TB5-14300

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-14300 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(A.K.A. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 18, 2016 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Robin Edoh Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has not submitted new evidence in support of her appeal; however, she requests an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the negative determination and substitute a positive determination accepting her claim for protection. In the alternative the Appellant asks the RAD to refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination giving directions to accept her claim. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Saint Vincent, she will be harmed by her ex-common-law spouse because he had abused her in the past and has threatened to harm her. [4] The Appellant's claim for refugee protection was heard on November 20, 2015. By a decision rendered orally the same day, the RPD rejected the claim finding that the Appellant was not credible, lacked subjective fear, and had failed to establish her allegations with credible and trustworthy evidence. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD's decision is replete with errors of law and fact. She further submits that the RPD failed to take into consideration her reasonable explanations for her ordeals and encounters with her ex-common-law partner. She submits that the RPD erred by failing to give weight to documentary evidence and did not have regard to the totality of the evidence before it. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [6] What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? While the Appellant makes no argument with respect to the role of the RAD, the RAD notes in Huruglica1 the Court considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD. It found that the RAD had erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of the IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.2 [7] Justice Phelan stated the following in Huruglica: Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.3 In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error."4 [8] Considering the most recent jurisprudence, including the Court's decision in Huruglica, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, recognizing and respecting the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own determination. Application for an oral hearing [9] The Appellant seeks an oral hearing; however, she is not relying on new evidence.5 [10] Subsection 110(3) of the IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to subsection 110(4), present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [11] According to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. In this appeal, where there is no further evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) must be understood in relation to subsection 110(4). [12] When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (subsection 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. As there is no new evidence to consider in this appeal, the RAD must proceed without a hearing and the Appellant's request for an oral hearing is denied. Merits of the appeal Inconsistent evidence regarding one of Appellant's children [13] The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's inconsistent evidence about one of her children. It noted that, at her hearing, the Appellant first testified that XXXX XXXX XXXX was adopted and then testified that XXXX XXXX XXXX was the daughter of XXXX, the father of seven of her children. [14] The RAD notes that the Appellant indicates in her Basis of Claim Form (BoC) that XXXX XXXX XXXX is her daughter. The RPD was correct in noting that the Appellant first testified at her hearing that XXXX XXXX XXXX was adopted and then testified that she was the daughter of XXXX; however, this is not necessarily an inconsistency and it is plausible that XXXX XXXX XXXX is the daughter of XXXX and adopted by the Appellant. The Appellant even testified that XXXX is the father of XXXX XXXX XXXX and she adopted XXXX XXXX XXXX. Instructions for completing the BoC instruct refugee claimants to list their children, including children born outside of marriage and adopted children. Considering the above, the RAD does not concur with the RPD drawing a negative inference from a non-existent inconsistency. Inconsistent evidence regarding the name of the Appellant's abuser [15] The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's inconsistent evidence about the name of her abuser. In her BoC, the Appellant names her abuser as XXXX XXXX. The RPD noted that, at her hearing, the Appellant first referred to her abuser as XXXX XXXX and then referred to him as XXXX. When asked to explain why she called her abuser XXXX, the Appellant said that she had made a mistake. [16] The Appellant indicates in her BoC that she fears XXXX XXXX, her ex-common-law partner. XXXX XXXX (or just XXXX) is mentioned throughout the Appellant's BoC. There is no indication in the Appellant's BoC that XXXX XXXX is known by any other names. However, at her hearing the Appellant refers to her abuser as XXXX XXXX. The following is an excerpt from the hearing. RPD: What about your other two children? Appellant: They from XXXX XXXX. RPD: Which children are from XXXX XXXX? Appellant: XXXX and XXXX. RPD: So the first seven children of XXXX and next two children of XXXX XXXX. When break up with XXXX XXXX? Appellant: 2002 when he came home and fight. RPD: What XXXX full name? Appellant: XXXX. RPD: You said it was XXXX. Appellant: I made a mistake. RPD: You made a mistake in XXXX name? Appellant: Yes, sorry. [17] At her hearing, the Appellant also refers to her abuser as XXXX. The following are three excerpts from the hearing. RPD: Who are the fathers of these children? Appellant: I have seven children with one Mr. XXXX and when we break up I meet XXXX. _______________________________________________ RPD: Why would you foreclose asking the question of them? Appellant: Only one phoning me all the time that XXXX asking for me. ________________________________________________ RPD: You may not want to remember but..., Appellant: XXXX abused me. I don't want to remember. RPD: Who is XXXX? Appellant: XXXX XXXX. RPD: I thought it was XXXX XXXX. Appellant: Sorry. [18] It would be reasonable to expect a refugee claimant to provide consistent evidence regarding the name of her abuser. Considering that the Appellant alleges to have been in a common-law relationship with her abuser for approximately 17 years and has continued to hear of him during her eight years in Canada, it would be reasonable to expect her to remember his name and to recite it with accuracy when asked. The Appellant's failure to do so seriously undermines her credibility. Inconsistent evidence regarding the end of the Appellant's relationship with her abuser [19] The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's inconsistent evidence regarding the end of her relationship with her abuser. It noted that, at her hearing, the Appellant testified that she broke up with her abuser in 2002. She later indicated that the abuse started in 2002 and she ended her relationship with her abuser in 2007. [20] The following are two excerpts from the hearing. RPD: When break up with XXXX XXXX Appellant: 2002 when he came home and fight. ________________________________________________ RPD: You said you broke up in 2002. What did you mean by that? Appellant: We tried to break up in 2002 but he still in the house. When XXXX lose job he came to fight with me. RPD: You said you broke up in 2002. I want more information than that. Appellant: I made a mistake. We broke up in 2007. In 2007 the last fight. RPD: Why say 2002 earlier on? Appellant: I made a mistake. [21] It would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to provide consistent evidence regarding the year she ended her relationship with her abuser. Considering that the Appellant alleges to have been in a common-law relationship with her abuser since 1990 and the relationship lasted over 10 years, it would be reasonable to expect her to provide consistent evidence regarding the year their relationship ended. Although it is plausible that a refugee claimant makes a legitimate error in recalling the year a relationship ended, it would be reasonable for them to correct the mistake once it was realized. The Appellant in this case continued to use the year 2002 as the end of her relationship with her abuser until it was brought to her attention that it was inconsistent with her other evidence. The RAD finds that the above-noted inconsistency, without a reasonable explanation, further undermines the Appellant's credibility. Inconsistent evidence regarding two incidents of abuse and the reporting of those incidents to police [22] The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's inconsistent evidence regarding two incidents of abuse and the reporting of those incidents to police. It noted that the Appellant's testimony began by conflating the incident when she suffered an injury to her finger with an incident involving a gun and then separated the incidents when she went on to talk about a subsequent assault. She testified that one incident occurred in 2002 and the other in 2006 or 2007 however, later indicated that the incidents were reported to police three weeks apart. The RPD noted that in one section of the Appellant's BoC she indicates that she went to police on two occasions and in another section it indicates that she did not go to police. It noted that her testimony reflected one part of her BoC but not the other. [23] The RAD notes that the Appellant describes in her BoC an incident that occurred in 2006 when her abuser broke one of her fingers. She writes that she did not bring charges against her abuser and did not tell the doctor because her abuser had threatened her. The Appellant also describes in her BoC an incident when her abuser hit her with a gun. No date was given for the gun incident. She writes that she did not report it to police for fear of being killed. However, the Appellant also indicates in her BoC that she reported her abuser to police on two occasions but fails to identify which incidents. [24] At her hearing, the Appellant indicated that the first time she reported her abuser to police was in 2002. She indicated that her abuser beat her, threaten to kill her and himself, and she went to police. She also indicated that police picked up her abuser, talked to him, and let him go. When asked about the second time she went to police, the Appellant said it was in 2006. She went on to indicate that her abuser beat her up and she suffered a broken pinky finger. When asked what happened when she went to police, the Appellant said that police told her to go home as it was a family matter. However, later in the hearing the Appellant indicated that she did not go to police when her abuser broke her finger. When asked to explain the inconsistency, the Appellant said that she went to police. When asked why her BoC indicates the opposite of what she testified to, the Appellant provided no response. [25] It would be reasonable to expect refugee claimants to provide clear, consistent and detailed evidence about the abuse they suffered in their home country that led to them to seek protection elsewhere. The Appellant in this case provided unclear and inconsistent evidence, lacking in detail. The details in her oral testimony at her hearing were inconsistent with the details in her BoC. She provided contradictory testimony at her hearing and her BoC was internally inconsistent. She provided no reasonable explanations for the anomalies in her evidence. The RAD finds that this further undermines the Appellant's credibility. Omission in BoC regarding abuser's continuing interest in Appellant [26] The RPD noted the Appellant's testimony that her children informed her that her abuser had been looking for her since she left Saint Vincent yet there is no mention of this in her BoC. It also noted that the Appellant indicated that she only found out recently. The RPD drew a negative inference from the omission. [27] The Appellant indicated at her hearing that her children had told her that her abuser had been asking for her during the previous eight years; since she left Saint Vincent. However, when asked why that information was not in her BoC, the Appellant said that it was only lately that he had been asking for her. [28] One would expect the Appellant's children to have told the Appellant that her abuser had been looking for her since she left Saint Vincent, if in fact he had been. The Appellant indicated that she left Saint Vincent because her abuser had threatened her. She also indicated that she was in contact with her children in Saint Vincent since she left that country. The RAD finds it implausible that the Appellant's children in Saint Vincent would only tell the Appellant only recently that her abuser had been looking for her for the previous eight years. As a result, the RAD rejects the Appellant's explanation for the omission in her BoC. [29] It would be reasonable to expect refugee claimants to provide information in their BoC about an abuser looking for them after they left their home country, if they became aware of that information before completing their BoC. Refugee claimants are instructed in their BoC to explain everything in order and to include everything that is important for their claim. They are instructed to include dates, names and places wherever possible. If the Appellant's abuser continued to look for her after she left Saint Vincent, one would expect her to write about it in her BoC to support her fear of returning to Saint Vincent. [30] Furthermore, the Appellant was represented by counsel when she completed her BoC. It was indicated at her hearing that her counsel provided her with assistance in completing the BoC. The continued interest of the Appellant's abuser to pursue her is a significant and pivotal aspect of the Appellant's claim for protection. The omission, without a reasonable explanation, further undermines the Appellant's credibility. Negative credibility findings by the Board have been upheld by the Federal Court when a pivotal allegation, which goes to the heart of the claim, has been omitted from a Personal Information Form (a BoC in this case) and arises for the first time at a hearing, and for which a reasonable explanation has not been provided.6 The Appellant's inconsistent evidence about how long her abuser had been asking for her also undermines her credibility. Anomaly regarding household composition [31] The RPD noted that the Appellant had a number of adult and minor children who lived with her in Saint Vincent and her description of events in her BoC did not reflect a house with this composition of children. It noted that the BoC narrative reflects dependent children when the majority of the children were adults. [32] The RAD makes the same observation the RPD made regarding the Appellant's description of events in her BoC, considering her household composition. The composition issue is intrinsically linked to the issue of the similar BoCs discussed below. The RPD provided good reasons as to why the composition was problematic since it did not fit with the narrative in the BoC. Lack of effort to obtain corroborating documents [33] The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's lack of effort to obtain corroborating documents from family members in Saint Vincent. The Appellant explained that she did not want to remember the abuse. [34] The RAD agrees with the RPD drawing a negative inference from the Appellant lack of effort to obtain corroborating documents from family members in Saint Vincent. The Appellant testified that her adult children, who continue to reside in Saint Vincent, witnessed the abuse she suffered. She also indicated that her adult children in Saint Vincent told her about her abuser continuing to ask for her. It would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to obtain documentation from her adult children in Saint Vincent to corroborate her allegations as they would be in a good position to do so. They have firsthand knowledge of the events that led to the Appellant leaving Saint Vincent and they have firsthand knowledge of the abuser's continued interest in the Appellant. The Federal Court has established that the burden of proof to establish a claim lies with the refugee claimant. A refugee claimant must come to a hearing with all of the evidence that they have to offer and believe necessary to prove the claim.7 The Board may draw a negative inference from a refugee claimant's lack of effort in acquiring evidence to corroborate central elements of a claim since Rule 11 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules clearly states that the applicant must provide such documents. It is entirely reasonable for the Board to attach great importance to documentation which would have supported the allegations.8 [35] The RAD rejects the Appellant's explanation that the reason she did not ask for corroborating documents from her family members in Saint Vincent was because she did not want to remember the abuse. The Appellant has presented supporting letters from individuals who have no firsthand knowledge of the abuse the Appellant suffered, yet were told of the abuse by the Appellant. It is unreasonable that the Appellant would obtain supporting documents from individuals with no firsthand knowledge of the abuse she suffered and not request it from her family members in Saint Vincent who do. Psychological report [36] The RPD noted that the Appellant's psychological report indicates that she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and that her ability to provide clear and consistent testimony at the hearing may be affected by levels of anxiety and shame. It also noted from the report that the Appellant lacks the insight and advanced reasoning skills needed to properly express herself. The RPD acknowledged that the Appellant's psychological state may have influenced her ability to give consistent testimony. The RPD indicated that it made allowances for the Appellant's psychological condition. [37] The RAD, after reviewing all the testimony and evidence, finds that the many significant inconsistencies and omissions noted in the Appellant's evidence are not sufficiently explained by the psychological report. The Appellant's inconsistent reciting of her former common-law spouse's name - a detail that is subject to almost daily recall by an individual - cannot be explained by or be attributed to a lack of insight and advanced reasoning skills. The RAD finds that the Appellant's mental state, as opined in her psychological report, does not affect the credibility conclusions noted above. [38] The psychologist, in her report, opines that the Appellant's ability to provide clear and consistent testimony at her hearing may be affected by high levels of anxiety and shame. She goes on to indicate that any inconsistencies observed in the Appellant's account should be attributed to the sensitive subject matter, and not as an attempt on her part to be deceitful.9 While the RAD agrees with the psychologist that the Appellant's testimony may be affected by high levels of anxiety and shame as many refugee claimants in similar circumstances would experience, it does not agree with the psychologist that any inconsistencies should be attributed to the sensitive subject matter. The RPD conducted the hearing in an appropriately sensitive manner. Furthermore, most of the anomalies in the Appellant's evidence did not involve sensitive subject matter. For example, the Appellant's inconsistent reciting of her former common-law partner's name. [39] It is unclear from the psychotherapist's report what to expect from the Appellant in terms of her testimony. The RAD notes from the recording of the hearing that the Appellant had the ability to recall a considerable amount of information from her past, including sensitive information related to her claim that was previously not presented. The psychologist fails to adequately account for the Appellant's inconsistent evidence, simply stating her potential incapacity in general terms as a catchall for any anomalies in her testimony. The RAD gives the psychologist's report little weight in terms of justifying the anomalies in the Appellant's evidence, including her testimony at the hearing. [40] Furthermore, in the RAD's view, a psychological report presented by a refugee claimant does not serve to prove the alleged persecution suffered by that individual. Of course, such a report may establish that the Appellant suffers from a condition or exhibits symptoms that are consistent with the alleged trauma. A psychological report might assist the RPD in conducting the hearing in an appropriately sensitive manner or to consider whether apparent credibility problems are instead the result of a psychological condition. The Federal Court has commented that, "Just because a patient is suffering from psychological problems and manifests symptoms associated with those problems does not mean that the patient's account of past persecution as the cause of those problems can be believed."10 It is the RPD's responsibility to determine whether the Appellant is credible, and the RPD is not required to defer to a psychologist's report when making findings of fact in respect to alleged past persecution. Letters of support from daughter, relatives and friend [41] The RPD was not satisfied that the letter from the Appellant's daughter has sufficient probative value in and of itself to establish the facts, given the personal interest she has in the outcome of her mother's claim. It noted that the statements from the Appellant's relatives do not specify the source of their information. It also noted that the information contained in the letter from the Appellant's friend came from what the Appellant told her in Canada. [42] The RAD has reviewed the letter from the Appellant's daughter,11 the letter from relatives12 and the letter from the Appellant's friend.13 They provide very little information and few details about the problems the Appellant alleges to have suffered at the hands of her ex-common-law partner in Saint Vincent. Furthermore, the Appellant's friend does not have first-hand knowledge of the Appellant's alleged problems with her ex-common-law partner and her relatives do not indicate in their letter how they became aware of the Appellant's problems. The letter from the Appellant's daughter provides a very brief and non-detailed confirmation of the abuse the Appellant suffered at the hands of her former common-law partner; however, the Appellant's credibility has been undermined by the anomalies in her evidence noted above. As noted in Gomez,14 corroboration does not make an incredible story credible. Furthermore, the RAD finds that the letters submitted by the Appellant are not highly probative or credible evidence. The Federal Court has held that confirmatory evidence of family members and friends, which is not subject to cross-examination, is not highly probative or credible evidence. Highly probative evidence is intrinsically well-presented evidence from independent sources confirming a material fact in the matter.15 [43] The RPD was not wrong to give little weight to the letters from the Appellant's daughter, relatives and friend after it considered a number of factors. The letters were considered along with all the other evidence before an overall credibility finding was made. The RAD finds that the letters are not highly probative or credible evidence and assigns little weight to them. Delay in claiming [44] The RPD noted the Appellant's delay in claiming refugee protection. It noted her explanation for the delay was because she did not know about the process and did not have a circle of friends who could help her make inquiries. Given the resources in Toronto, the RPD concluded that it was reasonably open to the Appellant to make inquiries about her immigration status or asylum if either she or her daughter had chosen to do so. It concluded that the Appellant's delay in claiming demonstrated a lack of subjective fear. [45] The Appellant alleges to have left Saint Vincent due to the abuse and threats she received from a former common-law partner. She alleges her daughter, XXXX, a permanent resident of Canada, facilitated her travel to Canada. She alleges she has resided with XXXX since she arrived in Canada. The Appellant maintains that she did not file a refugee claim when she arrived in Canada or shortly afterwards because she did not know she could. She indicated that she did not inquire about regularizing her status in Canada until a friend took her to a pastor in 2015 and the pastor told her she could claim refugee protection. [46] An applicant's delay in claiming refugee status is an important factor which the Board is entitled to consider in weighing a claim for refugee status.16 While delay is generally not a determinative factor in a refugee claim, there are circumstances where delay can be such that it assumes a decisive role. What is fatal to the applicant's claim is his or her inability to provide any satisfactory explanation for the delay. Delays in leaving, exiting their country and/or claiming refugee protection can lead to a negative credibility finding.17 [47] In this case, the Appellant traveled to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2007 and did not file a claim for refugee protection until February 2015; approximately seven years after the expiry of her visitor status. She alleges she did not know about the refugee process until she spoke with a friend in 2015 who took her to see a pastor; however, the Appellant was living with her daughter who was a permanent resident of Canada. It would be reasonable to expect the Appellant's daughter in Canada to be familiar with immigration matters or know where or how to obtain information on immigration matters. The RAD finds it unreasonable for the Appellant to not inquire about regularizing her status in Canada and risk being removed from Canada until over seven years had passed that she had been in Canada, in light of her alleged fear of returning to Saint Vincent. [48] The Appellant did not speak with a lawyer or immigration consultant about the possibility of remaining in Canada or filing a refugee claim in Canada until over seven years after her arrival, even though it was not likely that there was any risk in asking. If persons truly fear returning to their home country, it would be reasonable to expect them to seek the advice of professionals in immigration matters as soon as possible. [49] The Federal Court has upheld RPD decisions rejecting claims because of a lack of subjective fear based on a delay in claiming protection in Canada, failing to seek protection in a third country, delay in leaving the country of persecution, or returning to that country.18 In this case, the Appellant's reason for not making a claim for protection immediately upon arriving in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2007, or shortly afterwards, is unreasonable and the RAD finds it undermines her credibility with regards to her subjective fear of returning to Saint Vincent, her allegations and her overall credibility. Substantially similar narratives in two other BoCs [50] The RPD noted that the first 13 lines of the Appellant's BoC narrative are substantially similar to statements made in two other unrelated BoCs. It noted that the wording was identical for the most part. The Appellant's explanation was that the information in her BoC is true and corresponds to what she narrated. The RPD drew a negative inference from the unreasonably explained similarities in the BoCs. [51] The RAD concurs with the RPD drawing a negative inference from the substantial similarities in the Appellant's BoC and two unrelated BoCs. The RAD notes, as did the RPD, that the first 13 lines of the Appellant's narrative19 are almost identical to the first 13 lines in two unrelated BoCs.20 It would be an extraordinary coincidence that the Appellant experienced substantially similar circumstances in Saint Vincent as two unrelated individuals in Jamaica. Considering the numerous other credibility findings with respect to the Appellant's evidence noted above and the lack of a reasonable explanation for the similarities in the BoCs, the RAD finds that the Appellant's credibility is further undermined. [52] The Federal Court in Sargsyan held that the Board's finding that the applicant's credibility was negatively affected by the fact that her Personal Information Form (PIF) closely resembled another PIF received on the same day as hers, was not patently unreasonable, given that it had already determined that the Applicant was not credible. The Court further indicated that where the Board has already made a number of negative inferences about a claimant's credibility, it is not an error to consider a similar PIF.21 Disposition [53] The Appellant has alleged that the RPD decision contains errors and the RPD failed to consider evidence. The RAD has found that the RPD's analyses and findings are not substantially flawed and that it had properly considered the evidence. Upon review of the evidence, the RAD has reached the same conclusion as the RPD. [54] As a cumulative result of the above-noted anomalies, the RAD finds that the Appellant lacks credibility. The RAD does not accept, on a balance of probabilities, that the events, as described by the Appellant in her Basis of Claim Form and at her hearing with the RPD, occurred as described. Therefore, the RAD finds that there is not a serious possibility of persecution should she return to Saint Vincent. The RAD therefore concludes that the Appellant has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA, and, for these same reasons, the RAD finds that the Appellant is not a person in need of protection or at a risk to life, or at risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or in danger of torture as set out in section 97 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [55] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Refugee Appeal Division confirms the decision of the Refugee Protection Division and dismisses the appeal. (signed) "M. Pettinella" M. Pettinella March 18, 2016 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 Huruglica, para. 45. 3 Huruglica, para. 54. 4 Huruglica, para. 55. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 10. 6 Aragon, Romel Abutan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-651-07), Frenette, February 4, 2008; 2008 FC 144; Kutuk, Aydin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2484-94), Simpson, December 14, 1995. 7 Kante, Abdoulaye v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2585-93), Nadon, March 23, 1994. 8 Luzi, Tshongo Ngongo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-4183-03) Pinard, June 28, 2004; 2004 FC 916. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 72. 10 Mico v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 964, para. 54. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 79. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 80. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 81. 14 Gomez, Hector Cisneros v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5741-04), Harrington, June 16, 2005, 2005 FC 859. 15 El Bouni, Haidar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7627-14), Annis, June 2, 2015; 2015 FC 700. 16 Heer, Karnail Singh v. M.E.I (F.C.A., no. A-474-87), Heald Marceau, Lacombe, April 13, 1988. 17 Onofre, Sofia Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-2084-10), Bedard, December 2, 2010; 2010 FC 1219. 18Rivera, Jesus Vargas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5826-02), Beaudry, November 5, 2003, 2003 FC 1292; Borges, Antonio Luis De Mello v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2995-04), von Finckenstein, April 12, 2005, 2005 FC 491; Gilgorri, Ruben Dario Modernell v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5423-05), Short, May 4, 2006, 2006 FC 559; Torres, Edison Colorado v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7630-05), Harrington, July 27, 2006, 2006 FC 927; Mejia, Dario Edgardo Rodriguez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-396-06), Mactavish, September 13, 2006, 2006 FC 1087;Sainnéus, Elange Bully v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-3777-06), Martineau, March 5, 2007; 2007 FC 249. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 13. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 103, 114. 21 Sargsyan, Gohar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1609-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 FC 221. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR :