TB3-09651

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-09651 TB3-09652 TB3-09653 TB3-09654 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision April 9, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Luis F. Agostinho Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Jack Davis Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and their minor children XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX are citizens of Colombia, and appeal their decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying their claims for refugee protection. The Principal Appellant has remained the designated representative (DR) for his children and is deemed to continue for a RAD appeal under RAD Rule 23(1). They have submitted no new evidence in support of their appeals. If the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) does not set aside the decision of the RPD and find the Appellants to be Convention refugees, they ask that the matter be referred to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. [2] The Appellants do not request that the RAD hold an oral hearing; only if the RAD deems one to be necessary do they request the services of a Spanish interpreter. Determination [3] Pursuant to Section 111(1) (a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. Their appeals are dismissed. Background [4] The Principal Appellant alleged before the RPD that over the past few years he worked as a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the marketplace in the city of Cali. The Principal Appellant believes that he was targeted by the FARC for extortion as he, along with other persons in his trade, were perceived to have money. The Principal Appellant's wife was employed as an XXXX for the cattle raisers for the past three years. The Principal Appellant alleges that in May 2011 in an attempt to extort him, the FARC threatened him with death. The Principal Appellant continued to go to work until July 2012. [5] The Principal Appellant further alleges that on July XXXX, 2012, three men came to his apartment in the early evening, and told him that he was to pay an extortion amount of 10,000,000 pesos from the next day's proceeds. The Principal Appellant decided to move his family and himself to his mother's residence a short distance away. In September 2012, the principal claimant and his family travelled to the United States of America (USA) since they already had tourist visas which had been acquired earlier. The Principal Appellant and his family left the USA, travelled to Canada on July 01, 2013 and entered Canada illegally on July 07, 2013 at an unmanned border in New Brunswick. [6] The Appellants' applications for refugee protection were heard on November 18, 2013. By a decision and reasons dated December 05, 2013, the RPD rejected their claims. The RPD found that the Appellants were lacking in credibility. Specifically, the Principal Appellant's testimony that he has not established that they had, or currently have, a subjective fear of persecution in Colombia. [7] The Appellants submit that the RPD made erroneous credibility findings which were not supported by the evidence and which, in some instances, were speculative. They submit that the RAD should reject the errors made by the RPD and, on the basis of the remaining evidence, accept the Appellants' refugee claims. In the alternative, the Appellants request that their claims be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. Analysis Nature of the Appeal Proceeding [8] The Appellants allege that the RPD made errors in its decision. The alleged errors concern credibility and plausibility and are therefore questions of fact. [9] The Appellants argue that this is an appeal and not a judicial review. The RAD's interpretation of the Appellants' argument is that the Appellants argue that this is a de novo proceeding. This is evidenced by the Appellants' statutory right to appeal, the RAD's broad power to substitute its own findings for that of the RPD, and the RAD's jurisdiction to consider appeals on questions of fact, law, and mixed fact and law. [10] In Newton v. Criminal Lawyers Trial Association, 2010, ABCA 399, the Alberta Court of Appeal considered the relationship between administrative tribunals and administrative appellate tribunals. The Court considered whether the appellate tribunal, in that case the Law Enforcement Review Board, properly chose to conduct a hearing de novo when considering an appeal against the decision of the administrative tribunal of first instance, in that case a presiding police officer. That Board considered various provisions of its enabling legislation, including those which gave the Board power to admit new evidence, and concluded that it should embark on a de novo hearing, and that, in fact, it was compelled to do so absent the agreement of the parties to do otherwise.1 [11] The Court disagreed, finding that neither the fresh-evidence provisions nor other sections of the Board's enabling legislation signalled an intention to require a de novo hearing in each appeal. The RAD notes that relevant sections of IRPA are similar to the legislative provisions considered in Newton. [12] Section 110(3) of IRPA provides that: Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal. Subsection (4) states that: On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. Subsection (6) gives the Refugee Appeal Division the discretion to hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [13] IRPA neither states nor signals that an appeal to RAD is a de novo hearing of the Appellant's refugee claim, and in fact the provisions set out above indicate otherwise. An Appellant bringing her case to the RAD has a restricted right to bring new evidence.2 The RAD is required to proceed without a hearing,3 unless there is new evidence which meets the requirements set out in Section 110(6). The effect of the restrictions on new evidence would be a de novo hearing where the Appellant is limited in her ability to present evidence to support her claim, despite having gained a new hearing of that claim. The RAD also notes that, in situations where it holds an oral hearing, the Rules require that a notice be prepared setting out the issues that will be raised at the hearing. The hearing is restricted to matters relating to those issues, an approach not at all consistent with a de novo hearing.4 [14] Having considered the Court's reasoning in Newton, as well as a plain reading of IRPA, the RAD finds that this appeal cannot result in a de novo hearing of the Appellants' refugee claim. Standard of Review [15] What is the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this appeal, where the appellate tribunal is to consider alleged factual errors and errors of mixed law made by the tribunal of first instance? The Appellants argue that the RAD should show little, if any, deference to the decision of the RPD. The RPD is not a specialized tribunal in relation to the RAD, as both Divisions belong to the same Tribunal. Further, an appeal to the RAD is a full appeal in that it is not limited to a review of the legality of the RPD decision. Finally, the RAD has broad power to substitute its own findings for that of the RPD, suggesting that it has the ability and expertise to determine the very same questions that were before the RPD. [16] In the Appellants' submission, the standard of review in this matter is one of correctness. [17] Although IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [18] In Dunsmuir,5 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the foundations of judicial review and the applicable standards of review, concluding that there are two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. Dunsmuir has limited applicability to the RAD, however, which is not a reviewing court but rather an administrative appellate body. In Khosa,6 the Supreme Court gave broad deference to a tribunal's interpretation of its own statute, but, again, this was not specifically in the context of an appeals tribunal reviewing the decision of a tribunal of first instance. As the RAD is a statutory creation, the standard of review must be extracted from the legislation. [19] In Newton, the Alberta Court of Appeal, having considered Dunsmuir and other jurisprudence, considered the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to a decision of a lower tribunal. The Alberta Court's analysis is therefore relevant in the context of the RAD, which has considered the factors set out in Newton:7 (a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; (b) the nature of the question in issue; (c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; (d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; (e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; (f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and, (g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [20] The respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation. The RPD's principal role is to hold hearings to determine whether refugee claimants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.8 An appeal to RAD may be made by the subject of the RPD proceedings or by the Minister against certain decisions of the RPD. An appeal may be made on a question of law, fact, or mixed law and fact, and the RAD is able to determine questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. After considering the appeal, the RAD must confirm the RPD decision, set aside that determination and substitute another, or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. [21] The nature of the question in issue. In this appeal, there is a question in issue of fact and one of mixed law, which favours a deferential standard of review.9 [22] The interpretation of the statute as a whole. The purpose and provisions of IRPA, when considered together, suggest a legislative intent to provide a fair and efficient adjudicative process which leads to finality. [23] Canada's refugee system is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted.10 Section 3(2)(e) of IRPA identifies as one of the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees: (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. [24] In the context of an appeal to RAD, this objective can be understood as ensuring that appellants receive a fair and efficient adjudication of their appeals and are given refugee protection when appropriate. This is consistent with Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA, which allows the RAD to set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in the RAD's opinion, should have been made. Further, Section 111(2) of IRPA places restrictions on the RAD's referral of matters back to the RPD. [25] Section 171(c) provides that a decision of a three-member RAD panel has precedential value for the RPD and for single-member RAD panels. Section 162(2) of IRPA requires that each Division of the IRB "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [26] The provisions set out above, when considered together with the "fair and efficient" reference in the Act's objectives, suggest that the RAD is empowered to bring finality to the refugee protection process and, to do so, may be entitled to show less deference to the RPD. [27] The expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal. Both the RPD and the RAD are specialized tribunals dealing with refugee protection. Neither is bound by legal or technical rules of evidence,11 and each can take notice of information and opinions within its specialized knowledge.12 In the area of fact finding and credibility assessment, however, the RPD holds a significant advantage. It must hold a hearing,13 while the RAD must, except in certain circumstances, not hold a hearing and must instead proceed on the basis of the record of the RPD proceeding.14 The effect of these provisions is that the RPD has the chance to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD will frequently not have this opportunity. Despite other similarities between the RPD and the RAD, this difference suggests that the RAD show deference to the RPD on findings of fact and particularly in respect to credibility,15 other than in situations where the RAD holds an oral hearing and there has opportunity to consider evidence first-hand. [28] The need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals, and preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance. In Newton, the Court noted that it is "singularly inefficient" for a first-level hearing to be repeated at the appellate tribunal.16 The Court observed that failure to show deference to the first-level decision-maker undermines the integrity of those hearings, which would, in effect, be reduced to a type of preliminary inquiry. In this respect, it is important to consider that one purpose of IRPA is to "establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system...." [29] When the Newton factors are applied to this appeal, they provide more clarity than does Dunsmuir in respect to the appropriate standard of review. There remains the matter of the interpretation of the legislation as a whole, and the conclusion that intended finality might lead the RAD to consider the refugee claim on its merits, showing little or no deference to the findings of the RPD. However, this is outweighed by other factors which favour a more deferential approach on questions of fact. The RAD is restricted in ways that the RPD is not, specifically in admitting evidence and holding oral hearings. The question in issue is one of fact, and the Courts have consistently held that triers of fact are better situated to make findings of fact at first instance.17 The RPD has the opportunity to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD may not. Failure to defer to the RPD on matters of fact and credibility would be singularly inefficient, would undermine the integrity of the RPD process, and would do nothing to limit the length and cost of appeals to RAD, as the RPD proceedings would be reduced to little more than preliminary inquiries. [30] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that, in considering this appeal, it must show deference to the factual and credibility findings of the RPD. The appropriate standard of review in this appeal is one of reasonableness. [31] Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility within the RPD decision-making process, but also with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in regard to the facts and the law.18 The RPD Findings [32] The Appellant argues that the RPD made various errors in its decision, and the RAD has considered those arguments. Specifically: [33] Failed to apply correct tests: The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its application of the test for a Convention refugee. The Convention refugee test: The test for whether a refugee claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution was set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Adjei.19 While a claimant must establish his case, on a balance of probabilities, the likelihood of persecution is subject to a different test: whether there is a reasonable chance of persecution. This test can also be described as "good grounds," a "reasonable possibility," a "serious possibility," or "more than a mere possibility" of persecution. In Ponniah,20 the Court elaborated on the standard, holding that "reasonable chance" occupies the field above the lower limit of a minimal or mere possibility and below the upper limit of a fifty percent chance or probability. [34] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in applying the wrong test for cumulative persecution, committing a fundamental error of law which taints the entire decision. He points to a passage from the RPD's reasons: " It has not been established on the balance of probabilities that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in Colombia for Convention reasons or a risk there to their lives, a risk of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, or a danger of torture. ..."21 [35] The RAD has some concern with the RPD's statement here. A refugee claimant must establish the facts upon which he bases his claim, and the civil standard is the appropriate means by which to measure such factual contentions. It was therefore not an error for the RPD to consider, on a balance of probabilities, whether the claimant's factual allegations - that he was or is targeted as a victim of extortion - had been established. However, when the panel considered whether the Appellant "would be" a potential target and victim, it was no longer considering facts and was instead assessing the likelihood of future harm. [36] It is unfortunate that the RPD used the term "balance of probabilities" when referring to the Convention refugee definition, without clearly setting out the Adjei test. Early in its reasons, the panel wrote that, "It has not been established on sufficient reliable evidence, and on the balance of probabilities that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Colombia for any Convention reasons, or a risk there to his life, a risk of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, or a danger of torture." Later, the RPD wrote, "...I conclude that it has not been established on the balance of probability that the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Colombia for any Convention reason, or a risk there to his life, a risk of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, or danger of torture."22 In both of these passages, the RPD cites a single test in relation to both Sections 96 and 97. [37] The test for Section 97 is different, and higher, than the Adjei23 test for Section 96. The RPD was required to consider whether it is more likely than not that the Appellant would be subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. As such, the risk under Section 97 is to be assessed on a balance of probabilities. [38] Although the RPD did a poor job of articulating the tests, it did state the test correctly at paragraph 20 of its reasons. It seems that, when the RPD did finally refer to the test set out in Adjei, it applied this to both Sections 96 and 97: "It has not been established that there is a serious possibility that the claimant would face the forms or degrees of mistreatment set out in either Section 96 or 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act."24 [39] The RAD finds that the RPD erred in law in assessing the Appellant's likelihood of future persecution on a balance of probabilities. The RPD wrongly expressed the test for Section 96 in several instances, and when it did correctly state it, it then erred in law by also applying that lower test to Section 97. However, these errors are not fatal to the RPD's decision, for the following reasons. [40] First, the RPD concluded, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's evidence was not credible. In doing so, the RPD properly applied the civil standard of proof, which is common to both Sections 96 and 97. As the Appellant's evidence was rejected, there was no credible evidence upon which to base the application of either test. It was the Appellant's lack of credibility, not the RPD's application of the tests, which caused the refugee claim to fail. There is no reason for the RAD to conclude that the outcome of the claim would have been any different had the RPD applied the tests correctly. [41] Second, while the RPD applied the incorrect test in considering the claim under Section 97, this error was in the Appellant's favour. Rather than considering whether it was more likely than not that the Appellant would be subject to a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, the RPD considered whether there was a serious possibility of such. This error could only benefit the Appellant, and his appeal cannot succeed on the basis of this error. [42] Credibility analysis: The Appellants argue that the RPD proceeded on the assumption that the Appellants were lying by not accepting their sworn testimony. The Appellant points to a few examples in the Appellants' record. The Appellant argues that these examples point to the negative determination with respect to credibility on inconsistency in the evidence regarding the Appellants' residency in a particular location. The RPD cited that when the Principal Appellant was asked where he and the other claimants went to live after living at the Principal Appellant's brother's home, the Principal Appellant provided an address which conformed substantially to the address provided in immigration documents. The Principal Appellant testified that he and his family were there for eight months. The RPD questioned the Principal Appellant regarding the inconsistency in dates. 25 The RPD cited that the responses "vacillated" and were unreliable with respect to the period of time the family stayed at this new location. [43] Upon review of the evidence, the RAD disagrees with the Appellants' argument. [44] It was reasonable for the RPD to arrive at the conclusion it did, based on the evidence before it, and the responses to the questions regarding the length of stay at that particular location. In the RAD's view, it was reasonable for the RPD to reject the Appellant's explanation that they had stayed at the location for eight months, then changed his testimony to ten months, and for the RPD to make a negative credibility finding based on the Appellant's inconsistent evidence here. [45] The Appellants further argue that the RPD did not cite any evidence regarding the FARC's modus operandi, and in particular how they prioritize their targets. The RAD has reviewed the NDP for Colombia,26 and it cannot locate in any of the documents, related to the FARC, it's modus operandi and in particular how they prioritize their targets. The RAD notes that this argument was made in the context that the RPD erred by drawing an adverse inference from the fact that the minor appellants stayed in school during the threat to the principal appellant.27 The RAD doesn't know why the RPD relied on the fact that the principal appellant's children continue to go to school in the United States and Canada. In assessing the RPD's finding in this area of evidence, the RAD finds this to be an unreasonable finding as it is not supported by the evidence orally or documentarily. [46] The Appellants argue that the whole determination by the RPD was based on credibility on perceived want of subjective fear. The RPD noted in its decision numerous accounts where it found that the Appellants lacked subjective fear, and made an overall credibility finding in relation to this issue. The RPD cited such examples as delay in departure, failure to claim in the US as part of its decision regarding lack of subjective fear. The RPD cited in its reasons that the Principal Appellant continued to work in his business, attending the marketplace and continuing to buy and sell pigs, and occasionally travelling outside Cali. The RAD notes that the Appellant had testified that he had commenced receiving death threats in May 2011, and the other Appellants received death threats in July 2012. Yet, the Appellants didn't leave Colombia until September 2012. The RAD agrees with the RPD finding that the Appellants lacked the requisite subjective fear based on their actions and this negatively impacted their credibility. [47] The subjective fear relates to the existence of a fear of harm in the mind of the claimant. The objective basis requires there be a valid basis for the fear.28 Both subjective fear and an objective basis for it are crucial elements. In Kamana,29 Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer held that the panel's finding that the claimant had not credibly established the subjective element was reasonable and that: "The lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is a fatal flaw which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the claim, since both elements of the refugee definition-subjective and objective-must be met." [48] The fact that the Appellants delayed in leaving their home country when threatened and the fact that the Appellants failed in claiming protection for over nine months, upon arrival in the United States, subjectively, fear serious harm or persecution at the hands of FARC in their home country. The RAD, for these reasons, finds that the Appellants lacked the requisite subjective fear to return to their home country. [49] The Appellants entered the US as visitors in September 2012; furthermore, the Appellants did not claim protection. Each of these facts - delay in leaving their home country and their failure in claiming after arriving in the US - is significant when considering the Appellants' subjective fear. Although the presence of any one of them may not necessarily be determinative, the RAD finds that these instances, when accumulated, are determinative. [50] Furthermore, as stated by the Federal Court, "... a negative finding regarding subjective fear may render the assessment of the objective aspect of the complaint superfluous and may in itself warrant the dismissal of the claim."30 The Federal Court has upheld this Board when denying a claim when making a finding of lack of subjective fear based on failure of the claimant to make a refugee claim in a country which is a signatory to the Convention.31 In the Bobic case,32 the court stated that an applicant's reasons for not claiming refugee status in a foreign country must be valid in order to avoid adverse inference. In the Cortes case, the court stated: "... this failure to pursue asylum during a period of more than 5 years is markedly inconsistent with a subjective fear of persecution. [51] Further, As Mr. Justice O'Keefe stated in the Garzon33 decision: "A finding that the applicant lacked subjective fear due to his failure to apply for asylum in the United States is sufficient, alone, for the Board to reasonably deny the refugee claim."34 For the reasons outlined above, the RAD finds the RPD finding to be reasonable. [52] When the RAD looks at the totality of the credibility analysis of the RPD, the RAD doesn't see the basis for the Appellants' argument that the RPD ignored Maldonado35 and presumed they were being untruthful. The RPD concluded that they lacked credibility only after assessing various inconsistencies in their testimony. The Appellants' argument of the RPD failing to give clear reasons36 is the specific instance that they rely on and appears to be unclear to the RAD, and as such the RAD finds this point not to be persuasive. SUMMARY AND DETERMINATION [53] The issue of the Appellants' subjective fear is a determinative issue as it grounds their allegation of being targeted and of facing a serious possibility of persecution if returned to Colombia. The RAD finds that the RPD's assessment of the Appellant's testimony related to their alleged subjective fear was reasonable particularly in light of the adverse credibility findings. The RPD's findings that the Appellants would not face a serious possibility of persecution, upon their return to Colombia, was also found to be reasonable. [54] The RPD found that the Appellants failed to credibly establish the material allegations upon which their refugee claims are based. The RAD, having considered the credibility determinations in its totality, finds that the RPD's decision to reject the Appellants' refugee claims fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. CONCLUSION [55] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. [56] Their appeals are, therefore, dismissed. (signed) 'Luis F. Agostinho' Luis F. Agostinho April 9, 2014 Date 1 Newton v. Criminal Lawyers Trial Association, 2010 ABCA 399, para. 22. 2 IRPA, Section 110(4). 3 IRPA, Section 110(3). 4 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Rules 56(1) and 57(1). 5 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 6 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. 7 Newton, para. 43. 8 IRPA, Sections 96 and 97. 9 Khosa, para. 89. 10 IRPA, Section 3(2)(a). 11 IRPA, Sections 170(g) and 171(a.2). 12 IRPA, Sections 170(i) and 171 (b). 13 IRPA, Section 170(b). 14 IRPA, Section 110(3). 15 Khosa, para. 89. 16 Newton, para. 80. 17 Khosa, para. 89. 18 Dunsmuir, para. 47. 19 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 683 20 Ponniah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.) 21 Reasons for Decision, paragraph 2 22 Reasons for Decision, paragraph 22 23 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 683. 24 Reasons for Decision, paragraph 20 25 Reasons for Decision, paragraph 10 26 RPD record, National Documentation Package for Columbia, May 3, 2013 27 Reasons for Decision, paragraph 20 28 Rajudeen, Zahirdeen v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1779-83), Heald, Hugesson, Stone (concurring), July 4, 1984. 29 Kamana, Jimmy v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., IMM-5998-98), Tremblay-Lamer, September 24, 1999. 30 Ahoua, Wadjams Jean-Marie v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 1239 at paragraph 16. 31 Garzon, Omar Yovani Ortiz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-925-10), O'Keefe, March 11, 2011, 2011 FC 299; Cortes, Carmen Alicia Mantilla v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1671-07), Barnes, February 27, 2008, 2008 FC 254. 32 Bobic, Petru v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2225-04), Pinard, November 5, 2004, 2004 FC 1488, paragraph #6. 33 Supra, footnote 29. 34 Goltsberg, Yuriy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-117-10), Kelen, September 9, 2010, 2010 FC 886; Gamassi, Hichem v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5488-99), Pinard, November 10, 2000), 194 F.T.R. 178. 35 Maldonado, Pedro Enrique Juarez v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-450-79), Heald, Ryan, MacKay, November 19,. 1979. Reported: Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.).M.E.I), [1980]2 F.C. 302 at p 305 36 Appellants' memorandum, paragraphs 41-42 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-09651 TB3-09652 TB3-09653 TB3-09654