TB6-12219

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12219 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision December 8, 2016 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Shirley Van Der Merwe Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal and requests an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to allow her request for refugee status. In the alternative, the Appellant asks the RAD to refer the matter back to the RPD to redo the hearing with legal representation. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Mauritius, her parents will disown her and force her to leave the family home because she converted from Islam to Christianity and because she refuses to marry someone they will select for her. She also alleged that she will become destitute and unable to provide for herself economically in Mauritius. [4] The claim for refugee protection was heard on February 15, 2016. By a decision rendered orally the same day, the RPD rejected the claim finding that the Appellant's claim does not have an objective basis. [5] On appeal to the RAD, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that she had not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground or that on a balance of probabilities she would personally be subjected to a danger of torture or face a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to her country. She further submits that the RPD erred in its consideration of Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Gender Guidelines). ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [6] While the Appellant makes no argument with respect to this issue, the RAD notes that the Federal Court of Appeal, in Huruglica, indicated that the role of the RAD is to intervene when the RPD is wrong in law, in fact or in fact and law; and this translates into an application of the correctness standard of review. 1 The Court held that, with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law), which raises no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. It went on to indicate that after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD is to carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether the RPD erred. The Court also stated that having done the above, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination.2 [7] Considering the recent jurisprudence, the RAD will conduct its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. Where no issue of credibility of oral evidence was raised, the RAD will apply a standard of correctness when assessing RPD findings of fact or of mixed fact and law. Where the credibility of oral evidence was raised, the RAD will defer to certain findings of the RPD where the RPD enjoyed an advantage over the RAD in assessing the oral evidence of witnesses who appeared before it. The extent of this deference will be assessed on a case-by-case basis dependent upon the particular circumstances of the matter and in conjunction with the RAD's own analysis of the record as a whole. In addition, the standard of correctness will be used for any error of law including a breach of natural justice or procedural fairness found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. Admissibility of evidence submitted on appeal [8] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim or that was not reasonably available, or that she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum of Argument about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to her.3 [9] Where a document meets the test in subsection 110(4), the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. In Singh,4 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza5 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on nearly identical wording of subsection 113(a). In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.6 In Singh, the Court found that three of the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of subsection 110(4).7 The Court has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.8 [10] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in subsection 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), the RAD will apply the Raza factors, minus the "materiality" factor, as this is to be assessed in light of subsection 110(6) only. [11] The Appellant tendered two sets of documents as proposed new evidence in support of her appeal. One set are documents the Appellant had submitted to the RPD and were not accepted by that Division. The other set are documents that were not previously submitted to the RPD. The RAD will assess each group of documents separately. Documents previously submitted to the RPD [12] The Appellant notes that the following documents were accepted by the RPD at her hearing. * Two letters from pastors XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX * Photographs of the Appellant at XXXX XXXX as proof of her public involvement in Christian activities * Gender Profile: Mauritius * Another side of paradise [13] She also notes that the following documents were submitted by her at her hearing but not accepted by the RPD. (a) Covering letter of explanation; 9 (b) Statement Document Supporting Details - Appellant's answers to specific issues raised by the Minister's intervention document; 10 (c) The curse of domestic violence; 11 (d) No to domestic violence; 12 (e) Justice - Putting an end to domestic violence; 13 (f) Domestic Violence in Mauritius; 14 (g) Domestic Violence: A Daily Terror in Most Mauritian Families; 15 (h) Islamist fundamentalism raises head in Mauritius; 16 (i) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; 17 (j) Letter from XXXX XXXX; 18 (k) Letter from XXXX XXXX; 19 (l) Letter from XXXX XXXX; 20 (m) Letter from XXXX XXXX; 21 (n) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 22 (o) Letter from XXXX XXXX; 23 and (p) Letter from XXXX XXXX. 24 [14] The Appellant notes that the vast majority of the documents she had wished to submit to the RPD at her hearing were articles regarding the pervasive nature of domestic violence in Mauritius and the relative inaction on the part of Mauritian authorities to intervene on behalf of the victims of the violence. She maintains that she submitted these documents because they closely mirrored her personal experience of life in Mauritius with escalating domestic violence and police indifference. [15] The Appellant maintains that the reason she submitted her supporting documents to the RPD late was because the person who received her Basis of Claim Form on December 23, 2015 would not accept her supporting documents and told her to present them to the RPD at her hearing. She also maintains that she did not have time to prepare her defense in relation to the Minister's statement she received on February 2, 2016. The Appellant alleges that the RPD rejected her documents based on a cursory review of them. [16] Items (a) to (p) do not meet the statutory requirements of subsection 110(4) as they were presented to the Board prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim. It is not evidence that arose after the rejection of the Appellant's claim; it is not evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and it is not evidence that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. It does not meet the test for new evidence. However, the RAD will conduct its own analysis of the record to determine whether the RPD erred in its treatment of the documents the Appellant presented at her hearing. [17] In the RAD's view the RPD was not wrong to not accept documents (a) to (p) as evidence in the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. Instructions for completing the Basis of Claim Form (BoC) are clear in asking persons claiming refugee protection in Canada to attach to their BoC two copies of all documents that they have to support their claim for refugee protection. Instructions also clearly indicate that if the person claiming protection obtains more documents, other than identity or travel documents, that support their claim after they have submitted their BoC, they are to provide the Board with a copy at least 10 days before their hearing. [18] Even if the Appellant was told that she could provide documents to the RPD at the time of her hearing, this is more likely in relation to original documents as they are to be presented at the time of the hearing; a copy is to be provided to the parties at least 10 days before the hearing. The Appellant was required to follow instructions on her BoC and Claimant's Guide. The Claimant's Guide, which the Appellant refers to,25 indicates that individuals claiming refugee protection in Canada must attach copies of all of the documents that they have to support their claim to their BOC Form. Also indicated is that if individuals get more documents that support their claim after they provided their BOC Form, they must immediately give two copies to the RPD; and copies of these additional documents must be received by the RPD at least 10 days before their hearing. Also indicated is that it is best for individuals to send their documents to the RPD as soon as they get them. [19] The RAD notes that many of the documents are dated subsequent to the date the Appellant filed her BoC (item (a) and items (i) to (p)); therefore, she could not have filed them with her BoC, but could have filed them with the RPD before her hearing. Also, the Appellant provided no reasonable explanation as to why these documents could not have been obtained and provided to the RPD at least 10 days before the date of her hearing. [20] It is interesting to note that the Appellant was aware of the requirement to provide her supporting documents to the RPD at least 10 days before her hearing. Her letter dated February 10, 2016, five days before her hearing, is regarding her inability to provide copies of her supporting documents 10 days before her hearing.26 While the Appellant's letter attempts to explain the reasons for her inability to provide copies of her supporting documents 10 days before her hearing, it fails to explain why she was unable to obtain and provide the documents she provided at her hearing that postdate the date of her letter. [21] Items (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) are dated years before the Appellant's hearing. Item (g) is undated, however the year 1995 is referenced in the article suggesting that it was produced in or about that year. The Appellant offered no reasonable explanation as to why these documents could not have been provided to the RPD at least 10 days before her hearing. [22] The Appellant maintains that she did not have time to prepare her defense (item (b) Statement Document Supporting Details) in relation to the Minister's statement she received on February 2, 2016. However, the Appellant had a number of days to prepare her statement and submit it to the RPD no later than five days from the date of her hearing as per the RPD rule. RPD rule 34(3)(b) indicates that if a party wants to use a document in a hearing, the party must provide a copy of the document to the other party, if any, and to the Division; and documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than five days before the date fixed for the hearing, if the document is provided to respond to another document provided by a party or the Division. The defense document the Appellant refers to is to respond to another document provided by a party (the Minister), therefore, it had to have been received by the RPD no later than five days before her hearing. The Appellant's explanation for her failure to file it on time was unreasonable since her evidence suggests that she could have filed it at least five days before her hearing. [23] Furthermore, the RPD considered relevant factors when it decided whether to allow the use of documents the Appellant provided at her hearing, which were not provided in accordance with rule 34. RPD rule 36 indicates that a party who does not provide a document in accordance with rule 34 must not use the document at the hearing unless allowed to do so by the Division. In deciding whether to allow its use, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including the document's relevance and probative value; any new evidence the document brings to the hearing; and whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule 34. [24] The RPD did not reject the Appellant's documents based on a cursory review of the documents as alleged. The RPD considered the documents as it was required to by rule 36. It is important to note that the RPD allowed the use of five documents the Appellant had not provided in accordance with rule 34. These documents included two letters from pastors, photographs of the Appellant at XXXX XXXX, the report - Gender Profile: Mauritius, and the article - Another side of paradise. This was after the RPD considered relevant factors as rule 36 requires. It is worth noting that the RPD, throughout the hearing, asked the Appellant if there was any information in her documents that would support the objective basis of her claim since that was the sole issue the RPD was focusing on. The documents the Appellant demonstrated were relevant and probative, and brought new evidence to the hearing, were allowed by the RPD. [25] Even though the RPD indicated at the outset of the hearing that the issues in the Appellant's claim were credibility, state protection and objective basis, it narrowed down the issues to solely the objective basis of the claim. The RAD notes that many of the documents the RPD did not admit into evidence addressed the issue of credibility. For example, item (b) is the Appellant's response to specific credibility issues raised by the Minister. Also, at the hearing, the Appellant did not refer to items (a) to (p) to support the objective basis of her claim, even after the RPD specifically asked her if there was any information in her documents to support the objective basis of her claim. [26] The RAD concurs with the RPD's treatment of the documents the Appellant presented at the hearing. The RPD was not wrong to not allow items (a) to (p) into evidence. Also, since items (a) to (p) do not meet the test for new evidence, they will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. Documents not previously submitted to the RPD [27] On appeal to the RAD, the Appellant presented a second set of documents she had not previously presented to the RPD. She tendered the following documents as proposed new evidence in support of her appeal. (i) Index to IRB National Documentation Package (NDP) for Mauritius, 28 August 2015 version; 27 (ii) IRB document, Chapter 3 - Persecution; 28 (iii) IRB document, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution; 29 (iv) mauritius.usembassy.gov Op-Ed by Ambassador Wills to mark International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, dated November 25, 2010; 30 (v) U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 - Mauritius, 31 (vi) wikipedia.org article Yaser Abdel Said; 32 (vii) preventhonorbasedviolence.com article Canadian Victims of Honour Based Violence; 33 (viii) ipsnews.net article Honour Killings Take Heavy Toll on Women & Girls; 34 (ix) Encyclopedia of Women in Today's World, Volume 1, page 913, Mauritius; 35 (x) lemauricien.com article Security and Violence in Paradise Island, dated 12 February 2014;36 (xi) humanreligions.info Apostasy: Thought Crime in Christianity and Islam (excerpt) The Dangers of Leaving Islam (Apostasy); 37 (xii) islam-watch.org article "Honor Killing" is Absolutely Islamic!, updated 16 January 2008;38 (xiii) jihadwatch.org article UK: Muslims attack convert from Islam to Chrisitanity with pickaxe, dated 20 November 2015; 39 (xiv) psychologytoday.com article The Madness of Honor Killing, dated 25 May 2012; 40 (xv) nationalpost.com article Dad killed daughters, wife over western habits, alleged honour killing trial hears, dated 10 October 2011; 41 (xvi) Facts: Chronological Timeline Events; 42 (xvii) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated 6 April 2016; 43 and (xviii) wikiislam.net Muslim Statistics (Persecution) dated December 2012; 44 [28] The Appellant asks that the RAD accept the above documents as new evidence because she represented herself and prepared her defense for her RPD hearing almost singlehandedly, with no legal counsel or advice. She argues that she had almost no knowledge of refugee or immigration law and therefore did not have a full understanding of what other information might have been helpful to her case. [29] In the RAD's opinion, none of the documents, except for item (xvii), meet the statutory requirements of subsection 110(4) for the following reasons. [30] Items (i), (ii) and (iii) are Board documents that are all dated prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Also, the Appellant may refer to them without presenting them as proposed new evidence. [31] Items (iv) to (xv), and item (xviii), are articles, reports, commentaries, and extracts from publications dealing mainly with domestic violence and religion in Mauritius. The documents that are dated, pre-date the rejection of the Appellant's claim. The documents that are not dated, contain information that pre-dates the rejection. Since the documents contain information the Appellant alleges is helpful to her case, it would be reasonable to expect her to have presented it to the RPD. It is not evidence that arose after the rejection of the Appellant's claim; it is not evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and it is not evidence that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. [32] Item (xvi) is titled Facts: Chronological Timeline Events. It is a point form listing of events related to the Appellant. Except for two points regarding the filing of an appeal with the RAD, the other points pertain to events that occurred prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. If the Appellant believes that these events were relevant to, and support her claim for refugee protection, it would be reasonable to expect her to have presented this evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of her claim. [33] Item (xvii) is a letter from Legal Services Society denying the Appellant's application for legal aid. The letter is dated after the rejection of the Appellant's claim and meets the statutory requirements of subsection 110(4). [34] The Appellant's argument regarding her lack of legal counsel and her lack of knowledge about refugee and immigration law, to satisfy the statutory requirements of 110(4), has no merit. The Appellant maintains that she did not have a full understanding of what other information might have been helpful to her case due to a lack of legal knowledge and a lack of legal counsel; however, at her hearing she presented the RPD with over 20 documents to address various aspects of her claim. This suggests that the Appellant had an understanding of information required to support her claim. Also, the Appellant is well educated. She had been studying at XXXX XXXX XXXX for approximately four years in the field of XXXX XXXX.45 One would expect her to be familiar with conducting research. If she lacked knowledge on refugee matters, it would be reasonable to expect her to research this area. Furthermore, the Basis of Claim Form and the Claimant's Guide, which the Appellant refers to,46 provides detailed instructions and outlines the responsibilities of individuals who are claiming refugee protection in Canada. For example, the Claimant's Guide indicates that the refugee claimant is responsible for obtaining and providing any documents that may support their protection claim. Also, although a refugee claimant has a right to counsel, it is not an absolute right, and the refugee claimant may represent himself or herself. [35] The Appellant provided a detailed narrative with her Basis of Claim Form outlining her fear of returning to Mauritius.47 A reading of the Appellant's BoC narrative suggests that she had a good understanding of information important to her claim. The Appellant even confirmed at the outset of her hearing that the information she had provided in her BoC was complete, true and correct. When the Appellant was given an opportunity to provide any other information she thought was important for the RPD to know, she reiterated what she had stated in her BoC narrative. Based on the above, the RAD finds that the Appellant could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented items (i) to (xvi), and item (xviii), at the time her claim was rejected by the RPD. [36] Since items (i) to (xvi), and item (xviii) do not meet the test for new evidence, they will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. Also, submissions made by the Appellant, which are based on the proposed new evidence that has not been accepted, will not be considered. [37] Item (xvii) meets the test for new evidence and is addressed below. Request for an oral hearing [38] The Appellant requests a hearing before the RAD.48 [39] When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) of the IRPA establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new 110(4) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [40] Even though item (xvii) meets the statutory requirements of subsection 110(4), it is immaterial to the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. Item (xvii) is a letter from Legal Services Society, dated after the rejection of the Appellant's claim, denying her application for legal aid. Although the letter reflects the Appellant's effort to seek legal counsel, it does nothing to support her claim for refugee protection. Therefore, the RAD gives this evidence no weight in terms of supporting the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. Since item (xvii) does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is not central to the RPD's decision, and does not justify allowing the Appellant's refugee protection claim, and since no other new 110(4) evidence has been accepted in this appeal, the RAD must proceed without a hearing. The Appellant's request for a hearing is therefore denied. MERITS OF THE APPEAL Gender Guidelines [41] The Appellant finds it incredible that the RPD rejected her claim considering the Gender Guidelines. She argues that the Gender Guidelines appear to support her claim rather than suggest she does not warrant protection. [42] In the RAD's opinion, the Appellant's argument cannot succeed. The RPD stated in clear terms why it found that the Appellant's claim lacked objective basis. Once the RPD addressed the objective basis of each of the Appellant's allegations, there was no allegation remaining which relates to the gender of the Appellant. The Gender Guidelines exist to ensure that gender-based claims are heard with sensitivity.49 The Appellant has not demonstrated how the RPD failed to hear her claim with sensitivity. The Gender Guidelines do not shield the Appellant's testimony from the RPD's scrutiny. The RPD found that the Appellant's subjective fear of persecution or harm does not have an objective basis, and as such it was reasonable for it to conclude that she had not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or that on a balance of probabilities she would personally be subjected to a danger of torture or face a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to Mauritius. Persecution [43] The Appellant notes that the RPD, at her hearing, indicated that her fear of being kicked out of the house for having changed her religion is not persecution. She argues that being ostracized by one's family would be considered persecution under the conventional definition of the term; and it would be a denial of the basic human right to family. [44] The RAD notes that the RPD in summarizing the Appellant's fear at her hearing stated, "Well, you fear returning because you changed your religion and refuse to marry someone they want you to marry - at that point they would kick you out of the house - that is not persecution - do I have a good idea of what you fear?" The Appellant responded, in the affirmative. The RPD was not wrong to indicate that being forced to leave the family home is not persecution. In the RAD's opinion, the treatment the Appellant fears from her parents - being forced to leave the family home because she has converted from Islam to Christianity and because she refuses to marry someone her parents select for her - does not constitute persecution; and one's right to live in the familial home is not a basic human right. [45] To be considered persecution, the mistreatment suffered or anticipated must be serious.50 The Appellant has been residing away from her family home since XXXX 2009. Also, she has demonstrated her desire to live outside of her familial home by filing a refugee claim in Canada. Therefore, in the RAD's view, the mistreatment the Appellant anticipates is not serious since the Appellant has expressed her desire to live outside of her familial home and would therefore not be considered mistreatment. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the essential question is whether the persecution alleged by the claimant threatens his or her basic human rights in a fundamental way. A person's right to live in the familial home is not a basic human right identified by the United Nations in their Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The basic human right to family that the Appellant refers to is a person's right to found a family. Article 16 of the UDHR states the following: (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. The Appellant misconstrued Article 16 to mean that she has a basic human right to live in her family's home. Objective Basis [46] The RPD found that there is insufficient credible evidence to establish that the Appellant would be persecuted if her parents were to disown her and evict her from their home. It noted that the Appellant is an adult and the mere fact that her parents do not wish for her to live in their home is not persecution. The RPD indicated that the issue in the Appellant's claim is whether her parent's decision would result in the Appellant facing discrimination, which would rise to the level of persecution, because of being unable to obtain employment or housing for herself. [47] The RAD notes, as did the RPD, that the Appellant is over 30 years old, highly educated and multilingual. She has belonged to, and volunteered with, numerous organizations while she has been in Canada.51 The Appellant has an impressive educational and XXXX XXXX background that would make her a desirable hire in Mauritius. Even though the unemployment rate was higher for females than it was for males in Mauritius in 2009,52 the statistics do not reflect the unemployment rate for someone with the Appellant's notable credentials. [48] Documentary evidence indicates that, in Mauritius, men and women enjoy the same rights under the constitution and the law, and the courts uphold these rights. Also indicated is that women have equal access to education, employment, housing and government services and could inherit land. Women have equal access to credit and can own or manage businesses.53 This evidence suggests that the Appellant would not face barriers in obtaining employment and housing in Mauritius due to her gender, and any discrimination she did encounter would not rise to the level of persecution. [49] With respect to religion, the Appellant maintains that she would face obstacles in obtaining employment because she will be perceived as Muslim because of her surname, even though she has converted to Christianity. Documentary evidence indicates that the constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and in practice the government generally respected religious freedom. There were no reports of societal discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief or practice.54 Although there is evidence that tensions exist between Hindus and Muslims in Mauritius, there is no indication that it currently affects the ability to obtain work and housing for someone perceived as Muslim. For example, documentary evidence indicates that, unlike the previous year, there were no reports that private companies refused to employ Muslim women wearing the hijab. 55 [50] The RPD was not wrong to find it speculative for the Appellant to suggest that she would not be able to find employment in Mauritius or obtain housing due to corruption in the country. Although there is evidence of corruption, there is also evidence that the government takes steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses.56 This is indicative of a government intent on curbing corruption. [51] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not established that there is a serious possibility that she would become destitute if she returns to Mauritius and is disowned by her parents. The RAD also finds that the evidence does not suggest that there is discrimination in Mauritius against persons of the Appellant's religion, perceived religion, or gender that rise to the level of persecution. Disposition [52] The Appellant has alleged that the RPD erred in finding that she had not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground or that on a balance of probabilities she would personally be subjected to a danger of torture or face a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to her country. She has also alleged that the RPD erred in its consideration of the Gender Guidelines. Based on its own analysis of the record, the RAD has found that the RPD did not err in its assessment of persecution and did not err in its consideration of the Gender Guidelines. The RPD's findings are thorough and based on the evidence. Upon a review of the evidence, the RAD has reached the same conclusion as the RPD. [53] The RAD finds that there is not a serious possibility of persecution should the Appellant return to Mauritius. The RAD therefore concludes that the Appellant has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA and for these same reasons - the lack of objective basis - the RAD finds that the Appellant is not a person in need of protection or at a risk to life, or at risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or in danger of torture as set out in section 97 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [54] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Refugee Appeal Division confirms the decision of the Refugee Protection Division and dismisses the appeal. (signed) "M. Pettinella" M. Pettinella December 8, 2016 Date 1 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93, para. 78. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, para. 103. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., No. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, De Montigny, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 96. (F.C., No. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014; 2014 FC 1022. 5 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 6 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, paras. 13-15. 7 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 8 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 24. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 25-31. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 32-33. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 34-37. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 38-40. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 41-43. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 44. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 45-48. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 49-50. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 51-52. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 53-54. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 55-56. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 57-58. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 59-61. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 62. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 63. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 24. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 24. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 67-72. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 73-78. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 79-91. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 92-95. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 96-102. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 103-104. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 105. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 106. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 107. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 108-111. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 112-113. 38 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 114-123. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 124-127. 40 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 128-131. 41 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 132-134. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 135-139. 43 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 140. 44 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 141-142. 45 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 30. 46 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 24. 47 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 19-22. 48 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 64. 49 Munoz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1273, 307 F.T.R. 67, paras. 29-35. 50 Sagharichi, Mojgan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-169-91), Isaac, Marceau, MacDonald, August 5, 1993, at 2. Reported: Sagharichi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 182 N.R. 398 (F.C.A.); Saddouh (Kaddouh), Sabah v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2200-93), Denault, February 2, 1994. 51 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 30-32. 52 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 158. 53 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 52-82, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Mauritius, 28 August 2015, item 2.1. 54 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 52-82, NDP for Mauritius, 28 August 2015, item 12.1. 55 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 52-82, NDP for Mauritius, 28 August 2015, item 12.1. 56 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 52-82, NDP for Mauritius, 28 August 2015, item 2.1; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 162. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12219