TC1-01105

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC1-01105 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision August 18, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Paul Muldoon Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Ravi Kumar Randal Jain Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Appellant) is a citizen of Pakistan who is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated January 21, 2021, dismissing his claim for protection. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in assessing his claim, and he asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to allow his appeal and determine that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) or to send the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] I dismiss the appeal and find that the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA, nor a person in need of protection, according to section 97 of the IRPA. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant is a Shia Muslim from XXXX in the Punjab province of Pakistan who fears persecution by an extremist group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or the Taliban) because he refused to pay ongoing extortion demands and based on his religion. The Appellant worked and resided in China from 2007 to 2018 and returned periodically to Pakistan when the extortion demands were made. The Appellant states that he gave donations to his Imam Bargah, and his name was read out during Friday sermons. From 2015 to 2018, he received various threats over the phone warning him that, if he did not pay certain sums of money, he and his family would be killed. In 2017, he visited the U.S., and when he returned, he again received a warning, and the person threatening him knew he was in the U.S., and the Appellant suspected that his travels were revealed through a social media post. In XXXX 2018, he moved his family to another house; however, he noted strangers outside his house who fired guns into the air. The Appellant filed a police report; however, the police would not allow him to name the TTP as those responsible. He then moved to another house in XXXX. In XXXX 2018, his neighbour reported strangers looking for him, and the Appellant's brother received a call asking about him, at which the Appellant withdrew his children from the local school. In XXXX 2018, the Appellant returned to China, and then in XXXX 2018, he traveled from China to the U.S., and he then travelled to Canada in XXXX 2018 and made his refugee claim. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [4] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.1 In doing so, I have carried out my own independent analysis of the RPD record, including the RPD's reasons and decision and the transcript of the hearing, to determine whether the RPD erred. NEW EVIDENCE [5] The Appellant does not request that new evidence be admitted. [6] Owing to the fact that I did not admit any new evidence, I have no authority to hold an oral hearing. ANALYSIS [7] The determinative issue in this appeal is whether the Appellant has a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Hyderabad or Islamabad. The RPD found that they were viable IFAs. [8] The test for assessing an IFA is well established.2 It has two prongs: (1) The Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or danger of torture, believed on substantial grounds to exist, in the IFA. (2) Moreover, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for the claimant to seek refuge there. [9] Under the test, both prongs must be met in order for an IFA to be found viable. Once a potential IFA has been identified, the burden of proof is on the Appellant to establish that there is no IFA. In assessing an IFA, the Appellant's circumstances and profile must be taken into consideration. For the second prong, the Appellant must overcome a very high threshold to demonstrate that the IFA location is unreasonable by providing evidence that the Appellant's life and safety would be jeopardized by relocating to the proposed location.3 [10] The RPD found that the Appellant had a viable IFA in either Hyderabad or Islamabad. [11] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that the Appellant has a viable IFA in Islamabad or Hyderabad because: (1) the population size and geographical location of the IFAs do not establish the viability of an IFA; (2) the evidence establishes that the agents of persecution have the means and motivation to pursue the Appellant; and that (3) the Appellant is at risk because he is a Shia Muslim. The Appellant also contested two credibility findings that I will discuss in the context of the grounds raised by the Appellant. Prong 1 of the IFA test: Whether the RPD erred in finding that the Appellant would not face a serious possibility of persecution in the IFAs Whether the Appellant has established that the agents of persecution have the means and ability to locate the Appellant in the proposed IFA RPD's findings [12] The RPD found that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA cities because the agents of persecution would not find him there due to the large populations of the IFAs and their distances from XXXX that would provide him a significant degree of anonymity in those cities. The RPD found that the Appellant's concern that he may be located because of the requirement to provide his address to Pakistan authorities is speculative and not supported by the objective evidence and that he was able to enter and exit Pakistan with his passport without incident. [13] The RPD found that there was no evidence that other extremist groups were aware of the Appellant or that the TTP has shared the Appellant's information. The RPD found that an individual with a localized threat may be able to relocate with respect to threats by the extremist groups and that the proposed IFA locations are not strongholds for the TTP. The RPD found that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the TTP or other affiliated groups have such a reach or type of coordination that they would learn of the Appellant's return to Pakistan or his presence in the proposed IFAs. [14] The RPD found that there was no evidence that the police had worked with the TTP in seeking to harm the Appellant in XXXX, and if they were, there is insufficient evidence that this would result in any increased risk to him in the IFA locations. The RPD found that the possibility of TTP being able to track the Appellant is remote. Appellant's submissions [15] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred, that large urban areas cannot be assumed to be viable IFAs by virtue of their population size alone, and that the distance between the proposed IFA and the location of the persecutors does not, in itself, serve to establish that the IFA is viable. The Appellant states that the RPD failed to undertake any analysis as to how the population and geographies of the IFAs would make them viable safe havens in relation to the TTP or their allies. The Appellant submits that it is unreasonable for the RPD to find that the "anonymity" afforded by a large city will provide the Appellant with any degree of protection against the largest extremist group in Pakistan that has infiltrated every province in the country. [16] The Appellant submits that the RPD was unreasonable to compartmentalize Pakistan to establish that, where the TTP has a presence within a province, it still may pursue a wealthy Shia Muslim even if it does not have a "stronghold" within that IFA city. The Appellant submits that the objective evidence states that there is violence from the TTP in Sindh province where an IFA is located. The Appellant submits that the TTP is coordinated with other Sunni extremist groups, and the objective evidence shows that these groups are a presence in the Sindh province. The Appellant submits that the RPD "cherry-picked" the National Documentation Package (NDP) where it stated that the TTP's level of cohesion waxes and wanes, although the objective evidence goes on to state that the TTP remain dangerous and willing to break any short-term agreements they may reach with the Pakistani state. [17] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that there is no objective evidence that the TTP engages in long-term, cross-country tracking, as the question is not whether the country condition evidence establishes that the TTP tracks low-profile individuals but whether the TTP has the means to locate the Appellant. The Appellant submits that most persons extorted by extremist groups do not report it; that a lack of country condition evidence on tracking of extorted persons is expected; and that the TTP followed the Appellant and that they were able to locate the Appellant twice after he changed locations twice. [18] The Appellant also submits that the RPD erred in questioning the veracity of two affidavits that support that view that the TTP is still pursing him because they were not accompanied by identification while the caselaw states that identification need not accompany sworn affidavits. [19] The Appellant states that the RPD erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence that the TTP found out that he contacted the police, rather than guessing accurately that a civilian threatened by an extremist group would go to the police. The Appellant states that this is a negative credibility finding, and it is unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence in that there is no evidence that the Taliban guesses when someone goes to the police. The Appellant states that the TTP's knowledge of the police report substantiates its ability to track the Appellant. [20] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by failing to recognize that the agent of persecution has the means to pursue the Appellant through the established use of telephone networks and the internet to carry out its activities, as the objective evidence states that terrorist groups use stolen subscriber identification module (SIM) cards and the internet. The Appellant also suspect that the agents of persecution also use social media which may be how they found out about the Appellant's trip to the U.S. [21] The Appellant also submits that the RPD erred in finding that he would not be located through the tenant registration system owing to police corruption. The Appellant states that he was told by the police that, while trying to file a First Information Report (FIR) against the TTP, he was told to file it against unknown persons suggesting a degree of interaction between the police and the TTP. Findings - The Appellant has not established that the agents of persecution have the means and ability to locate the Appellant in the proposed IFA [22] The Appellant states that the RPD erred because the physical size and distance from the agents of persecution cannot assume that the proposed IFAs would be viable. I agree that factors such as physical size and distance from the agents of harm, on their own, may be insufficient to establish the viability of an IFA, and instead, a contextual approach is required. For instance, in the Abbas4 case, an important consideration is whether family members in the proposed IFA can be used to track down those being persecuted. In a recent case, however, the Court distinguished the Abbas case holding that "those cases involved situations where the claimants were specifically targeted by persecutors who were family members who could draw on family networks of communication."5 This is not the case in this appeal because there is no evidence that the Appellant has family connections in either of the proposed IFAs where agents of persecution could exploit to track the Appellant. I also note that the Appellant worked in China from 2007 and visited Pakistan occasionally. [23] As noted, the size and location of the proposed IFAs should be considered in the context of other factors in order to assess that they are viable. As I find below, there is insufficient evidence to support that the TTP or any other extremist groups would have the interest or ability to track the Appellant in either of the proposed IFAs. The Appellant is essentially stating that, because the TTP have some presence in various parts of Pakistan, the RPD has not established that the TTP would not pursue the Appellant in Hyderabad or Islamabad. The onus is not on the RPD to establish that the proposed IFAs are safe. Instead, the onus is on the Appellant to establish that he faces a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs. [24] I find that the RPD did not err in considering that the proposed IFAs would serve to provide some anonymity for the Appellant. Islamabad and its twin city of Rawalpindi has a combined population of over three million people and is some XXXX kilometres from XXXX while Hyderabad, another large urban centre, is some XXXX XXXX XXXX kilometres from XXXX. I also note that the NDP states that large urban centres, including Islamabad, have ethnically and religiously diverse populations and "offer some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors."6 [25] I disagree with the Appellant's submissions that the RPD erred in finding that the TTP did not have strongholds in Hyderabad and Islamabad and are not primary areas of the TTP's operation. The NDP makes it clear that the TTP is present in all four provinces of Pakistan, and there is evidence that the focus of this group is Karachi and other parts of Sindh and in Bolachistan.7 There is no mention that Hyderabad has been the centre of its operation or has experienced the level of threats as in other places within that province or other provinces. Again, while there has been attacks in Islamabad, there are relatively few, and they appear to be declining.8 I discuss this issue further below. [26] The Appellant is essentially arguing that the mere presence of the TTP within the province where the proposed IFA is located translates that the group has the ability and means to track the Appellant in the proposed IFA. There is no evidence to support this proposition in the NDP. The Federal Court has noted that this is not an issue of credibility with respect to whether the Appellant believes that he may be tracked by the TTP but, instead, whether he has provided sufficient evidence to support his allegation.9 The Courts state that the Appellant must establish that the agents of persecution have the means and motivation to track a claimant in a distant and large city.10 [27] I disagree with the Appellant's submission that, because the TTP located the Appellant twice in XXXX, they have the means and interest for long-term tracking. The TTP followed the Appellant in the same town, although different houses, after responding to extortion demands. I agree with the RPD's finding that the fact that his children were still attending school in the town does not suggest that, in fact, his family was in hiding, as alleged by the Appellant. There is no evidence that the TTP would be able to track the Appellant, three years later, to a different city hundreds of kilometres from XXXX. [28] Moreover, I find that the RPD was correct to find that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the persons that appeared at the house he relocated to in XXXX 2018 or that the persons calling his brother or making inquiries about him in XXXX 2018 were the persons who extorted him. The affidavits submitted by the Appellant do not provide compelling evidence in support of his allegations. The affidavit from his brother11 states that the Appellant's wife was approached by the TTP in XXXX 2019 in search of the Appellant. Hence, the Appellant's brother is relaying what he was told, and at any rate, the Appellant's wife only feared it was the TTP; there is nothing more she said to suggest that the TTP was involved. Moreover, the Appellant's wife did not submit a letter to support this allegation, although he maintains contact with her.12 The Appellant explained that she is part of the family as an explanation as to why she did not send a letter to verify this allegation. The Appellant's brother, who did send in an affidavit, is also a member of the Appellant's family.13 The only information that the Appellant's brother had direct knowledge is that someone phoned him in XXXX 2018, and that person identified himself as "XXXX"; however, he suspects, without further explanation, that the caller may be from an extremist group. [29] I also note that the person who rented a home to the Appellant submitted an affidavit, and he notes that he was not informed by the Appellant that the incident pertaining to the firing of a gun was related to the TTP until he had left the country in XXXX 2018.14 It does not appear to me that the affidavit from the Appellant's brother-in-law15 provides any probative evidence as to whether the TTP was involved with the threats to the Appellant or the ability to track the Appellant in the IFAs. [30] The Appellant submitted that the RPD erred in making a negative credibility finding with respect to the affidavits because no identification was attached to the affidavits. I agree with the Appellant's submissions that identification is not required for an affidavit to be relied upon in support of an allegation. However, I disagree that the RPD erred in giving no weight to the affidavits. In reading paragraph 14 of the RPD's reasons, it appears to me that the RPD gave the affidavits no weight because they provided very limited probative value as to whether, in fact, the TTP had followed two different locations in XXXX. I agree with the RPD that the affidavits provide little probative value in establishing that issue. [31] I find that the RPD was correct in finding that no persuasive evidence was provided to establish that the police or any other law enforcement in Pakistan were in any way working with or under the control of the TTP in seeking to harm the Appellant. In his narrative, the Appellant states that the TTP "somehow" found out that he reported a 2016 extortion request to the police and that led to another threat.16 I find that the RPD did not err in finding that the Appellant provided insufficient evidence to establish that the TTP has such influence with the police to know that he filed a police report about the incident. The Appellant frames the issue as one of credibility. However, this issue pertains to sufficiency of evidence to establish the allegation. Even if the TTP did somehow find out about the police report, the Appellant states that he, in fact, paid the extortion demand. This incident was over five years ago, and there is no evidence that, even if the TTP had some influence with the police, such influence would extend to the proposed IFAs. [32] Similarly, the Appellant is arguing that the TTP has sufficient influence with the police to trace the Appellant through the tenant registration system. I find this submission speculative and not based on country condition evidence. The NDP indicates that each province has its own laws which regulate the process of tenant registration, that there is variation between the provinces, and that such information is only shared in high-profile cases and not just any case, and only if absolutely necessary.17 It is used to allow the police to search if the person is wanted by the police. In this appeal, there is no evidence that the police have any interest in the Appellant. I find it is highly unlikely that, although there is corruption within the Pakistan police forces, information would be accessible to the TTP allowing them to find the Appellant in Hyderabad or Islamabad through the tenant registration system. I find that the evidence does not indicate that the Appellant is a person of interest to the police, and the objective evidence does not establish how the TTP would be able to access information in the tenant registration system about the Appellant's location if he relocated to any of the proposed IFAs. [33] Further, I disagree with the Appellant's submission that the TTP may use stolen SIM cards to extort money and that they use the internet to track people. The Federal Court has ruled that the submission that one's location can be traced through social media is not well founded because it was reasonable to conclude that the claimant "could keep this information private and that this was not akin to living as a fugitive."18 There is no fundamental right to the use of social media and, if the Appellant insists on using social media, he can set his profile information and social media posts to a private setting, and as the Court noted, this would not be akin to living as a fugitive. I also note that the Appellant did not provide any specifics as to how the TTP could find him through their use of electronic devices or the internet, other than a vague allegation. [34] I find that the Appellant has not established that the TTP has sufficient contacts with the police or the internet to contact him in any of the proposed IFAs. Whether the agents of persecution have the motivation and interest and ability to track the Appellant in light of his profile [35] The RPD found that the TTP and their networks do not engage in long-term and cross-country tracking for individuals who have a relatively low profile, such as the Appellant's profile. The RPD also found that there is a paucity of reports in the NDP that they target persons like the Appellant over an extended period of time, and it has been some time since his last problems with the TTP. [36] The RPD found that there is insufficient evidence that the Appellant's Shia activities, including attending and donating at his Imam Bargah, would establish a type of profile that may put him at risk in Pakistan in the IFA locations. [37] The RPD found that, although the Appellant stated that his family relocated from their home to another home in XXXX in 2018, the fact that his children were still attending school until two armed men threatened him meant that the Appellant was not in complete hiding while in XXXX. [38] The RPD also found that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the incidents where he saw the armed men in XXXX 2018 and the report of strangers near his residence involved persons from the TTP. [39] The RPD found, in reviewing the affidavit material, that the Appellant has failed to establish that the individuals who allegedly approached his spouse in XXXX 2019 were from the TTP or that the incident demonstrates on ongoing interest in the Appellant or his family. [40] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that the agents of persecution did not have the means or motivation to locate the Appellant in the IFAs. First, the Appellant states that the RPD did not provide an analysis of an important aspect of the Appellant's profile, namely, his perceived wealth. The Appellant states that the TTP finances itself through ransoms and extortion of wealthy persons, and they knew that he worked in China, that he had the resources to travel to the U.S., and that he paid the ransom demands twice. [41] Second, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that the TTP only targets high-profile people because the TTP also targets civilian Shias, including attacks on mosques. The Appellant also submits that it was unreasonable for the RPD to require a large, country-wide dangerous terrorist organization to have a stronghold in either of the proposed IFAs. The RPD erred in finding that the RPD is looking for a higher standard of proof and that the TTP are located in the IFAs than the balance of probabilities. Findings - The Appellant has not established that the agents of persecution have the motivation or interest to locate the Appellant in the proposed IFA [42] I find that the RPD did not err by not taking into account the Appellant's perceived wealth or that the TTP does not only target high-profile Shia people. I find that there is no evidence that the TTP would now know that the Appellant had returned to Pakistan and reside in cities hundreds of kilometres from XXXX or would be aware of his financial status, considering that his last encounter with them was in 2018. Further, the Courts have been consistent with respect to an analysis under section 97 of the IRPA, where a population are at risk of becoming the victims of violence, perceived wealth does not translate generalized risk into a specific risk for the claimant.19 I find that reasoning is analogous in this proceeding. The RPD asked directly why the Taliban, after being out of the country for a number of years, would still be targeting him. The Appellant's response was that he has not paid the extortion request, that he gave donations to his Imam Bargah, and that his name was read out many times during Friday sermons.20 The Appellant has provided insufficient evidence that he would be targeted solely due to his perceived wealth or how the TTP would know of his status should he return to Pakistan. [43] The objective evidence does support the view that high-profile Shias are most at risk, although there are instances where ordinary Shias have also been subject to extremist attacks. However, the NDP notes that the TTP has been responsible for the targeted "...killings of Shi'ite professionals and officials, including, doctors, lawyers, politicians, prominent business people and local traders."21 I agree with the RPD's finding that "there is a noticeable paucity of reports of them targeting individuals like the claimant by successfully tracking and locating such individuals over an extended period of time across hundreds of kilometers."22 Another document in the NDP states that the TTP's strategic document indicates that "legitimate targets for attacks" include military, police judiciary, civilian governments and "non-believers" who are observed to be working in collaboration with the Pakistani state.23 I also note that the Appellant testified that he knows of no other Shia in his community that has had problems with the Taliban in XXXX; however, he states that "we used to hear stories that this happened to so and so and that happened to so and so."24 The fact that the Appellant gave donations to his Imam Bargah at his local mosque does not necessarily suggest that his profile has been elevated so as to remain a target of an extremist group. [44] The Appellant did not provide any evidence that information about the donations were publicized outside of his name being read in the local mosque. According to his Basis of Claim form (BOC), the Appellant suspects his trip to the U.S., which is one of the reasons that the TTP thought he had money, was through a post on social media. The Appellant has not provided information regarding how any extremist group would find out that he has perceived wealth should he relocate to a new city a long distance from XXXX. [45] I find that the Appellant's personal profile does not establish that, on a balance of probabilities, he would be at risk of a serious possibility of being persecuted in the proposed IFA or that the Appellant would be personally subjected to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or to a danger of torture in the IFA. Whether the Appellant would face a serious possibility of persecution as a regular civilian in the proposed IFA [46] The RPD found that, although Shia Muslims face problems in Pakistan, the objective evidence indicates that Shias can live safely in that country. [47] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in determining that he would not face more than a mere possibility of persecution in Pakistan as a Shia Muslim. The Appellant selects a number of references from the NDP and relies on a number of articles submitted into evidence before the RPD to state that there is overwhelming evidence to find that Shias face persecution in Pakistan based on their faith alone. [48] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in requiring the Appellant to produce financial documentation or require his Shia religious activities to elevate him to a significant degree of notoriety because he explained that his donations were in strict adherence to his faith. The RPD did not err in its assessment of whether the Appellant would face a serious possibility of persecution as a regular civilian in the proposed IFA [49] I find that the RPD did not err in finding that the Appellant can live in relative safety as a Shia Muslim in one of the proposed IFAs. [50] The Appellant cites the objective evidence by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its 2017 report entitled "Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan," highlighting the sectarian violence against the Shias.25 [51] However, documents in the NDP that are more recent than the UNHCR document indicate that large urban centres have ethnically and religiously diverse populations and can give anonymity for persons fleeing violence from non-state actors.26 Moreover, a 2019 United Kingdom (UK) Home Office report on Shia Muslims states that Shia Muslims generally will be able to relocate internally to a place where they would not face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state actors, although each case must be considered on its individual merits.27 [52] The Appellant cites a section from the NDP Item 1.6, "Pakistan: Country Report," in support of his argument of the "crisis" of sectarian violence facing Shia Muslims in Pakistan and cites 1.13 that Shia are continuing to be targeted.28 [53] However, the NDP indicates that, year over year, sectarian violence is decreasing.29 One report noted:30 The report documented with regards to Sunni militants-religious groups that "The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Sunni militant groups and religious minority groups, especially Shiites, Ahmadis, Sufis, and Christians, continued. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jamaat-ul-Ahraar (JuA) and the so- called Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a majority of the attacks. Throughout the year, at least 240 people were killed and at least 809 injured, mostly in IEDs attacks or shootings. IS claimed responsibility for two attacks against Sufi Muslims". In its annual report covering events in 2017, the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) summarised the security situation thus: The past year continued the trend of declining violence over the last three years, with many outlaws arrested or convicted. Although the drop in violence-related fatalities was countrywide, the change fluctuates regionally, owing to several factors, including geo-political scenario alterations in the militant strategy. Internationally and domestically, terrorism has witnessed a decline. Daish lost territory in Iraq and Syria, while Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) lost its sanctuaries in the tribal regions of Pakistan. However, territorial loss does not translate to complete elimination, as they continued sporadic attacks throughout the year. Domestically, religious parties in favor of the militants either openly supported the Taliban or provided support in elections for the candidates who were considered to be affiliated with some banned outfits.... [54] Moreover, Item 1.13 notes: Overall, there was a 29 per cent decline in the number of reported terrorist attacks in 2018 (compared to a 16 per cent decline in 2017), marking a nine-year downward trend. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to face security threats from insurgent, separatist and sectarian militant groups.31 [55] A recent report by the Centre for Research and Security Studies corroborates that sectarian violence is declining while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) suffering the highest number of fatalities with 43, followed by Balochistan with 18, Punjab and Sindh with 11 each and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 8.32 The NDP also indicates that there are declining terrorist attacks in Islamabad, although there is more violence in the Sindh province, much of it is focused on Karachi, and the situation there has shown improvement in recent years.33 [56] The Appellant cites the NDP that provides evidence that state authorities in Pakistan do not provide adequate protection for minorities, including Shia and that blasphemy laws are used to target Shia Muslims.34 The Appellant also submitted various news articles in support of this position.35 [57] While there may be increased incidents of accusations of blasphemy directed toward Shia, the Appellant has not been accused or charged with blasphemy. [58] The Appellant's quotes from that confirms that the Shia continue to be the target of sectarian violence, and groups like the TTP have publicly called for them to be killed.36 Although there has been random sectarian violence, the NDP notes that about 96 percent of Pakistan's population is Muslim, and 15 to 20 percent are Shia Muslim.37 In light of Pakistan's overall population, Shia Muslims comprise approximately 17 to 26 million people, and the NDP notes that Shias live throughout the country in urban centres.38 Shias are represented in all walks of life and in many cases have succeeded in playing prominent roles in Pakistan's cultural sphere and attaining influential, high-profile positions.39 Hence, the sectarian violence against Shia in Pakistan is directed to all Shia generally, and it is necessary to consider the individual circumstances of the case to assess whether protection is warranted .40 After considering the evidentiary record in this matter, I do not find that there are individual circumstances to warrant protection. [59] A number of the articles provided by the Appellant do provide compelling or specific support for his allegations. Some of the articles provide a general background or historical perspective of the sectarian violence.41 A number of articles refer to recent incidents in Karachi42 or issues pertaining to the overall policing issues within Pakistan.43 I find these articles do not provide compelling evidence to establish that the Appellant faces a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs. Summary [60] In summary, I find that the Appellant has not provided sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he faces a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs. While the Appellant selectively used the NDP to show that there is sectarian violence in Pakistan, the NDP provides evidence that the Appellant, as a Shia Muslim, can relocate to either Hyderabad or Islamabad without facing a serious possibility of persecution. There is no indication in the objective evidence that Shias face a real risk of serious harm due to practicing their religion in Hyderabad or Islamabad. [61] Having independently reviewed the record, I find that the Appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the TTP have the means to find him in Hyderabad or Islamabad. Therefore, I find that the Appellant has not met the onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a serious possibility that he will be persecuted under section 96, or that there is a risk to his life, or danger of torture, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under section 97, in the proposed IFA. RPD findings with respect to the Second Prong of the IFA test [62] The RPD found that it would not be objectively unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate to one of the proposed IFAs. The RPD found that the objective evidence does not support the Appellant's contention that Hyderabad does not want other people from other provinces relocating there. [63] The RPD also found that it would not be unduly harsh to relocate in light of the profile of the Appellant considering his work experience, his ability to speak multiple languages and his work experience. The RPD also noted that four of five of the Appellant's children are adult. The RPD also noted that there is a significant Shia population in the proposed IFAs that would allow him to practice his religion. [64] The Appellant made no submissions with respect to whether it would be objectively unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate to one of the proposed IFA. I find that it would not be objectively unreasonable for him to relocate to either Hyderabad or Islamabad. Findings - It would not be objectively unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate [65] I find that, in light of the Appellant's profile, it is not objectively unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate to one of the proposed IFAs. [66] The Appellant has fourteen years of education, including university schooling and extensive work experience in Pakistan and China. He is well travelled and speaks Punjabi, Urdu, Cantonese, and some Mandarin and English.44 [67] There is documentation in the NDP that there is no evidence of systemic discrimination against the Shia in gaining employment in the public service, police, military or the private sector and they are well represented in the political process.45 [68] I have reviewed the evidentiary record, and I have not identified any particular circumstance that would make it unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate. There is no evidence of a mental health or medical issue, or any similar issue, that I need to consider. [69] Therefore, I find that the Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that conditions in Hyderabad or Islamabad are such that it would be objectively unreasonable for him to relocate and reside there. CONCLUSION [70] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Paul Muldoon Paul Muldoon August 18, 2021 Date 1 M.C.I. v. Huruglica (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas Del Solar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145. 2 Rasaratnam v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710; and Thirunavukkarasu v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). 3 Ranganathan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-191-03), von Finckenstein, November 20, 2003, 2003 FC 1367. 4 Abbas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-429-19), Ahmed, December 10, 2019, 2019 FC 1576. 5 Khan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6209-19), McHaffie, November 30, 2020, 2020 FC 1101, at para. 21. 6 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.13, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ?DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan, February 20, 2019, at p. 66. 7 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021) Item 1.24, European Union, European Asylum Support Office, Pakistan: Security Situation - EASO Country of Origin Information Report, October 2019, at pp. 18, 46 and 58. 8 Ibid., Item 1.24. 9 Kassim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5050-17), Southcott, June 15, 2018, 2018 FC 621, at paras. 23-25. 10 Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7762-19), Pamel, April 7, 2021, 2021 FC 284, at para. 29. 11 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5.1, at pp. 162-163. 12 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, December 8, 2020, at p. 20, at lines 43-45. 13 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, December 8, 2020, at p. 29, lines 38-50. 14 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5.1, at p. 159. 15 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5.1, at pp. 166-167. 16 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, at p. 23. 17 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021) Item 3.18, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Response to Information Request (RIR) PAK106026.E, Tenant registration systems, including implementation; whether authorities share information on tenant registration (2015-December 2017), January 23, 2018, section 3. 18 Rizwan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3796-16), Roussel, May 5, 2017, 2017 FC 456, at para. 14. 19 Prophète v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3077-07), Tremblay-Lamer, March 12, 2008, 2008 FC 331; 70 Imm LR (3d) 128, aff'd 2009 FCA 31, 78 Imm LR (3d) 163, at para. 23. 20 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, December 8, 2020, at p. 28, lines 35-46. 21 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.8, UNHCR, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan, January 2017, at p. 58. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 10. 23 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 7.8, IRB, RIR PAK106391.E, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban] (TTP), including leadership, structure, objectives, areas of operations, activities and targets; state response (2017-January 2020), at section 4. 24 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, December 8, 2020, at p. 21, lines 45-46. 25 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.8, supra, endnote 21. 26 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.13, supra, endnote 6, at p. 66. 27 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.16, UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Pakistan: Shia Muslims, Version 2.0, January 2019, at p. 9; and Item 1.12, UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note. Pakistan: Background information including internal relocation, Version 3.0, June 2020, at section 2.32. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 40-41. 29 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.16, supra, endnote 27, at pp. 31-32; and Item 1.6, Asylum Research Centre, Pakistan: Country Report, June 18, 2018. 30 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.6, Ibid., at pp. 38-39. 31 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.13, supra, endnote 6, at section 2.67. 32 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.5, IRB, RIR PAK106393.E, Situation and treatment of Shia [Shi'a, Shi'i, Shiite] Muslims, including Hazaras and Turi, particularly in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Hyderabad; state response to violence against Shias (2017-January 2020), January 15, 2020, at section 2. 33 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.24, European Union, European Asylum Support Office, Pakistan: Security Situation - Country of Origin Information Report, October 2019, at pp. 76-77 and p. 79. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 40-41. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 175-180, Exhibit 5.2, The Guardian, "Pakistani shias live in fear as sectorian violence increases", October 21, 2020; and pp. 206-211, Exhibit 5.2, VOA News, "Blasphemy Cases Against Shite Community Surge in Pakistan", October 28, 2020. 36 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.16, Minority Rights Group International, Pakistan: Shi'a and Hazaras, World Director of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, June 2018, at p. 1. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP (March 31, 2020), Item 12.1, U.S. Department of State (DOS), Pakistan: International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, June 21, 2019, at p. 4. Current version is: NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.1, U.S. DOS, Pakistan: International Religious Freedom Report for 2019, June 10, 2020, at p. 4. 38 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.5, supra, endnote 32, at p. 1. 39 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.5, ibid., at pp. 3-4. 40 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 1.8, supra, endnote 21, at p. 58. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 181-191, Exhibit 5.2, The Diplomat, "The Changing Landscape of Anti-Shia Politics in Pakistan," September 28, 2020; and pp. 212-213, Daily Excelsior, "Anti-Shia Protests in Pakistan," October 30, 2020; and pp. 214-217, Modern Diplomacy, "Is Pakistan the next Yemen?"; at pp. 233-239, The Diplomat, "The Resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan", July 18, 2020. 42 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 192-195, Exhibit 5.2, The Print, "Shia-Sunni rift on rise in Pakistan"; at pp. 196-205, Exhibit 5.2, Middle East Monitor, "If Pakistan is unwilling to protect its Shia citizens, they may look to Iran's Revolutionary Guards". 43 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 230-232, Exhibit 5.2, The Dawn, "Policing Principles", September 27, 2020; and pp. 218-229; The Nation, "Senior Police Officers not leaving offices to arrest criminal: CJP". 44 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 17, 26-27 and 35, Exhibit 2. 45 NDP for Pakistan (April 16, 2021), Item 12.5, supra, endnote 32, at section 2. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC1-01105 RAD.25.02 (May 19, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (May 19, 2021) Disponible en français