TB9-14018

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-14018 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision July 29, 2020 Date de la décision Panel J. Lourenço Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Henry Igbinoba Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, appealed a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated May 14, 2019, rejecting her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant alleges she faces a risk of persecution and a risk to life at the hands of her husband's family. The determinative issue in this case for the RPD was credibility. [2] I agree with the RPD that the Appellant has not credibly established her allegations. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that her mother borrowed money from the Appellant's husband, XXXX, when the Appellant was a child. The Appellant alleges that her mother was unable to pay back the money, and instead she agreed to give the Appellant to XXXX to marry. The Appellant alleges that XXXX was 20 years her senior and was abusive throughout their relationship. The Appellant alleges that she suffered physical abuse which resulted in a stillbirth in XXXX 2000. The Appellant alleges that she attempted to go to the police on a number of occasions; however, they were unwilling to assist her as they viewed the abuse as a family matter. [4] The Appellant alleges that her husband and his family began to suspect she was a witch and told her she had to perform rituals at a shrine. The Appellant alleges that because of her worsening situation, she contacted her sister in Canada and asked for help to leave Nigeria. The Appellant alleges that her sister assisted her in applying for the live-in caregiver program so that she could come to Canada and care for her sister's children. The Appellant alleges that her relationship with her sister broke down and that she was forced to leave her sister's home and after a number of months, she initiated a claim for refugee protection. [5] The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (the Minister) intervened in the Appellant's refugee claim. Initially, the Minister submitted a number of documents, including the Appellant's visa application and documents submitted in support of her live-in caregiver application. The Minister indicated in their initial correspondence that they would be present at the hearing; however, ultimately the Minister chose not to appear. [6] The RPD found that there were material omissions and inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence, and as such, it found that she had not credibly established her allegations and rejected her claim. Notice regarding any document or written submissions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic [7] On June 15, 2020, the RAD provided Counsel with a notice related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This notice advised Counsel that they had 30 days from the date that the notice was received to submit any document or written submission in support of the appeal. Additionally, counsel was also advised that the other requirements of Rule 29 and 110(4) continue to apply. Counsel has not submitted any document or written submissions in response to this notice. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [8] The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) reviews decisions of the RPD on a standard of correctness after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it. The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in the assessment and weighing of oral testimony heard, which in particular cases, attracts deference. Unless specifically stated below, I have applied a correctness standard.1 ANALYSIS Appellant's Arguments [9] The Appellant argues that the RPD breached her right to procedural fairness by failing to question her about contradictions in her evidence. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to adequately consider the explanations she provided regarding her inability to obtain certain evidence. The Appellant also argues that the RPD was unreasonable by ignoring the Appellant's Canadian medical report. The Appellant further argues that the RPD unreasonably assessed the record when it concluded that she lacked subjective fear and failed to consider her explanations regarding her return to Nigeria. The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to follow the Jurisprudential Guide on internal flight alternatives (IFAs) and failed to conduct a proper section 97 analysis. Specifically, the Appellant argues "that the RPD and RAD failed to conduct any section 97 analysis despite the plethora of objective evidence on domestic violence and the difficulties faced by single women in Nigeria."2 The Appellant also included new evidence with her appeal which she argues is admissible and supports the credibility of her allegation. Guidelines [10] In deciding the appeal, I have considered and applied the Chairperson's Guideline 4 on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Based Persecution.3 NEW EVIDENCE [11] Subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)4 sets out that an appellant may only present evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. Where evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), the RAD will then go on to consider the factors affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh.5 [12] The Appellant submits a number of documents as new evidence with her appeal. The list of new evidence is as follows: 1. a marriage certificate, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2000; 2. an affidavit from the Appellant's brother, XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019; 3. a medical report from the XXXX XXXX Authority, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014; 4. medical records from the XXXX XXXX Centre in Nigeria, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014; 5. a surgical procedure consent form, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014; 6. a photograph of what appears to be a pregnant woman standing by a vehicle; and 7. a bio-XXXX assessment report from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 219. The marriage certificate will not be admitted into evidence. [13] The Appellant states in her affidavit that she testified before the RPD that she had forgotten her marriage certificate and other documents at her sister's home. She indicates that she has "finally been able to get [her] marriage certificate of medical records".6 In her affidavit, the Appellant indicates that she did not provide the evidence earlier because she did not have access to the documents.7 The Appellant's memorandum indicates that she is providing these documents because "the panel member drew negative credibility findings because the Appellant did not provide her marriage certificate."8 [14] In considering the admissibility of the Appellant's marriage certificate, I find that this document does not meet the requirements for new evidence. Firstly, contrary to the Appellant's argument, new evidence before the RAD is not an opportunity for an appellant to respond to weaknesses identified by the RPD.9 [15] In applying the test in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, I note that the marriage certificate clearly predates the rejection of the Appellant's claim and is not new. In considering whether the Appellant ought to have provided this document before the rejection of her claim or whether she had access to the document, I find that the Appellant has failed to establish why her marriage certificate was not tendered to the RPD before her claim was rejected. I acknowledge that the Appellant testified before the RPD that she did not have this document at the time of her hearing, as she had left it at her sister's house. However, the Appellant has not provided any explanation as to why she was unable to obtain this document prior to her claim being rejected. It is worth noting that the Appellant's hearing was on April 8, 2019, but her claim was not rejected until May 14, 2019 giving her over a month to provide additional evidence. The Appellant fails to provide an indication of when she obtained this document or how. The Appellant also does not set out why she was unable to obtain it before May 14, 2019. [16] It is clear from the record that the issue of her marriage certificate was relevant to her claim. The basis of the Appellant's allegation was that her husband and his family were abusive and wanted her to undergo spiritual cleansing. Given the nature of her allegation, I find that it was reasonable to expect that the Appellant would have provided some evidence of her marriage. I also note that in the Appellant's case, the Minister provided evidence prior to her hearing demonstrating concerns with her credibility. This evidence included her application for the live-in caregiver program in which she does not mention her husband and lists herself as single. According to the record, the Minister's notice was sent to the Appellant and the RPD on January 31, 2019,10 thereby giving the Appellant ample notice of the importance of establishing her marriage in advance of her hearing. [17] For these reasons, I find that the marriage certificate does not meet the requirements of section 110(4) of the IRPA and will not be admitted with the appeal. The affidavit from the Appellant's brother will not be admitted. [18] The Appellant provides an affidavit from her brother dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. In the Appellant's memorandum, she indicates that she has provided an affidavit from her brother confirming the abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband and that she received a scanned copy of her brother's affidavit via email.11 Once again, the Appellant fails to establish why this evidence was not tendered before the rejection of her claim. There is nothing in the memorandum or the Appellant's brother's affidavit indicating why she was unable to obtain this document prior to her claim being rejected. There is also no indication that information contained in the affidavit is new despite the fact that it postdates the rejection of her claim. The affidavit of the Appellant's brother speaks to her marriage and allegations that predate her departure from Nigeria. Therefore, this evidence is not new. [19] In considering whether this evidence was available to the Appellant, I find that she has not established any reason why she was unable to obtain a declaration from her brother regarding her situation in Nigeria prior to the rejection of her claim. I also find that, given its relevance to her allegation, it could have reasonably been expected to have been presented to the RPD. This is especially true when I review the RPD record for any corroborating evidence presented by the Appellant regarding the core of her allegation. I note that, apart from a document that purports to be from the Nigerian police and a Nigerian medical report, the Appellant provided no affidavits or other evidence regarding her marriage or the abuse she alleges took place. I find that if she had a witness such as her brother, who could speak to the fact that she was married and abused, she could have reasonably been expected to provide this evidence before the RPD rejected her claim. As such, I find that this affidavit does not meet the requirements of section 110(4) of the IRPA. [20] Furthermore, even if I were to accept that the affidavit met the statutory requirements of new evidence and I turned my analysis to the factors set out in Singh/Raza,12 I find that the affidavit is not credible on its face. Although the Appellant argues that an affidavit is sworn evidence which is presumed to be truthful, I find that a preliminary reading of the contents of the affidavit raise concerns about its credibility. Specifically, the affidavit of the Appellant's brother indicates that she married her husband on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2000. This is in contradiction with the Appellant's own testimony, as well as the marriage certificate indicating that she was married in XXXX 2000. [21] For all of these reasons, the affidavit from the Appellant's brother will not be admitted as new evidence. The medical reports regarding the Appellant surgery will not be admitted as new evidence. [22] Similarly, to the allegations made by the Appellant regarding her inability to obtain her marriage certificate, she argues that the medical reports from Ghana and Nigeria regarding her breast surgery in 2014 were unavailable to her as she had forgotten them at her sister's home. These documents clearly predate the rejection of the Appellant's claim, as they relate to a surgery in 2014. Once again, I find that the Appellant has failed to set out when she obtained these documents or why she was unable to obtain them prior to the rejection of her claim. Finally, given that the Appellant's allegation is that her husband assaulted her which necessitated the surgery, I find that it was reasonable to expect that the Appellant would have provided these documents to the RPD before her claim was rejected. As such, I find that the records do not meet the requirements of section 110(4) of the IRPA. [23] Even if I were to accept that these documents met the statutory requirements of the IRPA, I find that they are not relevant to the determinative issue in the appeal. Although the Appellant argues that these documents substantiate her allegation that her husband assaulted her and that that required that she undergo breast surgery in 2014, I find that the new evidence does not actually speak to the Appellant's allegation of abuse. These medical records simply indicate that there was a recurrent breast lump detected which was removed and tested for malignancy. The reports indicate that this lump was found to be benign. The pathologist's conclusion and diagnosis were that the Appellant had a stromal fibrosis in her right breast. There is no indication that this lump was caused by trauma, as alleged by the Appellant, and therefore I find that these reports are not relevant to establishing the Appellant's allegation. For all of these reasons, these documents will not be admitted as new evidence. The photograph of a pregnant woman will not be admitted. [24] The Appellant submits two photographs that appear to be essentially the same. These are photographs of what appears to be a pregnant woman standing in front of a vehicle. There is no mention of these photographs in the Appellant's memorandum or in her affidavit. There is no indication as to how these photographs meet the requirements of new evidence. Presumably these are photographs that purport to be of the Appellant's pregnancy in the year 2000. There is no indication that these photographs are new or that they were not reasonably available to the Appellant. Assuming that the Appellant tenders the photographs to support her allegation that she was pregnant, it could have been reasonably expected that she would have tendered them prior to the rejection of her claim. As such, this evidence will not be admitted with her appeal. The bio-XXXX assessment report will be admitted with the appeal. [25] The bio-XXXX assessment report submitted by the Appellant is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. On the face of it, the information contained in this report is new, as the assessment and report occurred after the rejection of the Appellant's claim. In considering the requirements of section 110(4), I have applied the criteria liberally and find that, given this report postdates the rejection of the Appellant's claim, it is new. [26] In assessing the report against the factors in Singh/Raza, I find that the report is new. I find that the report is credible on its face, as it comes from a registered social worker in Canada. The report speaks about the Appellant's allegation and the alleged XXXX difficulties she faces as a result of her situation. As such, I find that the document is relevant. Therefore, I will accept the report and consider it with the appeal. However, this document does not raise a question with regards to the Appellant's credibility and therefore an oral hearing will not be convened. Credibility is the determinative issue The contradiction in the Appellant's evidence regarding her marital status impugn the credibility of her allegations [27] The RPD found that the Appellant was inconsistent in describing her marital status. Specifically, the RPD noted that, in the Appellant's application for a work permit, she did not indicate that she was ever married or in a common-law relationship. The RPD noted that this application was prepared with the assistance of Counsel. The RPD also noted that the Appellant's resume, which was submitted with her work permit application in 2015, also indicated that she was single. In contrast, the RPD noted that the Appellant's basis of claim forms indicated that she was married from XXXX 2000 until XXXX 2017. [28] The RPD noted that the Appellant was asked about this apparent contradiction and she testified that she considered herself single as she did not consider herself to be married any longer. The RPD also noted that the Appellant testified that although it is tradition in Nigeria for a wife to take her husband's name, she never completed the paperwork to change her name. The RPD noted that the Appellant testified that her marriage was not formally dissolved; however, since her mother had returned part of the dowry, she believes the marriage was dissolved in a traditional sense. The RPD also notes that the Appellant did not provide a marriage certificate with her evidence and she testified that she had forgotten this document as well as most of her personal documents at her sister's home. [29] The RPD found that the Appellant's evidence regarding her marital status was contradictory. The RPD found that the Appellant's explanations were not reasonable and found that she had not adequately explained why her marital status was not accurately reflected in her work permit application. The RPD also noted that when the Appellant testified regarding when she was separated from her husband, she stated that she was married until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017; however, her testimony also indicated that she was separated several years before that. Given these contradictions, the RPD concluded that the Appellant was not credible in her evidence about this relationship. [30] The Appellant argues that she did in fact provide a reasonable explanation as to why she did not have her marriage certificate. The Appellant reiterates that she was removed from her sister's home when she had been working as a caregiver and that she had forgotten a number of documents, including the marriage certificate, at her sister's home. Aside from restating this explanation, the Appellant does not make any other substantive arguments about the RPD's finding that her evidence regarding her marital status was contradictory. [31] Having independently reviewed the record, I agree with the RPD. I find that the Appellant's evidence regarding her marital status contain significant contradictions. As noted by the RPD, the Appellant indicated that she was single in her application for the live-in caregiver program. In fact, as part of this application, the Appellant signed a declaration indicating that she certified she did not have a spouse or common-law partner on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015.13 Further, the Appellant's resume that was submitted with this application indicates that she is single.14 I find that the Appellant's failure to mention that she was married when she made this application seriously impugns the credibility of her allegation that she was married to XXXX from XXXX 2000 until the XXXX of 2017. [32] I also agree with the RPD that the Appellant has failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why she did not include her spouse's information in this application. I do not accept the Appellant's testimony that she no longer considered herself to be married, and that is why she did not include the information in her application. The Appellant explicitly signed a declaration that she did not have a spouse or common-law partner in 2015. But according to her testimony before the RPD, as well as her information and her Basis of Claim (BOC) form, the Appellant's evidence was that she was in fact married in 2015. Even accepting the Appellant's evidence before the RPD that her marriage was dissolved in the traditional sense when her mother was able to repay the dowry, this did not occur until two years after the Appellant signed the declaration in her live-in caregiver application. Further, I note that the Appellant indicates in her generic application form that she was legally separated from her husband in XXXX 2017.15 Therefore, I find that this contradiction has not been reasonably explained. I also find that this contradiction is material to the heart of the Appellant's claim, as she claims that she fears her husband and his family. Therefore, I find that the Appellant's contradictory evidence regarding her marital status seriously impugns the credibility of her allegations. [33] Further, I agree with the RPD that the Appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation for her failure to provide a marriage certificate. Even accepting the Appellant's evidence that she forgot to take this document with her initially when she left her sister's home, she failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why she was unable to retrieve the document after leaving her sister's home in XXXX 2017. The Appellant had approximately a year and a half following her departure from her sister's home to prepare for her refugee hearing. Given that her marriage was central to her allegation, I find that it would have been reasonable that the Appellant would have provided evidence to substantiate this marriage if it was genuine. [34] Further, I note that the Minister provided a notice of written intervention as well as the Appellant's work permit application where she declared herself to be single in XXXX 2019. This would serve as a further indication of the concerns regarding the Appellant's marital status. Despite this, the Appellant did not provide her marriage certificate to the RPD or any other independent evidence, such as an affidavit or other legal documents indicating her marital status, demonstrating that she was married to XXXX, as alleged. In the circumstances, I find that this evidence could have reasonably been expected to be provided. I find that the lack of corroborating evidence, in conjunction with significant contradictions regarding the Appellant's marital status, seriously impugn the credibility of her allegation that she was married and subsequently suffered gender-based violence at the hands of her husband. The inconsistencies in the police report and medical report are significant and impugn the credibility of the Appellant's allegations. [35] The RPD found that the Appellant's medical reports from XXXX 2000 contained contradictions and inconsistencies. The RPD noted that the document from the Nigerian police indicated that the Appellant reported an assault on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2000 at 3:45 PM. However, the hospital report indicated that the Appellant was admitted to the hospital about one hour beforehand and was admitted for three days, therefore making these reports implausible. Given this contradiction, the RPD found that the documents were fraudulent. [36] The Appellant argues that the RPD breached her right to procedural fairness by failing to question her on this alleged contradiction. The Appellant argues: "if the alleged contradiction was brought to the Appellant's attention, what was her response? And why was the response considered insufficient?"16 Further, the Appellant argues that "the deliberate refusal of the panel to simply seek clarification from the claimant who was at the hearing, is incontrovertible proof that the panel member was determined to discredit her."17 The Appellant argues that this breach of procedural fairness alone is sufficient to quash the decision of the RPD. [37] Having independently considered the record, I disagree with the Appellant. I find that the RPD's finding regarding a contradiction in the Appellant's evidence, that she herself tendered in support of her claim, without explicitly questioning her about it did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness. I would note that the RPD did question the Appellant about her hospital visit as well as her attendance at the Nigerian police station. The Appellant testified that she went to the hospital because she was bleeding and that the record from the hospital contained some errors including that she in fact had a stillbirth rather than a miscarriage and that she remained in hospital until XXXX XXXX rather than being discharged as indicated in the report.18 The Appellant also testified that she initially went to the hospital and when the doctor saw blood coming from her as well as marks on her body, they told her to go get a police report and then come back at which time an emergency caesarean section was performed.19 [38] Although the RPD did not put the exact errors in the documents to the Appellant, it is clear from the record that the Appellant was asked about details of her admission to the hospital as well as her alleged attendance at the police station. As such, I find that the RPD did not breach procedural fairness as it clearly provided the Appellant an opportunity to provide testimony regarding the timing of these events. [39] Furthermore, I find that the Appellant has an opportunity to provide arguments regarding this contradiction before the RAD. Given the scope of a RAD appeal, I find that the Appellant is once again being provided with an opportunity to provide arguments about this contradiction. Aside from arguing that it was procedurally unfair to not put the explicit error to the Appellant, she provides no further argument or explanation regarding this evidence. [40] I have independently reviewed the evidence, I agree with the RPD that the contradictions in the documents impugn their credibility. As noted by the RPD, the Appellant's medical report indicates that she arrived at the hospital at "2.5Pm"20 while the police report indicates that she attended the station a little over an hour later at 3:45 PM. Aside from the discrepancy noted by the RPD regarding the timing of the Appellant's visit, I also note that the hospital record is inconsistent with the Appellant's own testimony. The Appellant herself testified before the RPD that the medical notes provided were not accurate and that she remained in the hospital until XXXX XXXX after an emergency caesarean section was performed, and she delivered a stillborn child. The medical report indicates that the Appellant attended the hospital as a result of the physical assaults from her husband, and eventually she lost the pregnancy and remained in the hospital for three days before being discharged on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2000. [41] I find that this is a significant contradiction in the evidence. I find that the credibility of a hospital report is seriously impugned, given that the report indicates that the Appellant lost her pregnancy rather than having a surgical procedure conducted at the hospital which resulted in a stillbirth. As well, the hospital report reflects that the Appellant was admitted until XXXX XXXX XXXX rather than XXXX XXXX as indicated by the Appellant in her testimony. I also note that the hospital record indicates that the Appellant was directed to report issues to chiefs and traditional leaders. This is in contradiction with the Appellant's testimony that she was advised by the hospital to attend the police station and make a police report.21 Again, I find that the significant contradictions in the Appellant's testimony when contrasted with the hospital record impugn the credibility of this document. [42] Further, in considering the Nigerian police report, I once again note that aside from the temporal contradictions noted by the RPD, the contents of the report are inconsistent with the Appellant's own testimony. The Appellant testified that the police brought her husband in after she reported the assault but ultimately told her that they would not intervene given that it was a family matter.22 In contrast, the report provided by the Appellant indicates that she came to the police station to report an assault case against her husband and was advised to go back to her home and settle the matter with her husband. I find that this contradiction in the content of the police report further impugns the credibility of this document and of the Appellant's allegation that she was assaulted by her husband and reported the assault to the police who declined to intervene. Given the significant contradictions, I find that the hospital report and the police report are not genuine, and therefore I give them no weight. The Appellant's Canadian medical report does not credibly establish her allegations [43] The RPD considered the Appellant's Canadian medical report regarding her injuries which she alleged occurred at the hands of her husband. The RPD noted that the Canadian report relied on the Appellant's self reporting about the cause of her injuries and found that, given the Appellant's overall lack of credibility, this report did not credibly establish her allegations. [44] The Appellant argues that the RPD refused to attach the appropriate weight to her Canadian medical evidence. The Appellant argues that this evidence corroborates her version of events and it was unreasonable for the RPD to ignore the report as it emanates from an uninterested source. [45] Having independently reviewed the record, I agree with the RPD. While there is no reason to doubt that the source of this report is a Canadian doctor who is otherwise uninterested in the outcome of the Appellant's claim, the report does not provide independent corroboration of the Appellant's allegations and does not credibly establish her claim. The report indicates that the Appellant told the doctor that she had suffered physical abuse in Nigeria. The report does indicate that the Appellant has scars on her body, including a scar on her shoulder, eyebrow and her back. The report also indicates that the Appellant has an incisional scar on her breasts which is consistent with a scar from a surgical procedure as well as one on her lower abdomen. [46] Even accepting this evidence of scars on the Appellant's body, I find that this does not credibly establish her allegation that these injuries are as a result of gender-based violence at the hands of her husband. I agree with the RPD that the Appellant's Canadian doctor is relying on her self-reporting in writing this report. I note that this examination took place in 2019 many years after the alleged assaults would have taken place. Therefore, I find that the report only establishes the presence of some scars but does not credibly establish her allegation that she was assaulted by her husband. [47] The Appellant's subjective fear is not determinative of the claim. [48] The RPD found that the Appellant did not provide a plausible explanation as to why she returned to Nigeria if she feared her husband. The RPD noted that the Appellant testified that she returned to Nigeria in XXXX 2016 with her sister and her sister's family in order to care for their children. The RPD noted that the Appellant testified that she did not talk to many people and therefore was able to avoid being located by her spouse. The RPD noted that the Appellant's other evidence was that her spouse was an individual who was well-connected and could locate her throughout Nigeria. In considering this, the RPD found that the Appellant did not provide a credible or reasonable explanation for her return to Nigeria and that this demonstrated she lacks subjective fear. [49] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in coming to this determination by failing to consider the fact that she would be less likely to be located when returning to Nigeria on a temporary basis. The Appellant argues that the explanation provided was reasonable and that her brief return to Nigeria did not demonstrate a lack of subjective fear. [50] While I agree with the RPD that the Appellant's return to Nigeria, in view of her allegations that she feared her husband throughout the country, raises concerns about her subjective fear, I find that this is not the determinative issue in the Appellant's claim. I find that the determinative issue is the credibility of her allegation that she was married at all and that she suffered violence at the hands of her husband. For the reasons previously outlined, I find that the Appellant has not credibly establish this allegation which is determinative of her claim. The Appellant's bio-XXXX assessment report does not credibly establish her allegations. [51] The Appellant has provided a bio-XXXX assessment report from XXXX 2019 which has been accepted as new evidence with her appeal. In this report, a clinical social worker sets out findings that she has made after a clinical interview with the Appellant. The author of this report indicates that, after this assessment, it is her belief that the Appellant is displaying symptoms of XXXX XXXX XXXX and generalized XXXX XXXX. The report goes over the allegations presented by the Appellant, including that she was married to XXXX who assaulted her over a number of years. According to the report, the Appellant self-reported that she felt restless, agitated and had difficulty sleeping. The report also sets out that the Appellant indicated that she had difficulty concentrating and has been experiencing "lack of forgetfulness."23 The author of the report indicates that the Appellant experienced a headache during the interview and had difficulty concentrating. The author also opined that "the huge stress can also affect her in dealing with authority figures such as the police and the immigration whereby her anxiety level becomes high which will impact her interaction negatively. ... XXXX XXXX XXXX['s] lack of forgetfulness will significantly impact her in proving thorough testimony."24 [52] The Appellant argues that this XXXX report substantiates her allegation that she suffered gender-based violence. The Appellant also argues that it explains any difficulty with her evidence before the RPD. The Appellant argues that her condition negatively impacted her ability to make rational decisions and to testify, especially in high-stress situations. [53] Having independently reviewed this report, I find that it does not credibly establish the Appellant's allegations. This report was conducted by a registered clinical social worker after an assessment of the Appellant. While I have no reason to question the credentials of the author of the report, I find that even if I were to accept the conclusions that the Appellant suffers from XXXXandXXXX XXXX, this does not credibly establish her allegations. The source of the information concerning the Appellant's allegations of suffering gender-based violence is the Appellant's own information which is provided to the author of the report. Essentially, this clinical social worker has no way of independently verifying the Appellant's allegations that she was assaulted. I also find that, even accepting that the Appellant suffers from XXXXandXXXX XXXX, this does not reasonably explain the contradictions in her evidence. As noted previously in these reasons, a significant contradiction comes from the fact that the Appellant failed to disclose that she was married in her live-in caregiver application. Given that this was a written application completed with the assistance of Counsel, there is no indication that it was a high-stress situation or one that would have been impacted by XXXX health considerations. Therefore, I find that these diagnoses would not explain the contradiction in the Appellant's live-in caregiver application. [54] Furthermore, although it is not exactly clear from the language of the assessment, I infer that the author is suggesting that the Appellant might suffer difficulties in remembering during periods of high stress. Again, I note that in the particular circumstances of the Appellant's case, her credibility is not impugned on the basis of her inability to remember specific dates or events. Rather, her credibility is impugned given the contradictions in the evidence. For these reasons, I find that the report does not credibly establish the Appellant's allegation or sufficiently explain the contradictions in her evidence. Therefore, I give the report limited weight. The Appellant's allegations that the RPD erred by failing to assess her risk under section 97 and failed to apply the Jurisprudential Guide are unsubstantiated. [55] The Appellant argues that "assuming, but not conceding, that the RPD & RAD made valid credibility negative findings, they were still under the obligation to carry out a separate section 97 analysis. Both the RPD and RAD failed to conduct any Section 97 analysis."25 The Appellant then lists a variety of documents in the objective evidence regarding the prevalence of domestic violence in Nigeria as well as circumstances for survivors of gender-based violence in Nigeria. The Appellant then argues that the RPD neither acknowledged nor analysed the above evidence, and this was a fatal error. [56] I am not persuaded by the Appellant's argument. The Appellant was explicitly asked by the RPD if she feared anything else in Nigeria and she testified that she only feared her husband XXXX.26 The sole basis of her claim was her fear of her husband and the gender-based violence she alleged to have endured. Given the lack of credibility of this allegation, the RPD concluded that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [57] While there may be cases where the personal credibility of an appellant is not entirely determinative of a claim, such as situations where an individual's religious or ethnic profile may place them at risk of persecution or risk to life, this is not the case in the matter before me. In the Appellant's claim, it is clear that she alleges that she fears persecution and a risk to life at the hands of her husband, XXXX. As I find that the Appellant has not credibly established her marriage to XXXX or any allegations of gender-based violence, I find that this necessarily leads to the conclusion that she is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [58] The Appellant's argument regarding the Jurisprudential Guide is equally without merit. The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by not following the Jurisprudential Guide. Specifically, the Appellant argues that "despite questions and answers on Internal Flight Alternatives, the RPD and RAD panel members failed to make a decision or apply the jurisprudential guide."27 Further, the Appellant argues that "the panel member ought to either apply the guide OR explain why the guide will be disregarded. The panel members did neither."28 [59] I find that the Appellant's argument that both the RPD and the RAD failed to apply the Jurisprudential Guide is without merit. The Jurisprudential Guide referenced by the Appellant deals with the viability of internal flight alternatives in Nigeria. In the Appellant's case, while some questions regarding internal flight alternative were asked by the RPD, clearly the determinative issue in this matter is the Appellant's credibility. Given that the RPD found the Appellant had not credibly established her allegations, there was no requirement to go on and conduct an analysis on internal flight alternatives. Similarly, I find that since the Appellant has not credibly established her allegations, there is no need to conduct an analysis on internal flight alternatives or consider the Jurisprudential Guide which deals with that matter. CONCLUSION [60] For the above-noted reasons, the appeal is dismissed, pursuant to 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) J. Lourenço J. Lourenço July 29, 2020 Date 1 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; [2016] 4 FCR 157, at para 103. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 63, Appellant's Memorandum, at paragraphs 36 and 37. 3 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson, pursuant to Subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 13, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in paragraph 159(1)(h) of the IRPA. 4 S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 5 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; [2016] 4 FCR 230. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 48, Appellant's Affidavit, at paragraph 5. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 48, Appellant's Affidavit, at paragraph 6. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 70, at para 50. 9 Eshetie, Agernew Tilahun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4396-18), Walker, August 1, 2019, 2019 FC 1036, at para 33. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 212. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 48, at paragraphs 7 and 8; and Appellant's Affidavit, at p. 9. 12 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FC 385. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 216. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 218. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 26. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 56, Appellant's Memorandum, at para 15. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 56, Appellant's Memorandum, at para 16. 18 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:48:22 and 01:03:45. 19 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:06:50. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 174. 21 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:06:50. 22 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 00:59:40. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 15d. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 15d, XXXX Report. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 63, Appellant's Memorandum, at paragraph 36. 26 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing, at 01:37:20. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 62, at paragraph 32. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 63, at paragraph 34. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-14018 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français