TB8-19311

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB8-19311 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision - Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit à Date of decision August 29, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Sasha Kiran Cragg-Gore Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Ron Shacter Counsel Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX), the appellant, is a citizen of Côte d'Ivoire. She alleged that she is scared of the XXXX because she worked for the XXXX XXXX from 2001 to 2011. She stated that she was fired by the XXXX XXXX in 2011 and that she was interrogated by the police in 2013 and 2014. She came to Canada in XXXX 2017 as a XXXX. After her arrival, police officers went to her house in Côte d'Ivoire a number of times and left her two summonses. They accused her of participating in a protest against the XXXX XXXX in 2016. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected the refugee protection claim primarily on these grounds: (a) She waited several years before leaving the country. (b) She stated that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. (c) The appellant stated that there had not been any elections since 2010, but the documentary evidence indicates that elections were held in 2015 and 2016. (d) She had no difficulty leaving the country in 2017. (e) The interrogations she endured are not sufficient grounds to establish a serious possibility of persecution. (f) She is not facing a serious possibility of persecution if she were to return because: i. the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; ii. she has never been imprisoned or mistreated; and iii. only XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX officials are at risk of being arrested by the authorities. [3] The appellant contested the RPD's decision and is now asking the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to recognize her as a refugee or person in need of protection, or, alternatively, to refer the case to the RPD for re-determination. She is asking to submit new evidence, but is not requesting an oral hearing for this appeal. She stated that: (a) The RPD did not analyze the evidence, particularly the summonses that are presumed valid. (b) The RPD erred in determining credibility before examining all the evidence. (c) The RPD misinterpreted the documentary evidence in its conclusion that solely XXXX XXXX XXXX are at risk. (d) The RPD cannot infer that she was able to leave Côte d'Ivoire scot-free because it did not consider the evidence pertaining to her departure. (e) Her ability to leave Côte d'Ivoire is irrelevant because she started to feel afraid after her arrival in Canada. THE ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [4] The RAD's role is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard of review after having carried out its own analysis of the record in order to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage, in which case the RAD may then defer to the RPD's findings.1 After conducting my own analysis of the record, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not have a meaningful advantage and that the correctness standard of review must be applied. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL AND SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS [5] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the determination of the RPD that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.2 [6] The appellant was never detained, tortured or mistreated by the authorities, and, even if she had been summoned by the police after she had left, she would not face a serious possibility of persecution if she were to return. Having worked as a XXXX for the XXXX XXXX more than 10 years ago does not expose her to a sufficiently serious possibility of persecution should she return to Côte d'Ivoire. Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate that she was an XXXX XXXX. NEW EVIDENCE [7] I can admit new evidence in an appeal only if it meets one of the following criteria: (a) It arose after the rejection of the refugee protection claim; (b) It was not reasonably available before the rejection of the claim; or (c) The appellant could not reasonably have been expected to have presented it at the time of the rejection.3 [8] If one of the above criteria is met, the evidence must also be credible, relevant and new. [9] The appellant wishes to submit the following evidence in this appeal: (a) A letter from her daughter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2018; and (b) A letter from her daughter, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. [10] I am admitting these two letters as new evidence for the following reasons. First, they are dated after the refugee protection claim was rejected. In addition, they mention events that occurred after the claim was rejected. They are credible, relevant to the appeal and new. For these reasons, I am admitting them as new evidence. HOLDING AN ORAL HEARING BEFORE THE RAD [11] In her written statement, the appellant does not request an oral hearing before the RAD. According to the case law, the onus is on the RAD to determine whether the criteria set out in subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) have been met.4 The new evidence corroborates events that occurred after the claim was rejected. I am not doubting the veracity of these events; they do not raise any issues of credibility nor are they decisive. For these reasons, there will be no oral hearing for this appeal. ANALYSIS Major inconsistencies regarding recent political events in Côte d'Ivoire [12] During the hearing, the appellant stated that there have not been any presidential or legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire since 2010, but the documentary evidence indicates that there was a presidential election in 2015 and an election for the National Assembly in 2016.5 I agree with the RPD's conclusion that this is a major inconsistency with regard to the documentary evidence. The appellant did not contest this conclusion. [13] When asked to explain how she could have forgotten these major events, the appellant stated she had misunderstood the question and, after, that she was stressed. I agree with the RPD that these explanations are not sufficient. [14] It is not reasonable that the appellant, a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX who was interrogated twice by the authorities, did not know that elections had been held in Côte d'Ivoire before leaving the country. The appellant not only worked for the XXXX, but she was also fired when XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. It is not plausible that she did not know that an election had taken place, given her background and allegations. I agree with the RPD that this inconsistency significantly undermines her credibility. Whether or not the appellant became an XXXX XXXX after having worked as a XXXX has not been established. A risk of persecution that is too remote [15] The appellant states that the RPD did not analyze or consider the summonses issued after she left Côte d'Ivoire. I agree that this is an error on the part of the RPD. I accept that the Ivorian authorities have been looking for the appellant and that they went to her house another time in 2018, according to new evidence. However, that does not establish that she would face a serious possibility of persecution if she were to return. [16] It is not the first time that the Ivorian authorities have been interested in the appellant. The last two times they met with her, in 2013 and in 2014, she was not detained, mistreated or arrested. If she were to return today, it has not been established that the police would do anything other than interrogate her as they did in the past. The appellant stated that the authorities suspect that she participated in a protest in 2016, but this is not the case. Therefore, unfounded suspicions such as these about her XXXX XXXX are not susceptible of exposing her to a serious possibility of persecution. [17] There is no valid motive for detaining or arresting the appellant today, more than 10 years after she worked as a XXXX for a XXXX that is now XXXX XXXX XXXX. Furthermore, in the years that followed, the authorities never opted to detain the appellant. Given that she has not been XXXX XXXX during that whole period, I find it difficult to see how she could experience any prejudice whatsoever if she were to return to Côte d'Ivoire today. [18] I have taken into consideration the summonses that are on the record. I see that they are asking the appellant to come to the police station. These documents are not arrest warrants, and it has not been established that she would be arrested. Given her background, the fact that it has not been established that she became an XXXX XXXX after she was fired and her prior interactions with the police, I consider it improbable that she would be arrested, detained or mistreated by the police if she were to return. [19] For the above reasons, the risk of persecution is too remote and too conditional to reach the level of a serious possibility of persecution. A XXXX XXXX of an XXXX XXXX who did not become a XXXX after she was fired and who has never been mistreated, detained or arrested by the police does not fit the profile of a person who would face a serious possibility of persecution. I find, like the RPD, that the appellant faces no prospective risk if she were to return to Côte d'Ivoire. [20] I agree with the appellant that the documentary evidence indicates that XXXX XXXX are sometimes targeted by the Ivorian authorities,6 but, since I have concluded that the appellant is not an XXXX XXXX, I do not believe she will face a serious possibility of persecution if she were to return. [21] I have also considered the possibility that the appellant will be perceived as an XXXX XXXX. According to the documentary evidence, a number of the XXXX XXXX who were arrested XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX have since been freed.7 There are XXXX who were XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and remain in custody to this day; however, the appellant was never an XXXX XXXX and has never been detained. Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate that she would risk being arrested if she were to return to Côte d'Ivoire. [22] In addition, the RPD found that the appellant is not credible, because she left Côte d'Ivoire without any problems at the airport. I agree with the appellant that that was an error on the part of the RPD, because, at the time, the police were not looking for her. However, this conclusion is not determinative and does not change my final decision. CONCLUSION [23] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the RPD's determination that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) "Sasha Kiran Cragg-Gore" Sasha Kiran Cragg-Gore August 29, 2019 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, A-470-14, Gauthier, Webb and Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93; Dahal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-330-17, Crampton, December 4, 2017; 2017 FC 1102, paragraphs 30 and 31. 2 Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 3 Pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 4 Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3425-17, Mosley, February 8, 2018; 2018 FC 147, paragraph 18. 5 Exhibit RPD-1, Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record, item 7, pp. 147-155. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, item 3, p. 85, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Côte d'Ivoire, version from April 30, 2018, Tab 4.3. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, item 3, p. 85, NDP for Côte d'Ivoire, version from April 30, 2018, Tab 4.2. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR: TB8-19311 RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration Et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français