TB4-06072

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-06072 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Redetermination of the Appeal Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision February 5, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Robert S. Garner Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Micheal Crane Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal and requests an oral hearing under the provision of s.110 (6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and substitute a decision with its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the RAD refer the matter back to the RPD with a differently constituted panel. [2] The original RPD hearing was held on June 5, 2014, and in a decision of June 19, 2014, the Appellant's claim for refugee protection was denied. The RPD found that the Appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground in Ethiopia and that she would not be personally subjected to a danger of torture or a risk to her life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [3] The decision was appealed to the RAD and in a decision of December 9, 2014; the RAD upheld the RPD decision. This decision was appealed to the Federal Court and on XXXX XXXX, 2015, Justice XXXX granted the appeal and referred the matter back to the RAD for redetermination, de novo. [4] A letter sent from the IRB on XXXX XXXX, 2015, indicating the following. Please be advised that any objections to the file content or to the composition of the panel should be made in writing, provided to every party and to the registry within 20 days after this letter was sent to you by the Assistant Deputy Chair or the Coordinating Member. The parties may also include additional submissions in response to the Federal Court Decision. [5] The Appellant submitted documentation, and a request under RAD Rule 29 to file additional submissions, and a letter on November 23, 2015 requesting that no redetermination be made for two weeks. This communication was submitted some XXXX days after the original letter sent by the IRB. In spite of this, the documentation and letter were accepted. The letter requested that no redetermination be made for a period of two weeks. A submission was submitted on XXXX XXXX, 2015 one month after the request. The submission was made almost 2 months after the original letter was sent to the Appellant. The Appellant has not honoured the timelines and process of the RAD. However, because this case is a de novo, the RAD will accept the new submissions and include them with the original submissions made for the first RAD decision. The RAD will make a determination using the information available on file. DETERMINATION [6] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. BACKGROUND [7] The Appellant is a XXXX XXXX employed with XXXX XXXX. During a flight to Frankfurt, Germany in XXXX 2014, the Appellant became involved in a conversation with two Ethiopian nationals. As a result of this conversation, the Appellant was detained, by government authorities in Ethiopia, for several XXXX and questioned about her involvement with the opposition party. During this detention she was kicked, slapped, and beaten. She denied all of the allegations and was released and returned to work after her brother paid money for her release. [8] During the flight to XXXX XXXX, on XXXX XXXX, 2014, the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX came to her hotel room and attempted to force her to have sex with him. She escaped, and ran to a co-worker's room where she spent the night. Upon returning home to Ethiopia, she reported the situation to management, but no action was taken. She learned that XXXX XXXX was an influential member of the ruling EPRDF. The Appellant fears political retribution, detention, and persecution, if she returns to Ethiopia. Memorandum of Appeal [9] In the original Memorandum of Appeal, the Appellant respectfully requested that the appeal be granted. In the subsequent Memorandum, the Appellant requested an oral hearing. In the November 23rd, 2015 letter, the Appellant submitted original documents of the new evidence submitted in the original Memorandum of Appeal to the RAD. In the Appellant's submission submitted December 24, 2015, she requests that the RAD admit the new evidence because it was directly relevant to whether the Appellant had made a complaint against XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXROLE OF THE RAD [10] Counsel made submissions regarding the role that RAD should play in review of an RPD decision. The RAD finds that the Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,1 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal, such as the RAD, to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error." [11] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Deference will be afforded to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [12] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant "may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [13] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 [14] While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such document, even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [15] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). [16] The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible and trustworthy. [17] The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence-whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence) of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal. [18] The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it would be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of the IRPA. [19] The Appellant submitted originals of the following documents to support her appeal: 1. The original letter of decision from XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014; 2. The original letter, XXXX XXXX, 2014, from XXXX XXXX indicating that she missed XXXX XXXX between the period of time from XXXX XXXX, 2014 to XXXX XXXX, 2014; 3. The FedEx express envelope dated XXXX XXXX, 2014. [20] Copies of these two documents were submitted in the original appeal to the RAD. Using the above information, the RAD will deal with each of these documents. [21] The letter dated XXXX XXXX, 2014 indicates that the Appellant made a complaint on XXXX XXXX, 2014, regarding an incident that occurred in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, 2014. The dates of the incident predate the date of the RPD hearing, XXXX XXXX, 2014, and the RPD's date of decision June 19, 2014. According to section 110(4) the above letter should not be accepted as new evidence because it could reasonably have been available prior to the RPD hearing. [22] The Appellant stated that she was concerned, because of the nature of the complaint, that her employer, XXXX XXXX, would not have complied and as a result did not make a request. The Appellant's argument is based upon an assumption that she could not obtain the documents. According to documentation and testimony, she made no efforts to obtain them. The Appellant did not provide any further explanation why she did not attempt to obtain these letters for her hearing. The Appellant was represented by competent counsel at her RPD hearing. Accordingly, the Appellant could reasonably be expected to have tendered these documents at the time of her hearing or before the rejection of her claim. [23] After her claim for refugee protection was denied, she made the request to the XXXX. The basis of her claim was fear of the government and XXXX XXXX because of his political affiliation and his anger at the Appellant having made a complaint against him. One could expect that the Appellant would immediately have made every effort to acquire the necessary documentation to substantiate her claim against XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds it does not find it credible that the Appellant would not have taken this action after making a refugee claim, given that it forms one of the bases of her claim. However, the RAD will consider the other factors outlined above before deciding whether to admit this document as new evidence. [24] The letter submitted is not specific and vague regarding the complaint. In the Basis of Claim BOC narrative,4 the Appellant is quite specific about XXXX XXXX forcible attempt to have sex with her. According to the letter submitted, the Appellant filed a complaint report, no mention is made of whether this complaint was oral or written. However, the word "file" suggests that it was written. A copy of this alleged report was not included in the documentation submitted for this claim. In addition, the XXXX XXXX, 2014, letter also has many errors such as: not capitalizing the date that the letter was allegedly drafted, no punctuation after the address to the Appellant, incorrect language (complain instead of complaint), similar errors on the same line, a misspelling of the word lack (luck) in the second paragraph, and grammatically incorrect language in the same sentence. [25] As a result of the above, the RAD gives no probative value to this letter. It is not credible that a nationally recognized XXXX would communicate using such structurally inaccurate English. The RAD also finds that the vagueness of the complaint is telling. The RAD does not admit this letter as new evidence, and finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the document is fraudulent. [26] The second letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014, has some of the concerns outlined above. The language and syntax are poor. The letter is vague and gives no explanation of the Appellant's reasons for missing the flights. The letter does not substantiate the Appellant's narrative and testimony that she was held in custody for XXXX XXXX because of allegedly consorting with other politically aligned Ethiopians when out of Ethiopia. No other documentation was available in the file to substantiate these allegations. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the two documents submitted are fraudulent, and draws a negative inference regarding the Appellant's credibility. The RAD will not accept this letter as new evidence, and finds it not probative in relation to the Appellant's refugee claim. [27] The FedEx envelope is not probative as to the basis of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. [28] As a result of not accepting these documents as new evidence, the Appellant's request for an oral hearing, pursuant to section 110(6) of the IRPA, is denied, according to s.110 (3.1), (4), and (6) Of IRPA. Merits of the Appeal Return to Ethiopia [29] The RPD found that the Appellant did not demonstrate subjective fear because she returned to Ethiopia after flights to China and XXXX XXXX, both signatories to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, as well as the 1967 Protocol. The RPD based this finding on the fact that the Appellant had allegedly been detained, by government authorities, for XXXX XXXX, because of an alleged contact with other Ethiopians while out of the country. The Appellant's explanation for returning to Ethiopia was, "... Happy, I was paid well I was with family did not think to claim in China." When questioned about not claiming in XXXX XXXX, the Appellant replied, "It did not occur to me." Given these responses, the RPD concluded that the Appellant did not demonstrate subjective fear of returning to Ethiopia based on her fear of the government, even after being detained and beaten in prison. As a result, the RPD found that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA because she had not demonstrated subjective fear, a necessary requirement. [30] The Appellant submits that the RPD placed a great deal of weight on the fact that she said she was happy to be in Ethiopia. The Appellant submits that there was no evidence on file regarding the refugee system in China, and commented on China's lack of democracy, and lack of respect for human rights. The Appellant submits that it is not reasonable that she would make a refugee claim in XXXX XXXX given the trauma of the attack by the XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant also submitted that there was no evidence concerning the XXXX XXXX Refugee System before the RPD. [31] In the submissions of December 24, 2015, the Appellant submits that the RPD's finding that she had been released and so was not seen as an associate with political parties, is speculative. The Appellant supports this by quoting her testimony that she did not know why she was released, but that her brother paid a bond of 8000 Birr. The Appellant also testified that she was detained but because of a lack of evidence, was not charged. Quoting documentation5 the Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider that it was an error to deny protection to a refugee claimant on the ground that a claimant can avoid persecution if she or he lies to provide a cover story. [32] Quoting Hathaway,6 the Appellant submits that not making a claim in a given country is not fatal to subjective fear. The Appellant submits that it was unreasonable to find that there was no subjective fear for not having made a claim in China. In referring to XXXX XXXX, the Appellant references her testimony at the hearing, (2:32-2:33), (2:34-2:35-2:36), to indicate confusion and anxiety she felt after the attack.7 [33] The RAD rejects the Appellant's submissions regarding both China and XXXX XXXX. The Appellant could have made inquiries about seeking protection in China, and decided against it. However, she did not make an effort, according to testimony and documentation. If she had rejected China as a safe country, even though it is a signatory of the Convention, she had another opportunity to seek safety in XXXX XXXX. Her testimony that she did not think of it is telling. The alleged prison detention, by government authorities, occurred prior to her flights to these countries. [34] The RAD notes that the Appellant produced no probative documentation to support her allegations of being detained in prison for XXXX XXXX and beaten during this time. No documentation was presented to prove that her brother paid a fine in order for her to be released from detention. It would be reasonable to expect that documentation, in the form of a receipt, to support the payment of a fine would be produced. [35] If the allegation noted above was credible, it would be reasonable that the Appellant would seek safety at the first opportunity. In listening to the Appellant's testimony at the RPD hearing, she made no effort to seek protection in China or XXXX XXXX because she was happy, content, and well-paid in Ethiopia. The RAD finds that this lack of action by the Appellant to seek safety after allegedly being detained and beaten by government authorities is not credible. With regards to the Appellants submission that the RPD found her credible regarding the allegations against the government, the RAD notes that the RPD used the word, "alleged",8 in relation to her allegations of persecution by the government. [36] It is reasonable that after the alleged sexual attack by the XXXX XXXX, the Appellant would be distressed. However, if the Appellant had fears about the government and their actions, as alleged, it would be reasonable that she would have taken action to seek safety upon arrival in XXXX XXXX, a safe third country. The RAD notes that in her documentation, her response to the question, "Why did you leave at that time [XXXX XXXX, 2014 (Canada)] and not sooner, or at a later time?" was, "This was my first opportunity to go to a safe country." The RAD rejects this as a credible response in that the Appellant had been in a safe third country, XXXX XXXX, and made no effort to seek refugee status there. [37] The RAD rejects the additional submissions by the Appellant, dated December 23, 2015. The submissions are predicated upon the fact that the Appellant was detained by government forces for XXXX XXXX, and that the XXXX XXXX attempted to sexually assault her. As stated earlier in this decision, no probative documentation or evidence was produced to support these allegations. The RAD found the Appellant not credible because she submitted fraudulent documents. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant has not been credible regarding her allegations of government imprisonment and the attempted sexual assault. [38] The RAD rejects the Appellant's submissions that documentation regarding refugee systems in both China and XXXX XXXX were not on record. The RAD finds that the RPD is an expert panel, and is expected to have knowledge about the refugee systems in countries that are discussed during a refugee claim. This is evidenced by the RPD's statements regarding both China and XXXX XXXX being signatories of the Convention. [39] The Appellant has not demonstrated subjective fear, as demonstrated by her willingness to return to Ethiopia, a country that allegedly had persecuted her because of an alleged contact with other Ethiopians when out of country. The RAD finds that the Appellant's claim under section 96 of the IRPA fails. No probative documentation was submitted to substantiate the Appellant's allegations that she feared persecution from the existing Ethiopian government, or that she was a member or tied to a political opposition party. IRPA, Section 97 [40] The RPD gave the following reasons under section 97(1)(b), to support the finding that the Appellant would not face a risk to her life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment at the hands of the government should she return to Ethiopia. [41] The RPD found that the Ethiopian government released her from prison because there was no basis or evidence to support that she was tied to a political organization. This release, on a balance of probabilities, that the government was satisfied she was not a member of any political opposition party, and their interest in her ceased upon her release. [42] The Appellant alleged that the XXXX XXXX is owned by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and it was her actions, while employed by the XXXX, that led to government suspicions. However, she was allowed to return to work on XXXX XXXX, 2014, after missing XXXX XXXX, indicating that the government no longer found the Appellant to be a threat, a security risk, or member of an opposition party. [43] The Appellant stated that she was not approached again by government or security forces and was able to live happily with no further encounters with the government or security agents. [44] The RPD noted that when the Appellant was asked questions to establish an understanding as to why she feared that the government would continue to pursue her in the future, she made continual responses such as: "probably, maybe, might, it could be, I am just guessing, and I am just thinking." As a result, the RPD found the Appellant's statements to be speculative and that she was not able to provide any confident or clear evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the government or security forces would threaten her life or inflict cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon her return to Ethiopia. The RPD also found that the claimant had not established an objective basis, on a balance of probabilities. [45] The Appellant submits that the points made by the RPD in relation to section 97(1)(b) do not consider the entirety of section 97 of the IRPA. She submits that the RPD used the wrong test in the section 97 finding by omitting the term, "risk."9 [46] The Appellant submits, using Federal Court documentation10 that the RPD's contention that she was highly speculative regarding the government's motivation was irrelevant. "How could she know that?" The Appellant submits that the short time period between her release and the date she left Ethiopia did not merit protection, and the RPD's finding was unreasonable. In further submissions, The Appellant requests that the RAD find that the Appellant had been persecuted in the past because she was detained, mistreated, terrified, and released without warning not to reveal what happened to her. The Appellant quoted case law to support this view.11 The Appellant also challenges the RPD finding that the government authorities took no further interest in her. She states that the period of time that she was in Ethiopia was minimal, given that she was flying to China and XXXX XXXX. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in reasoning that the Appellant was guessing because she could not give details regarding the detention. [47] The Appellant submits that the RPD found her credible in relation to what had occurred. She also maintains that the RPD was unreasonable in finding that the Appellant should have some knowledge regarding the government authorities when they detained her. [48] In reviewing the Appellant's reference to the incorrect statement of 97 (1) (b), the RAD notes at the beginning of the paragraph referred to by the Appellant, the RPD does use the correct test in referencing the decision written below. [49] As stated above in this decision, the Appellant produced no probative documentation to support her detention and persecution by the Ethiopian government. The RAD agrees with the Appellant's reference to documentation12 that Ethiopian forces can detain persons without charges or any given reasons, [50] The Appellant also stated that she was allegedly kept in custody for XXXX XXXX. In reviewing the Appellant's testimony, she testified that this alleged incident occurred because of her contact with other Ethiopians when out of the country. She alleged that she was being beaten and persecuted. It is not credible that such allegations, if truthful, would not have been accompanied by questions regarding any number of activities in Ethiopia. It is not credible that the Ethiopian authorities would have not indicated some of their intent, through the use of questioning, during the alleged XXXX XXXX detention and beating. [51] In reviewing the recording, the RAD found that the Appellant prefaced her statements of potential persecution by the Ethiopian government, with indefinite words. The Appellant did not state with any surety that any of her allegations would come to pass, or produce, as stated above, any documentation to support these allegations. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's allegations regarding her detention, persecution, beating, and future fear of the government are not credible. The Airlines XXXX [52] The RPD found that the Appellant provided no persuasive evidence to support the allegation that she filed a complaint against XXXX XXXX. No documentation was on record. When the Appellant was asked why this documentation was missing, she testified that she did not think XXXX XXXX would cooperate because she had left them. The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's neglect to obtain possible evidence, stating that her explanation was pure speculation, not founded in fact. [53] When questioned by the RPD if she was aware of what happened after she filed her complaint, she stated that she did not know. She gave the same response when asked if any actions were taken against XXXX XXXX. The RPD found the Appellant's belief that he would seek revenge against her speculative as there was no objective evidence to establish that he is even aware of report against him that has been made. The Appellant testified that she had not received any threats from XXXX XXXX after the incident. She testified that her fear was based on a report from a fellow employee that he was influential member of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party of Ethiopia, and that he would seek some sort of revenge for having reported him. The RPD found that the Appellant did not present evidence which established, on a balance of probabilities, the objective basis of her allegations. The RPD stated that while the events described by the Appellant are disturbing, there was no evidence, on a balance of probabilities, that XXXX XXXX had a desire to pursue the Appellant any further than this attack. The RPD found that the Appellant had no objective basis for fear. [54] The Appellant found that the RPD's findings on this issue were unreasonable; submitting that the Gender Guidelines13 recommend a lessening of the burden of proof and the fact that the Appellant did not have proof of the complaint should not have been reason to discount her evidence. The Appellant submitted case law to support this submission. [55] In further submissions, the Appellant referenced her testimony at the RPD hearing, she outlined her fears of being put in jail and tortured. She outlined her confusion after the attack and testified she did not know what to do. [56] In reviewing the documentation, the RAD finds that the Appellant did not produce any probative documentation to support the allegation that she made a complaint regarding the sexual attack by the XXXX XXXX. The RAD also found, as stated above that the documentation submitted was fraudulent, and drew a negative inference with respect to the Appellant's credibility. The RAD also finds that no documentation was submitted to support that XXXX XXXX was an influential member of the XXXX Ethiopian political party. In listening to the recording of the RPD hearing, the Appellant also testified that he had not attempted to contact her since the alleged sexual assault, and the alleged subsequent complaint. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the alleged attack and subsequent complaint never occurred, and that the Appellant has not been a credible witness in this regard. [57] The RAD finds that the RPD's findings must be considered in the context of its overall analysis. The RAD finds that the Appellant's release from alleged custody, her ability to return to work with the XXXX XXXX (allegedly tied to the Ethiopian government) after missing XXXX XXXX, her ability to carry on with her life in Ethiopia without any difficulties, lack of any contact with government or security forces, and no further pursuit by XXXX XXXX XXXX who allegedly sexually assaulted her, are proof that there are no obvious reasons why the Appellant should fear a risk to her life or well-being should she return to Ethiopia. The RAD notes that no further evidence regarding pursuit by the authorities or the XXXX XXXX were provided in either Memorandum of Appeal. The RAD rejects the Appellant's submission regarding the Appellant's limited time in Ethiopia after the alleged attention by the government. If the allegations were credible, one could expect that the Appellant fresh from these alleged beatings and persecution, would be more inclined to seek immediate relief when arriving in a safe third country. The Appellant was reemployed by XXXX XXXX, and continued to live happily according to her testimony. [58] In listening to the recording of the RPD hearing, and reviewing the documentation, the RAD found that Appellant's testimony was speculative with regard to potential future difficulties with the government should she return to Ethiopia. The Appellant provided no clear or definitive statements regarding potential future difficulties. The Appellant also did not indicate that she had knowledge of people in similar circumstances suffering from any consequences by the Ethiopian government. The RAD finds that the failure of the RPD to mention all sections of section 97 (1) (b) of the IRPA in all sections of its decision is not fatal to the claim. CONCLUSION [59] In reviewing the Appellant's testimony and documentation provided, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant has not established a serious possibility that she would be persecuted or that she would be personally subjected to a risk to her life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture by any authority in Ethiopia. Disposition [60] The RAD dismisses the appeal, and according to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA confirms the determination of the RPD and finds that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) "Robert S. Garner" Robert S. Garner February 5, 2016 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799. 2 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, at para. 51. 3 Rule, 3(3)(g)(iii), Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 21-23. 5 Donboli, Khosrow v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3013-02), Dawson, July 16, 2003, 2003 FC 883. 6 The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd edition (2014), page 98.20, Hathaway and Foster. 7 Exhibit P-3, Appellant's submissions. at p.7. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 5, para10. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 29, para 40 10 Chen v Minister of Employment and immigration,[1993] F.C.J. No. 996, Kong v Minister of Employment and immigration[1994 F.C.J. No. 101]. 11 Kaler v Canada (M.E.I.), [1994]F.C.J, No. 134,Wickramasinghe v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Date: 20020426 Neutral citation: 2002 FCT 470 (FCTD). 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Ethiopia (March 14, 2014), item 2.1. 13 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-06072