TB8-32870

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-32870 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision April 30, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Christopher G. Harrison Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Laurence Cohen Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "Appellant") is a citizen of Nigeria. He appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division ("RPD") dated October 15, 2018, whereby the RPD found that he was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act1 ("IRPA"). The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD") to set aside the RPD decision and to find that he is a Convention refugee and/or a person in need of protection pursuant to the IRPA. [2] The Appellant has tendered no new evidence under subsection 110(4), and has requested a new hearing. It is unclear from the memorandum whether, in asking for a new hearing, the Appellant is requesting a re-determination by a different panel or as sometimes occurs, a request for an oral hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA,2 regardless of the fact that no new evidence has been adduced. DETERMINATION [3] I hereby confirm the RPD decision that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA, nor is he a person in need of protection within the meaning of subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. Accordingly, this appeal is denied. BACKGROUND [4] The Appellant claims to have been a resident of Lagos, Nigeria, who was married and had one child - a daughter. He claims to have had some training and to have followed in his father's footsteps by acting as a Muslim cleric in certain religious ceremonies celebrated at different locations in Nigeria. He alleges that he, his wife and daughter, as well as his parents travelled to Maiduguri, a city located in the northeast section of Nigeria to participate in a ceremony known as Mailud-Nabiy, which is observed in celebration of the birthday of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. [5] Following the ceremony, the Appellant claims that he, his wife, daughter and parents were all kidnapped by members of the terrorist group Boko Haram. They (and many others) were rounded up and loaded onto trucks by which they were transported to an unknown location several hours away. Although he has not seen them and has no confirmation of their status, the Appellant believes that his wife and daughter were released, however he and his parents remained captive. He claims that Boko Haram attempted to recruit him to their cause but he resisted. One of the Appellant's friends did enlist with their captors and attempted to convince him to do likewise. At some point during their captivity, he alleges that the Boko Haram terrorists ordered the friend to execute his father in front of him. He claims that his mother died of shock sometime afterward. [6] Some months into their captivity, gunshots were overheard which led the Appellant to believe that the Boko Haram terrorists were involved in some sort of action which resulted in the captives being loaded once again into a truck and transported away from the activity. During this trip, the truck had mechanical problems and prisoners were unloaded to assist. According to the Appellant, he took this opportunity to run into the forest and escape. He walked for some time, eventually arriving in a location which he ultimately learned was in the Republic of Niger, an adjoining country which shares a border with Nigeria. [7] The Appellant claims that he approached an individual who agreed to assist him and with whom he stayed for almost a year while an attempt was made to obtain a Canadian student visa. When this visa application was denied, the Appellant claims that this individual obtained a false passport for him, transported him to Lagos where they flew to Ethiopia, then on to Toronto where he immediately made a claim for refugee protection. ROLE OF THE RAD [8] My role is to review the RPD decision on a standard of correctness after having conducted an independent examination of the evidence.3 The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoyed a meaningful advantage in the assessment and weighing of oral testimony heard or documentary evidence tendered at the hearing which may, in certain cases, allow me to defer to RPD findings. I do not believe the RPD enjoyed any such meaningful advantage in this matter, so no deference will be accorded and all evidence from the RPD hearing has been taken into consideration in arriving at my decision. ORAL HEARING [9] As indicated above, it is unclear whether the Appellant is asking for a re-determination of the matter or an oral hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. Subsection 110(3) of the IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. According to subsection 110(6), the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new evidence (i.e., evidence admitted under subsection 110(4), subsection 110(5) or Minister's evidence), in which case the RAD may hold a hearing. As there has been no new evidence submitted, there is no jurisdiction to hold an oral hearing under subsection 110(6). ANALYSIS OF MERITS OF APPEAL History of matter at the Immigration and Refugee Board ("IRB") [10] This matter has a lengthy history before the IRB. The matter first came up for hearing with the RPD in July 2017, with a negative determination being issued on August 11, 2017.4 The matter was subsequently appealed to the RAD which, on May 8, 2018, returned it to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. The redetermination by the RPD was heard on September 25, 2018, with a negative determination being made on October 15, 2018. This is the appeal of the RPD redetermination. RPD redetermination and Appellant's grounds of appeal [11] The RPD redetermination found that the Appellant lacked credibility on the manner by which he made his way to Canada, as well as with respect to allegations of his capture by Boko Haram. In addition, the panel identified credibility issues regarding his religious profile. Lastly, the RPD found that the Appellant had a viable internal flight alternative ("IFA") to Port Harcourt. [12] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its credibility assessment by making findings of fact that were speculative and argumentative in their analysis and were overly microscopic, and that the panel erred in determining that Port Harcourt was a viable IFA. In addition, the Appellant alleges that the RPD erred in its assessment of the XXXX XXXX submitted in support of the claim. I am not persuaded by these arguments and, for reasons which follow, I determine that the RPD correctly identified legitimate credibility concerns which undermined the claim and that the Appellant had failed, on a balance of probabilities, to establish his religious profile. Credibility findings [13] Credibility is an over-arching principle in all refugee claims. Both the personal credibility of the claimant and the overall credibility of the claim must be assessed by the decision-maker and, if found wanting, may compromise the claim. It is well-established that the starting point of any credibility assessment is the presumption of truthfulness which holds that when an applicant swears to the truth of certain allegations, there is a resulting presumption of truthfulness.5 This presumption may be rebutted in a number of circumstances such as, for example, an accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies or omission or where the documentary evidence fails to mention what one might ordinarily expect it would mention. As set out below, I find that the credibility concerns noted by the RPD were correct and that they not only undermined the Appellant's credibility and the credibility of his claim but also effectively rebut the Maldonado presumption of truthfulness. Appellant's flight from Nigeria is not credible [14] The RPD found that it was unreasonable that the smuggler would not tell the Appellant pertinent information about the identity he was travelling under and require him to memorize those details. The Appellant argues that this is speculative and contrary to his sworn evidence that he was not told such information and that, based upon the XXXX XXXX, begs the question whether it would be reasonable under those circumstances for the Appellant to retain such information. [15] With respect, I am of the view that the Appellant's argument misses the mark; it is not the fact that the Appellant cannot, at this time, recall the specifics of the identity on the false passport under which he travelled that is not credible, it is the fact that he has testified that there was no such information relayed to him and no rehearsal of that information with the smuggler6 that is problematic. It is not speculative to observe that international human smuggling is a risky business, particularly when the smuggler travels with his or her client, as both face the possibility of detection and/or detention if authorities become alert to the scheme. I would agree with counsel, in light of the report, to expect the Appellant to recall the specifics of the false identity some years later would be unreasonable; however, the fact that the Appellant maintains there was no discussion whatsoever about it at the time, runs counter to common sense and I agree with the RPD finding that this adversely affects the Appellant's credibility. Mass kidnapping not reported in media [16] The Appellant was asked if the mass kidnapping by Boko Haram was ever reported in the media to which he replied, "I couldn't know because of what I was passing through that time."7 When asked if he had done any research into the incident, the Appellant testified: "I didn't think about that."8 The RPD found these responses to be unreasonable, given earlier testimony that some 3000 people attended the event with over 100 Boko Haram militants effecting the mass kidnapping.9 The Appellant argues that while it may be logical to suggest a mass kidnapping would be reported in the media, the RPD erred by failing to consider the lack of media reporting within the parameters of its Nigerian experience. With respect, I am not persuaded by this argument which fails to account for the various articles submitted by the Appellant detailing Boko Haram activity in Nigeria.10 These articles were considered both by the RPD and myself and make clear that Boko Haram activity is widely reported in the media. Moreover, the National Documentation Package ("NDP") provides many examples of Boko Haram actions in Nigeria including but not limited to the highly publicized mass kidnapping of some 250 schoolgirls.11 I reject the Appellant's argument and find that the RPD was correct in finding that a mass kidnapping of this magnitude would reasonably have found its way into the Nigerian, indeed worldwide, media and the fact that it failed to do so undermines the credibility of the Appellant's claim. Appellant's profile as religious leader not established [17] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant had failed to establish his profile as a religious leader in the community or that he holds a profile as someone who would be recognizable in Nigeria based on his role in his religious community.12 The Appellant argues that his having provided video evidence of him at a religious ceremony is such proof and that the RPD erred by suggesting that the Appellant might have obtained letters from a member or members of his religious community confirming this status. The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to assess the testimony and the video evidence resulting in an incorrect credibility finding. I do not find this argument to be particularly compelling and for reasons which follow, find that the RPD was correct in its assessment that the Appellant had failed to establish a religious profile that would cause him to be recognizable throughout Nigeria, including in the proposed IFA location. [18] The RPD clearly assessed the two videos presented and recounts certain observations made in respect thereof.13 For example, the RPD noted that the first video approximately 20 people (including the Appellant) were in a room drumming and singing. The second video purportedly took place in Kano. The RPD concluded that while the videos showed the Appellant engaging in religious ceremony alongside other worshippers, these videos failed to show him in a participatory, as opposed to a leadership role within those religious rites and failed to corroborate his claim of leadership and status on a national basis within the Muslim community. Having reviewed these videos (as well as certain photographs which accompanied them) personally, I concur with the RPD finding. [19] I might add that the Appellant's own submissions cast some doubt upon his profile or status within the country's Muslim religious community. In this regard, I note that his amended Basis of Claim ("BOC") narrative states that he had to attend the event in Maiduguri (from which he claims to have been kidnapped) because of his position as a religious leader and a scholar in his "neighbourhood"14 which presents an entirely different profile than alleged by the Appellant. Failure to obtain readily available corroborating documents [20] The Appellant alleges that following his escape from Boko Haram, he made his way to the Republic of Niger where he met an individual who offered to harbour and assist him in exchange for monetary consideration. As a result, the Appellant claims that this person drove him across the border between the two countries, back into Nigeria where he was able to make a withdrawal of 1.5 million Nigerian naira from his bank. [21] When asked if he had obtained any bank documents or records that would corroborate this large sum of money being withdrawn from his account, the Appellant indicated that he had no such evidence to attest to that fact.15 When questioned as to what efforts he had made to contact the bank to get a printout of the account history, he replied: "No, I did not think in that direction so I didn't do anything."16 The RPD found that the Appellant's lack of effort to obtain corroborative evidence of this bank withdrawal was unreasonable. I agree and find that it further undermines the credibility of the Appellant's claim. I note that this finding has gone unchallenged by the Appellant. RPD Credibility findings were not microscopic [22] As set out above, the RPD made a number of findings related to this claim that impacted negatively on either the Appellant's personal credibility or which had the effect of undermining the credibility of his claim. The Appellant argues that such credibility findings were microscopic and involved an examination of issues irrelevant or peripheral to the central issue of the claim. I do not find this argument to be persuasive. For example, it is hard to envision how credibility findings relating to the Appellant's flight from Nigeria or relating to his failure to produce readily available banking documents establishing the veracity of his claim to have paid a large sum of money to a smuggler as being peripheral or microscopic. The fact of the matter is that the RPD credibility findings do relate to and undermine the foundational underpinning of the claim, namely, that the Appellant was kidnapped by Boko Haram militants. Having considered these findings and agreeing that they are correct, I can arrive at no conclusion other than the Appellant has, on a balance of probabilities, failed to establish that he was kidnapped by Boko Haram, escaped and made his way to Niger where he resided for approximately one year in preparation for his journey to Canada. XXXX XXXX does not overcome credibility concerns [23] The RPD did not dispute the diagnosis set out in the XXXX XXXX wherein the psychologist indicates that the Appellant suffers from "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX."17 The RPD then went on to find that for a variety of reasons, the report did not act to corroborate the substance of the claim. The Appellant argues that it is contradictory for the RPD to first accept the diagnosis, then reject the findings with respect to the underlying issues. I disagree and find that it was open to the RPD to make this finding which, in my view, correctly considered and assessed the report. [24] Firstly, I note that in my review of the report, it is quite apparent that it "sets the stage" for the Appellant's appearance before the RPD by indicating that certain aspects of his diagnosis or symptoms may be heightened by the stress of the hearing room. For example, the report notes that the Appellant might "go blank" under questioning, have difficulty recalling dates and details, may not understand questions, requiring them to be repeated or rephrased and experience difficulty in providing "clear and consistent" testimony.18 [25] In my independent review of this matter, I note that the RPD decision and the transcript of the hearing display an acute awareness of these potential frailties on the part of the RPD. The Appellant was advised that he could request a break when necessary,19 and the transcript is replete with instances when questions were repeated or rephrased. Despite the fact that no application was made to have the Appellant designated as a vulnerable person, as defined by Chairperson Guideline 8,20 the RPD displayed sensitivity to his situation and the potential hurdles that he might face in giving his evidence and made every effort to accommodate him. Having said that, in my review of the evidentiary record, I find very few instances where the Appellant displayed such frailties and, for the most part, found that his evidence was given in a manner that displayed none of the concerns set out in the XXXX XXXX XXXX [26] I note that much of the report is prepared on the basis of information received from the Appellant regarding the events which took place in Nigeria and, as such, is fundamentally informed as to its factual background by the Appellant. While I am fully cognizant that it would be exceedingly rare for a mental health professional to be able to provide first-hand information as to the events which may inform such a report, the fact that it is self-reported is a fundamental weakness of such reports which is exacerbated by the negative credibility findings. This was commented upon by the Federal Court in Czesak,21 which cautioned against over reliance upon them in the absence of verification. In my view, the RPD is correct in accepting the diagnosis but regarding the self-reporting aspect of the report with some reservation. Evidentiary weight is a function of credibility and probative value.22 While the report itself emanates from a credible source, the information upon which the author relies is subject to reliability concerns, particularly in light of the credibility concerns noted above. Apart from the self-reporting by the Appellant of the allegations underlying his claim, the report speaks primarily to the impact of a hearing on the Appellant's ability to testify and I find that the panel was correct in finding that the XXXX XXXX is of insufficient weight to overcome the highlighted credibility concerns. IFA is determinative of the matter - Appellant has a viable IFA in Port Harcourt [27] By way of preliminary, I note that the RPD indicated that it "adopts the reasoning in the Jurisprudential Guide for Nigeria" ("Nigerian JG")23 which dealt extensively with the viability of IFA locations in Nigeria. On April 6, 2020, the Nigerian JG was downgraded from a Jurisprudential Guide to a "Reasons of Interest decision" by the IRB24, largely due to changes in country conditions. Regardless of it being downgraded in this manner, the IRB continues to promote it as a "helpful conceptual framework" for IRB decision-makers. In using this conceptual framework, it is critical that the decision-maker considers facts and circumstances that are particular to the claimant (or Appellant). While the Appellant has not argued that this represented an error on the part of the RPD, it is worthy of comment for purpose of this appeal. [28] Having read the RPD decision at some length and having considered the appropriate test for the determination of a viable IFA, I am satisfied that the RPD did not apply the Nigerian JG in blanket fashion and that the phrase "adopts the reasoning,"25 really equates with the panel having applied the conceptual framework of analysis set out in the Nigerian JG which is entirely compatible with the IRB downgrade. Regardless, in my view, the Nigerian JG remains an appropriate tool for the assessment of IFA cities in southern Nigerian for claimants or appellants claiming persecution by non-state agents of persecution, provided that the analysis includes consideration of the Appellant's personal circumstances and current country conditions. [29] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in the IFA analysis which resulted in the conclusion that Port Harcourt would be a safe haven for the Appellant.26 The Appellant bases this argument upon his role as a relatively prominent leader of his religious community and his testimony that, based upon this profile, he would be located and persecuted by Boko Haram. I have found that the RPD was correct in its determination that the Appellant failed to establish his religious profile; as a result, I disagree with the Appellant and, for reasons which follow, find that the RPD was correct in its finding that Port Harcourt was a viable IFA location for him. General principles re: IFA location [30] The jurisprudence establishes that the test for a viable IFA has two prongs: (i) the first being that there would be no serious possibility of the Appellant being persecuted in the IFA location and that, on a balance of probabilities, he would not be subject to a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment, punishment or danger; and (ii) the second prong is that the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such in all of the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for the Appellant to seek refuge there.27 [31] The Appellant bears the burden of proof to establish that Port Harcourt is not a viable IFA location and, with respect to the second prong of the test, the Appellant must show, by actual and concrete evidence, that it is objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh for him to live in the IFA. The Federal Court of Appeal has set an extremely high threshold for this test requiring nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of the Appellant in either travelling to or relocating to the IFA.28 In addition, the Court has reiterated the importance of not lowering that threshold.29 First prong of IFA analysis - risk of persecution or harm [32] In the first prong of its IFA analysis, the RPD concluded that there was not a serious possibility that the Appellant would face persecution in Port Harcourt. With respect to the RPD, that statement features an omission and is but one consideration of the first prong of the test; the second consideration is whether, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant would be subject to risk to his life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. In my role as the "safety net" of the RPD,30 I am well-positioned and, indeed, mandated to consider the effect of this error and to rectify it where possible. For reasons which follow, I find that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution, nor does he, on a balance of probabilities, face risk to his life or cruel or unusual punishment or treatment if he were to relocate to Port Harcourt. [33] The Appellant essentially bases his argument against Port Harcourt as an IFA location on his "role as a relatively prominent leader of his religious community"31 and his testimony that he would be found. I have already confirmed the RPD finding whereby the Appellant has not, in fact, established that he is a prominent religious leader whose location might become known by reason of his religious activities or a nationwide base of followers. The Appellant further argues that the assessment of the IFA should have been conducted on the basis of accepting his identity as testified. With respect, that is a proposition I cannot accept, as credibility is one of the fundamental elements of a successful refugee claim and the Appellant has failed to credibly establish his status within his religious community. In fact, while the Appellant argues that the RPD erred by failing to acknowledge such status, I note that the Appellant's amended BOC narrative indicates that he had to attend the event in Maiduguri because of his "position as a religious leader and scholar within my neighbourhood."[emphasis added]32 As noted above, neighbourhood and nationwide are very different concepts and the fact that the Appellant refers to himself as a religious leader and scholar within his own neighbourhood does little to support the profile that his status in that regard would allow for him to be located throughout Nigeria. [34] The Appellant also testified that the friend who joined Boko Haram after the kidnapping knows his movements and would be able to locate him. This testimony is highly speculative and has to be weighed against the objective country evidence which advises that Nigeria is a huge country of some 923,000 square kilometers (more than two times the size of California) with a population of approximately 190 million,33 approximately 50 percent of which are Muslim. Furthermore, Boko Haram activity appears to be concentrated in the northern parts of the country, occasionally spilling across international boundaries into Cameroon, Chad and Niger.34 [35] The NDP notes that Boko Haram's capacity to pursue and locate individuals relocating to other parts of Nigeria is greatest in the northeast (where its activity is concentrated) and that the further one moves from its sphere of activity in the northeast, the less likely Boko Haram will make attempts to track them down.35 While Boko Haram might be inclined to pursue higher status individuals or "religious elites,"36 the RPD found (and I concur with that finding) that the Appellant has not established such a profile.37 [36] The Appellant argues that Boko Haram has his identity card and has tendered evidence by way of two affidavits from a neighbour in Lagos alleging that the terrorist group has been at his former residence to look for him. I have reviewed these affidavits and find them also to be highly speculative, as the affiant states that "some people who I now believe are the Boko Haram members"38 came to the house looking for them. In a second affidavit, the affiant also observes that "strange people" in cars with tinted glasses came to the house looking for the Appellant.39 While she "suspects" these people to be Boko Haram operatives, she fails to provide any information as to what forms the basis of these suspicions or observations and, in my view, these affidavits do not reliably establish that Boko Haram continues to look for the Appellant. [37] Lastly, the NDP evidence indicates that Boko Haram does not have the technological sophistication to track down individuals and such tracking ability would depend largely on word of mouth.40 On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that the RPD was correct in finding that there is neither a serious possibility that he would face persecution there on the basis of a Convention ground, nor would he, on a balance of probabilities, be exposed to risk to his life or risk of cruel and unusual punishment if he were to relocate to Port Harcourt. Second prong of analysis - IFA is objectively reasonable [38] As indicated, the second prong of the IFA test requires that the decision-maker consider a number of factors in attempting to determine whether it would be objectively unreasonably for a claimant or appellant to relocate to that location. Among the factors considered by the RPD were the Appellant's ability to earn a living, language ability, education, ability to secure accommodation, support system in the proposed IFA location, access to public services and indigeneship. In concluding that the Appellant had not satisfied the burden of producing "actual and concrete evidence" of adverse conditions that would jeopardize his life and safety, the RPD ultimately determined that it would not be objectively unreasonable for him to relocate to Port Harcourt.41 [39] The Appellant argues that given his role as a relatively prominent leader of his religious community, he would be found. As I have already discussed, the Appellant has not established that his profile as a religious leader is such that this argument is at all persuasive and the memorandum fails to argue how the RPD erred in the findings that led to its conclusion. By way of recap, those findings are as follows: (i) the Appellant has a history of self-employment in the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX experience and has displayed a good level of sophistication, savvy and resourcefulness; (ii) the Appellant is able to travel safely to Port Harcourt; (iii) the Appellant is fluent in English and Yoruba, both languages being used specifically in Port Harcourt and being a positive factor in the assessment of relocation there; (iv) the Appellant has proven business acumen and his previous employment experience and resourcefulness weigh in favour of his ability to find employment or start a new business; (v) while the cost of living is high in Port Harcourt, the Appellant supported himself and his family in Lagos, another Nigerian city with a very high cost of living associated with it; (vi) the Appellant's Muslim religion mitigates against Port Harcourt being unreasonable as there are a significant number of Muslims and mosques there providing him with religious support; (vii) there was no evidence proffered by the Appellant regarding indigeneship and the RPD found that such status is less important in major cities such as Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt; and (viii) the Appellant would have similar access to health services in Port Harcourt as he previously enjoyed in Lagos. Apart from a very general submission that the RPD erred in its IFA analysis, the Appellant has essentially left these crucial findings unchallenged. I have reviewed these findings and do not discern any errors and, accordingly, I find that the RPD correctly applied the two-pronged test set out in Rasaratnam and that it was correct in its assessment and determination that Port Harcourt was a viable IFA location for the Appellant. Accordingly, the appeal is denied. CONCLUSION [40] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(1)(a) of the IRPA, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Christopher G. Harrison Christopher G. Harrison April 30, 2021 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (IRPA) S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 1, paras. 1-2. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157, at para. 103. [Huruglica] 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 10, at pp. 235-244. 5 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.). 6 Transcript of September 25, 2018, RPD Hearing, at p. 34, lines 23-38. 7 Ibid., at p. 35, line 18. 8 Ibid., line 22. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at pp. 9-10, para. 22. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 151-152; citing the Express news article "Terror Group Boko Haram snatch 100 boys in Nigeria just months after schoolgirls capture." 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (July 10, 2018), item 7.3, Response to Information Request, NGA104917.E. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 12, para. 29. 13 Ibid., at p. 11, para. 26 . 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at p.35. 15 Transcript of September 25, 2018, RPD Hearing, at p. 32, lines 46-50. 16 Ibid., at p. 33, line 21. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at p. 183. 18 Ibid. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at pp. 5-6, para. 10. 20 Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB. Update Guideline issued by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, IRB, Ottawa, Amended date: December 15, 2012. 21 Czesak v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1149 (CanLII) 22 Magonza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 14 (CanLII). 23 Jurisprudential Guide - Decision TB7-19851, Guide identified by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Effective date July 6, 2018. Revoked, April 6, 2020. 24 Notice of Revocation of Jurisprudential Guide-Nigeria, IRB, Ottawa, Decision? ?TB7-19851, Gamble, May 17, 2018. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 12, para. 30. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 7, para. 13. 27 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 28 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164. 29 Ibid. 30 Huruglica, supra, endnote 3, at para. 98. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's memorandum, at p. 7, para. 13. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit , at p. 35. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, NDP for Nigeria (July 10, 2018), item 1.6. 34 Ibid., item 7.21. 35 Ibid., item 7.26. Response to Information Request NGA105451.E. 36 Ibid. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 13-14, para. 13. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at p. 149. 39 Ibid., Exhibit 6, at p. 257. 40 Item 7.26, op. cit., p. 3. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, p. 19, para. 49, citing Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 988 (CanLII). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-32870 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français