TB8-15002

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-15002 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision December 22, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Robert Bebbington Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Annabel Busbridge Barrister and Solicitor Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), citizen of Pakistan, appealed a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated January 26, 2018, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. [2] He asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and substitute its own decision that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection or, in the alternative, refer his claim back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [3] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Background [4] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he was told by the local Imam not to enquire about suspicious activities at the mosque. The Appellant persisted and he faced problems at the hands of the Imam and his thugs. The Appellant eventually gave information to the police resulting in the arrest of Taliban members. The Imam disappeared. The Taliban vowed to kill the Appellant. After a period in hiding, he left Pakistan with the Taliban still searching for him. The Appellant's hearing for refugee protection was held on January 26, 2019. In an oral decision on the same day, the RPD rejected the Appellant's claim, finding that the Appellant had a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Pakistan. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of the IFA and in drawing its credibility findings associated with the IFA. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL Uncontested Findings [5] The RPD found: * While the Taliban did come to look for him after he left his home, he was hiding with a friend in a nearby location (XXXX km distant), known to everyone and this was a logical place for him to go. This was not evidence that the agent of persecution had an all-knowing monitoring network and the ability to locate him anywhere in Pakistan. * The Appellant does not have a visible public profile that would bring him to the attention of the agents of persecution in the IFA location. [6] The RAD has reviewed the findings of the RPD and finds no perceptible error with these findings. [7] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its application of the legal principles in relation to the first prong of the IFA test. And that it continues to misapply the test through-out its decision. [8] The RAD finds that the Appellant has a reasonable IFA in Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad in Pakistan. The Appellant submits that the RPD's suggestion that there is a viable IFA is based on a disregard for the documentary evidence provided in the National Documentation Package (NDP) and the Appellant's submissions. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [9] In assessing an IFA, the RAD must apply a two-pronged test cited in Rasaratnam:1 [1] ...the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and/or the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the IFA. [2] Moreover, conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for the claimant to seek refuge there. [10] Both prongs must be satisfied to find that the Appellant has an IFA. The burden of proof rests with the Appellant to show that he does not have an IFA. The finding of an IFA must be based on a distinct evaluation of a region for that purpose taking into account the Appellant's identity. An IFA must be a realistic and attainable option. The Appellant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to undergo undue hardship in traveling there or staying there.2 First Prong The Documentary Evidence [11] The RAD has considered if the Appellant will face risk in Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad due to his profile as an individual being sought by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the agent of persecution identified by the Appellant. [12] Country documentation from the United Kingdom Home Office states: The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided an assessment, published November 2013, with regard to internal relocation in Pakistan, stating: 'Because of Pakistan's size and diversity, internal relocation offers a degree of anonymity and the opportunity for victims to seek refuge from discrimination or violence. In most cases, there are options available for members of most ethnic and religious minorities to be able to relocate to areas of relative safety elsewhere in Pakistan. In particular, many large urban centres are home to mixed ethnic and religious communities and offer greater opportunities for employment, access to services and a greater degree of state protection than other areas. In practice, internal relocation is most successful when these conditions exist, but is limited mostly by a lack of financial resources and in some cases due to debts owed to landowners or money lenders.'3 [footnotes omitted] [13] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan states: Given the wide geographic reach of some armed militant groups, a viable IFA will generally not be available to individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups. The operational capacity of certain militant groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, extends far beyond FATA or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as evidenced by high-profile attacks, such as suicide bombings, countrywide, particularly in urban centres. Furthermore, some non-State agents of persecution, such as local powerbrokers, organized criminal elements, as well as armed militant groups, reportedly have links to or are closely associated with influential actors in the local and central administration, law enforcement and/or judiciary. As a result, they often operate with impunity and their reach may extend beyond the area(s) under their immediate control.4 [footnotes omitted] [14] In assessing this documentation, the RAD finds that it is necessary to consider the nature of the group targeting the Appellant in respect of the availability of an IFA in Pakistan. The RAD has considered the statements in the UNHCR document, which clearly states that certain militant groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, have a reach beyond their physical point of origin. The RAD has considered that this document does not specifically reference the TTP. [15] The RAD notes that the documentary evidence indicates that the TTP in Pakistan does not operate as a unified, integrated organization with a solitary hierarchical structure. This information comes from a July 2014 Response to Information Request prepared by the IRB research directorate, which describes the TTP as follows: Sources describe Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) [also known as Tehrik-e Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan] as "an alliance of militant groups" (US 2014); "a coalition" of militant and extremist groups; and "an umbrella organization" uniting militant groups. According to sources, TTP was formed when various militias coalesced in 2007. [...] According to sources, TTP is based in the tribal areas along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan....Sources indicate that members of the group originate from all seven tribal agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as many districts of the northwest province of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa. The New York Times specifies that TTP's headquarters is in North and South Waziristan. However, sources note that TTP has also expanded into other areas of the country. According to CNN, "they maintain loose factions spread out as far as Punjab province." [...] The Guardian describes TTP as "fractious" and "fracture-prone." CNN explains that "[a]s a result of its beginnings, Tehrik-i-Taliban are not a unified fighting force," adding that the militant groups which comprise TTP "control different regions within the tribal area and often have different agendas and political objectives. The factions don't always speak with one voice."5 [16] The RAD additionally notes, that the TTP is composed of up to 30 "loosely uniting groups."6 The RAD has further reviewed the most recent evidence from the current National Documentation Package (NDP) referenced by the Appellant in his submissions.7 The RAD finds the document does state, as the Appellant references, that the TTP has spread its network into all four provinces of Pakistan by establishing various chapters of the organization. Yet, the document carries on to indicate, as the RAD has previously stated, that the organization is highly fractured. It noted that a number of factions broke away from the organization over certain practices, which it considered to be immoral and "un-Islamic," such as extortion, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians.8 [17] The Appellant submits that the TTP has networks throughout the country, but provides little specific evidence to support those statements in his testimony or documentary submissions. The RAD finds in its review of the documentary evidence before it, that the fact that the TTP is composed of a number of loosely connected groups does not provide persuasive evidence that these groups have the ability to communicate or locate individuals with a profile similar to the Appellant. The RAD further notes that the additional documentation states that "their ability to deploy suicide bombers makes them a threat throughout Pakistan."9 The Appellant's own documentary evidence describes that the strength of the TPP has decreased in the previous year due to intervention against it by special government forces. The documents describe that attacks by the TTP have decreased by 68% and these attacks have predominantly targeted security forces and religious minorities, while assets with enhanced security measures - such as airports, government installations, and hotels - have not been subjected to any attacks since 2015. 10 Given the documentary evidence on the operation of the TTP, and having considered the additional evidence submitted by the Appellant, the RAD finds it does not indicate that a specific individual would be targeted, if they are not a high-profile person. The documents make reference to bombs being used for terrorism and the organization being capable of deploying suicide bombers, however, personal targeting in these attacks does not feature prominently. The Appellant's Profile [18] In his testimony or documentary evidence, the Appellant did not demonstrate that he held a profile that would cause him to be a person of interest, if he were to relocate to any of the proposed IFA locations. The RPD found that the Appellant does not have a visible public profile that would bring him to the attention of the agents of persecution in the IFA location. [19] The Appellant has described an incident where he had an ongoing disagreement with the XXXX of the local mosque. He and two friends reported a number of suspicious individuals around the mosque, who the police subsequently arrested and identified as members of the TTP. The Appellant noted that he began receiving threats from "unknown individuals", which caused him to seek shelter at the home of a friend. As discussed previously, the RPD found that the Appellant's problems with these "unknown individuals" seeking him at his home and that of his friend, were the actions of local individuals associated with the XXXX. [20] The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that the Appellant's problems were limited and local. Mosques as a Focal Point of Terrorism [21] The Appellant argues that the basic act of attending or being a member of a Mosque in the community in which an individual such as the Appellant lives places him at risk of being identified by the TTP. He submits that all Mosques are recruiting bases for the TTP. The Appellant argued the simple act of meeting people would cause a person in the mosque that he might attend and who is part of that network to communicate with people from the mosque that he previously attended. In this way, people he fears would become apprised of the fact that he was in one of the proposed IFA cities. The RPD agreed that it was reasonable that he might speak to new people that he met, but it found there was little persuasive evidence that all mosques are recruiting bases for terrorists. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [22] The RAD has reviewed the documentary evidence referenced by the Appellant. The RAD finds the Appellant's submission that the Taliban can extend their reach of influence over most mosques in the country and that this is supported by the Board's documentary evidence, amounts to a selective interpretation of that evidence. The RAD notes that much of this evidence points to concerns in southern Punjab. In Southern Punjab - militant groups with local, regional and transnational links and an endless source of recruits, including through large madrasa and mosque networks. ... The state's unwillingness to clamp down on it in sectarian madrasas and mosques so as to counter hate speech and prevent dissemination of hate literature increases the potential for radicalization in the region. ... Though jihadists still are a fringe minority of southern Punjab's moderate society, exposure to radical ideological discourse in madrasas and mosques increases the potential for violence. ... Jihadist groups' promises of influence, prestige and financial reward are especially appealing to the disenfranchised in southern Punjab, who lack social or economic opportunities in its backward and largely rural economy.11 [23] The RAD's review of the evidence confirms that the problems described are occurring in a specific area and this does not support a conclusion that all Mosques in Pakistan have be infiltrated by terrorists, such those the Appellant fears. Despite a level of intolerance and extremism in some regions in Pakistan, the RAD notes the organization's (TTP's) repeated and increasingly indiscriminate terror attacks have sparked widespread outrage among many Pakistanis. By the onset of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, citizens were demanding justice against terror organizations. Many were willing to support any military measures necessary to protect their towns from the brutal violence of the TTP and other militant groups12. The RAD finds, as did the RPD, that there is insufficient persuasive evidence to displace the notion that the vast majority of Muslim Pakistanis are tolerant, do not share or agree with these extremist views and are not part of these networks. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument must fail. Housing Registration [24] The Appellant submits that he must register his residence, should he relocate to the one of the proposed IFA cities. He argues that the Taliban could corrupt an official in order to access the database and hence discover his location. The RPD confirmed that it was likely the Appellant's name would eventually be part of a database in a local area where he would be renting. The RPD found that it was unlikely that the local police (who maintain these registrations in many areas) in the IFA location would communicate the information to the police in Gujranwala where he used to live. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [25] The Appellant has further argued that the TTP would be able to influence the police and access his location. The RAD has reviewed the documentary evidence and finds that there is insufficient evidence to confirm that the Appellant would be located and face harm, if he attempted to rent a room or home to reside in one of the proposed IFA locations. The RAD notes the documentary evidence confirms that there are tenant registration systems in each of the provinces in Pakistan, but its implementation is not centralized. The evidence is not definitive as to whether there is one registration database per province, region or city, but it appears that there is no national database.13 The RAD further notes, "the police authorities do communicate with the police in different provinces to find persons of interest... However, this usually takes place in high profile cases".14 The evidence indicates that the local police who receive tenant registration information do not routinely verify the information being declared. They only do so when there is a match between a tenant profile and a wanted criminal or terrorist database, such as described in an article about the tenant registration being implemented in Islamabad.15 In the Punjab, the evidence states that tenant information is entered manually, "therefore it is highly unlikely to assist in tracking." 16The RAD finds that no pervasive evidence has been advanced to indicate that the Appellant is being sought by the police or any government agency and that he would not exist in any national crime register that may be accessible to the police. The RAD recalls that it has previously found his problems were limited to his home area of Gujranwala. Even if the RAD were to accept that the local actors who were seeking the Appellant could access this data, they would be unable to locate the Appellant outside of his home province. The RAD finds this argument must fail. [26] The RAD has determined the Appellant's agent of persecution's pursuit is limited and local. The RAD has reviewed the available documentary evidence, as well as the audio recording of the hearing. The RAD notes that in order to target the Appellant in Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad the agent of persecution, would be required to: 1) Learn the Appellant has returned to Pakistan; 2) Learn the Appellant has relocated to Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad; and, 3) Determine the whereabouts of the Appellant in Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad. [27] The RAD finds it reasonable to expect that, if an individual or organization was of sufficient strength and reach to be able to learn of a person's return to Pakistan or their presence in any city in Pakistan, there would be objective country condition evidence to support this. [28] The RAD has reviewed the submissions of the Appellant, the available documentary evidence, and finds that, as much as it accepts that the Appellant was targeted by a local criminal elements, there is not sufficient credible evidence to establish that they have geographic reach or the capability to learn of the Appellant's return to Pakistan upon arrival at a regular port of entry to the country, or trace the Appellant's movements within Pakistan. [29] The RAD finds, upon its review of the evidence, there is not a serious possibility that the Appellant would face persecution at the hands of members of the TTP in Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad. The Second Prong [30] The RAD notes that the Appellant has twelve years of education culminating in a post-secondary institution. The Appellant speaks Urdu and some English. The RAD notes the Appellant was questioned as to whether he would be able to relocate to any of the proposed IFA locations. His only response was that he would have problems from the Taliban. The RAD finds that the Appellant has not adduced any evidence to confirm that there are any circumstances or conditions which would make Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad an unreasonable IFA. [31] The RAD has reviewed the documentary evidence and notes there is a single article17 which is undated, describing a TTP suicide bomber who attacked a marketplace in Rawalpindi. The RAD finds this article indicates an attack that was described as generalized. It was carried out as a form of "revenge" for a military attack on the TTP and it was not targeting a specific individual. The RAD finds there was little persuasive evidence to confirm that any of the proposed IFA cities are unsafe for the Appellant. [32] The RAD further notes that the cities are all quite populous, offering a high degree of anonymity with approximately 2 million people in Rawalpindi, over 3 million people living in Faisalabad and 1.7 million people residing in Hyderabad. [33] The RAD does not find the Appellant's argument sufficient to justify his failure to attempt relocation within his home country. [34] As per Thirunavukkarasu,18 the test for reasonableness is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to move to another, less hostile part of the country before seeking status abroad. This requires an evaluation of the conditions in the IFA, as well as the Appellant or similarly situated persons. Thirunavukkarasu sets a very high threshold for what makes an IFA unreasonable in all the circumstances. The hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not the kind of undue hardship that renders an IFA unreasonable.19 Additionally, it is not enough for the Appellant to say that he or she does not like the weather there, or that he or she has no friends or relatives there, or that he or she may not be able to find suitable work. [35] The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that there are no serious social, economic or other barriers to the Appellant relocating to Rawalpindi, Faisalabad or Hyderabad. The RAD finds, after a full assessment of the evidence, that the Appellant would not suffer from undue hardship in relocating to any of the proposed IFA cities. [36] The RAD therefore, finds that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellant, for him to seek refuge there. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument that there is no viable IFA for him in Pakistan must fail. [37] The RAD finds that there is not a serious possibility of persecution for the Appellant, nor would he be subjected personally, on a balance of probabilities, to a risk to life, a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, should he return to Pakistan. Accordingly, the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, nor a person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [38] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). (signed) "Robert Bebbington" Robert Bebbington December 22, 2019 Date 1 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991. Reported: Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 2 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993. Reported: Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.), at 596-599. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Pakistan, 20 July 2017, Item 1.12, United Kingdom. Home Office (6 October 2014), at section 2.4.2. 4 Ibid, Item 1.8, HCR/EG/PAK/12/02, United Nations. High Commissioner for Refugees (14 May 2012), at p. 42. 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Pakistan, 20 July 2017, Item 7.8, PAK.104907.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (3 July 2014), at sections 1 and 2. 6 Ibid., at section 2. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, National Documentation Package, Pakistan, 29 March 2019, tab 7.7: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Stanford University. Mapping Militant Organizations. 6 August 2017. 8 Ibid. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Pakistan, 20 July 2017, Item 1.6, United Kingdom. Home Office (8 May 2014); Item 1.12, United Kingdom. Home Office (6 October 2014); Item 2.2, European Asylum Support Office (August 2015); and Item 7.8, PAK104907.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (3 July 2014). 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 7, pp.54-56. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Pakistan, 20 July 2017, tab 7.6: Pakistan's Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab. Asia Report N°279. International Crisis Group. 30 May 2016. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, National Documentation Package, Pakistan, 29 March 2019, tab 7.7: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Stanford University. Mapping Militant Organizations. 6 August 2017. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, National Documentation Package, Pakistan, 23 January 2018, tab 3.18: Tenant registration systems, including implementation; whether authorities share information on tenant registration (2015-December 2017). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 23 January 2018. PAK106026.E. 14 Ibid. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 5, pp.42-43. 16 Ibid., Exhibit 8, pp.74-75. 17 Ibid., Exhibit 4, pp.253-255. 18 Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993. Reported: Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). 19 M.C.I. v. Ranganathan, Rohini (F.C.A., no. A-348-99), Létourneau, Sexton, Malone, December 21, 2000. Reported: Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 164 (C.A.). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-15002 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 14 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français