MB9-27897

RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB9-27897 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ?Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision December 21, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Normand Leduc Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Oscar Fernando Rodas Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Mexico, is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his refugee protection claim. [2] For the reasons below, the appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The appellant worked as a XXXX XXXX in the Mexican state of Michoacan. [4] He alleges that in XXXX 2017 he received threats from criminals ordering him to give them XXXX information about the XXXX XXXX clients. [5] The appellant quit his job and stayed in the city of Morelia until he left Mexico on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, for Canada, where he claimed refugee protection. [6] Following a hearing held on September 25, 2019, the RPD rejected his refugee protection claim on the grounds that the appellant had an internal flight alternative (IFA) in the states of Campeche and Yucatan. [7] Before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), the appellant submits that the RPD erred in its IFA assessment for reasons that will be set out in detail below under the Analysis heading, if required. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [8] The role of the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard of review after carrying out its own analysis of the record in order to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. ANALYSIS [9] In his memorandum, the appellant first submits that the RPD erred in concluding that the appellant's fear has no nexus to one of the five grounds in the definition of a Convention refugee, [translation] "but did not draw any conclusion about whether the claim could have a nexus to paragraph 97(1)(b) of the IRPA." [10] I cannot agree with that statement. [11] In its reasons, it is clear that the RPD analyzed the claim under subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), and it determined that the appellant is not a Convention refugee (section 96) or a person in need of protection (section 97), by reason of the IFA. [12] In any event, the decision regarding the IFA applies to the claim under both section 96 and section 97 of the IRPA. [13] The issue to be determined in this case is therefore whether the RPD erred in its conclusion that the appellant has an IFA in Mexico. [14] Having analyzed the evidence presented, the RPD's reasons and the appellant's submissions, I am of the opinion that the answer to this question is no, for the following reasons. [15] The criteria to apply in assessing an IFA were defined by the Federal Court of Appeal in Rasaratnam1 and Thirunavukkarasu.2 From these cases it is clear that the test to be applied in determining whether an IFA exists is two-pronged: "i. ... the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists." ii. Moreover, conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there." [16] Both prongs must be satisfied to conclude that there is an IFA. [17] In this case, considering the first prong of the IFA assessment, the RPD considered that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution or face a risk under section 97 of the IRPA in the states of Yucatan and Campeche because: * The appellant stopped receiving threats after XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017; * He no longer works at the XXXX; * His wife and children, who live in Morelia, in the state of Michoacan, have not had any problems with the criminals who threatened the appellant. [18] According to the RPD, this evidence establishes that the criminals who threatened the appellant have no interest in locating him in the states proposed as IFAs. Also, the appellant is unable to show or explain how these criminals would be able to find him in these locations, which are far from the state of Michoacan. [19] After analyzing the evidence submitted, I have reached the same conclusion. [20] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the RPD erred in failing to consider that the two states proposed as IFAs are [translation] "dangerous" states. [21] In my opinion, that submission is not relevant in this appeal. It is, at most, an indication that there is crime in those states, just as there is everywhere else in Mexico. However, nothing in the evidence shows that is likely that the appellant would be personally subjected to a risk because of the crime in those two states. [22] In his memorandum, the appellant then submits that the RPD erred in failing to consider his testimony, according to which the criminals who threatened him [translation], "are everywhere in the national territory, they can move throughout the Republic's territory." [23] I do not agree with that argument. [24] Instead, the appellant's testimony reveals that he does not know the individuals who threatened him in XXXX 2017. Nothing in the evidence submitted establishes that these criminals are [translation] "everywhere in the national territory." On the contrary, the evidence establishes that these criminals never tried to locate the appellant once he left the country, be it through his family members, friends or former colleagues. [25] Like the RPD, I am also of the view that this evidence establishes that the criminals who threatened the appellant are not interested or able to locate him in the states proposed as IFAs. [26] With regard to the second prong of the IFA analysis, that of its reasonableness, the RPD considers that the appellant did not demonstrate any special circumstances that would make it impossible for him, for example, to find employment or housing in the states proposed as IFAs. [27] The appellant does not contest this conclusion in his memorandum, and I do not see where the RPD might have erred in this regard. [28] Nothing in the evidence presented demonstrates that it would be objectively unreasonable for the appellant to settle in the state of Yucatan or the state of Campeche. [29] The appellant speaks the same language and has the same culture as the people in those states. He has diverse work experience, and there is no indication that he would not be able to find employment or housing in those places. [30] There are no laws or regulations in Mexico that would prevent the appellant from settling in either of those two states. [31] Therefore, considering all of the above, I conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the RPD made errors that would warrant the RAD setting aside the RPD's determination. REMEDY [32] For these reasons, I confirm the RPD's determination that XXXX XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" under section 97 of the IRPA. [33] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) Normand Leduc Normand Leduc December 21, 2020 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Rasaratnam v. Canada (1992) 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.) at p. 710. 2 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (1994) 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB9-27897 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 5 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français