TB4-00383

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-00383 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision April 23, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Douglas Lehrer Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Iraq, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted no new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either find him to be a Convention refugee or return the matter to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he and his brothers worked for the XXXX XXXX in Iraq. In XXXX of 2007, his brothers were killed, and the Appellant stopped working XXXX XXXX XXXX, finding employment elsewhere as XXXX XXXX. He alleged that, in 2013, he was kidnapped by men whom he believes to be affiliated with al-Qaeda, who wanted him to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. After being held captive for some time, the Appellant escaped and went into hiding. In XXXX of 2013, he left Iraq for Turkey, and in XXXX of 2013, he arrived in Canada, where he made a refugee claim. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on July 2, 2013. By a decision of December 23, 2013, the RPD rejected the claim. It cited credibility concerns with the Appellant's testimony about working XXXX XXXX XXXX, found the alleged actions of al-Qaeda to be implausible, and drew a negative inference from the Appellant's failure to produce further documents. The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness and that "the central allegations of this case are not true."1 [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that his evidence was not credible. ANALYSIS Standard of Review [6] The Appellant challenges the RPD's credibility findings, and this appeal therefore raises questions of fact. [7] Although IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [8] The Appellant submits that the RAD should review the RPD's decision on a standard of correctness. As IRPA allows appeals to RAD on pure questions of fact, and as the RAD has the power to set aside the RPD's findings of fact, no deference is required. The Appellant points out that the standard of review to be applied by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) is one of correctness, as an appeal to the IAD is a hearing de novo; an appeal to the RAD may include new evidence and an oral hearing, which in the Appellant's submission is analogous to the context of the IAD. The Appellant argues that the very purpose of the RAD is to provide refugee claimants with the safeguard of an appeal on the merits, and as such a deferential standard is not appropriate. Further, the Appellant submits that the RAD should concern itself with whether a decision being appealed is mistaken or wrong, not unreasonable, and this too supports a standard of correctness. [9] In Dunsmuir,2 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the foundations of judicial review and the applicable standards of review, concluding that there are two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. Dunsmuir has limited applicability to the RAD, however, which is not a reviewing court but rather an administrative appellate body. In Khosa,3 the Supreme Court gave broad deference to a tribunal's interpretation of its own statute, but, again, this was not specifically in the context of an appeals tribunal reviewing the decision of a tribunal of first instance. As the RAD is a statutory creation, the standard of review must be extracted from the legislation. [10] In Newton,4 the Alberta Court of Appeal, having considered Dunsmuir and other jurisprudence, considered the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to a decision of a lower tribunal. The Alberta Court's analysis is therefore relevant in the context of the RAD, which has considered the factors set out in Newton:5 (a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; (b) the nature of the question in issue; (c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; (d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; (e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; (f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and (g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [11] The respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation: The RPD's principal role is to hold hearings to determine whether refugee claimants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.6 An appeal to the RAD may be made by the subject of the RPD proceedings or by the Minister against certain decisions of the RPD. As noted by the Appellant here, an appeal may be made on a question of law, fact, or mixed law and fact, and the RAD is able to determine questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. After considering the appeal, the RAD must confirm the RPD's decision, set aside that determination and substitute another, or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. [12] In the RAD's view, these respective roles suggest deference is owed to findings of fact, or findings of mixed fact and law that can be traced back to evidence given at the RPD hearing. Where the RAD has new evidence before it, either through documents or from an oral hearing, less deference may be owed, as the RPD will not have considered this evidence. [13] The RAD does not accept the Appellant's argument that a RAD hearing is analogous to a de novo proceeding before the IAD. Section 110(3) of IRPA provides that the RAD must proceed without a hearing except in very specific circumstances, while Section 110(4) restricts an Appellant's right to introduce new evidence on appeal. Section 57(1) of the RAD Rules restricts a hearing to issues set out in advance by the RAD. In the RAD's view, these provisions are simply inconsistent with a de novo hearing. [14] The nature of the question in issue: In this appeal, the questions in issue are ones of fact. Such questions have generally, in both appellate court and judicial review contexts, attracted a deferential standard of review.7 [15] The interpretation of the statute as a whole: The purpose and provisions of IRPA, when considered together, suggest a legislative intent to provide a fair and efficient adjudicative process which leads to finality. [16] Canada's refugee system is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted.8 Section 3(2)(e) of IRPA identifies as one of the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees: (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. [17] In the context of an appeal to RAD, this objective can be understood as ensuring that appellants receive a fair and efficient adjudication of their appeals and are given refugee protection when appropriate. This is consistent with Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA, which allows the RAD to set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in the RAD's opinion, should have been made. Further, Section 111(2) of IRPA places restrictions on the RAD's referral of matters back to the RPD. [18] Section 171(c) provides that a decision of a three-member RAD panel has precedential value for the RPD and for single-member RAD panels. Section 162(2) of IRPA requires that each Division of the IRB "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [19] The provisions set out above, when considered together with the "fair and efficient" reference in the Act's objectives, suggest that the RAD is empowered to bring finality to the refugee protection process and, to do so, may be entitled to show less deference to the RPD. [20] The expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal: Both the RPD and the RAD are specialized tribunals dealing with refugee protection. Neither is bound by legal or technical rules of evidence,9 and each can take notice of information and opinion within its specialized knowledge.10 In the area of fact finding and credibility assessment, however, the RPD holds a significant advantage. It must hold a hearing,11 while the RAD must, except in certain circumstances, not hold a hearing and must instead proceed on the basis of the record of the RPD's proceeding.12 The effect of these provisions is that the RPD has the chance to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD will infrequently have this opportunity. Despite other similarities between the RPD and the RAD, this difference suggests that the RAD show deference to the RPD on findings of fact and particularly in respect to credibility,13 other than in situations where the RAD holds an oral hearing and therefore has an opportunity to consider evidence first hand. [21] The need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals, and preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance: In Newton, the Court noted that it is "singularly inefficient" for a first-level hearing to be repeated at the appellate tribunal.14 The Court observed that failure to show deference to the first-level decision-maker undermines the integrity of those hearings, which would in effect be reduced to a type of preliminary inquiry. In this respect, it is important to consider that one purpose of IRPA is to "establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system...." [22] The Newton factors are better authority than those in Dunsmuir for the purpose of determining the appropriate standard of review in this appeal, as they address a situation which is more similar to the context of the RAD and the RPD. There remains the matter of the interpretation of the legislation as a whole, and the conclusion that intended finality might lead the RAD to consider the refugee claim on its merits, showing little or no deference to the findings of the RPD. However, this is outweighed by other factors which favour a more deferential approach on questions of fact. The RAD is restricted in ways that the RPD is not, specifically in admitting evidence and holding oral hearings. The question in issue is one of fact, and the Courts have consistently held that triers of fact are better situated to make findings of fact at first instance.15 The RPD has the opportunity to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD may not. Failure to defer to the RPD on matters of fact and credibility would be singularly inefficient, would undermine the integrity of the RPD process, and would do nothing to limit the length and cost of appeals to the RAD, as the RPD's proceedings would be reduced to little more than preliminary inquiries. [23] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that, in considering this appeal, it must show deference to the factual and credibility findings of the RPD. The notion of deference to administrative tribunal decision-making requires respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of the decision made. Even if the reasons given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the RAD must first seek to supplement them before it substitutes its own decision.16 [24] The appropriate standard of review in this appeal is one of reasonableness. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility within the RPD's decision-making process, but also with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.17 The RPD's Findings [25] The Appellant raises various challenges to the RPD's findings. [26] Location of work in 2007: The RPD considered the Appellant's evidence that he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX in 2006 and 2007. While his Basis of Claim (BoC) form alleges that he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, he testified to the RPD that he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, though he later claimed that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD made a negative credibility finding in respect to this apparently contradictory evidence. The panel also found it implausible that the Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX to get to work. [27] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The RAD does not accept the Appellant's argument that the RPD's analysis of his evidence here was microscopic. The Basis of Claim form clearly indicates that the Appellant worked at, not near, the XXXX XXXX XXXX,18 and he completed a background information form in which he also listed his employer for this time period as "XXXX XXXX XXXX."19 While the Appellant concedes that he testified he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX and also testified that he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, he submits that this was not a significant inconsistency. In the RAD's view, however, in the context of 2006-2007 Iraq, there is a significant difference between XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. It was reasonable for the RPD to make a negative credibility finding in respect to the Appellant's evidence here. [28] The RPD is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and it may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole.20 Where the RPD finds a lack of credibility based on inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence, there must be a basis in the evidence to support such inferences.21 Here, the RPD found it implausible that the Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The RPD reasonably made a negative credibility finding in respect to the Appellant's evidence about his employment at or near the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [29] Plausibility of kidnapping and escape: The Appellant testified that one of his kidnappers asked him if his brothers had worked XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This finding is not justifiable, transparent, or intelligible. According to the Appellant's evidence, his two brothers had already been killed at the time he was kidnapped. It is simply unclear from the RPD's reasons why the Appellant's testimony here was not believable. If the Appellant's evidence was inconsistent or contradictory, the RPD was required to detail this. If this was a finding of implausibility, the panel had an obligation to explain the basis for its finding. [30] The RPD also found it "improbable that al-Qaeda would remember, seven years later, his brothers working XXXX XXXX XXXX back in 2007...." The panel also found it implausible that the Appellant, after being held captive by al-Qaeda for nine days, would leave him alone, giving him the opportunity to escape. The Appellant used a hammer and saw to break a padlock, and the RPD found it implausible that the extremists would "lock the claimant up XXXX XXXX XXXX and leave him unattended with power tools that he could use to break out XXXX XXXX XXXX."22 [31] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred here, as he gave no evidence about using power tools. He also argues that there was nothing implausible about al-Qaeda targeting him seven years after the killing of his brothers, or leaving him unattended, and that the RPD erred in requiring him to prove that violent agents of persecution act predictably, rationally, or justifiably. [32] Much of the RPD's decision appears to rest on its findings of implausibility in respect to the actions of al-Qaeda. The panel refers to the oft-cited case of Faryna v. Chorney:23 In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness... must be its harmony with the preponderance of the possibilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. [33] In the RAD's view, the RPD did not have sufficient regard for "that place" and "those conditions". The Federal Court has cautioned that the RPD "...must be careful when rendering a decision based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu." Plausibility findings should only be made in the clearest of cases.24 [34] Why is it implausible that al-Qaeda would remember the Appellant seven years after having killed his brothers? Objective evidence before the RPD indicates that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX25 In that place and in those conditions, it is simply not implausible that the extremists would be interested in and even recognize those whom they view as having collaborated with the enemy. Although the RPD quoted objective evidence about al-Qaeda's notoriety and methods of operation, it failed to explain how this supports a conclusion that the group should not have recognized the Appellant or remembered his murdered brothers. This is not "the clearest of cases," and it was unreasonable for the RPD to make an implausibility finding here. [35] It was also unreasonable for the RPD to make a negative credibility finding in respect to the Appellant's escape. The panel misconstrued the evidence when it found that the Appellant had access to power tools, and there was nothing implausible about him finding a hammer and saw, as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [36] Supporting documents: Although this is not raised by the Appellant, the RAD notes that the RPD gave little weight to letters from the Appellant's father and former employer. The panel stated that "the letters were clearly written for the purposes of the hearing, as they were addressed to the Board and are self-serving. The panel also noted that both letters do not indicate that Al-Qaeda was the terrorist group involved. Also the panel member is not able to verify the signatures of the letters as they are not sworn affidavits."26 [37] While it is reasonable for the RPD to assign less probative value to the letters than it would to affidavits,27 the remainder of its reasons for rejecting the letters do not withstand scrutiny. A refugee claimant is expected to provide documents to support his claim.28 As the Federal Court has repeatedly pointed out, any letter written in support of a refugee claim could be characterized as self-serving.29 In the RAD's view, all evidence submitted by a refugee claimant is intended to be beneficial to his case and thus could be accurately described as self-serving.30 It was unreasonable of the RPD to give the letters little weight because they are self-serving. It was also unreasonable of the panel to criticize the letters because they were addressed to the IRB. There is nothing in the Act, the Rules, or even in common sense that precludes a claimant from having letters in support of his claim addressed to the tribunal that will be determining that claim. [38] The RPD also gave little weight to the documents because "both letters do not indicate that al-Qaeda was the terrorist group involved."31 One letter, from the Appellant's former employer, makes reference to "a terrorist group"32-which is certainly not an uncommon description for al-Qaeda. In the other letter, the Appellant's father wrote that his sons were martyred "at the hands of al-Qaeda" and in the following paragraph that the Appellant fears for his life after escaping from "the terrorists," which can quite reasonably be understood as referring to the group named only two sentences earlier.33 It was unreasonable of the RPD to give the letters little weight because of the way in which those documents described al-Qaeda. [39] It is unfortunate that, after giving these self-serving documents little weight, the RPD criticized the Appellant for failing to provide other documents that would be equally self-serving, such as documents XXXX XXXX XXXX or a letter from the man who acted as his supervisor when he worked XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Had the Appellant provided letters from either source, it seems likely that the RPD would have rejected these too as self-serving. Here, the RPD created an impossible situation for the Appellant: where he provided letters in support of his claim, they were given little weight because they were self-serving, and where he failed to provide other such documents, a negative inference was drawn. [40] The RPD made a global credibility finding-after considering its various concerns with the Appellant's credibility, it concluded that he was not credible or trustworthy. While there was a basis for the RPD's credibility concern in respect to the Appellant's place of work, the RPD made unreasonable credibility and plausibility findings about the actions of al-Qaeda and about the Appellant's documents. When these elements are removed from the overall assessment of the Appellant's credibility, the RPD's global credibility finding cannot stand. Disposition [41] The RPD's credibility determination was unreasonable. As that determination was the basis for the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, the RPD's decision does not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and the law, and must be set aside. [42] The Appellant asks that the RAD find him to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. As there remain credibility concerns with the Appellant's refugee claim, the RAD is not in a position to substitute its own decision for that of the RPD. CONCLUSION [43] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld April 23, 2014 Date 1 RPD's Reasons, para. 32. 2 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 3 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. 4 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399. 5 Newton, para. 43. 6 IRPA, Sections 96 and 97. 7 Khosa, para. 89. 8 IRPA, Section 3(2)(a). 9 IRPA, Sections 170(g) and 171(a.2). 10 IRPA, Sections 170(i) and 171 (b). 11 IRPA, Section 170(b). 12 IRPA, Section 110(3). 13 Khosa, para. 89. 14 Newton, para. 80. 15 Khosa, para. 89. 16 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 (December 15, 2011) para. 12. 17 Dunsmuir, para. 47; in Khosa, para 4, the "range of reasonable outcomes." 18 RPD's Record, p. 23, Basis of Claim Narrative, Line 19. 19 RPD's Record, p. 67, IMM-5669, p. 2, Question 8. 20 Numbi, Gaston Kipa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-92-12), Boivin, August 30, 2012; 2012 FC 1037, at 19. 21 Miral, Stefnie Dinisha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3392-97), Muldoon, February 12, 1999. 22 RPD's Reasons, para. 23. 23 Faryna v. Chorney, (1952), 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.). 24 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776, 208 FTR 267, para. 7. 25 XXXXX XXXXX, XXXXX XXXXX (XXXXX), XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX, XXXXX XXXXX. 26 RPD's Reasons, para. 22. 27 Ray v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 731, para. 38. 28 Refugee Protection Division Rules, Section 11; Basis of Claim form, pp. 1 and 2. 29 Diaz, Silvia Mata v. M.C.I., 2010 FC 319, at para 37; Murillo Taborda v. M.C.I., 2013 FC 957, para. 27; 30 Ahmed v M.C.I., 2004 FC 226, at para 31. 31 RPD's Reasons, para. 22. 32 RPD's Record, p. 39, Letter of XXXX XXXX XXXX. 33 RPD's Record, p. 37, Letter of XXXX XXXX. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-00383