VB9-09039

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB9-09039 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision November 19, 2020 Date de la décision Panel M. Oh Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Raj Sharma Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ("the Appellant") fears persecution in his country of former habitual residence ("CFHR"), the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"), based on his identity as a stateless Palestinian. The Refugee Protection Division ("RPD") rejected his claim, as it found his treatment in the UAE did not amount to persecution. The Appellant disputes this decision. [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"), the appeal is dismissed. I have independently reviewed the evidence and arrive at the same conclusion as the RPD. Although the Appellant cannot return to the UAE and live there without a sponsor, I agree that this merely results from an ordinary law of general application. It is not persecutory. In addition, the Appellant has not established that he faces discrimination in the UAE that amounts cumulatively to persecution. The Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD") confirms the RPD's negative decision. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant was born in the UAE to parents who are stateless Palestinians. The Appellant's parents were born in Syria and later moved to the UAE. The Appellant has never lived in any other country. As a foreign national in the UAE, the Appellant required a sponsor. In XXXX 2018, the Appellant learned that his sponsor, his employer, would be terminating him. As he would soon lose his status in the UAE, the Appellant promptly left the country and traveled to Canada. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, he crossed the Canada-United States border and initiated a claim for refugee protection. [4] The Appellant complains that foreign nationals are not allowed to work in the UAE unless they have a sponsor. They also cannot access free education and medical care, or other benefits to which UAE citizens are entitled. Security clearances made it difficult for the Appellant to find a job, and security-related delays threatened his ability to remain in the country. In addition, when the Appellant went to renew his residency in XXXX 2018, an officer at the Ministry of Immigration insulted the Appellant for being Palestinian. [5] The RPD heard the Appellant's claim on October 21, 2019 and rejected it in an oral decision. The panel identified the UAE as the sole CFHR. Therefore, the Appellant had to establish the risks for him in that country, even though many of his fears had to do with the situation in Syria. [6] With respect to the Appellant's situation in the UAE, his complaints largely stemmed from his status as a foreign national in the country. As a non-citizen, he required a sponsor to remain in the country, and he was not entitled to the free education and healthcare that was enjoyed by Emiratis. This differential treatment was based on an ordinary law of general application. The RPD found it was not persecutory. Though there was an issue around the Appellant's security clearance when he last went to renew his residency, his residency was in fact renewed and there was no official policy in regard to Palestinians that seemed to form the basis for these problems. Even as a foreign national, however, the Appellant was able to obtain a private education and he was able to obtain security clearances in the past. The RPD accepted that the Appellant had faced some difficulties, such as insults from immigration officers, as well as some harassment and verbal abuse. However, the RPD considered the definition of persecution and found the Appellant's treatment did not amount to persecution. Role of the Refugee Appeal Division [7] The jurisprudence establishes that the RAD is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence and reach its own determination. Deference is owed to the RPD only where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing evidence.1 I see no reason, in the present case, to show deference to the RPD's findings. I have therefore applied a correctness standard throughout this decision. ANALYSIS [8] The Appellant takes issue with various aspects of the RPD's decision, but I see no error in the panel's analysis. [9] The Appellant faults the RPD for failing to consider certain factors. These include: * Whether the Appellant can return to the UAE, and whether the denial of his re-entry is persecutory; * Whether state interference in the Appellant's ability to find employment and the imposition of conditions on children's education, constitute serious violations of human rights; * Whether the UAE is a signatory to the Refugee Convention; and * Whether the RPD considered the possibility that the Appellant's treatment in the UAE might cumulatively amount to persecution. [10] The Appellant highlights information from the National Documentation Package ("NDP") for the UAE, specifically item 14.2. In the Appellant's view, this document establishes that Palestinians in the UAE are treated differently from other foreigners. [11] I have considered the Appellant's arguments, but I find no error in the RPD's decision. The Appellant's inability to return to the UAE was not in dispute, and the RPD expressly considered whether the Appellant's inability to return was persecutory. Its analysis addressed the need for a sponsor, the Appellant's inability to access free healthcare, education, and other services that Emiratis enjoyed, as well as his right to work. The RPD correctly determined that the Appellant's differential treatment, as compared to Emiratis, resulted from an ordinary law of general application. [12] The jurisprudence establishes that an ordinary law of general application, even in non-democratic societies, should be given a presumption of validity and neutrality. The onus rests on the Appellant to show that it is either inherently or for some other reason persecutory.2 I am not satisfied that this onus has been met. The very same evidence cited by the Appellant demonstrates how the same set of rules applies to all foreign nationals. The Appellant's differential treatment in the UAE, as compared to Emiratis, was not reflective of the UAE's persecutory treatment of Palestinians. All foreign nationals in the UAE require a sponsor. The Appellant's loss of status, his inability to return to the UAE, and his restrictions in obtaining employment stem not from the fact that he is Palestinian, but from the fact that he is a foreign national who has no sponsor. Similarly, access to education, healthcare, and other public services were all based on the individual's immigration status.3 Under these circumstances, the cancellation of the Appellant's status in the UAE is not persecutory, nor is his lack of entitlement to public services.4 [13] I do not agree with the Appellant's interpretation of the information in NDP item 14.2. This document only seems to say that stateless Palestinians do not benefit from any special programs, and that they are subject to the same immigration laws that apply to all foreign nationals. The UAE is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, and even refugees and asylum seekers registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") could be deported.5 Again, however, the situation was the same for all foreign nationals. All foreign nationals required a sponsor, and they could be deported as a consequence of overstaying a legal residence permit.6 I do not take this to mean that Palestinians are treated unfavourably, as compared to other foreigners. I remain unpersuaded that the requirement of a sponsor, and the lack of access to an asylum procedure in the UAE, are persecutory. While I acknowledge the possibility of refoulement in the future from the UAE, the jurisprudence establishes that the relevant question to determine is whether the claimant faces a risk if returned to their CFHR, and not what might occur later if the CFHR seeks to send the person to other countries.7 [14] As for instances of discrimination and verbal abuse in the UAE, the RPD seemed to accept the Appellant's allegations about the treatment he had experienced. However, the jurisprudence defines persecution as a sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights. The treatment must be serious, and it must be repetitive, or systematic. The quality of the incidents should be assessed in terms of whether they constitute a fundamental violation of human dignity.8 Like the RPD, I accept that the Appellant faced some difficulties, such as harassment and verbal abuse. Though relatively privileged as a university-educated engineer, I am willing to accept that the Appellant, as a Palestinian, may have lower social status in the UAE. The Appellant's assertion that discrimination can cumulatively amount to persecution - while correct - does not satisfy me that the RPD erred. The RPD considered the definition of persecution but correctly found that it had not been met. The Appellant has not satisfied me, with respect to the frequency of incidents and the seriousness of the events alleged, that the mistreatment experienced by him amounts to a sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights when viewed together; nor am I satisfied that a serious possibility exists that such a level of mistreatment will occur in the future. CONCLUSION [15] Though the Appellant cannot return to the UAE, the jurisprudence establishes that legal permission to re-enter the country is not required before a country can be considered a CFHR, against which a claim must be established.9 The Appellant is stateless, but he is still required to show that he meets the definition of either a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. For the above reasons, I agree with the RPD's conclusions. The Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in the UAE on a Convention ground. He also does not face a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. I therefore confirm the RPD's negative decision. [16] The appeal is dismissed, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) M. Oh M. Oh November 19, 2020 Date 1 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157; see also Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145 (CanLII). 2 Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 2971 (FCA), [1993] 3 FC 540. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for the United Arab Emirates (March 29, 2019), item 14.2, Response to Information Request (RIR), ZZZ106014.E, November 24, 2017. 4 Chehade v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 282 at para. 35; see also Kadoura v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1057 at para. 17. 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for the United Arab Emirates (March 29, 2019), item 14.2, RIR, ZZZ106014.E, November 24, 2017. 6 Ibid. 7 Qassim v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2018 FC 226 at paras. 59-62; Iraqi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1049 at paras. 34-35; Marchoud v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1471, at paras. 16-17; see also Chehade v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 282 at paras. 24-25. 8 Ranjha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 637; see also Portuondo Vasallo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 673 at para 15. 9 Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employmment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3021 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 723. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB9-09039 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français