds that there is nothing in the decision which takes away the burden of the Appellant to provide an explanation of how the proposed new evidence meets the test set out in s. 110(4) of the IRPA. [60] The RAD finds that the Appellant has provided an insufficient explanation why it was not reasonable for him to tender that evidence prior to the rejection of his claim. For these reasons, the Appellant's proposed new evidence is not admissible in this appeal. [61] The RAD further finds that, even if the documents were accepted as evidence in this appeal, they would not satisfy the Raza requirements. The RAD notes that the content of the HDP letter previously sent and the new letter tender as proposed new evidence are virtually identical, save for some additional facts. Given the fact that the provenance and the credibility of the original document was called into question and the fact that the letter was again sent via the same source that the Appellant's post-hearing documents were sent, the RAD finds that no weight can be given to this document. CONCLUSION [62] The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds, based on the cumulative adverse credibility findings together with the lack of subjective fear, that the Appellant's allegation that he was persecuted in Turkey on account of his political activism is not credible. [63] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not established that he faces a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, and he has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that he will face a danger of torture or a risk to his life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, upon return to Turkey. [64] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "L. Favreau" L. Favreau November 22, 2016 Date 1 As enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 27. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Turkey (30 June 2015), item 14.3, Response to Information Request (RIR) TUR102800.E, Airport security screening for departing international flight passengers, 3 April 2008. 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8. 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 173-174, Exhibit 12. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, p. 150. 7 Ibid., p. 154. 8 Ibid., p. 152. 9 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 10 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 11 Raza, 2007 FCA 385. 12 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 13.3(a). 13 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 14 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 13.5(b). 15 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 13.5(a). 16 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 13.3(b). 17 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, para. 13.5(a). 18 Raza, 2007 FCA 385. 19 Bengabo, Serge Cedrick v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2750-08), Shore, February 23, 2009, 2009 FC 186, at para. 23. 20 Jessamy, Gracel Bernadet v. M.C.I. (F.C., nos. IMM-2302-09, IMM-2639-09), Phelan, May 4, 2010, 2010 FC 489; See also: Aleziri, Abdullah Mohammed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-360-08), Lagacé, January 15, 2009, 2009 FC 38; and Haque v. M.C.I. and M.P.S.E.P. (F.C., no. IMM-5356-08) O'Keefe, June 28, 2010, 2010 FC 703. 21 Tran, Hoa Van v. M.P.S.E.P. and M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3222-09), Beaudry, February 19, 2010, 2010 FC 175. See also Founding, Allen Robin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2182-09), Shore, May 14, 2009, 2009 FC 500. (This is a motion for a stay of removal. Leave to be heard was denied on July 7, 2009 by Justice Harrington.) 22 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2012-257/index. html. See RAD Rules 3(3)(d)(i) and (g)(iii), 5(2)(d)(ii), and 29(3). 23 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014, 2014 FC 1022. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-10490