TB8-17483

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-17483 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 11, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Christopher Marcinkiewicz Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Lina Anani Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] The Appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX, appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated May 31, 2018, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute a finding that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination.1 DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), I grant the appeal and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant fears returning to Somalia for numerous reasons. First, he believes the family of his wife will attempt to harm or kill him for marrying her in secret as she is of the higher Habargadeer clan and he is from the lower Madiban clan. Secondly, he believes he is at risk from Al-Shebaab who have already killed his father and brothers, resulting in the rest of the family to flee to Kenya. Thirdly, he claims he will be harmed by Al-Shabaab if returned to Somalia as he has now been to a western and Christian country and will be suspected of being a spy who is bringing western religion and customs to Somalia. ROLE OF RAD [4] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.2 Where I determine that the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of the Appellant's oral evidence, I may defer to the RPD findings. Having listened to the audio recording of the RPD hearing and reviewing the evidence, I find that the RPD did not benefit from any meaningful advantage in assessing the Appellant's evidence in this case. PROCEDURAL HISTORY [5] The Appellant's claim before the RPD was heard February 23, 2018 and May 1, 2018. At the May 1st sitting, the Appellant's counsel at the RPD sought an adjournment to have the Appellant undergo a psychological assessment as counsel was concerned about his confused testimony at the initial sitting, explaining efforts to date to get an appointment were unsuccessful. The RPD refused the request and the Appellant's examination continued. The decision to reject the claim was rendered May 31, 2018. [6] The Appellant's appeal was received July 30, 2018. Within the Appellant's memorandum, he indicates that he "will tender as new evidence a psychological report."3 The Appellant explains that the report "will not be ready in time for the appeal deadline. However, it will be submitted after the appeal has been filed".4 It was argued this expert assessment will be submitted as new evidence for the purposes of this appeal. [7] When the file was assigned in April 2020, the appeal record still did not contain a psychological report, which was of concern as it had been well over a year and a half since the appeal was filed. Out of an abundance of caution and appreciating both the potentially serious implications the report may have on the Appellant's case and the global Covid-19 pandemic occurring, counsel for the Appellant was contacted to inquire if the psychological report had been submitted or could be resubmitted, to ensure it was not somehow missed. On July 9, 2020, the psychological report was received, accompanied by new evidence pertaining to the Covid-19 pandemic in Somalia and further submissions.5 RULE 29 AND NEW EVIDENCE [8] In deciding whether to allow late evidence and submissions after the perfection of the appeal, I am required to consider as per RAD Rule 29 any relevant factors, including the relevance and probative value of the document, any new evidence it brings to the appeal, and whether the Appellant could have provided the document with the appeal record with a reasonable effort. [9] In order to admit new evidence pursuant to s. 110(4) of IRPA, I must be satisfied that the new evidence arose after the RPD decision, or that it was either not reasonably available or the Appellant could not have been reasonably expected in the circumstances to present the evidence at the time of the RPD decision.6 If the new evidence passes this initial step, I am then required to consider the factors set out in Raza7 and adopted in Singh8. These factors include the credibility, relevance, and newness of the evidence. Psychological Report [10] Having reviewed the psychological report, I first note that the report is dated May 12, 2020, and is based on an assessment that occurred the day prior.9 Counsel for the Appellant explains the difficulty in arranging for the Appellant to undergo a psychological assessment, with appointments set for September and October 2018 being missed by the Appellant due to the state of his mental health, including forgetting the date and apparently being fearful of leaving his home.10 Counsel also explains the challenges of both finding appointments with mental health professional and rescheduling them when the Appellant failed to appear. With this context in mind, I find that the Appellant could not have provided the psychological report within the appeal record filed in late July 2018 with reasonable effort as his first appointment was not even scheduled until September 2018. Further, I find the psychological report to be probative and relevant as it pertains to the Appellant's mental health and ability to remember and concentrate, factors that were relevant to his evidence before the RPD. [11] As a result, I find the psychological report satisfies the requirements of RAD Rule 29. [12] In terms of the new evidence test under s. 110(4), given the report is dated May 2020, it clearly arose after the RPD decision in May 2018 and satisfies the initial step in the new evidence analysis. In terms of the other factors, I find that the evidence is from a credible source, a clinical psychologist registered in the province of Ontario with significant experience of almost four decades of practice. I further find the report is relevant, as discussed above, to the issue on appeal, that being the Appellant's mental health and its inter-relation with the negative credibility findings made based to a large degree on his recollection of prior events and his presentation of testimony before the RPD. Finally, this evidence is "new" in the sense that it attempts to establish a fact that was a raised as a concern by the Appellant related to his memory and rightfully canvassed by the RPD, but in my view, ultimately left unresolved due to the RPD's refusal to grant an adjournment for such a report to be obtained. [13] For these reasons, I admit the psychological report as new evidence. Covid-19 Evidence and Submissions [14] On June 15, 2020, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) provided Counsel with a notice related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This notice advised Counsel that they had 30 days from the date that the notice was received to submit any document or written submission in support of the appeal. Additionally, counsel was also advised that the other requirements of Rule 29 and 110(4) continue to apply. [15] Counsel made no specific submissions regarding Rule 29, although some factors are self evident. The pandemic occurred in 2020, long after the perfection of the appeal in July 2018. Further, the documentary evidence speaks to the broader situation in Somalia and its efforts to address the pandemic, so in this sense it is new evidence of country conditions that obviously was not before the RPD. [16] However, I fail to see the relevance or probative value of this evidence in respect to the Appellant's situation. The articles provided speak to the public health challenges in Somalia in terms of dealing with the virus, the likely under-reporting of infections, the complexity of the situation where Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations operate within the country and may attempt to disrupt aid from reaching its intended destinations, and the disproportionate impact the virus has on people of African descent.11 [17] The pandemic is a world-wide problem, with each country dealing with their own set of challenges. Counsel submissions are almost entirely speculative and general in nature. In terms of what would happen to the Appellant in Somalia, it is argued, for example, that stay at home orders would prevent him from finding his clan and therefore obtaining assistance and accommodations.12 Yet, there is no evidence of stay at home orders being instituted in Somalia. Counsel refers to the instability and poverty that undoubtably impacts the health measures and responses in place, but points to no evidence that the Appellant would somehow be discriminated against or prevented from obtaining whatever level of care is available to the general public. Finally, counsel points to Al-Shabaab's history of destroying aid supply intended for Somalia. While this is true and concerning, there is no evidence of this occurring at this time or how it would personally affect the Appellant. [18] For these reasons, I find the new evidence regarding Covid-19 is not relevant nor probative in deciding the merits of this appeal, especially considering the determinative issues were related to his credibility and identity. Further, as discussed below, the appeal is granted based on what I find to be a procedural error that undermined the evidence resulting in the refusal of the claim. PROCEEDING WITHOUT AN ORAL HEARING [19] The Appellant requested an oral hearing be held.13 Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of IRPA, the RAD may hold a hearing if there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3), which includes new evidence under 110(4), and raises serious issues with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and if accepted would justify allowing or rejecting the claim. Otherwise, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, relying on the RPD record. [20] In this case, while I accepted new evidence, I find that it does not raise any serious credibility issues with respect to the Appellant as the report was prepared by a registered psychologist and not by the Appellant. Further, I find that even as I accept the report, for the reasons contained in this decision, the new evidence is incapable of remedying the issues arising in the Appellant's evidence and therefore would not lead to the claim being allowed or rejected. Therefore, no oral hearing is required and will not be held. ANALYSIS [21] The RPD rejected the Appellant's claim for refugee protection based on credibility and identity not being established. Specifically, based on what is described as the Appellant's inconsistent and confusing testimony related to where he lived in Somalia, when he received home schooling, his relationship and marriage to his wife, and his delay in claiming refugee protection in Canada, the RPD found his evidence was not credible or trustworthy and he failed to establish his allegations on a balance of probabilities. Furthermore, the RPD also found the Appellant had failed to establish his identity, on a balance of probabilities. [22] The Appellant argues that the RPD made numerous critical errors. First and foremost, it is argued the RPD erred from a procedural standpoint by refusing a request for an adjournment at the second sitting for the Appellant to receive a psychological assessment. Additionally, the Appellant alleges the RPD erred in its credibility findings in light of the Appellant's evidence of having memory problems and psychological issues and failed to properly assess other pieces of evidence, including documentary evidence from a Somalian organization in Canada and his mother's affidavit, and the evidence from the identity witness. [23] For the reasons that follow, I agree with the Appellant that the RPD failed to observe natural justice and procedural fairness principles when it refused to grant the Appellant a postponement for a psychological assessment. This prevented him from obtaining medical evidence of the issues he explained he had with his memory and recollection of events, findings that were eventually used to impugn his credibility and formed the basis for rejecting his claim. Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice [24] Proceedings before the RPD require decision makers to adhere to procedural fairness principles at all stages. Subsection 162(2) of the IRPA requires the RPD to proceed "as informally and quickly as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit".14 A failure to observe a principal of fairness and natural justice may result in a decision being invalidated and requiring a new hearing. [25] The duty of fairness can be flexible; however, one must consider the context and implication of the decision on the affected party. In the refugee determination context, procedural fairness is to be exercised at a high standard given the importance of the decision being made, that being the granting or rejecting of Convention refugee or protected person status.15 Generally, procedural fairness concerns one's right to know what they must prove and have a meaningful opportunity to present one's case. [26] In the present case, the RPD considered the oral application by the Appellant's RPD counsel at the second and final sitting of his refugee claim. In its decision, the RPD notes that while the Appellant's testimony at the first sitting was "inconsistent and confusing, no mention was made as to the Claimant suffering from mental illness or other related health concerns".16 The RPD then explains it considered the Appellant's capacity to appreciate the nature of the proceeding, that no documentary evidence was provided regarding efforts to schedule a psychological assessment or any efforts were unsuccessful, or that an assessment could not have been completed between the first and second sittings which occurred about10 weeks apart. Finally, the RPD noted that the Appellant had sufficient time to bring such an application prior to the second sitting and did not and that everyone had appeared for the hearing on that day. The request was denied. [27] The Appellant admits his testimony at the first sitting of his RPD hearing was confused, incoherent, and at times contradictory in terms of numerous aspects of his claim. This continued during the second sitting after counsel's request for an adjournment was denied. He argues that his counsel provided the RPD with details of what had occurred between the first and second hearings, most notably a referral was made to the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture (CCVT) but they required another 1-2 months for the assessment and report to be completed. Further, it is argued that counsel explained why the assessment did not occur between the first and second sitting, that being the Appellant was on a wait list, and the RPD erred by finding no explanation was provided for why the assessment did not occur in the meantime and this is a factual error. Finally, the Appellant argues that the factors as outline by the Federal Court of Appeal in Siloch17 favoured the granting of the adjournment and the RPD applied the wrong test when considering if the Appellant understood the nature of the proceedings as that is not what was being sought, but rather the adjournment. [28] Having independently reviewed the record, I agree that the RPD erred by refusing to grant the adjournment. By doing so it prevented the Appellant from an opportunity to obtain evidence that may have assisted him in explaining his problems with memory and concentration, which may have impacted the challenges he had in providing testimony. Furthermore, it may have also assisted the RPD in its assessment and decision, which was almost entirely based on the Appellant's poor testimony and recollection of dates and events that negatively impacted his credibility and led to the rejection of the claim. [29] Before moving on, I do want to say that the RPD was in an unenviable position, tasked with the difficult job of trying to determine whether an admittedly poor witness provided evidence that was not credible because he was not being honest and forthright, or whether there were other factors related to his mental health which in turn could have impacted his credibility, or at least the perception of whether he was being truthful before the RPD. In my respectful view, when dealing with complex and often unknown or undiagnosed mental health issues, a decision-maker ought to err on the side of caution and decide within a proper context and with flexibility in terms of the process, even if that means sacrificing expediency and efficiency. Factual Error in Adjournment Consideration [30] To begin, I agree with the Appellant that in reaching the decision to refuse the adjournment request, the RPD made a factual error. Specifically, in its reasons the RPD states that no documentary evidence was presented in respect to the efforts made to schedule a psychological assessment between the first and second sittings or that a psychological assessment could not have been completed between the sittings. [31] While the RPD was technically correct that no documentary evidence was presented regarding the efforts undertaken to obtain a psychological assessment between the sittings, counsel for the Appellant explained in his oral application the efforts undertaken to have a psychological assessment completed. Specifically, that the Appellant had been referred to the CCVT and was on their wait list which typically is around 4 months for an appointment, but he was also informed that if there was a cancellation he would be seen earlier, which did not occur.18 [32] In my view, this was a reasonable explanation for why the assessment did not take place between the sittings and while it was not documentary evidence, it was an officer of the court providing information and context to the RPD in order to assist in their decision making in respect to the adjournment request. While I acknowledge that the Appellant had 10 weeks to complete the assessment, I am also mindful that unfortunately mental health services and assessments often take a considerable amount of time to complete than what would be ideal. The RPD's decision, while not explicitly discounting counsel's information, appears to question whether any steps were actually taken simply because there was no documentary evidence to support it. By doing so, the RPD failed to properly assess the explanation for why the assessment was not completed between hearing, a factor that appears to have contributed to its decision to refuse the request for an adjournment. Assessment of the Appellant's Appreciation of the Nature of the Hearing [33] The RPD considered whether the Appellant understood the nature of the proceedings, ultimately concluding, based on the Appellant's answers, that he did. As a result, the RPD did not find it necessary to appoint a designated representative for the Appellant as per s. 167(2) of IRPA. [34] The Appellant argues that the RPD applied the wrong test as counsel for the Appellant was not asking for such an appointment but rather for an adjournment. [35] I find that the RPD did not err by considering whether the Appellant required a designated representative. In my view, where a decision-maker becomes aware of a potential mental health concern that may impact a claimant's ability to appreciate or understand the nature of the proceedings, there is a duty on the decision maker to consider whether the appointment of a designated representative, that is, someone to act in the Appellant's best interests, is appropriate. In this case, the RPD did precisely this and concluded that the Appellant did not require a designated representative as he did appreciate the nature of the proceedings. I agree with the RPD. The Appellant understood why he was there and appreciated what the hearing was about. Wrong Test Applied for Adjournment Consideration [36] The Appellant argues that the RPD wrongly applied the test for a designated representative when the Appellant was seeking an adjournment. It is argued the appropriate test for the granting of an adjournment is what is described in Siloch and if the RPD considered these factors, the adjournment ought to have been granted. [37] As mentioned above, I agree with the RPD's approach to consider the designation of a representative for the Appellant. Having said that, I also agree with the Appellant that the RPD failed to consider the factors outlined in Siloch in deciding the adjournment request. In other words, the RPD's considerations for the adjournment request ought not have ended with the designated representative assessment. In my view, there may be occasions where the facts of the case warrant an adjournment for a psychological assessment even when the person seemingly understands and appreciates the nature of the proceedings. With respect, this is often a "grey area" with no simple and straight-forward answers but must be decided in context. [38] With that in mind, I have considered the Siloch factors and note they are not exhaustive.19 However, some of the factors that may be applicable to the present case include: number of previous adjournments granted including on a peremptory basis, length of time for the adjournment being sought, effect on the immigration system, would the adjournment needlessly delay, impede or paralyse the conduct of the inquiry, the fault or blame to be placed on the applicant for not being ready, and any other relevant factors.20 [39] Having considered the circumstances of this case, I find most factors favour the granting of the adjournment. Specifically, this was a first request for adjournment and no prior requests were made or granted. While counsel did not give an exact timeframe, the oral application indicated that the appointment would be in June,21 so the adjournment would have been approximately 2 months. I do not see this as an excessive amount of time. While it would cause a delay to the immigration system, it would not be a lengthy delay, nor would it be so "needlessly" as it was for a serious matter involving the assessment of the Appellant's mental health. Further, I do not see any blame that could be placed on the Appellant, as efforts were made to have the assessment completed between hearings but without success. [40] Finally, the other factor that is significant is that the request was due to a concern about the mental well-being of the Appellant, something that arose during and after the first sitting of his hearing. In my view, this deserved a cautious approach given the sensitive nature of the issue and counsel's belief the Appellant was not in the right state of mind to continue with an examination of his claim without obtaining medical evidence of what may be underlying factors impacting his testimony. [41] In summary, I find that the factors outlined favoured a granting of an adjournment as it was the first request, would not have been excessively long or needlessly delayed the process, and it was for an important reason, that being to access the Appellant's mental health and functioning. Psychological Report and Evidence of Difficulties with Memory and Concentration [42] The new evidence in the form of the psychological report sheds insight on the state of the Appellant's mental health. This report and its fruition are not without obvious concerns. It is based on an evaluation some two years after the RPD hearing. This does not necessarily assist in establishing the Appellant's state of mind at the RPD two years prior. As opposed to the anticipated June appointment that was discussed before the RPD, the actual assessment only took place after two previous attempts in September and October 2018 proved unsuccessful due to the Appellant's failure to appear for the schedule assessments. The explanations provided by the Appellant were that he forgot about the first appointment and he did not leave his home out of fear of deportation and as a result failed to attend the second appointment.22 Additionally, the source of the information, that is the Appellant, is the same source that the RPD found not to be credible. In these ways, the report must be considered with some degree of caution. [43] Having said that, in my view, it does provide insight into how the Appellant reports feeling at the time of the RPD hearings and the current diagnosis of the psychologist. Specifically, the report indicates that the Appellant "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX".23 He "experiences XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX...XXXX XXXX...[and] at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX He has become distracted and forgetful".24 The Appellant reported the same experiences while before the RPD. He is diagnosed as presenting "XXXX XXXX XXXX" and having "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.25 Furthermore, there is no evidence that he was exaggerating or embellishing his symptoms. In fact, the psychologist was of the view that he may have been under-reporting them. [44] Finally, the details of the events after he received his negative decision and missing his appointments also indicate someone who had some mental health struggles, missing appointments that could only assist him due to forgetfulness and fear and only being eventually assessed by the psychologist through video in 2020. All that to say, in my view, this is credible evidence pointing to some challenges the Appellant has with his mental health that could have impacted his testimony before the RPD. [45] A review of the Appellant's testimony before the RPD at the first sitting in February 2018 reveals confusion and lack of coherence, especially when it came to recalling dates and events, or trying to explain why there were inconsistencies. For example, his testimony regarding when his life was in danger, what passport he used to arrive in Canada, his age and years of being home schooled, and where he lived in Somalia, was confusing and internally inconsistent. [46] More importantly, however, there are numerous instances where the Appellant explains he does not understand or is confused, in particular when asked by his counsel if he understood what was happening, he responded "no, I'm really confused" and when asked about what, he replies "I'm confused about the dates because I don't remember them very well".26 When reminded by the RPD that the Appellant previously confirmed the content of his BOC narrative were true, complete, and correct, the Appellant confirmed that indeed he confirmed, "but I'm the one who could not remember the dates you asked me, and I should have told you that I don't remember those things".27 [47] In my view, the Appellant explicitly let it be known that he had problems with memory and recalling dates. His difficulty with testimony is also exhibited by the numerous cautions from the RPD during the first sitting about how his credibility would be negatively impacted by his answers and for him to take the time to listen carefully to the question and think about his answers before answering. For these reasons, I disagree with the RPD's finding that there was no mention of the Appellant "suffering from mental illness or other related health concerns".28 While perhaps the Appellant's evidence may not clearly point to him suffering from mental illness, in my mind he did clearly point to a health related issue, that being confusion and problems with his memory, factors that may impact the assessment of one's credibility. [48] Briefly, the second sitting was a similar experience, with the Appellant unable to provide focused and coherent testimony at time, as outlined in the Appellant's memorandum,29 cautions from the RPD about the impact this could have on his credibility, and the Appellant explaining he has problems with memory recall and had such problems since he was young.30 [49] Based on the above, I find on a balance of probabilities, there is credible and trustworthy medical evidence of the Appellant's mental health challenges and based on this evidence, along with a review of his evidence before the RPD, it is reasonable to conclude that he may have been suffering from the same problems before the RPD. The problem arises from the RPD not having the documentary medical evidence available because it refused the Appellant's request for an adjournment and prevented him with the opportunity to obtain such evidence. Credibility Findings Permeate Every Aspect of the Appellant's Claim [50] The RPD's negative credibility findings extent not only to central aspects of the Appellant's claimed fear, but also to the issue of his identity. For example, the RPD relied on the Appellant's "confusing and inconsistent" evidence relating to what passport he used and his travel route to come to Canada to impugn his credibility in terms of establishing his identity.31 [51] In my view, the evidence provided by the Appellant and utilized as the basis for refusing his claim is unreliable as it was considered without a fulsome consideration of the Appellant's challenges with memory, concentration, and general mental well being. Unfortunately, the RPD's refusal to grant an adjournment in order for an assessment to be carried out results in the evidence being tainted and as such, I am unable to make any factual findings with the degree of probability required regarding the Appellant's identity or the merits of his claim. [52] As a result, I have no option but to return the matter to a different RPD member for redetermination, with instructions to accommodate the Appellant as the decision maker sees fit but with the understanding of his prior challenges with memory and recall. CONCLUSION [53] The RAD refers the matter of XXXX XXXX XXXX back to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination, pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of the IRPA. (signed) "Christopher Marcinkiewicz" Christopher Marcinkiewicz September 11, 2020 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at p. 40, paras. 57-58. 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at p. 28, para. 8. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Written Statement, at p. 23, para. 4. 5 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, pp. 1-31. 6 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, para. 110(4). 7 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 8 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 9 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, p. 16. 10 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, pp. 3-4. 11 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, pp. 22-31. 12 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Written Statement, p. 24, para. 6. 14 IRPA, Section 162(2) 15 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Reasons for Decision, p. 4, para. 3 17 Siloch, H. v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993, 151 N.R. 76 (FCA) 18 RPD Hearing, May 2, 2018, Recording at [00:30 - 04:00] 19 Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1038, at p. 4, para. 6, citing Montana v. Canada (National Revenue), 2017 FCA 194, at para. 8. 20 Ibid., pp. 3-4, para. 5 21 RPD Hearing, May 2, 2018, Recording at [00:30 - 02:00] 22 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, pp. 8-9. 23 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, p. 18. 24 Ibid., p. 18. 25 Ibid., p. 18. 26 RPD Hearing, February 23, 2018, Recording at [01:09:00 - 01:11:00] 27 Ibid., Recording at [01:10:00-01:11:00] 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Reasons for Decision, p. 4, para. 3 29 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence and Further Submissions, p. 5. 30 RPD Hearing, May 2, 2018, Recording at [1:17:00 - 1:22:00] 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Reasons for Decision, p. 13, paras. 40-48. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-13319 2 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français