VB7-06194

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB7-06194 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 11, 2018 Date de la décision Panel Patricia Broad Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Russell Weninger Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (appellant), a citizen of Egypt, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting her claim for refugee protection. She claims that the authorities in Egypt persecuted her for what they perceive as her political beliefs. The appellant has requested to submit new evidence and has requested an oral hearing to review that evidence. The appellant has requested that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the RPD's decision and substitute it for its own determination that she is a Convention1 refugee or a person in need of protection. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or the Act),2 the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of IRPA nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of IRPA. BACKGROUND [3] The appellant was born in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. She lived with family in Cairo, Egypt. She bases her claim on the following. [4] She lived with family members. She worked in a clothing shop. The owner was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. She never talked with the owner directly; she communicated with a manager. In 2014, the authorities came to question the people who worked at the shop. She was detained for three days. She was released. She and her daughter did not tell her brother about the detention, although she lived with him. After that, she stopped working at the shop. She slept a lot and was not in a good frame of mind. [5] In May 2016, the appellant came to Canada. Her daughter had given birth and she came to help her. While in Canada, she found out that the authorities had been to her house in Egypt looking for her. She claimed Convention refugee status. [6] The RPD held a hearing. The appellant was represented by counsel and an interpreter was present. The appellant's son-in-law was an observer. The RPD found that there was insufficient credible evidence that the appellant was a Convention refugee and/or a person in need of protection. [7] The appellant has appealed this decision to the RAD. She argues, inter alia, that there were problems with the translation. Further, the RPD did not address the evidence properly. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [8] The appellant presented the following evidence upon appeal to the RAD: * An affidavit from the appellant, dated November 14, 2017; * Partial transcripts of the RPD hearing prepared by a student-at-law; and, * A translator's "Comments on Excerpts of an Audio File", dated October 19, 2017. [9] It should be noted that while the appellant submitted a large amount of case law to the RAD this does not constitute new evidence. [10] Section 110(4) of the Act states: 110(4) On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [11] RAD Rule 3(g) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules)3 states that the appellant must present submissions regarding how the documentary evidence meets the requirements and how the evidence relates to the appellant. [12] The appellant must establish that the evidence arose after the rejection of their claim or that it was not reasonably available. Alternatively, the appellant must establish that he could not have reasonably been expected to have presented the evidence at the time of the rejection. RAD Rule 3 states that there should be submissions on this as well as the relevance of the evidence. [13] I have also considered the "Raza principles" as modified by Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) in Singh.4 It directs the Tribunal to consider the credibility, relevance and the newness of the evidence. In terms of credibility, the RAD should consider credibility on in terms of its source and the circumstances that it came into existence. This is different than a credibility assessment for the purpose of adjudicating the appeal, which looks at the credibility of the content of the document. [14] In this case, the evidence clearly arose after the hearing as it pertains to a translator's comment on the interpretation at the hearing. The appellant's affidavit, the partial transcript from the student at law, and the transcript from the appellant's translator are all accepted into evidence. DETERMINATION ON WHETHER TO HOLD AN ORAL HEARING [15] Section 110(6) of the Act delineates when the RAD is permitted to hold a hearing. It states: 110(6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [16] This section states that the RAD can hold a hearing when there is new evidence that raises a serious credibility issue. Further, the evidence must be central to the decision. In addition, there is a requirement that the evidence would justify a final decision allowing or rejecting the claim. [17] I have considered the appellant's request for a hearing. I find that I do not need a hearing for credibility. The appellant has argued that the errors in translation were material to the credibility findings. She has submitted a translator's evidence of specific errors in the translation. I accept the specific corrections in the appellant's testimony as set out in her translator's affidavit. Aside from the specific corrections, the appellant's translator has made several vague references to errors in translation. For instance, he states that the review showed "numerous instances of omission" and "verbatim interpretation was not always observed".5 He noted that the interpreter was Lebanese and that the appellant might not have understood the interpreter. The translator stated that the appellant spoke a colloquial Egyptian dialect and the interpreter may not have understood. [18] The issues with interpretation are addressed in a more fulsome matter in the analysis of the decision. However, it is worth noting that the RAD is not a forum to re-adjudicate the entire appeal after the fact. There are specific limitations in the RAD's ability to hold an appeal. Further, if there is an affidavit pointing out errors in translation they must be precise errors in the interpretation. Further, the errors should show that the appellant's credibility is raised, or that the errors are such that they are central to the appeal, or that if the errors are accepted, the appeal would be accepted or rejected on the basis of it. In order to make this argument, the appellant must be able to show how the errors fit into this category. The vague references to error are not sufficient. Further, I have adjudicated this appeal accepting the specific corrections set out by the appellant. I do not find that the appellant has shown that the new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to credibility. It was already raised. Further, I have accepted the precise changes noted and, as will be shown in the analysis, do not find that they relate to the central findings of credibility. They are not central to the decision and would not justify allowing or rejecting the claim. Rather, they relate to matters that are not central to the issues of credibility. The content of the corrections are discussed further in the decision. For these reasons, I find that the new evidence does not meet the requirements of section 110(6). [19] In addition, I do not see value in having a hearing after I have reviewed a transcript of the hearing, the recording of the hearing, and have accepted the points specified in the appellant's interpreter's affidavit. I note that the recording of the hearing was over three hours long. The recording does not including the breaks taken for clarification and so that the appellant could contact witnesses. The appellant was given and a full and fair opportunity to present all of her evidence. The questioning by the RPD was thorough. The appellant had counsel who had a responsibility to present all of the evidence in her favour. [20] In Singh6 the FCA upheld the principal that evidence is to be presented in a fulsome manner at the RPD level. The RAD's ability to hold a hearing is limited through legislation. To hold a hearing to allow the appellant to represent her case when the criteria for section 110(6) has not been met is an aberration of the principles of Act. It appears that this request is in fact, a request to re-adjudicate everything. Without meeting the criteria of section 110(6), the RAD does not have jurisdiction to do so. [21] However, even if the RAD had the jurisdiction to do so, I would not find that a hearing to re-adjudicate everything is necessary. The record before me is complete to fully adjudicate this appeal. I have considered the flaws with the record that were specified and have accepted them as an accurate description of a flaw with the alternative interpretation. I find that this, in addition to the recording of the hearing and the full transcript of the hearing, is a sufficiently reliable presentation of the evidence upon which to rely on. I find that I can make a sound decision with confidence on the basis of it. SCOPE OF RAD APPEAL [22] The role of the RAD has been considered in depth by the FCA. In the Huruglica7 decision, Madame Justice Gauthier wrote that the RAD must apply the standard of correctness when considering RPD decisions where there is a finding of fact and mixed law and fact which does not raise an issue of credibility of oral evidence. After doing an independent analysis of the record to determine if the RPD erred, the RAD provides a final determination by confirming the RPD decision or by setting aside the RPD decision and substituting its own decision for it. If the RAD cannot provide a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD, the RAD can refer the matter back to the RPD for a determination. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [23] I have conducted an independent assessment of the evidence and arguments. This review includes listening to the entire recording of the hearing. The compact disc of this recording is in evidence. For the sake of accuracy, I also ordered a transcript and reviewed it while listening to the hearing. Between the two sources, and with my consideration of the appellant's evidence from her translator, I have sufficient evidence for the content of the hearing to make a decision with confidence. Credibility and deference to credibility assessment [24] In this instance, the RPD did not have any real advantage in assessing the credibility that would lead to deference to its finding regarding it. The RPD does not state that there were any difficulties with the appellant's testimony where the RPD would have been in a better position than the RAD to judge it. The RPD states that the appellant lacked credibility as there were inconsistencies in her testimony with those of others. These comments relate to the substance of the testimony and not to any behavioural or any other item that the RPD could observe and the RAD could not. For these reasons, I do not find that the credibility findings are owed deference. I will address findings of credibility in the course of this decision. Did the appellant have sufficient interpretation at the RPD hearing? [25] The appellant has argued that the quality of translation at the hearing was so poor that she was not able to adequately tell her story. I have looked into this thoroughly and find that she had adequate interpretation at the hearing. [26] After the hearing, the appellant had a student-at-law transcribed certain key sections of the hearing. Counsel than obtained a translator's opinion of the transcribed portions as well as the complete original audio file. As noted before, the translator stated that the reviewed portions showed "numerous instances of omission" and "verbatim interpretation was not always observed".8 He noted that the interpreter was Lebanese and that the appellant might not have understood the interpreter. The translator stated that the appellant spoke a colloquial Egyptian dialect and the interpreter may not have understood. [27] However, other than the points clearly identified, the interpreter does not identify where the miscommunications occurred. The appellant argues that it is "possible" that the words and terms used were not "entirely understood" by the interpreter.9 This is not sufficient to show that there was an error. The onus is on the appellant to point out errors and demonstrate that they are sufficiently significant that the appellant did not have a fair opportunity to present her case, or that it led to an error in a finding of fact such that the decision is incorrect. A decision, and interpretation, does not have to be perfect. Aside from the specific errors identified by the appellant, I am unable to give the comments about a vague impression that there were some flaws in interpretation much weight. [28] In the appellant's memorandum (memo), at paragraph 23, the appellant notes three specific concerns with the evidence. She states that: a) She testified that she asked the manager if she could come in twice a month when the interpreter stated that she asked for twice a week. I have considered this and accept it as accurate. However, even if she testified that she asked to work twice a month. it does not mean that she did not work twice a week. In any event, I do not find that whether she worked twice a week or twice a month is a salient issue. b) In a somewhat confusing argument, the appellant then stated that she had written that she had retired in 2011 because she asked for to work for two days a week and in 2011 she had one day off. I do not find that this affects the finding of fact that she worked twice a week she is not disputing that. Further, as will be noted later, I do not find that the appellant stated that she was retired to the authorities in Canada is sufficient to find that she was not working some days after 2011 in the store. I do not find that it leads to a negative credibility finding. c) When the testimony was about the end date of work, the interpreter left out that RPD's phrase "when you left Egypt", and incorrectly paraphrased the response giving impression that the appellant testified that she worked until 2016. I accept that the appellant stopped working after being questioned by the authorities in 2014. I do not find that this is a salient difference that effects the quality of the hearing and/or the decision. [29] The issues with interpretation seemed to be resolved at the hearing, now upon appeal it has been raised again. I have considered all of the errors in interpretation pointed out by the appellant's translator.10 I accept the corrections as noted by the appellant's translator. [30] Having listened to the recording of the hearing and reviewed the transcripts, I find that the RPD member did intervene frequently to ensure sufficient communication. The RPD was actively involved in the hearing. The appellant was represented by counsel and there was an observer. There were discussions about the interpretation and the RPD dealt with it in a fair and effective manner. [31] The appellant raised the issues with interpretation after the break at the hearing. Upon the objection, the RPD asked the appellant to identify the areas of miscommunication. The appellant identified the term that sounded like "suffold" [phonetic spelling] and the year 2016. The RPD did clarify the term "suffold".11 Further, as noted, I find that the appellant did not work until 2016. I find that there was sufficient opportunity for the appellant to address any issues in interpretation. The RPD did handle it properly by addressing it and seeking clarification. In addition, after seeking clarification, the RPD provided an opportunity for the appellant, her counsel and her son-in-law to speak in private to see if there were any other issues; there was a break and the RPD was not present in the room when the appellant, her counsel and the appellant's brother-in-law had an opportunity to discuss it. [32] Upon return from a break the appellant's counsel, stated he agreed to go ahead, that the interpretation issues were minor, that there were one or two instances of where there was "maybe a bit of confusion" and that he might discuss them at the end.12 The RPD again clarified that there were two issues and no other problems with the appellant and again instructed the appellant to seek clarification if she needed it. [33] I find that the RPD handled this issue in a complete and professional manner; I do not find that the appellant was prejudiced by flaws in the interpretation. The RPD gave clear and consistent instructions to the interpreter and all of the witnesses to ensure sufficient translation. As an example, the RPD member stopped the appellant from answering a question before the interpreter had an opportunity to interpret the question.13 The RPD informed the appellant that the questions had be to broken down twice. It repeated this instruction later when discussing the phone call from the appellant's brother.14 [34] The onus is on the appellant to point out precisely which errors lead to the allegation that there was an error in interpretation such that the appellant could not present her case, that the findings of the RPD were inaccurate, that the evidence is indeed something else or that the credibility findings were incorrect. I have listened to the hearing and reviewed a transcript and accepted the errors pointed out. I do not find that there were issues with the interpretation such that it was not sufficiently precise, continuous, competent, impartial and contemporaneous. Interpretation does not have to be perfect; it is more likely than not that there was linguistic understanding.15 I do not find that there is sufficient evidence that the appellant was not afforded the opportunity to fully present her case, or that the RPD did not understand the testimony or the evidence. There is insufficient evidence that there was a breach of natural justice at the hearing, that the witnesses could not communicate through the interpreter to the point where there was a flaw with communication, or that the interpretation affected the appellant's credibility. [35] The appellant's counsel and the appellant were given a fair opportunity to address any issue with interpretation at the hearing. The appellant's counsel who presented at the RPD hearing is the same who presented at the RAD. At the RAD, counsel has pointed that he speaks English. However, the appellant's son-in-law was also present at the RPD hearing and did not provide further objection at the hearing after it was resolved. I find that at the RPD hearing there was sufficient opportunity to raise additional concerns with the interpretation. The appellant's credibility [36] In her memo, the appellant points out that the RPD took a negative credibility finding regarding whether she worked after 2011. A large part of the appellant's memo addresses this argument. The RPD noted that the appellant testified that she worked until 2016.16 In documents completed for the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, she wrote that she retired in 2011.17 I find that it is more likely than not that the appellant worked after 2011. The appellant consistently stated that she did not understand the interpretation of the term "2016". Given the appellant's testimony on this matter, I find it is more likely than not that she did not work in 2016; rather, she worked full-time until 2011. After that, she worked two days a week with the shop windows until 2014 when she was arrested. Then she stopped working. I do not find that the appellant wrote that she had retired in 2011 when in fact she did some work is a strong mark against her credibility. It is plausible that she was doing some work but had stopped working full-time. However, there are other more serious difficulties with the claim. [37] The main issues that weigh against a finding that there is more than a mere possibility of persecution is the remoteness in the credible incidents of persecution. [38] There is not a strong link between the appellant and political beliefs that oppose the authorities. Despite the appellant stating that she did not support the Muslim Brotherhood,18 the appellant's daughter stated that only her mother supported the Muslim brotherhood.19 I prefer the testimony of the appellant as she would be in the best position to know. Further, the appellant's testimony was spontaneous and credible.20 She testified that she stopped working in 2014. After she stopped working, she did not move or hide and was not contacted by the authorities again while in Egypt. She left for Canada to help her daughter with newborns and did not leave to escape the authorities. [39] In addition, I have considered the seriousness of the incidents of persecution. I find that it is more likely than not that the appellant was questioned by the authorities as she worked in a shop that was owned by a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, there is not sufficient credible evidence that she was detained for three days. The appellant said that she was blindfolded and held in a small room for three days where she had to squat the entire time. She was questioned and foul language was used; but she was not hit. They took a picture of her with a sign on her that said "Muslim Brotherhood". I accept that she was questioned by authorities. However, whether or not she was detained for three days is in question. The RPD asked the appellant's brother several times if the appellant was detained; he responded that she was questioned but not detained.21 Further, he also said he saw her every evening after work and had days off. It is not likely that he would not know that the appellant was detained. The appellant's daughter testified that her uncle [the appellant's brother] was travelling when her mother was detained. Further, she testified that they felt shame and would not tell him about it. However, it is still odd that no one would tell him that his sister that he lived with had been detained for three days. Even if he was travelling and the daughter and mother were too ashamed to tell him, it is not likely that there were no friends or other family members who told him about this event. I have considered this with respect to the decision of Faryna v. Chorney which states: In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.22 [40] I have considered the explanation of the cultural context where to be detained is shameful. In and of itself, that the brother did not know about the detention might not be sufficient to find that the appellant was not detained. But there are other factors that weigh against the likelihood that she was detained. I do not find that the explanations why the brother did not know are reasonable. To be detained when one is in her 50s by the authorities for three days is very serious and even if the daughter and mother did not tell him, it is likely someone who knew them did. And if, as testified by the appellant's daughter, the appellant had bruises on her face,23 he would have noticed them. In addition, the appellant's testimony about the detention was vague, giving minimal descriptions. I do not find that this was due to the appellant's style of testifying. At other times, the appellant was able to provide spontaneous detailed testimony. As an example, her testimony about being questioned had spontaneous detail that I found credible. These factors weigh against a finding that the appellant was detained for three days. [41] In his submissions to RPD, the appellant's counsel argued that it was entirely possible the appellant could have been too ashamed to admit the detention. The appellant's daughter testified that the appellant did not want her to worry so the appellant did not describe the detention to her. These explanations do not explain gaps in relevant evidence such as testimony about any efforts to locate the appellant while she was gone, what she told the daughter, if she sought support from friends, etc... [42] The appellant has argued that it is unreasonable to prefer the testimony of the brother to the daughter in the context of the Chairperson's Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Gender Guideline).24 I have considered the Gender Guideline and the arguments with respect to gender biases. However, even so, I find that there is insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence with regards to the appellant's detention of three days. The testimony about the detention is too vague it is inconsistent with her brother's testimony. Even considering the cultural context, the appellant's account of being detained is not credible. [43] There were other inconsistencies in the evidence. Testimony about who the appellant lived with was not consistent. The appellant's brother and her daughter testified that he was living with her in Egypt25 and the appellant stated that she lived with her mother and daughter but did not mention her brother.26 [44] Another inconsistency is that while the appellant mentioned that a friend of her was detained the daughter did not remember.27 None of the inconsistencies individually would be determinative; but the cumulative effect of them is such that it does further weigh against the reliability of the testimony of the witnesses. [45] For these reasons, I do not find that the appellant was detained by the authorities. Even if she had been, this event occurred about four years ago. She continued to live in Egypt for about two years. She was not politically active. The appellant has argued in her memo that she expressed views that were critical of the conditions in the country. While the appellant argues in her memo that the brother and her daughter find that she was somewhat political, she does not identify where in the testimony that is. The daughter initially testified that her mother complained about work and colleagues.28 This may be the case, but it did not attract the attention of the authorities for years. In fact, the appellant stopped working at the store in 2014 and severed any indirect ties she may have had with the Muslim Brotherhood. . As stated before, the daughter's testimony about the appellant's support of the Muslim Brotherhood contradicted that of the appellant. Further, while the appellant's daughter said that her mother complained,29 having considered all of the testimonies, there is insufficient evidence to find that the appellant was politically active or does not have the profile of someone who would be targeted. This raises the issue of the likelihood that her home was searched by the authorities after she left for Canada. Did the authorities come to the appellant's house to find her after she left for Canada? [46] Again, there are significant inconsistencies in the evidence regarding whether the authorities came to the appellant's house after she came to Canada. First, the evidence regarding the date that the authorities went to her house is not clear. The appellant states that it occurred in November 2016 and she found out in January 2017.30 This is a material difference. It alone might not be sufficient to find that this event did not occur, but it is in the context of other inconsistencies. [47] A central inconsistency is that while the brother and the appellant testified that authorities came to their house, the daughter who lived in the house testified otherwise.31 The daughter was clear that no one was looking for the appellant after she was detained. In her appeal memo, the appellant argues that on this point, the RAD should prefer the brother's evidence over that of her daughter's evidence. This is in contradiction to the other argument regarding preferring the evidence of the daughter with regards to the detention. However, there is no persuasive reason to do so. [48] Further, the daughter testified that the appellant was living with her, her grandmother, and her uncle and that she is still living with her grandmother and uncle,32 and if the authorities had come looking for the appellant the daughter would know. [49] The daughter testified that other than not telling the uncle that the appellant was detained, she did not discuss and would not even try to tell her uncle anything and he does not know anything.33 Later when asked if government agents were still looking for the appellant the daughter testified "we did not hear anything but this is what I assume, this is what I think because of the situation of the country".34 If the daughter was living there, it is unlikely that she would not know that the authorities had been to the house she was living in to find her mother. [50] Third, as stated before, there is remoteness in that given the length of time from when the authorities questioned the appellant, it is unclear why they would still search her out. The appellant argues that her brother testified that there were demonstrations and more activity. But it seems unlikely that they would still consider her to be active when she had no public profile. Further, her link with the targets is remote. As stated before, the appellant states that she does not support the brotherhood. The owner of the store where she worked up to 2014 is a supporter;35 however, all of the appellant's communications were through the manager. In other words, she had no direct contact with the owner who supported the Muslim Brotherhood. The indirect link was several years old. It reduces the likelihood that any authorities would still seek the appellant. [51] There were other considerations that are less central, but still are relevant and weigh against a finding of the mere possibility of persecution against the appellant. The appellant did not encounter problems when she left Egypt. Again, she left to help her daughter in Canada, not because of a fear of authorities. [52] The appellant argues that the inconsistencies could be explained by "anxiety, the cognitive drain of trying to understand the Syrian Lebanese Dialect, and her eagerness to agree with the Member".36 However, having listened to the recording of the hearing, I did not find any signs that she was drained. Further, this evidence should not come from counsel; it should come from the appellant. The appellant did not provide evidence in her affidavit dated November 14, 2017 about her emotional condition during the hearing that could have interfered with her testimony.37 Further, this argument appears to relate in the most part to the testimony about working in 2016, which I have already addressed and accept the appellant's testimony that she was not working at that point in time. SUMMARY [53] I have assessed the evidence that I find to be credible. The appellant worked for a shop that was owned by a Muslim Brotherhood supporter. She was questioned in 2014 by authorities. After that she stopped working. She did very little after that. She spoke about conditions with friends and family. She had no further encounters with the authorities. In 2016 she came to Canada to help her daughter who had recently given birth. Her daughter and her brother live in the home where the appellant lives. The link between the past events and a risk to future persecution is too remote to show more than a mere possibility of persecution. [54] I have also considered the appellant's testimony about her fears with returning to Egypt.38 She states that she is afraid that the authorities will think she is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This relates to the appellant's subjective fear. However, there must also be sufficient evidence of an objective fear. I have reviewed the evidence. Considering the totality of the evidence, I find that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that there is an objective fear. REMEDIES [55] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of IRPA nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of IRPA. (signed) "Patricia Broad" Patricia Broad September 11, 2018 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 4 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 5 Exhibit 2, Appellant Record, Comments on Excerpts of an Audio File, p. 21. 6 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 7 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 8 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record, Comments on Excerpts of an Audio File, p. 21. 9 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, para. 33. 10 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record, pp. 21-23. 11 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division (RPD) Record, Recording of Hearing, discussion of hearing beginning at 1:07:20. 12 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, at 1:11:00. 13 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, at 44:20. 14 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, at 45:53. 15 Singh v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2010 FC 1161. 16 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, RPD Decision, para. 12. 17 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Application for Visitor's Visa, p. 124. 18 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing 54:10. 19 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:45:59. 20 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, at 54:10. 21 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, beginning at 2:07:57. 22 Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C. C.A.), at 357, per O'Halloran J.A. 23 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing, Testimony of appellant's daughter, at 2:47:18. 24 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Effective date: November 13, 1996. 25 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:52:02. 26 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 18:17. 27 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:48:40. 28 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:35:39. 29 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at at 2:35:39. 30 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 45:00. 31 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:41:00. 32 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:41:15. 33 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:42:45. 34 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 2:50:38. 35 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 53:57. 36 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Memorandum, para. 40. 37 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record, p. 17. 38 Exhibit 3, RPD Record, Recording of Hearing at 1:32:10. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB7-06194