TB9-26271

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-26271 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Ottawa, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision October 19, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Alison Kennedy Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Michael F Loebach Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss this appeal. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant) is a citizen of Colombia. She is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) that she is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [2] The Appellant alleges that she cannot return to Colombia because she will be targeted by her abusive former partner. She alleges that her ex-partner has threatened to kill her and her family as he does not want her to have a new partner. [3] The RPD accepted that the Appellant was a victim of domestic violence by her ex-partner and has residual symptoms of XXXX. The RPD also accepted that the Appellant was attacked by her ex in January 2010. However, the RPD found that several of the Appellant's allegations lacked credibility, including that she was threatened by her ex-partner again in 2014; that her former partner was XXXX XXXX XXXX; and that her former partner was a member of the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC). The RPD then determined that the Appellant had not proven that her ex-partner has the means and ability to locate her in the IFA, and that relocation there would not be unreasonable. [4] The Appellant alleges that the RPD erred in its credibility findings and it further erred in reaching its IFA findings. Furthermore, the Appellant alleges that the RPD failed to consider the Appellant's psychological evidence and the national country documentation in finding that the IFA would be reasonable in her circumstances. DETERMINATION [5] While I do not agree with all of the RPD's credibility findings for the reasons noted below, I nonetheless find I that the Appellant has a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) available to her in Tunja. In reaching my determination, I have considered the Appellant's claim and supporting evidence in the context of the Chairperson's Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.1 NEW EVIDENCE The evidence presented by the Appellant is accepted in part [6] The Appellant is seeking to enter two news articles on appeal, as follows: 1. Unknown author, "Sinaloa and Clan del Golfo cartel are present in Bogota, political leaders denounce", noticias.caracol.com2 September 6, 2019 2. Unknown author, "Alias 'Rabbit' falls, alleged criminal of the Gulf clan in Tunja", Caracol.com3 March 11, 2019 [7] According to the law,4 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [8] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible, and relevant before I can accept it.5 [9] The first article submitted by the Appellant post-dates the RPD's decision. As such, I find that this article arose after the RPD decision and satisfies the criteria listed in subsection 110(4) of IRPA. I also find that this article is relevant and new, given that it states that the Sinaloa Cartel and AGC are active within the interior of Colombia, including Bogota, which contradicts the RPD's finding that these groups are only active on the Colombian border. I also find that this article is credible, as it appears to emanate from a credible news source. [10] The second article provided by the Appellant pre-dates the RPD's decision. I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated that this article arose after the RPD decision, that it was not reasonably available to her at the time of the decision, or that she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring this to the RPD prior to its decision being rendered. Rather, the Appellant was aware that Tunja was the IFA being put forward by the Appellant, and the RPD questioned the Appellant about the AGC's presence in Tunja at the August 9, 2019 hearing. As such, I find that it was incumbent on the Appellant to provide this relevant documentary evidence to the RPD before its decision was rendered on August 30, 2019. For this reason, I find that the subsection 110(4) criteria have not been met and this article is not admissible on appeal. Oral Hearing [11] Given that I have admitted new evidence on appeal, I must consider whether an oral hearing is necessary under s. 110(6) of IRPA. Having reviewed the new evidence and the record, I find that an oral hearing is not required in this appeal because the new evidence does not raise a serious issue about the Appellants' credibility that is central to the decision and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the claim. ANALYSIS Credibility issues [12] While the determinative issue in this case is an IFA in Tunja, the RPD nevertheless made several credibility findings that affected its IFA analysis. I will consider each of these findings in turn. Whether the November 2014 phone call occurred [13] The RPD found that the Appellant's allegations of receiving a threatening phone call by her partner in 2014 did not occur. It found that it was implausible that the Appellant would not contact the police to report this incident, given that she had done so previously when threatened in 2010. Furthermore, the RPD found that it was not reasonable that the Appellant and her family would not make an asylum claim in the U.S. in December 2014 if they had been threatened with death as alleged. [14] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred when it impugned her for failing to file a police report after the November 2014 phone threat, given that her previous interactions with police led her to believe that state protection would not be forthcoming.6 The Appellant further argues that the RPD erred in faulting her for failing to make an asylum claim in the U.S. in 2014. Indeed, the Appellant testified that she previously tried to claim asylum in the U.S., but her claim was denied due to her legal record.7 As such, she reasonably expected any further asylum claims would also fail. The Appellant alleges that it was unreasonable for the RPD to draw a negative inference based on her not seeking asylum when she already tried to make a claim but was denied.8 [15] I find that the RPD's finding on this point is not sustainable. Indeed, the Appellant provided a reasonable explanation for her failure to make a refugee claim in the U.S., that being that her previous claim was denied because of her legal record. Furthermore, I find that the RPD's implausibility finding regarding the Appellant's failure to seek state protection after this threat is not sufficient to sustain this finding. Indeed, the jurisprudence is clear that plausibility findings should be made "only in the clearest of cases, i.e., if the facts as presented are outside the realm of what could reasonably be expected, or where the documentary evidence demonstrates that the events could not have happened in the manner asserted by the claimant."9 I do not find that these circumstances sustain such a finding. For these reasons, I find that the RPD erred in finding that the 2014 telephone threat did not occur as alleged. Former partner is not XXXX XXXX XXXX [16] The RPD found that a news article about XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX contained information that was not consistent with the Appellant's narrative and testimony on several points, including where he was born, his other children, and when he travelled to the U.S. The RPD did not accept the Appellant's explanation that he must have lied in the article and noted that the publication likely sought some corroborating evidence for the article. The RPD also found that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX chest tattoos as pictured in the article in evidence are not sufficiently clear to support the Appellant's allegations that they include the names of her children, and, as such, that it was unable to establish that the names of the children are written on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX chest as alleged. The RPD also found that the Appellant did not provide consistent testimony as to why there were no photographs of her together with her former partner. For these reasons, the RPD found that the Appellant had embellished her former partner's criminal profile and that she had not proven that her former partner XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXis XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as alleged. [17] The Appellant alleges that the RPD did not make a negative credibility finding, however, failed to accept the Appellant's testimony that her former partner was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant argues that the news article in evidence about XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXcontained clear photographs of his tattoos, which include the names of her first three children. The Appellant argues that the presumption of truthfulness applies in this instance,10 and that she testified that the chest tattoos clearly show the names of the three children under his collarbone.11 The Appellants allege that the RPD was unreasonable in finding that this was not clear, and that the Appellant's evidence was clearly corroborated by the pictures.12 [18] I find that the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that her ex-partner XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. as alleged. First, I find it significant that the information provided in much of the Appellant's evidence (including her testimony, her father's affidavit, and her ex-partner's birth certificate) notes that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX was born in Colombia. Furthermore, the Appellant testified that her ex's family members live in Bogota. However, this is inconsistent with the article which notes that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. was born in Mexico and his family is in Mexico. Moreover, while the article speaks of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. having children with two other women, the Appellant and her children are not named in this article. Furthermore, the date and the age listed in the article related to when XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. first left for the U.S. and when the Appellant testified that she and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX left for the U.S. are inconsistent. When these inconsistencies were put to the Appellant, she stated that he must have lied in the article. However, I agree with the RPD's finding that there is no indication that the article depended entirely on statements from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX., and that it is more likely than not that the content of this information was corroborated and is consequently truthful regarding the personal history of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. As such, I find that these inconsistencies cast significant doubt on the Appellant's allegation that XXXX XXXX XXXX. and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. are the same person. [19] Furthermore, the Appellant alleges that the pictures of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. in the articles and the additional pictures she provided into evidence demonstrate that her children's names are tattooed on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX's chest. I note that the RPD had the opportunity to see the originals of this evidence firsthand, and found that, based on an examination of this evidence, the RPD was "unable to establish that the names of the children are written on the man's chest". If I find that the RPD had a meaningful advantage in a particular circumstance, I may defer to its assessment on a given point.13 In this case, based on the RPD's opportunity to examine the original evidence, I defer to its finding that an examination of this evidence does not prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's children's names are written on the man's chest as alleged. I find that the Appellant's claim that her children's names are tattooed on the man's chest is not sufficiently corroborated by the evidence on file, and that, consequently, the Appellant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that her children's names are tattooed on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX chest as alleged. [20] Similarly, I concur with the RPD that it would be reasonable to expect that the Appellant would be able to provide photographs of her and her ex (or her ex with her children) in support of her claim, given the length of time they were together - in both Colombia and the U.S. - and given that they have three children together. When asked about the lack of photographs, the Appellant explained that she was unable to provide such photos because her ex is a hit man and they are forbidden from being in photographs. I do not find that this explanation is reasonable, given that this is inconsistent with her having provided two pictures of him into evidence, as well as an article that contains his photograph. Furthermore, I do not accept the Appellant's explanation that, despite being told he was forbidden from appearing in photographs, he was then told that he was required to appear in the photographs submitted on file. Rather, I find that the lack of photographs of the Appellant with her ex cast doubt on the Appellant's allegation that her former partner, XXXX XXXX XXXX., is the same person as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX., the person pictured in the photographs on file and in the article she submitted. [21] For the above-noted reasons, I find that the Appellant has failed to prove that her ex-partner XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. as alleged. Whether her ex-partner is part of the AGC [22] The RPD also found that the Appellant had not proven that her former partner was a member of the AGC. The RPD found that timing of when he allegedly revealed himself to be a member of the AGC was suspect, given that it took place only a month before the Appellant's refugee hearing, despite her ex having visited her sister 6 times between XXXX 2018 and XXXX 2019. Nevertheless, the Appellant testified that it was only on the last visit that he alleged that he was part of the AGC and that she was a military target. [23] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to give clear and transparent reasons why it found that her former partner was not a member of the AGC.14 Rather, the RPD found that her ex-partner was not AGC because there was no indication that the ex-partner is part of AGC, and the timing of the XXXX 2019 visit in which he told the Appellant's sister that he was AGC. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider her sister's affidavit as evidence of this fact, and that her evidence is entitled to the presumption of truth.15 [24] I agree with the Appellant that the RPD member erred in finding that there was no indication that her ex-partner was part of the AGC, given that her sister swore an affidavit on file to this effect. Similarly, while the RPD might find that the timing of the Appellant's ex's declaration of his membership with the AGC might be coincidental, I do not find that this is sufficient to doubt the Appellant's evidence on this point. Consequently, I find that the presumption of truth is applicable to the Appellant's testimony and evidence that her ex was a part of the AGC. [25] Nevertheless, I do not find that the Appellant has proven that she has been declared a military target or objective of the AGC as alleged. The documentary evidence suggests that the a person is most often declared a military objective to eliminate the presence of a leader or a prominent person in the community.16 Indeed, the evidence suggests that people targeted as military objectives include human rights defenders, Colombian leaders, journalists, and public servants. I do not find that the Appellant has proven that she fits into any of these categories such that she would be declared a military objective on this basis. While the Appellant appears to allege that she has been declared a target on the basis of her past relationship with XXXX XXXX XXXX., the documentary evidence does not suggest that a person will be declared a military target on the basis of a personal vendetta.17 In this instance, I find the documentary evidence regarding how and why a person is declared a military target to be more persuasive than the Appellant's allegation on this point, which is not supported by the documentary evidence. Consequently, I do not find that the Appellant has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she was declared a military objective as alleged. Internal Flight Alternative [26] The test to determine whether a viable IFA exists has two prongs: (i) there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted or subjected, on a balance of probabilities, to a danger of torture or to a risk to her life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA; and (ii) conditions in the IFA area are such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for her to seek refuge there.18 [27] Once the issue of an IFA has been proposed to the Appellant, the burden is on her to demonstrate that the proposed IFA is either unsafe or unreasonable. Prong 1 - No serious possibility of persecution or s. 97 risk [28] The RPD found that the Appellant had not demonstrated that her ex could locate her in the IFA, given that none of the Sinaloa cartel, the Mara 18, or the AGC have a significant presence there. The RPD also found that the Appellant's allegation that her former partner had located her in 2014 was not credible, and that he had likely been able to locate her in 2010 because she resided in Bogota in close proximity to him and he may have had additional resources at his disposal to locate her there. [29] The Appellant argues that the RPD's erroneous findings regarding her ex-partner not being a member of the AGC impacted its analysis regarding the lack of an IFA for the Appellant and her ex-partner's ability to locate her in the IFA.19 Furthermore, the Appellant notes that the documentary evidence suggests that internal relocation is not an option for those who have been declared a military objective. Finally, the Appellant argues that her ex-partner has made ongoing and persistent efforts to locate her, which demonstrates that he has the motivation to locate her in the IFA. [30] Even having accepted that the Appellant's ex-partner is a member of the AGC as alleged, I do not find that the Appellant has proven that her ex partner has the means and ability to launch a country-wide search for her so as to locate her in Tunja. Indeed, I do not find that the objective country documentation demonstrates, on a balance of probabilities, that either the Sinaloa cartel or the Mara 18 are active in Tunja.20 Furthermore, while the Appellant has provided new evidence on appeal demonstrating that the Sinaloa cartel and the Clan del Golfo may be present in Bogota, I do not find that this evidence proves, on a balance of probabilities, that these groups are active in Tunja, such that they would be able to track the Appellant to this location. [31] Similarly, I do not find that the documentary evidence proves, on a balance of probabilities, that the AGC is operating in Tunja specifically, nor the Boyaca department more generally.21 While the Appellant provided post-hearing evidence on this issue to the RPD, I adopt the RPD's findings found in paragraphs 50-51 of its decision in relation to this evidence, which finds that the Appellant's articles do not demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the AGC has established themselves in Tunja.22 Indeed, based on an examination of the documentary evidence before me, I do not find that the Appellant has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that her ex-partner has the means or ability to launch a country-wide search for her such that she could be located in Tunja as a result of his membership in the Sinaloa cartel, the Mara 18, or the AGC as alleged. Nor do I find that the Appellant has demonstrated the existence of any other contacts or connections that would enable him to locate her in the IFA, on a balance of probabilities. [32] I am mindful of the Appellant's argument that her ex-partner could find her in Tunja, given that he already located her previously, including in Bogota in 2010 and Cali in 2014, which are much larger cities. However, I agree with the RPD that the fact that the Appellant was located in Bogota in 2010 does not mean that she could be located by him in Tunja, given that when she was located in 2010 she was living in close proximity to him. Similarly, I do not find that the fact that the Appellant's ex-partner phoned and threatened her after her relocation to Cali in 2014 proves that he could locate her in Tunja. Rather, while her ex-partner may have been able to obtain her phone number and placed her in Cali during this call, there is no evidence before me that he sought her in person and/or located her within in Cali before she left Colombia. Similarly, while the Appellant alleges that her ex-partner continued to seek her out, I note that the Appellant was nevertheless able to successfully stay in hiding in Colombia from XXXX 2017 to XXXX 2017 prior to her travel to Canada. I find that these circumstances, in combination with the documentary evidence considered above, suggest that the Appellant's ex-partner lacks the means and ability to launch a countrywide search to locate her in Tunja as alleged. Furthermore, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated how her ex-partner would become aware that she had returned to Colombia if she were to relocate to Tunja. [33] For these reasons, I find that the Appellant's allegations that her ex-partner could locate her in Tunja are speculative and that she has failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that her ex-partner has the means and ability to locate her in the IFA as alleged. Consequently, I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated that she faces a serious possibility of persecution or a s. 97 risk in Tunja. Prong 2 - Reasonableness of the IFA [34] The Appellant alleges that the RPD failed to assess if the IFA would be reasonable for her given her mental health difficulties that are supported by a psychotherapist report.23 The Appellant argues that the RPD was obligated to explain why it ignored the psychological evidence before it.24 The Appellant also alleges that the RPD failed to consider the availability of mental health care in Colombia. [35] However, I note that the onus in this instance is on the Appellant to demonstrate why relocation to the IFA would be unreasonable for her, and that proving that relocation would be unreasonable is a high threshold. While I accept that the Appellant has been diagnosed with symptoms associated with XXXX and XXXX, I do not find that the Appellant has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her psychological symptoms are such that relocation to the IFA would jeopardize her life and safety so as to be unreasonable. Furthermore, I do not find that the Appellant has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate what, if any, mental health care she would need to access upon her relocation to Tunja, or that such services would be inaccessible to her upon her relocation. [36] The Appellant also argues that she would be an internally displaced person (IDP) upon her relocation to the IFA, and that the documentary evidence suggests that local institutions lack the capacity to protect the rights of and provide public services to displaced persons.25 Furthermore, the Appellant alleges that IDPs suffer stigma and poverty and are subject to abuse and exploitation and that vulnerable populations, including women and children, are disproportionately affected.26 [37] In this instance, however, the Appellant has demonstrated that she was able to live and work in both Bogota and Cali previously. Furthermore, she also obtained work in the U.S. Given that the Appellant was able to live and work in two different cities in Colombia previously, as well as her added work experience in the U.S., I find that the Appellant would be likely to find employment that would assist her in relocating successfully in Tunja. I also find that the Appellant's previous ability to relocate successfully within Colombia (from Bogota to Cali) suggests that she would be able to relocate successfully to Tunja as well. Furthermore, I note that the Appellant testified before the RPD that there was no reason she could not relocate to Tunja, but for the threat from her former partner. Based on the Appellant's personal circumstances considered above, I do not find that she has demonstrated that she would face conditions that would jeopardize her life and safety based on her relocation to Tunja. Moreover, I do not find that there is any evidence before me that the Appellant would experience undue hardship in traveling to the IFA. [38] I acknowledge that there could well be some difficulties for the Appellant in relocating to Tunja. However, a very high threshold exists for the unreasonableness portion of the IFA test. According to the Federal Court, it "requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant".27 Furthermore, it requires "actual and concrete evidence of such conditions".28 I do not find that the Appellant has provided actual and concrete evidence of any conditions that would, alone or in combination, jeopardize her life and safety if she relocates to Tunja. Consequently, I find that the Appellant has not proven that a relocation to Tunja would be unreasonable in her circumstances. CONCLUSION [39] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Alison Kennedy Alison Kennedy October 19, 2020 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Effective date: November 13, 1996. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, new evidence, pp. 80-83. 3 Ibid. at pp. 85-88. 4 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza FC 385. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum at p. 97. 7 Ibid. at p. 96. 8 Ibid. 9 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776, [2001] FCJ No 1131. 10 Memorandum, supra note 6 at p. 100. 11 Ibid. at p.100-101. 12 Ibid. at p.102. 13 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 14 Memorandum, supra note 6 at p. 98. 15 Ibid. at p. 99. 16 National Documentation Package, Colombia, 31 May 2019, tab 7.21: What it means to be a "military objective" (objetivo militar), including who executes these threats and methods of issuing them; whether there is an internal flight alternative for someone who has been issued a threat; state response. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 15 April 2015. COL105118.E. 17 Ibid. 18 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 19 Memorandum, supra note 6 at p. 99 20 See, for example, National Documentation Package, Colombia, 31 May 2019, tab 7.2: ??Paramilitary successor groups and criminal bands (bandas criminales, BACRIM), areas of operation and criminal activities, including the Clan del Golfo (also known as Urabeños or Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia); state response ... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 24 April 2017. COL105773.E. 21 See, for example, the following items from the 31 May 2019 Colombia NDP: tab 7.24, The presence and activities of ?Los Rastrojos, including in Buenaventura; information on their relationship with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC) [also known as Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo)... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 17 April 2018. COL106086.E.; tab 7.2, ibid; tab 7.15, The Urabeños (also known as Clan Úsuga or Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia), including areas of operation, especially in Buenaventura, criminal activities, and state response; whether the Urabeños seek out individuals, particularl... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 6 March 2015. COL105044.E.; tab 7.23, The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional - ELN), including number of combatants and areas of operation; activities, including ability to track victims; state response and protection available to victims (2016-April 2018). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 23 April 2018. COL106085.E; and tab 7.24: The presence and activities of ?Los Rastrojos, including in Buenaventura; information on their relationship with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC) [also known as Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo)... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 17 April 2018. COL106086.E. 22 RPD decision at paras 50-51. 23 Memorandum, supra note 6 at p.104. 24 Ibid. at p. 107. 25 Ibid. at p. 105 26 Ibid. at p. 106, citing NDP tab 1.9: ?Political and Economic Situation. Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations. United States. Congressional Research Service. 8 February 2019. R43813. 27 Ranganathan v. Canada (MEI), [2001] 2 FC 164, 266 N.R. 380 (F.C.A.). 28 Ranganathan, ibid. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-26271 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français