TC2-04137

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC2-04137 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXXXXXX XXXX Personne en cause Date of decision May 31, 2022 Date de la décision Panel Susan Brown Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Sibomana Emmanuel Kamonyo Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] The Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX is a citizen of India who fears the Punjab police, who are targeting him at the behest of a corrupt MLA, and the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and all the police in India. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Appellant has a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in New Delhi. [3] The Appellant submits that the RPD made errors in law and in appreciation and presents new evidence under section 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which I have not accepted. [4] Following my own review, I find that the Appellant has not met his burden of proof to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a serious possibility he would be persecuted or face a risk of harm in New Delhi or that it would be objectively unreasonable in all the circumstances for him to seek refuge there. DECISION [5] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [6] According to this Basis of Claim (BOC) form,1 the Appellant was born in 1988 in the Punjab. [7] The Appellant was working at the village level XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the area. The Appellant alleges that the MLA for his constituency is closely linked with the drug mafia. [8] The Appellant supported the Aam Admi Party in the 2018 election and worked against the re-election of the MLA. During and after the election, he was threatened and abused for going against the MLA. He went to the police station twice to file a complaint but nothing happened. [9] The Appellant's brother was a Punjab policeman and in XXXX and XXXX 2019 area goons told him he and his brother would be fixed soon. [10] In XXXX 2019, the Appellant witnessed a shopkeeper selling illegal drugs and reported this to the local police who did not take any action. On the advice of his brother, the Appellant reported the shopkeeper to the Narcotic Emergency Hot Line the first week of XXXX. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, the police raided the shopkeeper's premises and detained him. No charges were laid, however, and the shopkeeper was released later in the day. [11] On XXXX XXXX, 2019, the police raided and searched the Appellant's house. They detained and tortured him alleging that he was involved in cybercrime and narcoterrorism. The Appellant's brother used his contacts to effect his release and the police took a bribe. The Appellant's brother told him that he was a police target and could be killed so the Appellant went into hiding. [12] The Appellant's brother was assigned to a Narcotics special cell. On XXXX XXXX, 2019, the police came looking for the Appellant and on XXXX XXXX, 2019, his brother was found dead. [13] The Appellant came to Canada in XXXX 2019 to seek protection. The police raided the Appellant's house three times after he left alleging that he was involved with anti-national elements and a threat to national security. [14] In an amendment to his BOC narrative, the Appellant alleges that the NIA questioned his father, head of the local council and a neighbour about him alleging his involvement in the Khalistan referendum and laundering money for the cause.2 NEW EVIDENCE The new evidence presented by the Appellant is not accepted [15] The Appellant's claim was heard on January 5, 2022, and the RPD gave its decision on February 4, 2022. The Appellant presented new evidence with the perfection of his appeal on March 31, 2022. [16] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that an appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. In Singh,3 the Federal Court of Appeal dictates a narrow interpretation of section 110(4): the conditions set out therein must be met, and there is no room for discretion on the part of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). If the section 110(4) threshold is met, then the new evidence must also meet jurisprudential requirements of credibility, relevance and newness.4 [17] The Appellant submits the following documents as new evidence: A. Affidavit of the Appellant sworn XXXX XXXX, 2022;5 B. Punjab Police ID. NO. XXXX XXXX XXXX issued XXXX XXXX XXXX-2016 of Constable No-XXXX XXXX XXXX;6 C. Death certificate of XXXX XXXX issued XXXX XXXX, 2019.7 [18] The RAD Rules8 state that the Appellant's memorandum must include full and detailed submissions regarding how any new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant. The Appellant does not make any submissions about the new evidence. [19] Document A, the Appellant's affidavit sworn on XXXX XXXX, 2022, repeats background facts about his case and arguments about why the RPD erred and why an IFA is not viable for him. As the Appellant did not make any submissions about this affidavit, I will treat it as supplementing submissions in his memorandum of argument as opposed to new evidence. [20] Documents B and C pre-date the rejection of the Appellant's claim. The Appellant did not make any submissions about why the documents were not reasonably available earlier or why he could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances not to have presented this evidence to the RPD before the rejection of his claim. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA does not provide an opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD. I find that documents B and C do not meet the temporal threshold of subsection 110(4) and are not admissible as new evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW [21] The RAD reviews decisions of the RPD on a standard of correctness after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it. The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in assessing and weighing the oral testimony heard, which in particular cases attracts deference.9 Unless specifically stated below, I have applied the correctness standard. ANALYSIS [22] The RPD identified the determinative issue as the availability of a viable IFA for the Appellant in New Delhi. [23] The Appellant argues that the central issue is whether the Appellant can have state protection in the suggested IFAs in a country where there is impunity for police. The Appellant submits that once it is established that someone is a victim of serious torture there must be very good reasons for asserting that he could live elsewhere in India. [24] I have reviewed the evidence on the record, including the transcript of the RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, and assessed the Appellant's submissions. As detailed below I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has a viable IFA in New Delhi. Internal flight alternative [25] It is settled law that the concept of an IFA is an inherent part of the Convention refugee definition because a claimant must be a refugee from a country, not from a particular region of a country.10 The existence of an IFA is fatal to any refugee claim11 as recently confirmed in a 2020 decision of the Federal Court: The concept of an IFA is an inherent part of the definition of Convention refugee: see Valasquez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1201 at para 15. If it is objectively reasonable for a claimant to live elsewhere in their country of nationality without fear of persecution, the claimant is not a Convention refugee, even if they have a well-founded fear of persecution in another part of the country.12 [26] The test for assessing an IFA was set out in a recent decision of the Federal Court:13 To determine if a viable IFA exists, the RAD must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that (1) the claimant will not be subject to persecution (on a "serious possibility" standard), or a section 97 danger or risk (on a "more likely than not" standard) in the proposed IFA; and (2) in all the circumstances, including circumstances particular to the claimant, conditions in the IFA are such that it would not be unreasonable for the claimant to seek refuge there: Thirunavukkarasu at pp 595-597; Hamdan v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 643 at paras 10-12. Both of these "prongs" of the test must be satisfied to conclude that a refugee claimant has a viable IFA. The threshold on the second prong of the IFA test is a high one. There must be "actual and concrete evidence" of conditions that would jeopardize the applicants' lives and safety in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area: Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164 (CA) at para 15. Once the potential for an IFA is raised, the claimant bears the onus of establishing it is not viable: Thirunavukkarasu at pp 594-595. [27] The RPD complied with the procedural requirement to raise an IFA before or during the hearing. At the outset of the hearing on January 5, 2022, the RPD identified IFA as an issue and New Delhi and Mumbai14 as potential IFAs. The RPD canvassed the issue during the hearing15 as did Appellant's counsel16 who also made oral submissions about IFA.17 The RPD identified the two-prong IFA test.18 First prong of the IFA test: no serious possibility of persecution or not likely that the Appellant would face a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFAs [28] The RPD found that there is no serious possibility of persecution or likelihood of harm in New Delhi because there is insufficient evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's agents of harm have the motivation or capacity to locate and harm him in New Delhi. The RPD considered a number of factors in arriving at this conclusion: the size and location of New Delhi; the Appellant's illegal arrest and detention; and the limitations of police tracking systems, including the Aadhaar card, Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) and tenant verification. [29] When asked how his agents of harm could find him in New Delhi, the Appellant testified that he would have to provide photo ID such as his Aadhaar card and his voters card when he opened a bank account or gets a SIM card or tries to find a place to live. The Appellant testified that when the landlord carries out the mandatory tenant verification process he would be "easily traced and arrested because the Indian police and Punjab police are connected together."19 Size and location of New Delhi [30] The RPD noted that India is a vast country that covers about three million square kilometres and has a population of over 1.3 billion people. New Delhi is the largest city in India, with a metropolitan population of more than 30 million people. New Delhi is more than a 7-hour drive and almost 400 kilometres from Jalandhar, near where the Appellant was targeted. Illegal arrest and detention [31] In his BOC narrative, he said that was abducted by the police on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, taken to an undisclosed place and tortured. His brother used his contacts to secure the Appellant's release and the police took a bribe.20 The Appellant testified that he was never charged, there was never a warrant for his arrest, a First Information Report (FIR) was not filed but the police got his signature on white papers.21 [32] As detailed below, the RPD concluded that the Appellant's agents of persecution acted illegally, did not register an official case against him in any database or watch list in India. The RPD found it is not likely, on a balance of probabilities, that the Punjab police or the NIA recorded the Appellant as a person of interest. [33] The RPD found that the Punjab police were acting outside the law noting that the Appellant was detained at an unknown location and not at the police station and then released without a charge on the payment of a bribe. The RPD cited objective evidence, a 2018 Response to Information Request (RIR),22 that a legal arrest subjects the police to a number of obligations including: the preparing a memorandum of arrest; entering the arrest in a book kept at the police station; allowing the detainee access to counsel during interrogation; and presenting the detainee to a magistrate no later than 24 hours after the arrest. The RPD also referenced a 2020 RIR that, if they were acting legally, the Punjab police could have issued a summons against the Appellant as a person of interest as well as arrest warrants.23 [34] With respect to the NIA, the RPD noted that the affidavit dated XXXX 2021 from the lawyer24 declares that the Appellant's father spoke to him in XXXX 2021 reporting that the police were harassing and extorting money from him and making false claims of terrorism against the Appellant and that the NIA interrogated him. The lawyer also states that when he went to the police station the officer said the government of India had evidence of the Appellant's involvement with Sikh separatists in Canada but when the lawyer requested a copy of the evidence, "the officer refused to provide any information".25 The RPD found on a balance of probabilities that the evidence establishes that the NIA officials who interrogated the Appellant's father were also likely acting improperly and extra judicially, at the behest of the corrupt MLA, and they likely did not leave a paper trail or record regarding the Appellant. [35] The Appellant confirms that he was illegally detained and tortured by the police at an unknown place26 and "there is no case filed against the appellant"27 but does not make any submissions to address the RPD finding that he is not recorded in any database or watch list as a person of interest. Limitations of police tracking systems [36] The RPD noted that police services are under state jurisdiction in India. The RPD found that, even if the Appellant's name is in the Punjab police database, the preponderance of the objective evidence supports a conclusion that name-specific information sharing amongst Indian state police services is fragmented, poorly integrated, and limited and that there is no well- functioning national database system that allows for efficient sharing between police across state lines. [37] The RPD found that a 2021 RIR28 establishes that there is no link between the Aadhaar card and police tracking systems. It quotes an expert as saying that the National Criminal Records Bureau, the agency that controls the CCTNS, "has been judicially excluded from access to Aadhaar data." The same objective evidence cites media reports that the Aadhaar Act prevents the Unique Identification Authority of India from sharing biometric data for criminal investigations and it "has never" shared Aadhar data with "any crime investigation agency."29 [38] The RPD noted that the objective evidence about the police's ability to track people across jurisdictions in India using the CCTNS is mixed. A 2018 RIR reveals that in most cases the police are not able to trace a person based upon information collected under the CCTNS.30 Police stations in India still work in silos as far as criminal information is concerned, that the CCTNS has yet to become functional across the country and the implementation of CCTNS varies across states and many police stations do not systematically enter information into CCTNS.31 [39] A 2021 RIR32 indicates that the CCTNS does allow police stations to collect and share information on crimes and criminals. Although CCTNS software is available at 96 percent of police stations in India, there are considerable differences in the versions of the software being used in different states, and it is difficult to locate individuals.33 Many jurisdictions, including New Delhi and Mumbai, have implemented tenant verification programs to maintain a database of where criminals reside.34 Even where police can use the CCTNS to screen tenants for criminal backgrounds using tenant verification, the objective evidence indicates that the police cannot verify all new tenants.35 [40] The RPD gave significant weight to a 2020 country information report on India by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as a reputable and objective source which states: "India does not have a centralised registration system in place to enable the police to check the whereabouts of inhabitants in their own state, let alone in any of the other states or union territories".36 A 2021 RIR quotes the Inspector-General of Police in the state of Haryana who indicates that India does "not have any national data[b]ase of criminals or gangs against which suspects can be identified". The same source indicates that "police systems between districts and states are not integrated, creating "[i]slands of technology" which can only communicate within a state or district".37 [41] Having found that there is no documented entry of a FIR, criminal charge, or investigation against the Appellant, the RPD concluded that there is no serious possibility that the authorities could locate him through a search of CCTNS and, even if he were in the database, the objective evidence does not establish that the police are consistently able to communicate with other police stations or access information in databases. [42] The RPD acknowledged that in theory there is a mandatory tenant verification process throughout India with the goal of tracking criminals but found that the bulk of the documentary evidence establishes that in practice it does not function efficiently or routinely and is "extremely limited."38 The RPD concluded that even if a landlord in New Delhi submits a verification check to the police in New Delhi, there is no serious possibility that the tenant verification process would reveal any record of the Appellant's agents of persecution interest in him. [43] The Appellant cites a 2019 RIR39 as authority that "you cannot rent an apartment or get a job elsewhere in India without the local police being informed and having the possibility to check your identity and background. The appellant would be found elsewhere, and he would be returned to great danger in the Punjab."40 [44] I note that the 2019 RIR41 says that even though the tenant verification system in India is mandatory, there is very little inter-state police communication, that police stations in India are virtually unconnected and that any registration process is not effective as the systems lack resources for verification. [45] With regards to the IFA location of New Delhi, the 2019 RIR quotes an India Today article describing the results of a Delhi-based newspaper's visit to about 25 police stations in Delhi and Noida to check on the verification process, and this article says, "[i]n most police stations, the verification forms were found dumped, gathering dust with no action being taken to complete the procedure."42 [46] In a 2021 RIR43 a Police Commissioner in Mumbai is quoted as saying that "'it is impossible for the police to actually verify the identity of all those who rent property' ... 'the police force is not equipped to personally go and check all new tenants.'"44 [47] The Appellant argues that a 2018 RIR45 "clearly show[s] the extreme difficulty of living anything like a normal life in India if the police or political authorities have any kind of interest in you at all. If you use any kind or bank car or your cellular phone they can find you."46 [48] While I agree that the 2018 RIR states that, since 2013, the Indian government has a surveillance program in place to monitor phone calls, text messages, and internet use,47 I find that the Appellant has not established that he is a person of interest recorded in a database and there is insufficient evidence to establish that his agents of persecution would use the surveillance program, if they have access to it, to try and track down the Appellant through monitoring of phone calls, text messages or internet use. [49] The Appellant argues that the prohibition in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture was not seriously considered by the RPD. I disagree as the formulation of the first prong of the IFA test dictates such consideration. [50] The Appellant also argues that an IFA does not exist when the persecution comes from agents of the state. This is not supported by objective evidence that in general, a person fearing state and non-state (including 'rogue' state) actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of India.48 [51] A 2016 RIR49 states that interstate police communication to locate an individual will only occur in cases of major crimes such as smuggling, terrorism, and some high-profile organized crime cases and a 2018 RIR also says that "tracking of persons of interest is difficult and police have a mixed record of success."50 According to one source: [i]f they put their minds to it, police authorities in India are able to track and locate persons of interest, depending on the heinousness of the crime and the pressure received from political authorities. For example, it is possible [for them] to locate a person of interest in cases of rape, murder or armed robbery. Social class also plays a vital role: the likelihood of prosecution is much greater if a case involves the murder of a politician's daughter versus the murder of a slum dweller.51 [52] Consistent with some recent decisions of the Federal Court,52 I find that the heart of the issue is whether the Appellant's name is in databases available to the police that would identify him as a criminal or militant. [53] Following my own review of the objective evidence I find that, given the circumstances of the Appellant's arrest and detention, it is unlikely that it was officially recorded. There is objective evidence that this is a common occurrence to avoid subjecting the police to unwanted scrutiny and potential accountability53 and legal arrest subjects the police to various obligations.54 Given that the police were acting on the instructions of the corrupt MLA and received a bribe to effect the release of the Appellant, they would not have left any trace in any database or in any other place (including the daily diary or general diary of the police station) that could be accessed by other persons to avoid unwanted scrutiny. [54] I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that his agents of persecution have the capacity or motivation to find him in the proposed IFA. [55] The onus is on the Appellant to show that he does not have an IFA in New Delhi. I find that the Appellant has not presented sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that he will be subject to persecution (on a serious possibility standard), or a section 97 danger or risk (on a more likely than not standard) in New Delhi from his agents of persecution. Second prong of the IFA test: it is not objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate to the proposed IFAs [56] The issue is whether it would be reasonable, in all the Appellant's circumstances, for him to relocate to the proposed IFA in New Delhi. As a starting point, the Federal Court of Appeal has held that there is: ...a very high threshold for the unreasonableness test. It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized. This is in sharp contrast with undue hardship resulting from loss of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and expectations.55 The Court has reiterated the importance of not lowering that threshold.56 [57] The Appellant is 34 years old and single. He has XXXX years of education and worked in XXXX and XXXX helping his father. In 2017 he travelled with friends to Cambodia, Thailand, Qatar, Serbia and Bosnia.57 The Appellant currently works in XXXX at a XXXX in Canada.58 The RPD found that there was no evidence that the Appellant does not have the practical skills and wherewithal to find work, make a living and find a place to live in New Delhi. [58] The Appellant testified that he would be the "odd man out among the community" and he may face discrimination in New Delhi due to his Sikh religion, Punjabi language and single marital status and problems due to the perception that he is anti-national.59 [59] The RPD referenced objective evidence that Sikhs account for approximately two percent of India's population, reside in every Indian state and "[a]lmost every major Indian city has a Sikh community."60 According to a 2020 report by Australia's DFAT since the late 1980s "Sikhs living outside Punjab mostly do so safely and integrate economically and socially into their communities" and "Sikhs in India generally face a low level of official and societal violence and discrimination."61 Based on this documentary evidence the RPD found that the Appellant did not establish that he would face cumulative discrimination amounting to persecution in New Delhi based on his religion. [60] With regard to language, the RPD cited objective evidence that Punjabi is widely spoken in New Delhi62 so language would not be a barrier to his relocation to the IFA. [61] The Appellant testified that he listens to sermons about the farmer protests, separatists and the Sikh referendum when he visits the Gurudwara in Canada because the events are organized during the times he usually visits but he "always go there just for peace of mind" and is only in favour of a separate homeland for Sikhs if it is done peacefully with a referendum or votes "otherwise I am not in favour of that if it is done some other way."63 [62] The RPD noted objective evidence that Sikhs in India who publicly promote a separate Khalistan state can face persecution for their political opinion. The RPD found that while the Appellant is a practicing Sikh, there is no evidence that he has the profile of a pro Khalistan activist, or that he publicly shares his views on Khalistan, or wishes to do so in the future so he is not at risk of persecution or harm due to his personal political views regarding Khalistan, in New Delhi. [63] Based on the assertion that he was a XXXX XXXX in Punjab the Appellant argues that a person moving from one state to another may face difficulty accessing financial services and resources such as loans to start a business, other issues relating to economic and social rights which constitute discrimination and there will be a language barrier that won't allow him to run his business easily. I do not find that the Appellant presented any evidence that he was a XXXX XXXX in Punjab. [64] Citing the same objective evidence as the RPD, a 2021 RIR,64 the Appellant argues that it is an error in law to say that a Sikh person will have a normal life in the proposed IFA. [65] Following my own review of the objective evidence, I note that according to a 2019 report from the United States (US) Commission on International Religious Freedom, conditions for religious minorities, including Sikhs, in India have come under attack in recent years due to a rise in Hindu nationalism. The report states that religious minorities face "challenges ranging from acts of violence or intimidation to the loss of political power, increasing feelings of disenfranchisement, and limits on access to education, housing, and employment".65 Other sources indicate that, while there have been localized conflict or harassment by Hindu nationalists, this does not represent a systemic pattern and incidents of communal violence have declined in the last several years.66 According to a 2018 United Kingdom (UK) Home Office report, "Hindu nationalists often harass Sikhs and pressure them to reject religious practices and beliefs." It notes that there were several hundred cases of communal violence in 2016 and 2017. However, despite the occurrence of religious discrimination and violence against minority groups such as Sikhs, the report notes that the number of incidents is low relative to the size of the country's population.67 Another report indicates that, violence perpetrated by Hindu nationalists is more likely to occur in states governed by the Bharatiya Janata Party.68 [66] Article 19 of the constitution grants citizens the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India.69 According to a 2018 RIR New Delhi has a population of 18 million, of whom 800,000 or 4.4 percent are Sikh and the predominant languages are Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu and English.70 I find that the Appellant has sufficient work experience, education and demonstrated capacity to adapt to new environments to allow him to find reasonable employment in the proposed IFA. [67] While the objective evidence says violence is perpetrated against religious minorities by Hindu nationalists, it also says that it is more likely to occur in states governed by the Bharatiya Janata Party. I note that the ruling party in New Delhi is not the Bharatiya Janata Party71 and the objective evidence also states the majority of Sikhs do not experience societal discrimination or violence. [68] I do not find that Appellant has demonstrated that the proposed IFA would be objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh in his particular circumstances, or that the conditions in the proposed IFA are such that they would endanger his life or safety. [69] I agree with the RPD that it would not be objectively unreasonable in all the circumstances for the Appellant to relocate to New Delhi. CONCLUSION [70] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugees nor a person in need of protection. (signed) "Susan Brown" Susan Brown May 31, 2022 Date 1 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 15-26, Exhibit 2. 2 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 214, Exhibit 5, BOC narrative amendment. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 4 Ibid., and Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 5 P-2, Appellant's Record, pages 2-4. 6 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 5. 7 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 6. 8 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257 (RAD Rules), Rules (3)(e) and 3(g)(iii). 9 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII). 10 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706. 11 Touileb Ousmer v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 222, para. 24 citing Rocha Pena v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 616 and Guzman Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 990. 12 Henao v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 84 (CanLII), para. 11. 13 Olusola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 799, paras. 8 and 9. 14 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, page 5, line 47. 15 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, pages 15-17. 16 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, pages 23 and 24. 17 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, pages 25-36. 18 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 5 and 6, RPD Reasons, paragraphs 13 and 14. 19 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, pages 15 and 16. 20 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 21 and 22, Exhibit 2, BOC narrative. 21 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, page 11. 22 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 9.9: ?Extrajudicial detention, including instances of torture by authorities; state response and recourse available to victims; documents issued to persons detained or interrogated by police (2016-April 2018). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 24 May 2018. IND106099.E. 23 Ibid., tab 9.2: ?Summonses, arrest warrants, and related police documents, including appearance, security features, issuance procedures, and samples (2017-June 2020). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 15 June 2020. IND200261.E. 24 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 215 and 216, Exhibit 5. 25 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 216, Exhibit 5. 26 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 47, Applicant's Observations, paragraph 15. 27 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 47, Applicant's Observations, paragraph 53. 28 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 3.16: The Aadhaar card, including requirements and procedures to obtain; purpose and uses of the card; relationship with tenant verification and criminal tracking systems; whether authorities use Aadhaar registration to track individuals across the .... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 25 May 2021. IND200627.E. 29 Ibid., tab 3.16, page 10. 30 Ibid., tab 10.6: ?Surveillance by state authorities; communication between police offices across the country, including use of the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS); categories of persons that may be included in police databases... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 25 June 2018. IND106120.E. 31 Ibid., tab 10.6, pages 7-8. 32 Ibid., tab 10.13: ?Police databases and criminal tracking, particularly the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS); relationship with the Aadhaar and tenant verification systems; capacity to track persons through these systems (2019-May 2021). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 26 May 2021. IND200626.E. 33 Ibid., tab 10.13, pages 2-3. 34 Ibid., tab 14.8: ?Requirements and procedures for tenant registration (or tenant verification), including implementation, particularly in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Bengaluru (2016-May 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 14 May 2019. IND106289.E., pages 1-2, 4-5. 35 Ibid., tab 10.6, pages 9, 12-13. 36Ibid., tab 1.5: ?DFAT Country Information Report: India. Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 10 December 2020, page 65, section 5.39. 37 Ibid., tab 10.13, pages 1-2. 38 Ibid., tab 10.13. 39 Ibid, tab 14.8. 40 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 54, Applicant's Observations, paragraph 32. 41 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 14.8. 42 Ibid., tab 14.8, page 3. 43 Ibid., tab 10.6. 44 Ibid., tab 10.6. 45 Ibid., tab 10.6. 46 P-2, Appellant's Record, page 54, Applicant's Observations, paragraph 33. 47 RPD-1, RPD Record, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 10.6. 48 Ibid., tab 14.10: ?Country Policy and Information Note. India: Internal Relocation. Version 1.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. January 2019, section 2.3.10, page 7. 49 Ibid., tab 10.2: ?Communication between police offices across the country, including the use of POLNET; whether police across India can locate an individual, particularly as a result of registration requirements for employment, housing and education, security checks .... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 10 May 2016. IND105494.E. 50 Ibid., tab 10.6, page 14. 51 Ibid., tab 10.6. 52 Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 510 (CanLII) at para. 3, Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 807 (CanLII), Mukhal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 868 (CanLII). 53 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package for India, 30 June 2021, tab 10.1: ?"Bound by Brotherhood": India's Failure to End Killings in Police Custody. Human Rights Watch. Jayshree Bajirao. 19 December 2016. pages 62-105, section III. 54 Ibid., tabs 9.6: ?Justice Under Trial: A Study of Pre-Trial Detention in India. Amnesty International. 2017, 9.8: Transparency of Information about Arrests and Detentions. Implementation of Section 41C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: A Scoping Study of Compliance across 23 States and the UT of Delhi. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. 22 June 2016, and 9.9: ?Extrajudicial detention, including instances of torture by authorities; state response and recourse available to victims; documents issued to persons detained or interrogated by police (2016-April 2018). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 24 May 2018. IND106099.E. 55 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 164, para. 15, citing Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589. 56 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 164, paras. 16 and 17. 57 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 31 and 32, Exhibit 1, Schedule A. 58 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, page 17. 59 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, pages 16 and 17. 60 RPD-1, RPD Record, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 12.8: Situation of Sikhs outside the state of Punjab, including treatment by authorities and society; ability of Sikhs to relocate within India; treatment of Khalistan supporters or perceived supporters outside of Punjab (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 16 December 2019. IND106294.E. 61 Ibid., tab 1.5. 62 Ibid., tab 1.9: ?Socio-economic profile of Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Ludhiana, Mumbai, including population, demographics and economy; tenant registration requirements (2016-April 2018). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 25 May 2018. IND106101.E. 63 RAD-1, Transcript of RPD hearing on January 5, 2022, page 21. 64 RPD-1, RPD Record, National Documentation Package, India, 30 June 2021, tab 12.8. 65 Ibid., tab 12.8 66 Ibid., tab 12.8. 67 Ibid., tab 12.14: ?Country Policy and Information Note. India: Religious minorities. Version 2.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. May 2018. 68 Ibid., tab 12.14. 69 Ibid., tab 14.10, sections 2.3.4 and 5.1.1. 70 Ibid., tab 1.9. 71 Ibid., tab 1.10: ?India: Status of political parties in different states (as of March 2020). Maps of India. 7 June 2021. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC2-04137 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français